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CAVALRY 

FRI E  DRIC  H 
VON  BERNHARDI 


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GAVALRY 

A   POPULAR    EDITION   OF 
"CAVALRY  IN  WAR  AND  PEACE" 


BY 

GENERAL  FRIEDRICH  von  BERNHARDI 

Author  of  "  How  Germany  Makes  War" 
WITH  A  PREFACE  BY 

FIELD-MARSHAL  SIR  J.  D.  P.  FRENCH 

G.C^.,  G.C.V.O.,  K.C.M.G. 


THIS    EDITION     EDITED     BY     A.    HILLIAKO 

ATTERIDGE  FROM  THE  TRANSLATION  BY 
MAJOR  O.  T.  M.  BRIDGES,  D.S.O. 
4TH    ROYAL      (IRISH)     DRAGOON     GUARDS 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


COPTBIOHT,  1914,  BT 

GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


EDITOR'S   NOTE 

General  von  Bernhardt  is  best  known  in  England 
as  a  writer  of  the  "Jingo"  School  which  has  done  so 
much  to  produce  the  war,  but  this  is  only  one  side  of 
his  literary  activity.  He  is  also  a  writer  of  recognised 
ability  on  the  theory  and  practice  of  modem  war. 
Sir  John  French's  introduction  to  the  present  work  is 
sufficient  testimony  to  the  value  which  is  set  upon  his 
purely  professional  writings. 

General  von  Bemhardi  is  a  distinguished  cavalry 
officer,  and  he  writes  with  remarkable  independence 
ggon  the  special  work  of  his  own  arm,  never  hesitating 
g  to  criticise  the  regulations  of  the  German  Army,  when 
~  he  considers  that  they  do  not  correspond  to  the  actual 
z  conditions  of  war.     The  book,  though  written  in  the 
^  first  instance  for  cavalrv  officers,  will  be  found  of  in- 
^  terest  to  all  who  wish  to  understand  what  cavalry  is 
-^  called  upon  to  do  and  how  it  does  it  in  the  war  of  to- 
day.    It  will  be  found  to  be  full  of  useful  instruction 
for  not  only  officers  of  the  regular  cavalry  and  the  yeo- 
manry, but  also  for  officers  and  non-commissioned  of- 
ficers of  our  cyclist  battalions,  whose  work  brings  them 
into  such  close  relation  with  our  cavalry  in  war  and 
manoeuvres,  and  who  have  to  perform  much  the  same 
work  as  that  of  the  cavalry  in  reconnaissance,  screen- 
ing, and  outpost  duties. 

General  von  Bernhardi's  work  deals  with  cavalry 
in  war  and  peace,  but  much  of  the  second  part,  dealing 
with  peace  duties  and  training,  is  made  up  of  a  mass 

5 


345549 


6  EDITOR'S  NOTE 

of  detail  on  parade  and  riding-school  work,  as  carried 
out  in  the  German  Army.  This  has  been  omitted,  but 
his  remarks  on  cavalry  training  at  manoeuvres  are  in- 
cluded in  an  appendix.  Sir  John  French's  introduc- 
tion gives  us  the  views  of  the  greatest  of  our  own 
cavalry  leaders,  who  is  now  commanding  our  Army  in 
France. 


PREFACE 

All  British  soldiers  will  welcome  this  excellent  trans- 
lation by  Major  Bridges  of  a  new  work  by  General 
von  Bernhardi,  whose  intimate  knowledge  of  cavalry 
and  brilliant  writings  have  won  for  him  such  a  gjeat 
European  reputation. 

Some  prominence  has  lately  been  given  in  England 
to  erroneous  views  concerning  the  armament  and  tac- 
tics of  cavalry.  General  von  Bemhardi's  book  con- 
tains sound  doctrine  on  this  subject,  and  will  show 
to  every  one  who  has  an  open  mind  and  is  capable 
of  conviction  by  reasoned  argument  how  great  is  the 
future  role  of  cavalry,  and  how  determined  are  the 
efforts  of  the  great  cavalry  leaders  of  Europe  to 
keep  abreast  with  the  times,  and  to  absorb,  for  the 
profit  of  the  arm,  every  lesson  taught  by  experience, 
both  in  peace  and  war. 

In  all  theories,  whether  expounded  by  so  eminent 
an  authority  as  General  von  Bernhardi  or  by  others 
who  have  not  his  claims  to  our  attention,  there  is,  of 
course,  a  good  deal  that  must  remain  a  matter  of 
opinion,  and  a  question  open  for  free  and  frank  dis- 
cussion. But  I  am  convinced  that  some  of  the  reac- 
tionary views  recently  aired  in  England  concerning 
cavalry  will,  if  accepted  and  adopted,  lead  first  to  the 
deterioration  and  then  to  the  collapse  of  cavalry  when 
next  it  is  called  upon  to  fulfil  its  mission  in  war.  I 
therefore  recommend  not  only  cavalry  officers,  but 
officers  of  all  arms  and  services,  to  read  and  ponder 

7 


8  PREFACE 

this  book,  which  provides  a  strengthening  tonic  for 
weak  minds  which  may  have  allowed  themselves  to  be 
impressed  by  the  dangerous  heresies  to  which  I  have 
alluded. 

:(c  H:  :K  H<  H^ 

Is  there  such  a  thing  as  the  cavalry  spirit,  and  should 
it  be  our  object  to  develop  this  spirit,  if  it  exists,  to 
the  utmost,  or  to  suppress  it?  General  von  Bern- 
hardi  thinks  that  this  spirit  exists  and  should  be  en- 
couraged, and  I  agree  with  him.  It  is  not  only  pos- 
sible but  necessary  to  preach  the  Army  spirit,  or,  in 
other  words,  the  close  comradeship  of  all  arms  in  bat- 
tle, and  at  the  same  time  to  develop  the  highest  quali- 
ties and  the  special  attributes  of  each  branch.  The 
particular  spirit  which  we  seek  to  encourage  is  dif- 
ferent for  each  arm.  Were  we  to  seek  to  endow 
cavalry  with  the  tenacity  and  stiffness  of  infantry,  or 
to  take  from  the  mounted  arm  the  mobility  and  the 
cult  of  the  offensive  which  are  the  breath  of  its  life, 
we  should  ruin  not  only  the  cavalry,  but  the  Army  be- 
sides. Those  who  scoff  at  the  spirit,  whether  of 
cavalry,  of  artillery,  or  of  infantry,  are  people  who 
have  had  no  practical  experience  of  the  actual  train- 
ing of  troops  in  peace,  or  of  the  personal  leadership 
in  war.     Such  men  are  blind  guides  indeed. 

Another  reason  why  I  welcome  this  book  is  because 
it  supplies  a  timely  answer  to  schoolmen  who  see  in 
our  South  African  experiences,  some  of  which  they 
distort  and  many  of  which  they  forget,  the  acme  of 
all  military  wisdom.  It  is  always  a  danger  when  any 
single  campaign  is  picked  out,  at  the  fancy  of  some 
pedagogue,  and  its  lessons  recommended  as  a  panacea. 
It  is  by  study  and  meditation  of  the  whole  of  the  long 
history  of  war,  and  not  by  concentration  upon  single 
and  special  phases  of  it,  that  we  obtain  safe  guidance 


PREFACE  9 

to  the  principles  and  practices  of  an  art  which  is  as 
old  as  the  world. 

It  is  not  only  the  campaigns  which  we  and  others 
have  fought  which  deserve  reflection,  but  also  the  wars 
which  may  lie  in  front  of  us.  General  von  Bern- 
hardi  does  not  neglect  the  lessons  of  past  wars,  but 
he  gives  the  best  of  reasons  for  thinking  that  the 
wars  in  South  Africa  and  Manchuria  have  little  in 
common  with  the  conditions  of  warfare  in  Europe. 
We  notice,  as  we  read  his  book,  that  he  has  constantly 
in  his  mind  the  enemies  whom  the  German  Army  must 
be  prepared  to  meet,  their  arms,  their  tactics,  and  their 
country,  and  that  he  urges  his  comrades  to  keep  the 
conditions  of  probable  wars  constantly  before  their 
eyes. 

It  passes  comprehension  that  some  critics  in  Eng- 
land should  gravely  assure  us  that  the  war  in  South 
Africa  should  be  our  chief  source  of  inspiration  and 
guidance,  and  that  it  was  not  abnormal.  All  wars  are 
abnormal,  because  there  is  no  such  thing  as  normal 
war.  In  applying  the  lessons  of  South  Africa  to  the 
training  of  cavalry,  we  should  be  very  foolish  if  we 
did  not  recognise  at  this  late  hour  that  very  few  of 
the  conditions  of  South  Africa  are  likely  to  recur.  I 
will  name  only  a  few  of  them.  The  composition  and 
tactics  of  the  Boer  forces  were  as  dissimilar  from 
those  of  European  armies  as  possible.  Boer  com- 
mandos made  no  difficulty  about  dispersing  to  the  four 
winds  w^hen  pressed,  and  re-uniting  again  some  days 
or  weeks  later  hundreds  of  miles  from  the  scene  of 
their  last  encounter.  Such  tactics  in  Europe  would 
lead  to  the  disruption  and  disbandment  of  any^army 
that  attempted  them. 

Secondly,  the  war  in  South  Africa  was  one  for  the 
conquest  and  annexation  of  immense  districts,  and  no 


lo  PREFACE 

settlement  was  open  to  us  except  the  complete  sub- 
mission of  our  gallant  enemy.  A  campaign  with  such 
a  serious  object  in  view  is  the  most  difficult  that  can 
be  confided  to  an  army  if  the  enemy  is  brave,  enter- 
prising, well-armed,  numerous,  and  animated  with  un- 
conquerable resolve  to  fight  to  the  bitter  end.  I  am 
not  sure  that  people  in  England  have  ever  fully  grasped 
this  distinctive  feature  of  our  war  with  the  Dutch  Re- 
publics. Let  me  quote  the  opinion  of  the  late  Colonel 
Count  Yorck  von  Wartenburg  on  this  subject.  In  his 
remarkable  book  "Napoleon  as  a  General,"  Count 
Yorck  declares  that  if,  in  the  campaign  of  1870-71,  the 
absolute  conquest  and  annexation  of  France  had  been 
desired,  German  procedure  would  not  have  been  either 
logical  or  successful,  and  that  the  Germans  would  have 
failed  as  completely  as  Napoleon  failed  in  Spain.  But 
Count  Yorck  shows  that  when  plans  have  a  definite 
and  limited  object  in  view — namely,  to  obtain  peace 
on  given  conditions — the  situation  is  altered.  Count 
Yorck  shows  that  the  German  plans  in  1 87071  were 
perfectly  appropriate  to  this  limited  aim,  and  that  they 
were  therefore  successful.  The  very  serious  task 
which  British  policy  imposed  upon  British  strategy  in 
South  Africa  must  never  be  forgotten. 

Thirdly,  we  did  not  possess  any  means  for  remount- 
ing our  cavalry  with  trained  horses,  such  as  we  are 
endeavouring  to  secure  by  our  new  system  of  cavalry 
depots  and  reserve  regiments.  After  the  capture,  in 
rear  of  the  army,  of  the  great  convoy  by  De  Wet,  our 
horses  were  on  short  commons,  and  consequently  lost 
condition  and  never  completely  recovered  it. 

Lastly,  owing  to  the  wholesale  and  repeated  release 
of  prisoners  who  had  been  captured  and  who  subse- 
quently appeared  again  in  the  field  against  us,  we  were 
called  upon  to  fight,  not,  as  is  stated,  86,000  or  87,- 


PREFACE  II 

000  men,  but  something  like  double  that  number  or 
more,  with  this  additional  disadvantage,  that  the  en- 
emy possessed  on  his  second  or  third  appearance 
against  us  considerable  experience  of  our  methods,  and 
a  certain  additional  seasoned  fitness. 

Nevertheless  we  are  now  invited  to  throw  away  our 
cold  steel  as  useless  lumber  owing  to  some  alleged 
failures  of  the  cavalry  in  South  Africa.  Were  we  to 
do  so,  we  should  invert  the  role  of  cavalry,  turn  it 
into  a  defensive  arm,  and  make  it  a  prey  to  the  first 
foreign  cavalry  that  it  meets,  for  good  cavalry  can 
always  compel  a  dismounted  force  of  mounted  rifle- 
men to  mount  and  ride  away,  and  when  such  rifle- 
men are  caught  on  their  horses  they  have  power 
neither  of  offence  nor  of  defence  and  are  lost.  If,  in 
European  warfare,  such  mounted  riflemen  were  to  sep- 
arate and  scatter,  the  enemy  would  be  well  pleased,  for 
he  could  then  reconnoitre  and  report  every  movement 
and  make  his  plans  in  all  security.  In  South  Africa 
the  mounted  riflemen  were  the  hostile  army  itself, 
and  when  they  had  dispersed  there  was  nothing  left 
to  reconnoitre;  but  when  and  where  will  these  condi- 
tions recur? 

Even  in  South  Africa,  grave  though  were  the  dis- 
advantages under  which  our  cavalry  laboured  from 
short  commons  and  overwork,  the  Boer  mounted  rifle- 
men acknowledged  on  many  occasions  the  moral  force 
of  the  cold  steel,  and  gave  way  before  it.  The  action 
at  Zand  River  in  May,  1900,  was  a  case  in  point,  and 

1  only  quote  a  personal  experience  because  the  venera- 
ble maxim  that  an  ounce  of  practice  is  worth  a  ton  of 
theory  has  still  a  good  deal  to  be  said  for  it.  The 
role  of  the  Cavalry  Division  on  the  day  to  which  I 
refer  was  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  right  flank 
of  the  Boer  army  in  order  to  enable  Lord  Roberts  to 


12  PREFACE 

advance  across  the  river  and  attack  the  main  Boer 
forces.  Having  crossed  the  river  to  the  west  of  the 
Boers,  we  determined,  with  the  inner  or  easterly  bri- 
gade, to  seize  an  important  kopje  lying  on  the  right 
flank  of  the  Boer  position,  and,  pivoting  upon  this, 
to  throw  two  brigades  against  the  right  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy. 

The  Boers  told  off  a  strong  force  of  picked  mounted 
riflemen  to  oppose  this  movement,  which  they  ex- 
pected. The  kopje  was  seized  by  the  inner  brigade, 
and  the  brigade  next  to  it  made  some  progress;  but 
the  Boer  mounted  riflemen  attacked  the  flank  brigade 
to  the  extreme  west,  and  began  to  drive  it  back.  I  gal- 
loped from  the  kopje  to  the  outer  brigade  with  the 
thought  that  either  every  idea  which  I  had  ever 
formed  in  my  life  as  to  the  efficacy  of  shock  action 
against  mounted  riflemen  was  utterly  erroneous,  or 
that  this  was  the  moment  to  show  that  it  was  not. 
On  reaching  the  outer  brigade  I  ordered  it  to  mount 
and  form  for  attack.  All  ranks  were  at  once  electri- 
fied into  extraordinary  enthusiasm  and  energy.  The 
Boers  realised  what  was  coming.  Their  fire  became 
wild,  and  the  bullets  began  to  fly  over  our  heads.  Di- 
rectly the  advance  began,  the  Boers  hesitated,  and 
many  rushed  to  their  horses.  We  pressed  forward 
with  all  the  very  moderate  speed  of  tired  horses, 
whereupon  the  whole  Boer  force  retired  in  the  ut- 
most confusion  and  disorder,  losing  in  a  quarter  of 
an  hour  more  ground  than  they  had  won  during  three 
or  four  hours  of  fighting.  A  cavalry  which  could 
perform  service  like  this;  which  held  back,  against 
great  numerical  odds,  the  Dutch  forces  at  Colesberg; 
which  relieved  Kimberley;  which  directly  made  possi- 
ble the  victory  at  Paardeberg  by  enclosing  Kronje  in 
his    entrenchments;    which    captured    Bloemfontein, 


PREFACE  13 

Kroonstadt,  and  Barberton,  and  took  part  successfully 
in  all  the  phases  of  the  long  guerilla  war  and  in  count- 
less drives,  can  afford  to  regard  with  equanimity  the 
attacks  of  those  who  have  never  led,  trained,  nor  un- 
derstood the  arm  to  which  I  am  proud  to  have  be- 
longed. 

***** 

I  have  already,  in  an  introduction  to  another  book 
by  General  von  Bernhardi,  expressed  my  high  sense 
of  the  general  soundness  of  his  teaching.  Were  I  to 
do  full  justice  to  the  merits  of  this  new  work,  I  should 
be  compelled  to  make  long  extracts  and  to  repeat 
matter  which  every  reader  will  perhaps  do  better  to 
search  for  and  select  for  himself.  But  I  would  in- 
vite particular  attention  to  the  General's  remarks  on 
the  subjects  of  reconnaissance,  the  cavalry  fight,  the 
combination  of  fire  and  shock,  the  divisional  cavalry, 
the  role  of  the  strategical  cavalry,  training,  and  or- 
ganisation. The  masterly  summary  of  the  qualifica- 
tions which  should  be  possessed  by  squadron  and  pa- 
trol leaders  is,  in  particular,  an  extremely  valuable 
contribution  to  the  study  of  a  most  important  sub- 
ject. 

The  General  does  not  always  agree  with  the  Regu- 
lations of  his  own  Army,  and  he  is  specially  in  con- 
flict with  them  when  he  recommends  raids  by  cavalry 
corps  against  the  enemy's  communications.  My 
opinion  upon  this  point  is  that  every  plan  should  be 
subordinate  to  what  I  consider  a  primary  necessity — 
namely,  the  absolute  and  complete  overthrow  of  the 
hostile  cavalry.  So  long  as  that  cavalry  remains  in- 
tact with  its  morale  unshaken,  all  our  enterprises  must 
of  necessity  be  paralysed.  The  successful  cavalry  fight 
confers  upon  the  victor  the  command  of  ground,  just 
in  the  same  way  that  successful  naval  action  carries 


14  PREFACE 

with  it  command  at  sea.  For  effective  enterprises  in 
either  sphere  command  is  absolutely  necessary,  and 
can  only  be  obtained  by  successful  battle,  whether  on 
land  or  sea. 

I  agree  generally  with  the  German  Regulations 
when  they  suggest  that  raids  against  communications 
should  not  divert  cavalry  from  their  true  battle  ob- 
jective, and  consequently  I  must  venture  to  differ  from 
the  author  on  this  point,  though  I  do  not  approve 
of  all  that  the  German  Regulations  say  concerning 
the  employment  of  cavalry  in  battle.  The  opinion 
which  I  hold  and  have  often  expressed  is  that  the 
true  role  of  cavalry  on  the  battlefield  is  to  reconnoitre, 
to  deceive,  and  finally  to  support.  If  the  enemy's  ca- 
valry has  been  overthrown,  the  role  of  reconnaissance 
will  have  been  rendered  easier.  In  the  roles  of  decep- 
tion and  support,  such  an  immense  and  fruitful  field 
of  usefulness  and  enterprise  is  laid  open  to  a  cavalry 
division  which  has  thought  out  and  practised  these 
roles  in  its  peace  training  and  is  accustomed  to  act 
in  large  bodies  dismounted,  that  I  cannot  bring  myself 
to  believe  that  any  equivalent  for  such  manifest  ad- 
vantages can  be  found  even  in  the  most  successful  raid 
against  the  enemy's  communications  by  mounted 
troops. 

I  entirely  agree  with  General  von  Bernhardi's  con- 
clusion that  very  important  duties  will  fall  to  the  lot 
of  the  divisional  cavalry  in  war,  and  that  the  fulfil- 
ment of  these  duties  has  become  more  difficult  of  late 
years.  The  necessity  for,  and  the  value  of,  divisional 
cavalry  are  often  not  properly  appreciated.  What 
the  strategical  cavalry  is  to  the  Army  in  the  greater 
sphere,  the  divisional  cavalry  is  to  the  division  in  the 
lesser. 

Most  cavalry  soldiers  of  good  judgment  will  agree 


PREFACE  15 

with  the  lucid  arguments  of  the  author  on  the  sub- 
ject of  cavalry  armament.  It  is  suggested  to  us,  by 
critics  of  the  cavalry,  that  the  lance  is  an  impediment 
to  dismounted  action.  If  this  difficulty  ever  existed,  it 
has  been  overcome  by  the  method  of  carrying  the  lance 
which  has  been  adopted  and  practised  with  marked 
success  for  the  past  two  years.  It  is  also  objected 
by  the  same  critics  that  a  thin  bamboo  pole,  carried 
by  the  side  of  a  mounted  man,  will  hinder  him  in 
reconnaissance  and  reveal  his  position  to  the  enemy. 
The  mere  statement  of  this  argument  absolves  me 
from  the  duty  of  replying  to  it. 

General  von  Bemhardi  very  wisely  says  that  it  is 
not  a  question  whether  cavalrymen  should  fight 
mounted  or  dismounted,  but  whether  they  are  pre- 
pared and  determined  to  take  their  share  in  the  de- 
cision of  an  encounter  and  to  employ  the  whole  of 
their  strength  and  mobility  to  this  end.  In  our  train- 
ing during  the  last  few  years  I  have  endeavoured  to 
impress  upon  all  ranks  that  when  the  enemy's  cavalry 
is  overthrown,  our  cavalry  will  find  more  opportuni- 
ties of  using  the  rifle  than  the  cold  steel,  and  that 
dismounted  attacks  will  be  more  frequent  than  charges 
with  the  arme  blanche.  By  no  means  do  I  rule  out  as 
impossible,  or  even  unlikely,  attacks  by  great  bodies  of 
mounted  men  aga.inst  other  arms  on  the  battlefield. 
But  I  believe  that  such  opportunities  will  occur  com- 
paratively rarely,  and  that  undue  prominence  should 
not  be  accorded  to  them  in  our  peace  training,  to  the 
detriment  of  much  more  solid  advantages  which  may 
be  gained  by  other  means. 

I  think  that  every  one  who  reads  this  book  will 
understand  that  the  sphere  of  action  of  cavalry  is 
steadily  widening,  and  is,  at  the  same  time,  making 
increased  demands  as  the  years  go  on  upon  all  ranks 


i6  PREFACE 

of  the  arm.  Those  who  wish  to  recall  what  cavalry 
has  done  in  the  past,  should  read  and  reread  "The 
Achievements  of  Cavalry,"  by  Field-Marshal  Sir  Eve- 
lyn Wood,  one  of  the  very  few  soldiers  in  the  Army 
who  has  taken  part  as  a  combatant  in  European  war- 
fare. Sir  Evelyn  Wood's  war  record  probably  sur- 
passes that  of  any  other  officer  in  the  Army.  His 
knowledge  of  horses  and  his  horsemanship  are  sec- 
ond to  none,  and  though  seventy-two  years  of  age, 
he  is  still  one  of  the  hardest  and  straightest  riders 
to  hounds  in  England.  It  should  be  a  constant  en- 
couragement to  the  cavalry  that  such  an  experienced 
and  sagacious  leader  should  entertain  such  a  firm  faith, 
in  the  destinies  of  an  arm  with  which  he  is  so  thor- 
oughly conversant. 

***** 

A  few  words  in  conclusion.  We  hear  it  said,  and 
see  it  written,  that  we  ought  not  to  accept  any  guid- 
ance from  military  Europe,  because  our  own  experi- 
ence of  war  has  been  so  considerable  that  we  can 
learn  nothing  from  Europe  which  we  do  not  know 
better  ourselves.  The  truth  is,  that  since  the  Crimean 
War  we  have  had  little  or  no  experience  of  the  kind 
of  effort  which  will  be  required  of  us  when  next  we 
meet  the  trained  army  of  a  European  Power.  In  de- 
luding ourselves  with  the  false  notion  that  our  cam- 
paigns of  the  last  fifty  years  represent  the  sum  of 
military  wisdom,  we  merely  expose  our  ignorance  and 
conceit,  and  do  our  utmost  not  only  to  cause  disaster, 
but  to  invite  it. 

The  cavalry  soldier  must  not  be  misled  by  these 
appeals  of  ignorance  to  vanity.  Let  him  continue  to 
study  profoundly  the  training,  tactics,  and  organisa- 
tion of  the  best  foreign  cavalry.  Let  him  reflect  long 
and  deeply  upon  the  opinions  of  such  acknowledged 


PREFACE  17 

authorities  as  Field-Marshal  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  and 
General  von  Bernhardi.  Let  him  keep  himself  abreast 
with  every  change  in  the  tendencies  of  cavalry  abroad, 
so  that  he  may  help  us  to  assimilate  the  best  of  for- 
eign customs  to  our  own.  Finally,  let  him  realise 
the  great  intellectual  and  physical  strain  that  modern 
war  will  impose  upon  the  cavalry,  and  let  him  preserve 
the  mens  sana  in  corpore  sano,  that  equable  balance 
between  study  and  action,  which  alone  will  enable  him 
to  rise  superior  to  every  difficulty  in  the  great  and 
honourable  calling  to  which  he  belongs. 

J.  D.  P.  French. 


TRANSLATOR'S   NOTE 

In  placing  this  translation  of  General  von  Bernhardi's 
work  at  the  service  of  the  officers  of  the  Army,  I  take 
the  opportunity  of  drawing  attention  to  the  educa- 
tional value  of  the  large  quantity  of  military  litera- 
ture published  abroad,  particularly  in  France  and  Ger- 
many. Translations  into  English  of  works  of  this 
kind  are  rare,  and  often  so  belated  as  to  have  lost  much 
of  their  value  by  the  time  they  are  produced. 

Modern  developments  in  means  of  communication 
and  intercourse  are  daily  bringing  us  into  closer  touch 
with  the  Continent  of  Europe,  and  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  rising  generation  of  officers  would  do 
well  to  make  themselves  masters  of  the  not  over-dif- 
ficult art  of  reading  French  and  German,  that  they 
may  be  able  to  appreciate  such  works  and  keep  them- 
selves abreast  of  the  times.  They  will  find  such  knowl- 
edge of  the  greatest  service,  not  only  in  the  profession 
of  arms,  but  in  the  course  of  everyday  life. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  Major  W.  H.  Greenly,  D.S.O. 
1 2th  Lancers,  for  his  kind  and  able  assistance  in  cor- 
recting proofs. 

T.B. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION 25 

EMPLOYMENT    IN    WAR    THE    BASIS     FOR 

TRAINING 33 

A.    Reconnaissance,  Screening,  and  Raids: 

I.    reconnaissance  by  the  army  cavalry      .        .  40 

1.  The  Main  Body  of  the  Army  Cavalry     .       .  40 

2.  Reconnoitring  Squadrons 51 

3.  Distant  Patrols 64 

4.  Close  Reconnaissance  and  Reconnaissance  dur- 

ing the  Fight *  7^ 

II.    reconnaissance  by  the  divisional  cavalky        .  82 

III.      THE  SCREEN 9I 

rv.    RAIDS 97 

21 


22  CONTENTS 

B.    The  Action  of  Cavalry  : 

PAGE 

I.      GENERAL IO4 

II.      ATTACK   AND   DEFENCE II3 

III.      CAVALRY   IN   COMBAT   AGAINST  THE  VARIOUS   ARMS, 

MOUNTED  AND  DISMOUNTED IIQ 

IV.      THE  FIGHT  OF  THE  INDEPENDENT  CAVALRY        .           .  I37 

1.  The  Battle  of  Encounter 138 

2.  Attack  of  Localities  .        ...        .        .        .  155 

3.  The  Defence       .        .        .        »        .        .        .  164 

4.  Breaking  off  the  Fight,  Retreat,  and  Pursuit  166 

V.      THE   ACTION   OF   CAVALRY   IN   BATTLE        .  .  .173 

1.  The  Army  Cavalry  on  the  Flank  of  the  Battle  178 

2.  The  Army  Cavalry  as  a  Reserve  behind  the 

Front 185 

3.  Pursuit  and  Retreat 190 

4.  The  Role  of  the  Divisional  Cavalry  .        .        .  196 


CONTENTS  23 

PAGE 
VI.      DEPTH    AND    ECHELON I98 

VII.      FORMATIONS    FOR    MOVEMENTS         ....      208 

VIII.      THE    VARIOUS    UNITS    IN    THE    FIGHT    .  .  .      213 

APPENDIX:    Cavalry  at  Peace  Man(euvres  .        .    221 


INTRODUCTION 

The  great  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  military 
science  since  the  year  1866  have  forced  all  arms  to 
adopt  new  methods  of  fighting.  It  was,  first  and 
foremost,  the  improvement  in  the  firearm  which 
wrought  the  transformation  of  the  battlefield  and 
called  forth  an  increased  demand  for  cover  against 
the  murderous  effect  of  fire.  The  infantry  sought 
safety  in  sparser  formations  and  in  utilising  the 
smallest  accidents  of  the  ground  for  cover,  while  the 
artillery  adopted  armoured  shields,  covered  positions, 
and  indirect  methods  of  fire.  It  was  only  the  cavalry 
that  could  not  keep  pace  with  these  developments. 
Forming  a  conspicuous  target,  capable  of  being  con- 
cealed only  behind  considerable  inequalities  of  the 
ground,  it  could  indeed  seldom  find  cover  within  the 
range  of  the  enemy's  fire.  As,  at  the  same  time,  its 
strength  in  comparison  to  that  of  the  great  armies 
of  the  present  day  has  sensibly  diminished,  it  might 
be  concluded  that  its  particular  value  in  battle  had 
decreased  considerably  in  possibility  and  importance. 
This  conclusion  is  thoroughly  justified,  but  not  al- 
together in  the  way  that  one  is  inclined  to  assume. 
For  one  reason,  the  cavalry  is  now  supplied  with  an 
excellent  firearm,  which  its  mobility  enables  it  to  em- 
ploy against  the  most  sensitive  parts  of  an  enemy's  line 
of  battle.  For  another,  the  composition  of  modern 
armies  offers,  as  I  have  frequently  said,  many  new 
possibilities  of  success.    Newly  raised  levies,  such  as 

25 


26  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

will  often  have  to  take  their  place  in  the  great  armies 
of  the  day,  cannot  possess  the  same  steadiness  as 
standing  permanent  troops.  They  are,  according  to 
experience,  very  sensitive  to  moral  impressions,  and 
will  often  enough,  when  shaken  in  battle,  offer  a 
tempting  and  suitable  object  of  attack  to  the  cavalry. 
At  the  same  time,  the  fact  remains  that,  by  reason  of 
its  relative  numerical  weakness,  cavalry  can  no  longer 
retain  its  former  importance  in  the  battle,  and  that 
the  manner  of  its  intervention  in  the  fight  must  often 
be  of  a  very  different  nature  from  what  it  has  been 
in  the  past. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  duty  of  cavalry  in  the  sphere 
of  reconnaissance  has  increased  in  importance.  For 
all  strategical  movements  the  main  body  of  the  mod- 
ern army  demands  considerably  more  time  and,  gen- 
erally also,  comprehensive  preparatory  measures.  If, 
therefore,  intelligence  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  en- 
emy is  to  be  of  use  in  operations,  it  follows  that  it 
must  be  procured  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
Whoever  gets  the  earliest  and  best  information  pos- 
sesses nowadays  a  far  greater  advantage  than  for- 
merly, when,  with  the  small  armies  of  the  day,  move- 
ments and  combinations  of  force  could  often  be  suc- 
cessfully carried  out  in  the  immediate  presence  of 
the  enemy's  army.  These  are  indeed  still  possible  in 
occasional  cases  and  where  sufficient  depth  of  forma- 
tion is  maintained,  and  it  is  this  circumstance  that 
has  made  early  and  full  intelligence,  combined  with 
successful  screening  of  one's  own  movements,  one  of 
the  most  important  factors  of  success. 

There  are  people  who,  in  fancy,  already  see  cavalry 
replaced  in  this  role  by  an  air  fleet.  Such  prophets 
cannot,  however,  be  treated  seriously.  The  air  cruisers 
will  not  be  designed  for  all  the  possibilities  of  war.    In 


INTRODUCTION  27 

the  period  of  concentration  and  in  fortress  warfare 
they  would  doubtless  be  able,  even  in  their  present 
condition,  to  render  excellent  service.  Whether  they 
can  be  adapted  for  use  in  a  war  of  movement  remains 
to  be  seen;  but,  even  if  they  can  in  time  be  of  more 
service  for  war  than  at  present  appears  to  be  the  case, 
their  capabilities  in  this  direction  will  always  be  lim- 
ited. They  can  only  observe  at  night  under  favour- 
able conditions — such  things,  for  example,  as  large 
detrainments  of  troops  or  bivouacs  with  fires  burning. 
They  are  under  all  circumstances  dependent  upon  the 
weather.  By  day  the  air  fleet  of  the  enemy  will  seek 
battle  with  them  in  order  to  hinder  their  reconnais- 
sance. Hostile  artillery  will  be  particularly  danger- 
ous to  them,  and  will  be  able,  thanks  to  the  develop- 
ments in  modern  ordnance,  to  wage  successful  war 
against  them.  All  detachments  cannot  possibly  be  sup- 
plied with  airships,  owing  to  the  great  cost  and  enor- 
mous apparatus  entailed,  and  their  usefulness  will 
therefore  only  be  realised  with  the  larger  formations. 
Finally,  one  or  the  other  of  the  air  fleets  will  be  driven 
from  the  field,  or  rather  from  the  air,  and  that  side 
which  meets  with  defeat  will  be  deprived  of  all  means 
of  reconnoitring  unless  it  can  rely  on  its  cavalry.  So 
in  the  most  modern  war  the  cavalry  remains  the  prin- 
cipal means  of  reconnaissance.  Its  activity  may  in- 
deed be  supplemented  by  airships,  but  will  never  be 
replaced  by  them.^ 

^  This  was  written  five  years  ago,  at  a  time  when,  though 
considerable  progress  had  been  made  with  airship  work,  the 
aeroplane  was  still  in  the  pioneer  stage  of  development, 
though  Bleriot  had  just  made  his  record  flight  across  the 
Channel.  Since  then  flying  corps  provided  with  aeroplanes 
of  improved  construction  have  been  introduced  into  every 
great  army,  and  the  flying  men  have  proved  in  actual  war- 
fare (Tripoli,  Morocco,  the  Balkans,  France)  the  utility  of 


28  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

These  circumstances,  however,  necessitate  a  new 
role  for  cavalry.  It  must  drive  the  hostile  cavalry 
from  the  field,  a  cavalry  which  will  do  all  in  its  power 
to  secure  its  own  army  against  intrusion.  It  will  find 
this  cavalry  reinforced  not  only  by  horse  artillery  and 
machine-guns,  but  also  by  cyclist  battalions,  mounted 
and  other  infantry,  and  will  therefore  have  to  be  pre- 
pared, in  order  to  properly  carry  out  its  service  of 
exploration,  to  fight  against  detachments  of  all  arms. 
But  the  same  thing  will  also  happen  when  it  seeks 
to  veil  the  movements  of  its  own  army,  or  to  under- 
take some  enterprise  against  the  enemy's  communi- 
cations, or  to  defend  its  own  against  similar  hostile 
raids.  Our  cavalry  thus  finds  itself  face  to  face  with 
totally  new  duties  of  a  most  real  kind,  towards  the 
carrying  out  of  which  it  has  no  previous  experience 
to  help  it. 

In  the  wars  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  of  Napo- 
leon, as  well  as  in  the  German  war  of  Unification, 
there  is  a  total  absence  of  analogy  from  which  to 
draw  conclusions  that  can  be  practically  applied.  The 
wars  in  South  Africa  and  Manchuria,  on  the  other 
hand,  reveal  conditions  which  have  very  little  in  com- 
mon with  those  of  a  European  war  such  as  the  Ger- 
man cavalry  will  have  to  fight.  Nowhere  can  the 
few  experiences  of  cavalry  action  gained  in  these  wars 
be  immediately  applied,  and  there  are  but  few  bases 

the  new  means  of  reconnaissance.  But  though  aerial  recon- 
naissance can  do  much  more  than  General  von  Bernhardi 
anticipated,  it  is  still  true  that  the  aviators  cannot  entirely 
supersede  the  cavalry.  The  two  arms  have  to  work  together. 
There  are  cases  where  the  aviator  can  accomplish  very  little. 
Thus,  for  instance,  we  are  told  that  during  the  French  ad- 
vance into  the  Vosges  and  Alsace  in  the  present  war,  the 
wooded  character  of  the  country  led  to  aerial  reconnaissance 
giving  very  disappointing  results. — Editor. 


INTRODUCTION  29 

for  the  formation  of  judgment  as  to  what  is  practi- 
cal and  possible  under  modem  conditions.  The  same 
may  be  said  to  hold  good  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war. 
The  most  interesting  and  instructive  campaigns  for 
the  service  of  modern  cavalry  appear  to  be  those  of 
the  American  War  of  Secession,  which  are,  however, 
almost  unknown  in  Germany,  where  there  is  a  lack 
of  opportunities  to  study  them.* 

There  is,  therefore,  for  our  cavalry  a  want  of  any 
sort  of  tradition  for  that  role  which  it  will  be  ex- 
pected to  carry  out  in  the  next  war,  and  this  want  will 
be  the  more  felt  as  it  will  in  the  future  be  expected 
to  deal  with  a  number  of  technical  methods  of  com- 
munication which  are,  as  a  whole,  still  almost  un- 
known, and  as  to  the  actual  war  value  of  which  no 
judgment  can  yet  be  formed.  Up  to  now,  also, 
cavalry  training  as  carried  out  since  the  war  of  1870- 
71  has  been  unable  to  create  a  sound  foundation  for 
preparation  for  war.  Left  far  behind  in  the  march 
of  military  progress,  in  tactics  as  well  as  reconnais- 
sance, it  has  been  led  so  far  from  the  right  way  that 
it  would  have  been  unable  to  stand  the  test  of  serious 
war.  Nor  have  we  yet  fully  extricated  ourselves  from 
these  trammels  of  the  past. 

For  the  moment,  therefore,  our  cavalry  finds  itself 
in  a  state  of  transition.  The  demands  which  modern 
war  will  make  upon  it  have  not  yet  penetrated  into  its 
flesh  and  blood,  that  is  to  say,  their  extent  and  range 
have  not  yet  been  clearly  grasped  by  the  arm,  nor  have 
we  yet  by  any  means  succeeded  in  breaking  loose  from 
the  fetters  of  the  past.     Views  based  on  antiquated 

*  In  England  these  campaigns  have  been  very  carefully 
studied  and  our  cavalry  have  learned  the  lessons  they  sug- 
gest.— Editor. 


30  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

assumptions  are  often  apt  to  survive  and  to  influence 
training  as  well  as  leading. 

This  is  particularly  the  case  as  regards  reconnais- 
sance. In  tactics,  too,  the  cut-and-dried  methods  of 
bygone  days  are  clearly  not  yet  forgotten,  while  for 
enterprises  against  the  enemy's  communications  there 
is  a  want  both  of  practical  training  and  theoretical 
instruction. 

This  state  of  affairs  must  be  regarded  as  a  great 
evil,  as  at  the  outbreak  of  a  war  there  will  no  longer 
be  time  to  collect  experiences.  From  the  very  first 
day  onward  the  greatest  demands  will  be  made  upon 
the  cavalry,  not  only  as  regards  intentions,  but  per- 
formances. On  the  achievements  of  the  cavalry  in 
the  early  days  of  the  war  will  depend  to  a  consider- 
able extent  the  success  of  the  first  great  decisive  en- 
counter. 

We  must  therefore  be  prepared  to  meet  these  great 
demands  when  war  breaks  out.  Only  a  clear  recog- 
nition of  the  necessities  and  the  possibilities  of  ma- 
noeuvre and  training  can  secure  us  this  preparation. 
There  remains,  then,  nothing  for  us — with  no  practi- 
cal war  experience  to  go  on — but  to  create  the  ground- 
work of  our  methods  of  training  from  theoretical 
and  speculative  reflection.  With  all  the  means  of 
intellect  and  foresight,  we  must  endeavour  to  dis- 
cern the  probable  course  of  the  war  of  the  future  and 
regulate  the  methods  of  training  accordingly. 

Peace  exercises  based  upon  such  clearly  defined 
principles  must  serve  as  a  further  guide  to  what  is 
possible  and  practical.  They  cannot,  it  is  true,  afford 
realistic  results,  as  they  lack  the  effect  of  weapons, 
the  hostile  country,  the  thousand  causes  of  friction, 
and  the  moral  factors  of  serious  war.  They  can,  how- 
ever, be  regarded  as  practical  guides  in  many  direc- 


INTRODUCTION  31 

tions  and  will  help  us  to  evolve  methods  unattainable 
by  pure  theory:  for  instance,  in  increasing  the  capa- 
bilities of  the  troops,  improving  the  practical  arrange- 
ments for  communication,  the  transmission  service, 
the  patrol  system,  and  the  like.  Only  these  peace  ex- 
periences must  not  be  overrated,  but  subjected  to  con- 
tinual criticism  by  the  light  of  what  would  be  practical 
in  war. 

It  thus  remains  our  chief  duty  to  get  a  clear  and 
just  idea  of  the  role  that  cavalry  will  play  in  a  future 
war,  in  order  to  clear  the  mind  fully  on  this  point,  and 
so  be  able  further  to  build  upon  the  foundations  of 
sound  reasoning. 

The  new  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations,^  in  which  I  had 
the  honour  and  pleasure  of  collaborating,  have  under- 
taken the  creation  of  these  fundamental  principles  of 
the  independent  role  of  cavalry.  Their  teachings,  how- 
ever, have  as  yet  by  no  means  penetrated  into  the 
ranks.  The  new  Drill  Regulations  have  endeavoured, 
to  give  new  rules  for  the  tactical  employment  of  cav- 
alry, which  have  not  yet  sufficiently  established  their 
value,  even  on  the  manceuvre-ground.  As  yet  the 
troops  are  only  endeavouring  to  get  accustomed  to 
them. 

It  is  also  obvious  that  practical  drill  instructions, 
at  least  for  tactics,  can  only  give  general  principles, 
and  cannot  be  too  definite,  lest  they  should  thereby 
tend  to  limit  the  independence  of  leaders  in  the  thou- 
sand varied  happenings  of  war. 

It  is  quite  another  matter  for  him  who  is  not  called 
on  to  make  regulations,  but  whose  task  is  rather  to 

^  "Exerzier-Reglement  fiir  die  Kavallerie,"  part  of  which 
has  been  translated  and  published  by  the  General  Staff, 
War  Office.  These  Regulations  are  frequently  referred  to 
throughout  this  work. — Trans. 


32  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

clear  the  understanding,  to  stimulate  independent 
thought,  and  to  encourage  the  troops  themselves  to 
form  correct  judgments.  Thus  will  be  moulded  the 
efficiency  which  will  enable  the  soldier  to  act  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  according  to  the  Regulations, 
with  full  freedom  of  thought,  not  after  the  letter, 
but  the  spirit,  and  even  perhaps,  in  many  cases,  the 
intention  of  them. 

From  this  point  of  view  I  have  set  forth  my  views 
and  reflections.  It  seems  to  me,  above  all  things,  im- 
portant to  discuss  those  points  which  will  be  new  to 
cavalry  in  a  future  war,  and  in  so  doing  to  touch  on 
many  matters  of  training  which  long  years  of  experi- 
ence have  convinced  me  are  practical.  May  I  by  these 
hints  contribute  towards  the  formation  of  fresh  tra- 
ditions for  the  training  of  the  arm  that  will  march 
with  modern  conditions,  that  will  break  away  for 
good  from  all  half -measures  and  obsolete  views,  and 
thereby  clear  the  way  towards  a  proper  conduct  of 
the  cavalry  in  war,  and  to  the  winning  of  fresh  and 
imperishable  laurels! 

Where  I  have  occasion  to  touch  on  views  formerly 
expressed  and  set  forth  in  my  various  writings,  I  find 
no  reason  to  retract  any  of  them.  In  certain  direc- 
tions they  have  naturally  developed  further,  and  have 
become  more  progressive  under  the  impress  of  the 
whole  of  modern  development  and  the  latest  experi- 
ences of  war.  On  the  whole,  however,  I  adhere  to 
my  opinions,  and  only  seek  to  supplement  and  develop 
them  in  order  to  suit  them  still  better  to  the  practical 
needs  of  the  arm.  I  hope  they  may  act  as  a  stimulus 
and  serve  as  a  guide  to  many  a  comrade  in  difficulties. 


EMPLOYMENT    IN    WAR    THE    BASIS    FOR 
TRAINING 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  value  and  significance 
of  cavalry  in  a  future  war  will  be  chiefly  demonstrated 
in  the  action  of  the  army  cavalry.^  The  army  cavalry- 
alone,  by  virtue  of  its  fighting  strength,  will  be  able  to 
carry  out  the  larger  services  of  reconnaissance,  to  op- 
erate against  the  enemy's  communications,  to  take  part 
in  the  tactical  decision  with  a  force  commensurate 
with  modern  conditions,  or  to  carry  out  a  pursuit. 
Reconnaissance  occupies  a  prominent  position 
amongst  these  various  duties.  There  will  not  be  a  bat- 
tle every  day.  Not  in  every  fight  will  considerations  of 
ground  and  other  circumstances  allow  of  the  cavalry 
taking  part  in  a  great  decision  as  a  mounted  arm.  Not 
always  will  an  effective  pursuit  by  the  cavalry  mass 
be  possible.  It  must  be  remembered  that  in  order 
not  to  render  itself  too  weak  to  carry  out  its  proper 
role  cavalry  must  not  expose  itself  to  heavy  loss  in 
battle  without  sufficient  reason.  Only  the  possibility 
of  a  very  great  success  can  justify  the  risk  of  stak- 
ing the  whole  cavalry  force  in  a  decisive  charge  dur- 
ing the  battle.  It  is  true  that  efforts  will  have  to  be 
made  to  drive  the  hostile  cavalry  from  the  field  to 
facilitate  operations  against  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
enemy's  line  of  battle.    But  such  operations  will  gen- 

^  The  army  cavalry  corresponds  with  our  independent  cav- 
alry.— Trans. 

33 


34  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

erally  be  limited  to  fire  action,  and  in  a  decisive  battle 
the  weakness  of  the  cavalry  would  probably  debar  it 
from  such  undertakings.  Engagements,  also,  that  are 
fought  with  a  view  of  opening  a  way  for  reconnais- 
sance will  not  be  of  frequent  occurrence,  and  must 
only  be  expected  during  occasional  crises.  They  will, 
however,  be  of  decisive  value  for  the  whole  future 
conduct  of  the  arm  and  its  operative  success.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  raids  against  the  enemy's  com- 
munications. Such  undertakings  may  exercise  the 
greatest  influence  on  the  course  of  a  campaign,  but 
can  only  be  undertaken  under  specially  favourable  con- 
ditions. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  everyday  task  of  the  cavalry 
which  goes  hand  in  hand  with  all  these  various  en- 
gagements and  enterprises  is  reconnaissance  proper 
carried  out  by  reconnoitring  squadrons  and  patrols. 
This  is  the  daily  bread  of  the  cavalry,  a  duty  that 
throughout  a  war  should  never  cease  to  be  performed, 
even  if  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  has  been  driven 
from  the  field  by  the  enemy.  It  demands,  therefore, 
the  highest  training,  the  wisest  economy  of  force  and 
systematic  arrangement,  if  it  is  not  to  become  inef- 
fective or  useless. 

In  close  and  continual  relation  to  the  above  is  the 
further  task  of  safeguarding  and  screening  the  army. 
Reconnaissance  itself  provides  a  measure  of  security, 
but  it  is  always  liable  to  miscarry,  and  can  never  se- 
cure the  army  against  hostile  observation.  Reconnais- 
sance must  therefore  be  supplemented  by  a  special 
system  of  security  and  screening  which,  however, 
demands  the  most  careful  organisation,  and  greatly 
increases  the  difficulty  of  husbanding  limited  forces 
and  of  keeping  the  troops  fit  by  not  overworking  them. 

Intimately  connected  to  the  services  of  security  and 


THE  BASIS  FOR  TRAINING  35 

reconnaissance  is  that  of  communication,  which,  owing 
to  the  great  distances  to  be  traversed  in  modern  war 
and  the  necessity  of  early  transmission  of  intelligence, 
has  become,  at  the  same  time,  of  the  highest  im- 
portance and  of  the  greatest  difficulty.  Here  also  is 
a  daily  duty  for  the  cavalry  in  which  a  thorough  train- 
ing is  necessary. 

All  these  considerations  must  be  kept  in  view  in 
arranging  the  training,  and  a  clear  conception  should 
be  formed  as  to  what  is  to  be  aimed  at  in  great  as  well 
as  small  matters.  Only  thus  will  results  be  obtained 
which  will  stand  the  test  of  war. 

It  is  only  natural  that  in  our  army  the  greatest  stress 
is  at  present  laid  on  the  duties  of  the  army  cavalry. 
These  are  so  obviously  new  and  important  for  the  arm 
that  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  more  time  is  devoted 
to  them  in  peace  training,  and  how  the  task  of  the 
divisional  cavalry  has  come  to  appear  of  less  import- 
ance. It  might  indeed  be  contended  that  the  training 
which  the  latter  has  hitherto  received  in  garrison  and 
at  manoeuvres  would  suffice  for  its  needs. 

It  is  my  opinion,  on  the  other  hand,  that  such  a 
conception  is  faulty.  The  importance  of  the  divisional 
cavalry  has  in  no  way  diminished,  and  one  is  not 
justified  in  assuming  that  any  lesser  demands  will  be 
made  upon  its  efficiency  than  on  that  of  the  larger  in- 
dependent formations.  The  exact  contrary  is  the  case, 
and  I  consider  it  opportune  now,  when  all  interest 
is  centred  in  the  army  cavalry,  to  lay  particular  stress 
on  the  extraordinary  importance  of  the  divisional 
cavalry. 

As  in  the  newest  phases  of  military  development,  the 
general  value  of  cavalry,  according  to  my  opinion,  par- 
ticularly in  the  organism  of  an  army,  has  increased, 


36  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

so  also  has  that  of  the  divisional  cavalry.  Higher 
demands  are  made  of  it,  and  it  must  therefore  be  capa- 
ble of  greater  performances. 

The  circumstances  of  modern  war  demand  that 
great  masses  of  mounted  men  shall  be  used  as  army- 
cavalry  and  concentrated  in  the  decisive  direction,  thus 
weakening  a  great  part  of  the  front  of  the  army  in 
cavalry,  in  order  to  ensure  superiority  at  the  decisive 
point.  It  is  in  accordance  with  the  universal  law  of 
military  success  that  a  concentration  of  force  at  the 
decisive  point  can,  under  most  circumstances,  only 
be  ensured  by  a  corresponding  weakening  of  force  in 
other  places.  The  front  of  the  army,  therefore,  can 
never  be  covered  throughout  its  whole  length  by  the 
army  cavalry,  but  at  the  same  time  it  will  never  be 
possible  to  entirely  denude  of  cavalry  that  front  or 
flank  in  front  of  which  no  army  cavalry  may  lie.  This 
would  be  simply  impossible,  for  every  body  of  troops, 
however  disposed  upon  the  strategic  front,  requires 
cavalry  for  the  service  of  close  reconnaissance,  of 
security,  and  of  screening  against  surprise  or  against 
hostile  observation. 

Furthermore,  even  those  bodies  of  troops  in  im- 
mediate advance  of  which  the  great  cavalry  masses 
are  on  the  move  require  their  own  cavalry,  not  only 
for  the  purpose  of  ensuring  and  maintaining  commu- 
nication with  the  army  cavalry,  but  also  that  they  may 
not  be  entirely  denuded  of  cavalry  when,  as  the  hos- 
tile armies  approach  each  other,  the  cavalry  masses 
clear  the  front  and  concentrate  towards  a  flank. 

Finally,  it  will  not  always  be  possible  to  detail  por- 
tions of  the  army  cavalry  to  detached  forces,  because 
it  has  other  duties  to  fulfil  and  other  claims  made 
upon  it.    Thus,  for  example,  the  army  of  Manteuffel 


THE  BASIS  FOR  TRAINING  37 

in  the  campaign  against  Bourbaki  had  at  its  disposal 
none  other  but  the  divisional  cavalry.^ 

The  weak  divisional  cavalry,  therefore,  must  be 
prepared  to  carry  out  all  the  cavalry  duties  which  may 
arise  from  these  conditions.  Amongst  them  particu- 
lar mention  must  be  made  of  the  outpost  service, 
which,  although  shared  with  the  infantry,  imposes  a 
heavy  burden  on  the  divisional  cavalry.  Any  one  who 
has  once  been  through  manceuvres  knows  how  great 
the  demands  of  this  service  are,  even  in  peace,  in  the 
exertions  involved  and  the  time  expended.  In  war 
these  exertions  become  at  times  considerable,  if  less 
frequent,  for  the  critical  days  do  not  follow  each  other 
so  closely  as  in  manoeuvres. 

If  we  consider,  moreover,  how  every  cavalry  under- 
taking has  increased  in  difficulty  owing  to  the  greater 
size  of  modern  battlefields  and  the  improvement  in 
firearms,  it  will  become  clear  that  the  sphere  of  use- 
fulness of  the  divisional  cavalry,  even  from  the  purely 
tactical  point  of  view,  which  up  to  now  we  have  alone 
considered,  is  a  very  extensive  and  important  one. 

This  tactical  activity  is  closely  dependent  upon  the 
whole  interior  economy  of  the  division.  These  few 
squadrons  must  furnish  orderlies  and  despatch-riders, 
which,  in  the  case  of  the  conduct  of  so  large  a  force  as 
an  infantry  division,  must  mean  a  considerable  drain 
on  their  strength.  They  will  often  be  deputed  to  col- 
lect supplies  in  villages  away  from  the  roads,  when 
the  supply  columns  fail  and  the  places  occupied  do  not 

^  Though  military  readers  will  need  no  such  explanation,  it 
may  be  well  to  explain  to  the  general  reader  that  the  divi- 
sional cavalry  is  a  small  mounted  force  attached  to  each 
infantry  division.  When  the  author  speaks  of  "army  cav- 
alry" he  refers  to  the  masses  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery 
organised  in  "cavalry  divisions." — Editor. 

345549 


38  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

afford  sufficient  for  the  troops.  Although  It  is  possi- 
ble that  other  troops,  such  as  infantry  in  carts  and 
bicyclists,  may  be  used  for  this  service,  it  will  never 
be  possible  to  relieve  the  divisional  cavalry  entirely 
of  it.  The  relay  service  also  makes  a  greater  demand 
on  the  strength  than  is  generally  supposed.  In  the 
campaign  of  1870-71  this  cause  contributed  largely  to 
the  weakening  of  the  squadrons  at  the  front.  Nowa- 
days every  effort  is  made  by  means  of  technical  ap- 
paratus to  relieve  the  cavalry,  at  least  partially,  from 
this  service.  It  would,  however,  be  a  mistake  to  as- 
sume that  the  relay  service  of  cavalry  can  be  every- 
where replaced  by  telegraph,  telephone,  signalling,  bi- 
cycles, or  motor.  Circumstances  will  occur  in  war  ia 
which  all  these  methods  of  transmission,  which  are 
already  in  themselves  partially  unreliable,  must  fail 
us,  especially  where  they  are  exposed  to  destruction 
from  the  hand  of  the  enemy.  The  proper  performance 
of  these  interior  services  must  never,  however,  mis- 
carry throughout  the  whole  campaign,  and  imposes 
therefore  still  higher  and  more  continuous  demands  on 
the  efficiency  of  the  troops. 

As  the  result  of  these  reflections  we  may  conclude 
that  a  series  of  very  important  duties  will  fall  to  the 
lot  of  the  divisional  cavalry  in  war,  which  cannot  be 
carried  out  by  any  other  troops  or  in  any  other  manner 
than  by  the  divisional  cavalry.  Further,  that  these 
duties  have,  on  the  whole,  increased  in  importance, 
and  that  their  fulfilment  has  become  considerably  more 
difficult  by  reason  of  the  conditions  of  modern  war. 

According  to  these  conditions  the  importance  of  the 
divisional  cavalry  must  be  judged.  If  the  decisive  role 
in  war  falls  essentially  to  the  lot  of  the  army  cavalry, 
yet  must  the  duties  of  the  divisional  cavalry  be  re- 
garded as  just  as  necessary  for  the  good  of  the  army. 


THE  BASIS  FOR  TRAINING  39 

Methods  of  training  must  be  adopted  with  these  points 
in  view,  and  it  must  be  quite  clearly  understood  that 
in  this  direction  modern  conditions  have  to  be  reck- 
oned with  which  demand  thorough  innovations. 

As  to  the  role  of  cavalry  in  the  fight,  we  may  con- 
clude from  the  above  that  it  may  be  sharply  divided 
into  two  separate  groups :  firstly,  in  those  encounters 
where  cavalry  is  acting  as  an  independent  body,  and 
will  have  to  carry  out  reconnaissance,  the  service  of 
security  and  raids;  and  secondly,  where  cavalry  will 
take  part  in  a  battle  in  conjunction  with  the  other 
arms.  It  is  obvious,  after  what  has  been  said,  that  the 
first  group  is  by  far  the  more  important,  and  will  re- 
quire particular  attention  as  regards  training.  We  will 
endeavour  in  the  course  of  this  work  to  prove  that  this 
is  the  direction  where  the  most  friction  is  to  be  over- 
come, and  where  by  far  the  most  difficult  part  of  our 
task  will  lie. 

The  chief  considerations  for  training  are  naturally 
evolved  from  the  duties  to  be  performed  in  war  itself. 
The  services  of  reconnaissance  and  security  come  first. 
The  technique  of  these  services  and  the  method  of 
fighting  necessary  for  carrying  them  out  must  be 
fully  mastered  by  the  troops  right  down  to  the  indi- 
vidual soldier.  Next  in  importance  come  undertakings 
against  the  enemy's  communications,  and  the  partici- 
pation in  the  battle  which  war  will  demand  of  our 
arm.  These  are  the  matters  which  must  be  studied 
by  those  who  undertake  to  discuss  methods  of  train- 
ing. We  must  be  perfectly  clear  in  our  minds  what 
duties  in  the  various  spheres  of  action  will  fall  to  the 
lot  of  the  arm  as  a  whole,  to  its  sub-divisions,  or  to  its 
single  members.  The  relative  importance  of  these 
duties  must  be  our  guide  in  considering  the  essentials 
of  training. 


40  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

A.     RECONNAISSANCE,     SCREENING,    AND 

RAIDS 

I.      RECONNAISSANCE    BY    THE    ARMY    CAVALRY 

The  very  essence  of  cavalry  lies  in  the  offensive. 
Mounted  it  is  incapable  of  tactical  defence,  but,  in 
order  to  defend  itself,  must  surrender  its  real  char- 
acter as  a  mounted  arm  and  seize  the  rifle  on  foot. 
The  service  of  reconnaissance,  therefore,  must  neces- 
sarily be  carried  out  in  an  offensive  sense. 

The  idea  of  the  offensive  is  not,  however,  meant 
here  in  a  narrow  sense,  such  as  seeking  a  tactical  bat- 
tle, but  rather  that  the  reconnoitring  army  cavalry 
must  under  all  circumstances  maintain  the  initiative, 
use  its  activity  against  the  enemy,  and  impose  its  will 
upon  him.  It  is  by  no  means  its  duty  under  all  cir- 
cumstances to  seek  out  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  order 
to  defeat  it.  By  such  conduct  it  would  allow  the  en- 
emy's cavalry  to  dictate  its  movements.  It  must  rather 
subordinate  all  else  to  the  particular  objects  of  recon- 
naissance, and  advance  in  those  directions  which  prom- 
ise the  best  fulfilment  of  the  reconnaissance  needs  of 
the  Army  Head  Quarters.  Should  it  thus  meet  with 
the  enemy's  cavalry  it  must  naturally  attack  and  over- 
throw it.  On  the  other  hand,  it  can  safely  reckon 
that  the  more  decisive  the  direction  in  which  it  moves 
for  the  purposes  of  reconnaissance,  the  more  chance 
there  will  be  of  meeting  the  enemy. 

I.     The  Main  Body  of  the  Army  Cavalry 

The  same  principle  holds  good  for  the  strategical 
disposition.     The  old  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  laid 


MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  ARMY  CAVALRY    41 

down  that  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  division  was  to 
remain  concentrated  until  the  enemy's  cavalry  had 
been  driven  from  the  field.  This  considerably  over- 
stepped the  bounds  of  restriction  usually  imposed  by 
regulation,  and  at  the  same  time  fettered  the  freedom 
of  movement  of  the  cavalry  in  a  way  that,  under  cer- 
tain circumstances,  might  have  become  most  harmful. 
The  new  Regulations  have  left  out  these  directions 
and  indeed  lay  down  that,  in  the  "advance  to  the 
fight,"  efforts  must  be  made  to  reunite  columns  that 
are  advancing  separated  before  collision  with  the  en- 
emy takes  place  (413).^  Here  is  expressed  a  principle 
which,  if  rightly  understood,  is  certainly  justified,  but 
which,  on  the  other  hand,  might  give  rise  to  misunder- 
standings. 

It  must  first  be  pointed  out  that  it  is  by  no  means 
always  desirable  to  unite  columns  that  are  separate 
before  the  fight.  It  may,  for  example,  very  easily 
happen  that  a  detachment  in  favourable  country  will 
be  able  to  occupy  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy,  and 
thus,  by  remaining  dispersed,  ensure  superiority  at  the 
decisive  point.  If,  however,  by  the  "concentration  of 
columns"  a  natural  approach  is  understood,  which  en- 
sures a  concentric  co-operation  of  divided  groups 
against  a  common  enemy  whose  direction  of  march  is 
more  or  less  known,  then  the  principle  is  an  excel- 
lent one.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  intended  that 
single  columns  should  be  so  closely  concentrated  that 
the  division  as  a  tactical  whole  can  be  thrown  into  the 

^"When  advancing  in  separate  columns,  special  measures 
must  be  taken  to  insure  the  cohesion  of  the  forward  move- 
ment. Every  endeavour  must  be  made  to  unite  the  columns 
before  collision  with  the  enemy;  for  a  junction  on  the  field 
of  battle  will  seldom  succeed,  if  only  on  accoimt  of  the  rapid 
course  of  the  cavalry  combat." 


42  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

fight,  it  appears  to  me  that  it  goes  too  far,  and  might 
easily  lead  to  harmful  dogmatism.  Thus  read,  the 
regulation  appears  to  me  to  be  the  more  dangerous, 
as  exercises  in  a  limited  space  encourage  the  concen- 
trated employment  of  the  larger  cavalry  bodies  in 
the  fight,  and  their  approach  and  deployment  from 
formations  of  assembly  or  intermediate  formations, 
for  which  brigade  columns  are  usually  chosen. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  it  is  always  much  more 
difficult  and  dangerous  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  to 
separate  a  cavalry  mass  for  the  fight  than  to  concen- 
trate it  from  a  not  too  wide  separation  for  common 
action  against  the  enemy.  In  the  first  case  the  danger 
must  be  run  of  surrendering  "the  proud  rights  of  the 
initiative"  to  the  enemy,  and  of  being  obliged  to  at- 
tack eccentrically;  while  in  the  second  case  one  is  in 
possession  of  the  exterior  lines,  and,  with  them,  the 
most  favourable  directions  for  attack. 

The  regulation  quoted  should  therefore  result  only 
exceptionally  in  a  complete  tactical  concentration. 
The  wish,  however,  to  fight  concentrated  must  never 
lead  to  a  concentrated  advance  unless  circumstances 
dictate  such  an  operation  as  practical.  Leaders  of 
the  large  reconnoitring  bodies  will  have,  rather,  con- 
tinually to  consider  how  they  may  best  fulfil  the  task 
of  the  moment  in  the  most  practical  way  without  al- 
lowing themselves  to  be  bound  by  preconceived  the- 
oretical views.  This  must  be  their  course  of  action, 
and  will  often  enough  lead  to  the  advance  in  separate 
columns.  The  breadth  of  reconnaissance-zones  will 
often  demand  such  procedure. 

Along  the  whole  front,  troops  must  be  in  a  position 
to  support  the  reconnoitring  bodies  which  have  been 
pushed  forward.  This  will  not  always  be  possible 
from  a  single  point  on  account  of  the  distances  in- 


MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  ARMY  CAVALRY    43 

volved.  It  will  at  times  be  necessary  to  break  through 
the  hostile  screen  when  it  is  met  by  force  of  arms, 
without  first  being  able  to  judge  where  this  can  most 
easily  or  most  advantageously  be  accomplished. 
Again,  complete  information  will  not  perhaps  be  to 
hand  of  the  presence  and  the  direction  of  march  of 
the  hostile  cavalry,  so  that  the  concentration  of  force 
upon  a  single  road  will  not  appear  at  all  desirable.  It 
must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  masses  of  cavalry 
have  not  only  to  act  as  fighting  bodies,  but  at  the  same 
time  to  play  an  important  part  in  the  system  of  ob- 
taining information.  Communication  must  be  main- 
tained with  the  Head  Quarters,  as  well  as  with  the 
reconnoitring  squadrons  and  certain  independent  pa- 
trols. In  the  latter  case  particularly,  great  difficulties 
will  often  arise.  A  cavalry  leader  must  continually 
ask  himself  which  is  the  shortest  and  safest  means 
of  communication  with  the  reconnoitring  organs  on 
the  one  hand  and  with  the  army  following  him  on 
the  other,  and  how  it  can  be  maintained  when  hos- 
tile detachments  pervade  the  intervening  country.  All 
these  are  circumstances  which  would  lead  to  the  adop- 
tion of  an  advance  in  separate  columns. 

The  universal  principle  must  always  hold  good  for 
cavalry,  that  when  a  decisive  struggle  is  in  prospect 
all  possible  strength  must  be  concentrated  for  it.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  must  be  perfectly  clearly  understood 
that  in  a  future  war  many  varied  and  often  contra- 
dictory demands  will  be  made  upon  the  arm.  It  will 
not  always  be  possible  to  meet  them  all  from  the 
one  point  of  view — that  of  uniting  all  possible  strength 
before  the  commencement  of  a  fight;  the  less  so  as 
in  reconnaissance  the  fight  is  only  the  means  to  an 
end,  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy  being  the  essential. 
It  remains  for  the  genius  of  the  leader  to  make  his 


44  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

preparations  in  full  freedom,  and  to  solve  the  task 
confided  to  him  in  his  own  way.  To  hamper  active 
operations  by  regulation  is  always  a  great  evil. 

The  danger  which  lies  in  separation  of  force  is  not 
so  great  for  cavalry  as  might  appear  at  first  sight,  on 
account  of  the  mobility  and  adaptability  of  the  arm. 
For,  although  the  Regulations  lay  down  that  on  ac- 
count of  the  rapid  conduct  of  a  cavalry  fight  the  con- 
centration of  separate  columns  upon  the  field  of  battle 
can  but  seldom  be  successfully  accomplished,  this  view 
can  only  be  admitted  in  the  case  of  the  mounted  com- 
bat. I  am  of  opinion  that  it  cannot  be  so  difficult 
under  ordinarily  favourable  circumstances  to  bring 
about  such  a  concentration.  With  reliable  reconnais- 
sance early  intelligence  of  the  presence  of  the  hostile 
cavalry  should  be  to  hand.  It  should  then  be  often 
still  possible  to  concentrate  the  separate  columns  ac- 
cording to  circumstances,  either  forwards,  backwards, 
or  to  a  flank,  and  finally  to  unite  them  for  the  fight 
with  sufficient  room  and  time,  and  in  an  effective  di- 
rection for  attack.  If,  however,  a  portion  of  the  ad- 
vancing cavalry  mass  should  come  into  unforeseen 
collision  with  superior  hostile  cavalry,  it  must  fall  back 
in  a  direction  which  will  lead  to  concentration  of  force. 
In  order  gradually  to  lead  up  to,  and  at  the  right  time 
to  achieve,  such  a  concentration  from  a  divided  ad- 
vance, without  falling  into  the  error  of  a  too  close  tac- 
tical concentration,  presupposes  that  the  leader  is  an 
artist  in  the  conduct  of  his  arm.  Such  an  undertaking 
is  much  easier  where  not  only  mounted  combat,  but 
fire  action  is  taken  into  consideration.  In  such  a  case 
that  detachment  which  comes  first  into  collision  with 
the  enemy  would  be  able  to  defend  itself  in  some 
strong  position  or  behind  some  naturally  defensible 
locality  until  the  rest  of  the  main  body  came  up. 


MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  ARMY  CAVALRY    45 

Good  communication  between  the  several  portions 
is  in  all  such  cases  an  important  factor.  If  necessary- 
it  must  be  effected  by  the  help  of  the  guns.  Generally 
speaking,  it  will  facilitate  and  prepare  communication 
if  the  separately  advancing  columns  are  kept  informed 
as  to  the  rate  of  march,  so  that  each  column  can  at  any 
moment  calculate  where  the  others  will  be  in  a  given 
time  if  nothing  unforeseen  occurs.  This  also  enables 
information  to  be  sent  by  the  shortest  route  to  points 
which  can  to  a  certain  extent  be  previously  determined. 

The  arrangements  for  the  advance  form  at  the  same 
time  the  foundation  for  the  action  of  the  actual  recon- 
noitring organs  and  the  complete  establishment  of  the 
reconnaissance  system.  Directions  for  this  will  be 
found  in  the  "Field  Service  Manual."  It  is  laid  down 
that  reconnoitring  squadrons  will  be  pushed  forward 
from  the  various  groups  of  the  army  cavalry,  and  will 
be  allotted  zones  of  reconnaissance  in  the  direction  of 
the  enemy.  The  reconnaissance  itself  will  be  carried 
out  by  patrols. 

The  breadth  of  these  zones  must  continually  alter 
according  to  circumstances. 

If  it  be  necessary  to  reconnoitre  on  a  broad  front 
with  a  comparatively  weak  cavalry,  very  wide  zones 
will  often  be  necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  the  closer 
the  system  of  reconnoitring  squadrons  can  be  estab- 
lished, the  more  reliable  the  manner  in  which  recon- 
naissance will  be  carried  out,  and  the  easier  will  it 
be  to  hamper  the  enemy's  efforts  at  gaining  intelli- 
gence. If  the  "Field  Service  Manual"  lays  down  a 
certain  breadth  as  normal,  this  naturally  only  indi- 
cates that,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  squadrons 
on  a  wider  front  would  no  longer  be  in  a  position  to 
carry  out  their  duties  to  the  full ;  nothing  more.  The 
frontages  laid  down  shoVlW  R^y^r  1^^  either  to  the 


46  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

perceptible  weakening  of  the  fighting  value  of  a  force 
by  sending  forward  too  many  reconnoitring  bodies, 
or,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  inability  of  the  recon- 
noitring organs  to  cover  the  space  demanded  by  the 
strategical  situation.  A  well-considered  allotment  of 
areas  is  therefore  of  special  importance,  and  a  mat- 
ter for  the  higher  leader  to  decide.  For  the  arrange- 
ments for  reconnaissance  inside  the  zone  apportioned 
to  him,  the  squadron  leader  is,  on  the  other  hand,  cor- 
respondingly responsible.  It  is  at  the  same  time  laid 
down  that  no  squadron  should  interfere  in  a  neigh- 
bouring zone. 

Although  in  these  measures  the  principles  for  the 
reconnaissance  may  be  sought,  it  must  be  clearly  un- 
derstood that  the  original  allotment  of  zones  cannot 
always  hold  good.  This  arrangement  is  only  practi- 
cable and  suitable  so  long  as  the  opposing  armies  are 
frontally  approaching  each  other.  As  soon  as  the  di- 
rections of  march  form  an  angle  with  each  other  the 
conditions  alter. 

When  information  has  been  obtained  as  to  the  en- 
emy's position  and  that  the  direction  of  his  advance 
is  not  directly  at  right  angles  to  our  front,  or  if  the 
direction  of  march  of  our  own  army  changes,  it  may 
be  necessary  to  make  repeated  changes  in  the  zones  of 
reconnaissance.  The  manner  in  which  this  can  best 
be  done  is  a  matter  which  experience  alone  can  show 
us.  The  change  of  zones  will  often  be  possible  in 
conjunction  with  the  recall  of  detached  squadrons  and 
the  sending  forward  of  fresh  ones  in  a  new  direction, 
or  during  the  relief  of  reconnoitring  squadrons. 

When  the  gradual  advance  of  the  hostile  army  takes 
place  and  the  army  cavalry  endeavours  to  clear  the 
front  and  to  draw  away  to  a  flank,  or  when  the  col- 
umns of  both  armies  group  themselves  for  the  tac-^ 


MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  ARMY  CAVALRY    47 

tical  decision  and  concentrate  more  or  less  from  their 
march  formations,  the  allotment  of  zones  must  utterly 
fail. 

An  allotment  of  zones,  also,  cannot  always  be 
recommended,  that  is  to  say,  not  where  it  can  be  fore- 
seen that  it  cannot  be  carried  into  operation.  Such  a 
case  might  happen  if  an  enemy  moved  across  the  front 
on  a  more  or  less  distinct  flank  march.  The  recon- 
noitring squadrons  would,  perhaps,  in  such  a  case  be 
better  employed  in  keeping  touch  with  the  various 
groups  of  the  hostile  army  than  by  tying  themselves 
down  to  a  systematic  reconnaissance  in  zones. 

The  conditions  of  war  are  everywhere  so  changing 
and  full  of  movement  that  a  single  concrete  scheme 
will  never  suffice,  but  each  case  must  be  judged  upon- 
its  own  merits.  The  allotment  into  zones,  therefore, 
laid  down  in  the  "Field  Service  Manual"  must  be  re- 
garded as  but  a  foundation  for  the  methods  to  be 
adopted,  and  will  perhaps  only  attain  its  full  effect 
during  the  first  concentration  of  opposing  armies, 
when  the  hostile  groups  deploy  along  a  land  frontier 
on  a  wide  front.  During  operations  the  original 
scheme  must  of  necessity  be  subjected  to  continual 
alterations  and  transformations. 

Let  us  now  further  consider  the  relief  of  recon- 
noitring squadrons.  It  is  out  of  the  question  that 
such  squadrons  should  remain  continually  in  touch 
with  the  enemy.  Such  a  procedure  would  very  soon 
paralyse  the  strength  of  men  and  horses.  The  relief, 
however,  cannot,  naturally,  be  arranged  and  carried 
out  at  any  given  moment.  It  requires  preparation,  as 
the  whole  patrol  system  must  be  drawn  in  and  replaced 
by  a  fresh  one.  The  relief  will  doubtless  best  take 
place  after  a  great  tactical  crisis.  At  such  times  the 
reconnoitring  squadrons  will  partly  have  been  driven 


48  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

back  on  to  the  cavalry  mass,  and  partly  will  be  in  po- 
sition with  their  patrols  near  them  in  flank  and  rear 
of  the  enemy,  whence  they  can  be  comparatively  easily 
brought  in.  A  great  tactical  decision  also  which  cre- 
ates a  new  situation  demands  fresh  measures  for  re- 
connaissance and  a  different  arrangement  of  the  re- 
connoitring organs.  Whether  it  will  then  be  possible 
to  mathematically  divide  the  ground  into  sections  need 
not  here  be  decided. 

Under  certain  circumstances  it  will  be  advisable  to 
detail  reconnoitring  squadrons  to  watch  the  various 
groups  of  the  hostile  army.  If  we  take  the  campaign 
of  1870  as  an  example  of  a  concrete  case,  the  battles 
of  Spicheren,  Mars  la  Tour,  and  Gravelotte  afforded 
natural  periods  for  the  relief  of  reconnoitring  squad- 
rons and  the  fresh  allotment  of  reconnoitring  zones 
for  the  First  and  Second  Armies,  and  later  the  bat- 
tle of  Sedan.  For  the  Third  Army,  first  of  all,  the 
battle  of  Worth.  Cases  may  of  course  occur  when 
the  reconnoitring  period  between  the  battles  is  too 
long,  and  a  relief  becomes  necessary  in  the  interim. 
The  case  of  the  Third  Army  is  a  good  example  of 
this. 

A  reconnaissance  from  Worth  to  Sedan  could  never 
have  been  carried  out  by  the  same  reconnoitring 
squadron.  A  relief  was  absolutely  necessary.  Ac- 
cording to  my  judgment,  the  best  time  for  this  would 
have  been  the  days  during  which  the  great  wheel  of 
the  Third  Army  towards  the  north  was  completed. 
During  these  days  fresh  reconnoitring  squadrons  would 
have  had  to  be  thrown  forward  in  the  new  line  of 
march,  while  those  which  had  advanced  in  the  origi- 
nal direction  could,  according  to  the  situation,  have 
been  gradually  drawn  in.  Strong  patrols  would  have 
been  sufficient  in  that  direction. 


MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  ARMY  CAVALRY    49 

In  any  case  it  is  clear  that  the  question  of  the  relief 
of  reconnoitring  squadrons  is  extremely  important 
and  cannot  be  solved  by  routine.  It  is  a  matter  for 
consideration  whether  it  would  not  be  of  advantage 
for  the  "Field  Service  Manual"  to  touch  on  these 
questions  as  well  as  on  the  circumstances  under  which 
a  departure  from  the  system  of  allotment  of  zones 
might  be  desirable.  I  am  inclined  to  think  this  de- 
sirable, as  otherwise  the  extremely  practical  disposi- 
tions therein  laid  down  are  apt  to  lead  to  a  lifeless 
formalism. 

The  important  service  of  transmission  will  naturally 
be  deeply  influenced  by  all  these  conditions. 

I  have  already  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  im- 
portance of  this  service  with  regard  to  the  increased 
extent  of  the  reconnoitring  rayons  may  even  lead  the 
main  body  of  a  division,  for  example,  to  advance  in 
separate  columns,  in  order  to  shorten  the  routes  of 
information  and  to  afford  a  not  too  distant  support 
for  the  reconnoitring  organs.  The  Head  Quarters 
will  often  be  more  quickly  informed  if  the  news  comes 
direct  from  detachments  themselves  than  if  it  had 
first  to  be  collected  at  one  point. 

If  it  has  become  so  necessary  to  accelerate  the  ser- 
vice of  communication,  it  is  all  the  more  so  to  ensure 
that  the  system  of  reports  should  be  properly  ordered. 
In  the  main  body  of  the  army  cavalry  it  is  a  matter 
of  keeping  up  communication  on  the  one  hand  with 
the  army  following,  on  the  other  with  the  advanced 
squadrons.  In  both  these  respects  the  application  of 
technical  means  of  communication  must  be  considered 
before  all  else. 

Communication  to  the  rear  is  fundamentally  the 
task  of  wireless  telegraphy.  But  the  system  of  in- 
formation to  the  front  must  be  otherwise  arranged  for. 


50  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Communication  with  the  reconnoitring  squadrons 
can  practically  never  be  carried  out  by  wireless  teleg- 
raphy. Here  efforts  must  be  made  to  work  with  the 
light-signal  apparatus,^  or  to  employ  cyclists  or  relay 
lines  to  facilitate  and  accelerate  the  service  of  trans- 
mission. A  combination  of  all  these  means,  and  the 
use  of  the  cavalry  telegraph,  if  need  be,  will  be  found 
advisable.  In  friendly  country  the  population  can 
often  be  used  to  keep  up  communication  or  to  send 
messages. 

The  employment  of  single  cyclists  or  motor-cars  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  not  advisable.  Without  taking  into 
account  the  fact  that  they  are  tied  to  the  roads,  and, 
having  no  fighting  value,  will  often  fall  an  easy  prey  to 
the  enemy,  technical  defects  occur  so  often  in  the  ma- 
chines that  they  cannot  be  classed  as  a  reliable  means 
of  communication,  particularly  in  hostile  country. 
Should  the  distance  between  the  reconnoitring  squad- 
rons and  the  main  body  become  very  great,  or  if  cir- 
cumstances arise  which  render  direct  communication 
between  them  too  long  a  matter,  or  if  it  is  desired 
to  provide  several  avenues  of  communication,  a  col- 
lecting station  can  be  formed  for  reports:  this  will 
keep  up  connection,  and  must  be  secured  by  a  detach- 
ment of  sufficient  strength.  It  is  erroneous  to  assume 
that  such  collecting  stations  must  always  be  used. 
They  often  operate  very  unfavourably,  especially 
when  armies  are  on  the  move,  as  they  are  for  the 
most  part  very  local,  and  then  do  more  harm  than 
good. 

If  there  is  a  sufficient  number  of  apparatus  at  dis- 
posal, and  if  the  collecting  stations  are  sufficiently 
secured,  an  effort  should  be  made  to  establish  wire- 

^The  lamp  used  by  night  and  day  in  the  German  Army, 
combining  the  functions  of  our  heliograph  and  lamp. 


MAIN  BODY  OF  THE  ARMY  CAVALRY    51 

less  communication  from  them  to  the  rear — a  cipher 
being  of  course  used  to  prevent  the  enemy  learning 
the  contents  of  messages.  Otherwise  the  various 
means  available  must  be  suited  to  the  particular  case, 
and  used  in  combination. 

The  system  of  communications  thus  forms  a  com- 
plicated machine,  formed  of  technical  and  natural 
methods  of  transmission  of  great  variety,  that  will  be 
difficult  to  maintain  in  an  efficient  state,  especially 
when  an  army  is  on  the  move. 

It  is  obvious  that  these  difficulties  must  be  aug- 
mented during  the  change  of  reconnoitring  zones  or 
the  relief  of  reconnoitring  squadrons.  It  will  often 
be  worth  while  to  establish  the  system  of  intelligence 
in  a  new  direction,  while  the  available  apparatus  and 
telegraphs  are  still  in  part  maintained  on  the  old  lines. 
Only  some  "system  of  auxiliaries"  will  meet  these 
difficulties ;  only  troops  to  whom  this  service  has  been 
entrusted  down  to  the  smallest  detail  will  be  able  to 
discover  these  auxiliaries  and  properly  employ  them. 
Otherwise  the  service  of  information  must  miscarry. 

2.     Reconnoitring  Squadrons 

From  the  above  considerations  it  must  be  already 
clear  that  a  great  measure  of  resourcefulness,  a  com- 
prehensive grasp  of  the  situation,  clearness  of  judg- 
ment, and  a  love  of  responsibility  will  be  demanded 
from  the  leader  of  a  reconnoitring  squadron.  Even 
in  the  simple  advance  in  the  allotted  zone,  clear  un- 
derstanding will  be  required  as  to  all  the  measures 
for  the  proper  conduct  of  the  troops,  and  well-cal- 
culated boldness  when  the  enemy  is  met  with. 

There  will,  however,  be  difficulties  to  overcome 
when  the  main  body  of  our  own  cavalry  changes  its 


52  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

direction;  when  the  concentration  for  battle  begins 
from  the  line  of  march,  the  cavalry  masses  draw  away 
to  a  flank,  unexpected  measures  of  the  enemy  come 
to  light,  which  had  not  been  counted  upon  when  our 
reconnaissance  was  arranged;  or  when  our  own  cav- 
alry is  beaten,  and  touch  with  it  is  completely  lost. 
Under  all  these  circumstances  the  allotment  of  zones 
completely  loses  its  value,  and  the  whole  reconnais- 
sance must  be  arranged  and  ordered  on  some  other 
system.  Squadron  leaders  will  often  in  such  cases 
act  quite  independently  and  according  to  their  own 
judgment  of  the  situation,  and  with  an  appreciation 
of  the  probable  action  of  neighbouring  squadrons, 
without,  however,  losing  sight  of  the  main  objective. 
In  such  cases  they  will  often  report  direct  to  Head 
Quarters,  and  may  then  have  to  fall  back  on  the  main 
army  instead  of  on  their  own  division. 

Every  squadron  commander  can  conclude  from 
these  reflections  what  an  unusually  high  standard  of 
military  training,  power  of  judgment,  and  initiative 
will  be  demanded  of  him  if  he  is  properly  and  success- 
fully to  carry  out  these  duties.  I  hope  that  all  officers 
will  be  stimulated  to  apply  themselves  to  these  mat- 
ters, so  that  a  future  war  may  not  find  them  unpre- 
pared. 

It  is  a  matter  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the 
conduct  of  the  squadron  in  general  whether  it  is  acting 
in  a  friendly  or  hostile  country.  While  in  the  first 
case  troops  may  ride  through  towns,  feed  in  villages, 
and  count  upon  considerable  support  from  the  inhabi- 
tants, in  the  service  both  of  security  and  information, 
in  the  second  they  must  always  be  prepared  against 
treachery  or  surprise,  and  behave  as  if  they  were  sur- 
rounded by  a  network  of  spies.    Townships  are  to  be 


RECONNOITRING  SQUADRONS  53 

particularly  avoided,  and  special  precautions  for  safety 
must  be  taken,  especially  while  at  rest. 

In  other  respects  the  advance  itself  must  in  both 
cases  be  carried  out  according  to  the  same  principles. 

Squadrons  will  generally  advance  by  successive 
stages,  and  upon  those  roads  which  appear  to  them  to 
be  the  most  important  for  reconnaissance.  If  they 
are  provided  with  the  light-signal  apparatus,  and  can 
use  it  for  communicating  to  the  rear,  they  must  keep 
in  mind  during  the  march  itself  the  possibilities  of 
being  able  to  use  it,  try  it  on  the  ground,  and  make  a 
mental  note  of  points  that  are  specially  adapted  for 
connection-stations.  The  whole  plan  of  the  day's 
march  must  then  be  made  with  an  eye  to  the  establish- 
ment of  communication  by  this  method.  Halting- 
places  for  rest  or  feeding  horses  must  be  selected  with 
regard  either  to  good  cover  or  to  the  view  which  may 
be  had  from  them.  In  order  to  be  independent  of  the 
hostile  population,  it  is  advisable  for  the  squadron  to 
have  its  ration  and  forage  wagons  with  it.  In  case  of 
an  unsuccessful  collision  with  the  enemy  these  may 
indeed  be  lost.  In  any  other  case,  however,  they  will 
always  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  squadron.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  hostile  country,  if  they  follow  the 
squadron  at  too  great  a  distance,  they  will  often  fall 
a  prey  to  the  enemy.  Under  such  circumstances,  if 
they  are  to  be  really  protected,  a  sufficiently  strong 
escort  must  be  left  with  them,  and  this  will  react 
unfavourably  upon  the  strength  of  the  squadron. 

The  efforts  of  reconnoitring  squadrons  to  diminish 
the  distance  between  themselves  and  the  enemy  as 
quickly  as  possible  by  undertaking  excessive  marches, 
such  as  are  frequently  seen  in  peace,  are  misdirected 
and  unreal,  and  only  tend  to  wear  out  the  horses.  In 
peace  manoeuvres,  which  only  last  two  or  three  days, 


54  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

and  which  have  not  to  be  sustained  by  a  number  of 
lame  and  over-tired  horses,  such  proceedings  are  in- 
deed possible,  but  in  war  they  are  pernicious.  A 
squadron  should  be  able  to  remain  up  to  strength 
throughout  a  campaign,  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  horses  that  go  lame  and  are  left  behind  will,  at 
all  events  in  hostile  country,  be  lost  to  the  recon- 
noitring squadrons  for  good.  The  patrols,  too,  must 
be  able  to  keep  something  in  hand.  But,  if  the  squad- 
rons tax  their  capacity  for  marching  to  the  utmost, 
the  patrols,  which  are  required  to  go  still  farther  in 
advance,  must  be  completely  exhausted.  If  the  squad- 
rons can  cover  daily  25  miles  and  the  distant  patrols 
35  to  40  miles,  this  will,  I  hold,  be  quite  sufficient. 
More  than  this,  on  an  average,  cannot  be  expected  of 
them.  This  does  not  of  course  preclude  special  efforts 
to  meet  particular  circumstances.  It  will  only  be  pos- 
sible, however,  to  demand  these  efforts  when  we  learn 
how  to  calculate  the  average  length  of  march  during 
which  men  and  horses  can  be  kept  fresh  and  efficient. 
Although  the  choice  of  lines  of  advance  and  the 
combined  action  of  the  reconnoitring  squadrons  are 
often  weighty  factors  of  success,  yet  on  the  other 
hand,  in  order  to  obtain  early  and  sufficient  intelli- 
gence of  the  enemy,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance 
that  the  patrol  system  should  be  properly  ordered  ac- 
cording to  the  needs  and  probabilities  of  the  situa- 
tion. The  "Field  Service  Manual"  gives  the  neces- 
sary principles  for  their  action.  They  must,  it  says, 
be  sent  forward  along  the  roads  that  the  enemy  is 
most  likely  to  use.  By  so  doing,  certain  results  must, 
under  any  circumstances,  be  obtained.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  a  mistake  to  send  forward  single  patrols 
against  a  wide  front.  Under  such  circumstances  a 
patrol  is  always  in  doubt  which  way  to  go,  will  prob- 


RECONNOITRING  SQUADRONS  55 

ably  divide,  and  cannot,  at  all  events,  be  everywhere. 
From  such  procedure,  which  is  unfortunately  only 
too  common,  reliable  results  cannot  be  expected,  and 
it  is  never  certain  if  observation  is  being  carried 
out  in  any  given  direction.  Such  a  faulty  course 
of  action  usually  originates  from  a  certain  confusion 
of  thought  on  the  part  of  the  leader  as  to  his  own 
intentions  and  his  suppositions  as  to  the  enemy.  A 
clear  appreciation  of  the  situation  ensures  at  the  same 
time  a  clearly  defined  course  of  action.  If,  however, 
no  sort  of  idea  can  be  formed  as  to  what  the  enemy  is 
likely  to  do,  the  patrol  system  must  be  extended,  not 
only  in  those  directions  from  which  the  enemy  may 
be  expected,  but  in  others  where  it  is  possible  that  he 
may  be  met  with.  Any  turning  movement  on  the  part 
of  the  hostile  forces  must,  in  this  manner,  be  con- 
tinually guarded  against. 

The  number  of  patrols  sent  out  will,  of  course,  de- 
pend on  the  importance  of  the  task.  If  the  strength 
of  a  squadron  is  insufficient  to  provide  them,  it  must 
be  supplemented  by  patrols  detailed  from  other  squad- 
rons. The  relief  of  such  patrols,  also,  may  have  to 
be  carried  out  by  the  same  means.  Cutting  down  the 
number  of  distant  patrols  is  to  be  avoided  as  far  as 
possible.  Economy  of  force  can  be  better  obtained 
by  careful  husbanding  of  strength  in  the  close  recon- 
naissance and  service  of  security. 

The  strength  of  distant  patrols  should  never  be  ar- 
bitrarily laid  down,  as  in  this  respect  also  the  circum- 
stances must  be  taken  into  account.  Patrols  which 
are  far  distant  from  the  road  upon  which  the  squadron 
is  advancing,  and  which  can  only  be  reached  with  dif- 
ficulty, require  a  greater  degree  of  independence  than 
those  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood,  which  can  be 
rapidly  supported  or  strengthened.     The  probability, 


$6  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

also,  of  meeting  with  superior  hostile  force  demands 
a  greater  proportion  of  strength.  Under  certain  cir- 
cumstances a  whole  troop  may  be  used  as  an  indepen- 
dent patrol.  At  the  same  time  a  wise  economy  of 
force  must  be  practised  so  that  the  fighting  and  march- 
ing efficiency  of  the  squadron  does  not  suffer  too 
much.  To  this  end,  quite  weak  patrols  must  be  made 
to  suffice  in  directions  of  secondary  importance.  A 
second  in  command  must  be  detailed  to  every  patrol. 
There  should  also  be  a  supply  of  trained  lance-cor- 
porals ready  to  lead  such  patrols  as  may  be  required 
to  carry  information  to  the  rear. 

The  strength  of  patrols  will  depend  largely  on  the 
number  of  messages  that  they  are  expected  to  send 
in.  As  a  general  rule,  in  large  operations,  not  more/ 
than  two  messages  will  be  required  from  each  patrol 
during  the  day.  It  is  only  when  the  opposing  armies 
approach  each  other,  and  the  distant  patrols  gradually 
become  close  patrols,  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  re- 
port frequently  on  tactical  events.  The  distances, 
however,  will  then  have  so  far  diminished,  that  a  re- 
inforcement of  the  patrols  from  the  squadrons  would 
probably  be  possible  if  they  have  become  over- weak 
through  transmission  duties. 

Like  the  reconnoitring  squadrons,  the  patrols  re- 
quire relief  from  time  to  time,  as  the  same  patrol 
leader  cannot  be  expected  to  remain  in  continuous 
touch  with  the  enemy. 

The  strength  of  patrols,  therefore,  will  generally 
have  to  be  calculated  according  to  the  number  of  mes- 
sages and  the  number  of  days  during  which  the  same 
men  are  required  to  be  in  contact  with  the  enemy.  It 
is  only  when  a  special  fighting  strength  appears  neces- 
sary that  these  numbers  should  be  exceeded.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  patrols  in  friendly  country  may  be 


RECONNOITRING  SQUADRONS  57 

made  weaker  than  when  in  the  enemy's  territory,  as, 
in  the  latter  case,  it  will  scarcely  be  possible  to  send 
in  messages  by  single  orderlies. 

Careful  preparation  must  be  made  for  the  relief 
of  patrols.  Every  patrol  that  is  sent  out  must  know 
when,  and  approximately  where,  it  can  rejoin  the 
squadron.  The  relieving  patrol  should  arrive  on  the 
field  of  exploration  before  the  original  patrol  returns. 
The  two  patrol  leaders  should  meet  where  possible. 
All  the  patrols  should  never  be  relieved  at  one  time, 
as  such  a  procedure  would  tend  to  weaken  the  squad- 
ron too  much. 

The  reconnoitring  squadron  must  continually  en- 
deavour to  maintain  communication  with  the  distant 
patrols  which  send  in  reports  to  it.  As  the  main  body 
must  always  be  careful  to  render  communication  with 
the  reconnoitring  squadron  possible  and  to  facilitate 
it,  so  is  communication  with  the  patrols  one  of  the 
most  important  duties  of  the  latter.  It  will  often  be 
necessary,  when  the  distances  become  great  or  the 
ground  difficult,  to  push  forward  relay  posts  to  facili- 
tate and  accelerate  the  service  of  transmission.  These 
posts  must  have  a  sufficiency  of  force  assigned  to 
them.  The  squadron  leader,  further,  must  most  mi- 
nutely instruct  the  patrols  in  anything  that  can  serve 
to  assist  the  carrying  out  of  their  task,  and  as  to  all 
arrangements  for  the  transmission  of  reports. 

A  patrol's  instructions  must  be  short  and  clear,  and 
must  leave  no  room  for  doubt  in  the  patrol  leader's 
mind  as  to  what  is  expected  of  him. 

The  instructions  must  contain:  all  that  is  known 
of  the  enemy;  a  statement  of  the  general  situation, 
and  of  the  system  of  reconnaissance,  as  far  as  it 
may  concern  the  patrol  in  question;  an  indication  of 
the  proposed  march  and  the  objective  of  the  squadron; 


58  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

points  where  messages  as  to  the  position  of  the  squad- 
ron may  be  deposited,  in  case  it  should  be  found 
necessary  to  depart  from  the  preconceived  plan ;  exact 
data  as  to  when  and  where  the  relieving  patrol  will 
be  sent  and  also  when  the  patrol  is  to  rejoin  the 
squadron. 

Although  such  arrangements  may  not  always  have 
the  desired  results,  as  all  such  dispositions  are  liable 
to  be  disturbed  by  the  action  of  the  enemy,  they  yet 
form  a  good  groundwork  on  which  to  build  further, 
according  to  circumstances,  and  which  can  be  suited 
to  any  alteration  of  the  situation.  Such  arrangements 
should  therefore  never  be  neglected. 

In  manoeuvres,  the  leaving  of  such  information — 
for  instance,  under  stones — in  prearranged  places  or 
localities  that  are  easy  to  find,  and  which  must  be 
determined  by  the  map  according  to  the  expected 
situation,  will  be  found  a  valuable  exercise. 

Communication  will,  as  a  rule,  be  best  secured  if 
the  reconnoitring  squadron  can  succeed  in  beating  the 
hostile  organs  of  reconnaissance  and  security.  We 
must  not,  of  course,  assume  that  a  squadron  that  has 
been  thrown  back  and  pursued  for  a  space  will  be  ren- 
dered incapable  of  carrying  out  its  role.  It  will  still 
try  to  support  its  patrols  as  before.  If,  however, 
such  successful  combats  become  numerous,  a  superi- 
ority will  at  length  be  obtained,  particularly  on  the 
main  avenues  of  communication,  that  will  considerably 
facilitate  the  task  of  obtaining  and  transmitting  in- 
formation. 

It  must  therefore  be  the  ceaseless  endeavour  of  the 
cavalry  to  attack  the  enemy  wherever  found.  The 
reconnoitring  squadrons  in  particular  must  undertake 
the  duty,  not  only  of  driving  the  corresponding  hostile 
squadrons  from  the  field,  but  of  endeavouring  to  in- 


RECONNOITRING  SQUADRONS  59 

tervene  and  assist  wherever  the  hostile  reconnoitring 
patrols  offer  an  obstinate  resistance.  They  must  take 
every  opportunity  of  fighting  with  the  arme  blanche, 
or  of  attacking  the  enemy  in  some  unfavourable  situa- 
tion, perhaps  by  night.  Dismounted  action  for  single 
squadrons  advancing  in  hostile  country  is  generally 
dangerous,  and,  on  account  of  the  weakness  of  the 
force,  usually  leads  to  failure.  It  should  never  be 
forgotten  that  for  a  successful  action  on  foot  great 
numerical  superiority  is  indispensable. 

Should  the  reconnoitring  squadron  come  in  contact 
with  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  strength,  it  must  be  de- 
cided whether  to  fall  back,  or  avoid  it  by  a  detour  in 
order  to  maintain  under  all  circumstances  communi- 
cation with  the  distant  patrols.  In  the  latter  case, 
communication  to  the  rear  becomes  naturally  con- 
siderably more  difficult,  and  it  can  only  be  hoped  that 
the  hostile  cavalry  will  be  beaten  by  our  own.  What- 
ever decision  is  made  will  depend  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case:  the  terrain,  the  distance  from 
our  own  cavalry  and  from  the  enemy's  main  body, 
as  well  as  on  what  is  already  known  of  the  enemy,  and 
on  what  it  is  of  particular  importance  to  learn.  It 
will  generally  be  most  important,  as  well  as  desirable, 
to  maintain  at  all  costs  communication  with  the  dis- 
tant patrols,  as  news  must  first  be  procured  before  it 
can  be  sent  back,  and  it  will  be  possible  under  certain 
circumstances  to  communicate  over  the  enemy's  head 
with  the  light-signal. 

In  order  to  maintain  the  necessary  fighting  strength 
of  the  squadrons  under  all  circumstances,  as  few  men 
as  possible  should  be  detached.  This  does  not  of 
course  refer  to  the  distant  patrols. 

The  melting  away  of  the  squadron's  numbers,  so 
often  seen  in  peace,  is  generally  a  result  of  the  man- 


6o  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

ner  in  which  the  close  reconnaissance  is  conducted. 
The  close  patrols  are  sent  out  6  or  7  miles,  often  still 
farther,  and,  having  general  instructions  to  remain 
in  touch  with  the  enemy,  seldom  rejoin  the  squadron. 
Thus  they  become  lost  to  the  squadron,  and  as  the 
squadron  leader  is  not  fully  aware  of  their  position 
he  is  soon  under  the  obligation  of  having  to  send  out 
a  fresh  patrol.  This  patrol  is  a  less  useful  one  than 
the  first,  and  if  it  brings  in  news  of  the  enemy  the 
latter  will  often  arrive  simultaneously  with  the  news. 
The  report  often  enough  goes  first  to  the  enemy  about 
whom  it  is  being  made.  No  reproach  can  be  attached 
to  any  one  concerned.  It  lies'  in  the  nature  of  things 
and  in  the  method  of  apportioning  duties. 

In  contradistinction  to  such  procedure,  it  is,  in  my 
opinion,  in  most  cases  quite  superfluous  to  arrange  a 
close  reconnaissance  in  addition  to  the  distant  pa- 
trols. Close  patrols  weaken  the  squadron,  and  can 
only,  it  appears,  rejoin  it  with  difficulty,  nor  do  they 
effect  the  necessary  reconnaissance.  Every  squadron 
must,  on  the  other  hand,  be  continually  surrounded  by 
local  patrols  for  its  own  safety,  closely  connected  with 
it,  and  which,  being  in  constant  communication  with 
the  squadron,  secure  it  immediately  from  surprise 
and,  as  far  as  their  strength  allows,  attack  and  break 
up  hostile  patrols.  This  measure  will  not  have  the 
effect  of  weakening  the  squadron  too  much.  These 
patrols  will  require  relief  from  time  to  time,  and  ac- 
company the  march  of  the  squadron  in  its  rayon  in 
such  a  manner  that  a  second  patrol  can  be  sent  out 
before  the  first  rejoins.  They  must,  however,  never 
be  drawn  so  far  away  from  the  squadron  that  they 
cannot  secure  its  immediate  safety  and  beat  off  hostile 
patrols. 

If,  in  exceptional  circumstances,  patrols  are  sent  out 


RECONNOITRING  SQUADRONS         6i 

in  close  reconnaissance,  it  is  desirable  that  they  should 
work  from  one  locality  to  another  a  few  miles  in 
advance,  so  that  it  will  always  be  possible  to  get  them 
back.  Especial  attention  must  be  given  to  this  mat- 
ter when  operating  in  the  enemy's  country. 

Patrols  to  connect  with  neighbouring  squadrons  are 
quite  superfluous.  They  have  little  prospect  of  carry- 
ing out  their  task  in  a  practical  way,  and  must  there- 
fore be  regarded  as  a  useless  expenditure  of  force. 
The  regulation  of  the  movements  of  the  various  recon- 
noitring squadrons  as  a  whole,  and  the  dissemination 
of  information  regarding  them  to  each  other,  is  a 
matter  for  the  Head  Quarters  of  the  main  body. 

Economy  in  patrols  should  never  go  so  far  as  to 
allow  of  cyclists,  or  indeed  a  single  cyclist  or  motor- 
car, being  used  for  reconnaissance,  as  unfortunately 
repeatedly  happens  in  manoeuvres.  Cyclists  may  be 
used  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  communication 
and  bringing  back  reports.  It  will  not  be  possible  to 
use  them  singly  for  these  duties,  especially  in  the  en- 
emy's country,  but  several  will  have  to  be  sent  to- 
gether. Bound  as  they  are  to  the  roads,  they  are 
quite  unsuited  to  patrol  work.  It  is  also  inadmissible, 
at  all  events  in  hostile  country,  to  send  bicycles  or 
motor-cars  with  patrols.  They  only  become  a  burden 
to  the  patrol  as  soon  as  it  wishes  to  leave  the  road. 
For  the  motor  cyclist  the  question  of  petrol  is  also 
an  important  one.  Where  will  he  replenish  his  sup- 
ply in  hostile  country  ?  Certainly  not  in  villages  with 
a  hostile  population,  unless  a  sufficient  show  of  force 
can  be  made. 

The  accommodation  of  reconnoitring  squadrons  for 
the  night  also  demands  close  attention.  Such  accom- 
modation must  be  chosen  from  quite  different  con- 


62  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

siderations,  according  as  the  squadron  is  operating  in 
a  friendly  or  hostile  country. 

In  any  case,  endeavour  must  be  made  so  to  dispose 
the  squadron  that  the  chief  avenues  of  communication, 
at  least,  will  be  under  observation,  and  thus  closed  to 
the  enemy's  despatch-riders.  The  horses  also  must  be 
rested,  that  they  may  be  ready  for  the  next  day's 
work,  for  a  tired  squadron  cannot  reconnoitre  prop- 
erly. In  order  that  the  horses  may  really  rest,  they 
must  be  off-saddled,  and,  to  do  this,  the  squadron  must 
be  secure  from  surprise.  This  will  not  always  be  pos- 
sible, but  endeavours  must  be  made  towards  that  end. 
Should  hostile  detachments  be  in  the  neighbourhood, 
which  is  unavoidable  during  critical  days,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  be  always  ready  for  possible  surprise,  and 
to  so  arrange  that  the  squadron  can  speedily  with- 
draw from  its  bivouac  on  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 
The  measures  taken  for  safety  must  be  directed  to 
this  end.  It  is  also  sometimes  desirable,  in  order  to 
deceive  the  enemy,  to  change  the  halting-place  already 
occupied,  after  darkness  sets  in.  In  friendly  coun- 
try, if  an  attack  is  expected,  it  is  often  better  to  spend 
the  night  in  larger  villages,  where  the  inhabitants 
themselves  will  co-operate  in  the  service  of  security. 
In  the  enemy's  country,  on  the  other  hand — where 
the  hostility  of  the  inhabitants  is  to  be  reckoned  with 
— the  larger  villages  must  always  be  avoided,  and 
accommodation  must  be  sought  in  single  isolated 
farms,  which,  by  their  position,  are  in  a  measure  se- 
cure from  surprise,  where  the  fighting  force  can  be 
kept  together,  where  there  is  nothing  to  fear  from 
the  inhabitants,  and  which  can  be  quickly  abandoned, 
if  possible,  unobserved. 

The  service  of  security  in  such  situations  must  be 
carefully  organised  and  must  not  consist  merely  of 


RECONNOITRING  SQUADRONS         63 

guarding  the  immediate  environs.  It  will  rather  be 
advisable  to  push  forward  posts  on  the  chief  lines  of 
approach  of  the  enemy,  which  will  be  able  to  bring  in 
timely  news  of  his  advance.  What  degree  of  readi- 
ness for  movement  is  maintained  in  such  situations 
the  circumstances  of  the  moment  must  dictate. 

In  this  question  of  accommodation,  attention  must 
also  be  paid  to  the  service  of  communication.  It  must 
be  possible  from  the  position  selected  for  the  night 
to  pick  up  communication  with  our  own  troops  and 
to  receive  the  orders  and  instructions  which  will  nat- 
urally be  expected  at  the  end  of  the  day. 

If  the  squadron  is  provided  with  the  light-signal 
apparatus  it  should  remain  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
high  ground,  from  which  it  is  thought  possible  that 
communication  may  be  picked  up.  If  instructions 
have  been  received  to  establish  communication  by 
mounted  orderlies  or  cyclists,  care  must  be  taken  that 
there  are  roads  easily  found,  even  in  the  dark,  by 
which  they  can  reach  the  main  body,  the  reporting 
centre,  or  the  relay  posts,  as  the  case  may  be.  The 
squadron's  own  reports,  too,  will  often  not  be  sent  off 
before  evening,  in  order  that  all  the  events  of  the 
day  may  be  collated.  This  must  be  done  in  clear, 
concise  form,  more  especially  where  the  means  of 
transmission  is  the  telegraph  or  light-signal. 

The  sifting  and  collating  of  information  received  is 
therefore  an  important  and  very  responsible  task,  re- 
quiring continual  practice.  The  squadron  leader  must 
be  able  properly  to  judge  which  of  the  reports  re- 
ceived must  be  sent  to  the  army  Head  Quarters  or 
to  the  cavalry  commander,  and  all  superfluous  matter 
must  be  eliminated.  All  reports  received  should  by 
no  means  be  transmitted.  This  would  overburden  the 
service  of  transmission  to  no  useful  purpose. 


64  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

3.     Distant  Patrols 

The  duties  of  the  distant  patrols  are  just  as  difficult 
as  those  of  the  reconnoitring  squadrons,  as  they  are 
continually  brought  face  to  face  with  the  necessity  of 
forming  independent  decisions,  and,  in  order  to  act  and 
report  efficiently,  require  a  high  degree  of  strategic 
insight.  Apart  from  the  personal  capacity  of  the  offi- 
cer commanding  the  patrol,  a  thorough  training  em- 
phasising the  essential  points  in  its  conduct  is  neces- 
sary for  the  men. 

I  have  already  shown  the  lines  on  which  silch  in- 
struction should  be  conducted,  I  would  here,  how- 
ever, like  to  add  that  the  patrol  leader,  if  he  is  in  any 
doubt,  can  clear  up  the  situation  in  his  mind  by  cross- 
questioning  himself.  It  should  never  suffice  to  him 
that  the  authority  who  set  him  the  task  veiled  his  re- 
sponsibility by  general  verbiage.  The  task  must  be 
definitely  determined ;  whether  negative  reports  are  re- 
quired or  not,  and  when  and  where  reports  are  to  be 
sent,  more  especially  when  touch  has  been  lost  with 
the  squadron.  The  complete  instructions  must  of 
course  be  confided  to  the  second  in  command  of  the  pa- 
trol, and  the  general  task  to  be  fulfilled  to  each  mem- 
ber of  it. 

For  the  conduct  of  the  patrol  it  is  a  matter  of  still 
greater  importance  than  for  the  squadron,  which  has  a 
certain  fighting  strength,  whether  it  is  acting  in  its  own 
or  in  hostile  country.  It  will  have  the  same  points  to 
consider  as  in  the  case  of  a  squadron,  but  in  hostile 
country  its  conduct  must  be  still  more  circumspect, 
while  in  friendly  country,  where  concealment  is  more 
easy,  its  action  can  be  correspondingly  bolder. 

If  long  distances  are  to  be  covered,  the  patrol  should 
remain  on  the  road  until  it  reaches  country  where  an 


DISTANT  PATROLS  65 

encounter  with  the  enemy  is  Hkely.  The  passage 
through  large  villages  peopled  by  hostile  inhabitants  is 
to  be  avoided. 

Horses  should  not  be  fed,  at  least  in  hostile  country, 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  villages  or  on  the  main  road, 
but  always  in  a  safe  place,  and  a  proportion  of  them 
only  at  a  time.  In  friendly  country  they  may  best  be 
fed  in  the  larger  villages,  which  the  hostile  patrols  will 
avoid,  but  should  not  halt  on  the  main  road. 

When  the  locality  is  reached  where  a  meeting  with 
hostile  detachments  niay  be  expected,  the  patrol  should 
advance  in  bonds  successifs.  It  must,  unfortunately,  be 
admitted  that  such  methods  appear  to  be  quite  foreign 
to  most  patrol  leaders;  at  all  events,  they  are  seldom 
applied  in  manoeuvres.  Most  of  them  ride  forward 
with  praiseworthy  speed  along  the  road  until  they  col- 
lide with  the  enemy;  then,  indeed,  they  begin  to  ob- 
serve him,  without  asking  themselves  whether  in  war 
the  result  of  such  tactics  would  not  have  already  com- 
promised their  chances  of  success.  For  if  they  are 
once  discovered  by  the  enemy  they  may  count  on  being 
relentlessly  hunted  and  pursued,  so  that  there  will  no 
longer  be,  in  most  cases,  any  further  possibility  of 
deliberate  observation. 

Very  different  indeed  are  the  circumstances  when, 
from  a  well-chosen  point  of  view,  a  patrol  is  successful 
in  detecting  the  enemy  before  coming  into  immediate 
collision  with  him.  The  patrol  can  then  order  the 
whole  of  its  conduct  according  to  its  knowledge  of  the 
enemy  before  it  is  discovered,  and  has  a  very  much 
greater  prospect  of  attaining  good  results. 

We  must  lay  down  here,  once  and  for  all,  that  the 
distant  observation  with  the  glass  is  by  far  the  most 
important;  it  affords  the  best  survey  over  the  general 
conditions,  and  a  better  possibility  of  sending  back  a 


66  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

report  safely  and  quickly.  It  is  just  in  this  method  of 
observation  that,  in  consequence  of  our  peace  condi- 
tions, patrols  are  generally  so  badly  trained.  Again 
and  again  they  fall  into  the  error  of  approaching  too 
close  to  the  enemy  and,  in  order  to  see  as  much  of  him 
as  possible,  let  him  march  past  them.  They  are  then 
compelled  to  send  in  their  reports  from  places  which 
lie  behind  the  belt  of  the  hostile  service  of  security. 
The  despatch-riders  have  then  to  ride  from  the  rear 
through  the  hostile  advance-guard,  outposts,  and  pa- 
trol system. 

In  peace,  where  there  are  no  bullets,  and  prisoners 
may  not  be  made,  these  methods  lead  to  the  best  re- 
sults, and  to  their  being  employed  again  and  again, 
particularly  if  the  superior  commanders  are  inclined 
to  praise  such  too  complete  information  instead  of  con- 
demning it.  In  truth,  it  is  the  worst  system  that  could 
be  conceived.  Properly  speaking,  such  protracted  ob- 
servation is  only  possible  under  certain  circumstances ; 
for  instance,  if  the  outer  flank  of  the  enemy's  advance 
has  been  turned,  then  perhaps  there  might  be  a  chance 
of  sending  reports  round  the  flank  of  the  hostile  zone 
of  security.  It  should,  however,  be  quite  inadmissible 
for  a  patrol  to  remain  in  this  manner  between  the  hos- 
tile columns  of  the  enemy's  army.  Unless  it  were  un- 
usually lucky,  it  would  quickly  be  detected  and  cap- 
tured ;  more  particularly  if  the  inhabitants  were  hostile. 
It  is  quite  another  matter  where  a  hostile  screen  has 
to  be  broken  through.  This  can  generally  only  be 
accomplished  by  fighting;  and  it  is  the  first  duty  of  the 
reconnoitring  squadron  to  break  through  the  enemy's 
screen.  Patrols  also,  which  in  such  a  case  have  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  behind  the  enemy's  outpost-line,  can- 
not count  upon  sending  back  messages  as  they  please. 
It  will  only  be  a  question  of  a  rapid  offensive  through 


DISTANT  PATROLS  (iy 

the  screen  towards  the  main  body  of  the  enemy.  The 
patrols  will  then  be  surrounded,  and  must  at  once  pro- 
ceed to  effect  their  return,  and  only  report  what  they 
have  seen  when  they  have  successfully  broken  back 
again  through  the  enemy's  screen.  Despatch-riders 
have,  in  such  a  case,  small  prospect  of  getting  through. 
The  less  it  is  possible  to  observe  and  report,  the  more 
carefully  must  the  points  for  breaking  through  be 
chosen,  and  attention  must  therefore  be  paid  to  reach- 
ing good  points  of  vantage  that  command  a  view  of 
places  of  probable  importance. 

The  time  chosen  for  observation  is  also  of  great 
importance.  The  enemy  can  best  be  observed,  and  his 
strength  and  intentions  appreciated,  when  he  is  on  the 
move.  Marches  are  generally  undertaken  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  towards  the  evening  one  may  expect  to  find 
the  enemy  in  quarters.  Under  such  circumstances  ob- 
servation is  difficult.  The  patrol  leader  must  therefore 
arrange  to  reach  in  the  morning  those  points  from 
which  he  expects  to  be  able  to  observe  the  enemy  on 
the  march.  He  will  then  be  obliged  in  most  cases  to 
fall  back  before  the  advancing  enemy,  and  will  en- 
deavour to  ascertain  his  halting-place  and  the  approxi- 
mate line  taken  up  by  his  outposts.  If  a  distant  patrol 
should  be  successful  in  obtaining  such  information  it 
will  generally  have  done  as  much  as  is  expected  of  it. 
It  is  for  the  tactical  close  reconnaissance  to  send  in  in- 
formation as  to  details.  From  the  distant  reconnais- 
sance it  is  only  required  to  form  the  foundations  on 
which  the  Head  Quarters  can  base  its  decisions.  This 
fact  should  be  borne  in  mind  while  reporting  on  the 
enemy. 

These  duties  can  for  the  rest  be  only  carried  out 
under  war  conditions  and  against  an  enemy  who  is 


68  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

working  to  the  same  end,  if  undertaken  in  a  regular 
and  systematic  way  and  with  great  boldness. 

The  patrol  leader,  therefore,  should  generally  make 
his  plan  in  the  evening  for  the  following  day.  It  will 
be  desirable  for  him  to  study  the  map  very  closely, 
and  to  impress  on  his  memory  the  main  roads  and  es- 
pecially points  which  appear  to  be  suitable  for  ob- 
servation. He  can  thus  obtain  an  impression  of  the 
succession  of  stages  necessary  for  his  advance,  and 
judge  how  he  can  best  spare  his  horses  without  preju- 
dicing the  success  of  the  reconnaissance. 

For  a  patrol  to  move  en  masse  without  scouts,  as 
unfortunately  is  often  done  in  peace,  is  altogether  out 
of  the  question.  In  war  such  conduct  must  often  be 
paid  for  by  the  lives  of  the  patrol  and  the  complete 
failure  of  the  enterprise.  A  point  must  always  be  sent 
so  far  ahead  that  the  patrol  will  not  come  under  fire  at 
the  same  time  with  it.  ,  It  should  never  happen  that 
the  point  collides  unexpectedly  with  the  enemy.  A  rear- 
guard will  also  in  most  cases  be  found  desirable.  Cir- 
cumstances must  determine  how  the  flanks  can  best 
be  protected. 

Should  the  patrol  be  obliged  to  ride  through  country 
where  it  might  be  surprised,  it  will  be  advisable  first  to 
make  a  halt  and  to  send  on  scouts.  Manoeuvres  have 
repeatedly  proved  that  the  point  is  insufiicient  in  such 
a  case. 

It  is  in  most  cases  quite  inadmissible,  especially  in 
hostile  country,  to  divide  the  patrol  and  to  arrange  a 
meeting-place  farther  to  the  front.  As  there  will 
usually  be  at  most  but  one  map  available,  the  detached 
party  will  find  themselves  in  the  enemy's  country  with- 
out means  of  locating  themselves,  probably  unable  to 
make  themselves  understood  by  the  inhabitants,  and 
in  any  case  will  run  the  danger  of  being  betrayed  by 


DISTANT  PATROLS  69 

them.  It  will  not  even  be  of  much  avail  if  they  are 
given  some  kind  of  sketch  if  they  meet  with  and 
are  chased  by  the  enemy. 

I  should  therefore  like  to  utter  a  warning  against  the 
custom  of  such  division  of  patrols  in  peace  which 
could  not  be  carried  out  in  the  enemy's  country.  In 
friendly  country  they  are  possible,  but  always  danger- 
ous. The  various  detachments  having  insufficient 
fighting  strength,  the  possibility  of  sending  back  in- 
formation will  be  reduced  and  a  junction  will  always 
be  doubtful,  while  any  collision  with  the  enemy  may 
make  it  impossible. 

There  is  another  error  into  which  patrols  frequently 
fall  in  peace  manoeuvres,  and  that  is,  of  leaving  the 
road  assigned  to  them  for  observation  without  suffi- 
cient reason,  and  of  using  other  roads  upon  which 
other  patrols  are  working.  Even  when  a  patrol  has 
sure  indication  that  it  will  not  meet  with  the  enemy 
upon  the  road  assigned  to  it,  it  should  still  remain 
upon  this  road,  and  send  back  definite  negative  in- 
formation, even  if  no  instructions  to  this  effect  have 
been  received. 

On  collision  with  the  enemy's  patrols,  action  must 
be  taken  in  as  offensive  a  spirit  as  possible,  but  after 
due  reflection.  Should  a  charge  promise  any  kind  of 
success,  the  opponent  must  be  attacked  in  the  most 
determined  way.  It  will  also  often  be  possible  to  de- 
feat an  enemy  of  superior  numbers  by  a  carefully  laid 
ambush.  Every  success  of  this  kind  will  increase  our 
own  moral  superiority,  paralyse  the  enemy's  recon- 
naissance, and  facilitate  the  transmission  of  informa- 
tion. Before  attacking,  however,  it  should  always  be 
ascertained  whether  the  enemy  is  followed  by  any  close 
support  which  might  turn  an  initial  success  into  a 
worse  defeat.    Thus  it  does  not,  for  example,  promise 


70  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

success  to  attack  the  point  of  an  advancing  squadron 
under  the  apprehension  that  it  is  a  single  patrol.  Mak- 
ing prisoners  and  carrying  them  off,  or  sending  them 
back  under  escort  from  the  patrol,  is  to  be  deprecated. 
They  can  generally  be  rendered  harmless  by  depriving 
them  of  their  horses,  arms,  and  boots.  Good  captured 
horses,  however,  should  be  always  used,  either  to  re- 
place the  tired  cattle  of  the  patrol,  or  lead  with  it  in 
reserve. 

Should  the  patrol  meet  with  a  superior  force  of  cav- 
alry, it  must  endeavour  to  extricate  itself  and  to  get 
round  the  enemy's  flank.  Under  such  circumstances 
the  ability  to  ride  quickly  and  safely  across  country 
will  be  of  great  service.  But  it  is  important,  as  soon 
as  the  patrol  is  in  safety,  that  it  should  again  reach 
the  road  detailed  to  it,  and  also  that  the  men  should 
be  instructed  as  to  how  to  avoid  the  enemy,  when 
carrying  messages  to  the  rear,  without  losing  their 
way. 

When  a  patrol  has  been  successful,  by  judicious 
riding,  determined  fighting,  and  clever  avoidance  of 
the  enemy,  in  obtaining  information  as  to  the  enemy, 
it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  what  information  is  to 
be  sent  back,  and  when  and  how  it  should  be  sent. 

As  I  have  already  indicated  above,  the  patrol  must 
be  perfectly  clear  as  to  what  facts  are  most  important 
from  the  Head  Quarters'  point  of  view.  If  the  oppos- 
ing armies  are  still  so  far  apart  that  a  collision  can- 
not be  expected,  only  those  matters  that  are  of  strategic 
importance  need  be  ascertained  and  transmitted :  e.g. 
number  of  the  hostile  columns,  objective  of  the  day's 
march,  any  circumstances  that  lend  themselves  to  a 
conclusion  as  to  alterations  in  the  enemy's  direction  of 
march  or  the  combination  of  his  forces.  In  such  a  case 
there  is  no  need  for  information  as  to  details.     The 


DISTANT  PATROLS  71 

closer,  however,  the  opposing  armies  approach  one 
another,  the  more  does  information  which  is  of  tactical 
significance  increase  in  importance.  It  is  not  always 
advisable  to  confine  oneself  to  reporting  the  bare  facts. 
It  will  often  be  desirable  to  indicate  also  the  process  of 
reasoning  by  which  the  reporting  officer  arrives  at  his 
impression,  for  this  originates  from  a  number  of  im- 
ponderabilia  which  cannot  always  be  detailed  in  a 
report.  When  this  is  done,  it  must  be  thoroughly  and 
carefully  considered  how  far  this  personal  impression 
is  dependent  upon  facts,  or  if  it  does  not  rather  rest 
upon  certain  feelings,  as  to  the  cause  of  which  no  clear 
account  can  be  given.  Should  the  latter  be  the  case, 
the  personal  point  of  view  is  best  left  out.  Precon- 
ceived opinions  originate  but  too  easily  in  war,  and 
may  lead  to  a  biassed  interpretation  of  reports,  and, 
consequently,  to  faulty  dispositions.  The  facts  must 
always  be  weighed  with  sober  impartiality.  Only 
thus  can  a  true  and  definite  appreciation  be  arrived  at. 

The  same  naturally  holds  good  for  those  reports 
which  are  sent  in  from  the  reconnoitring  squadrons 
or  other  reporting  centres.  The  method  in  which  such 
information  is  sifted  for  passing  on  brings  into  play, 
in  a  certain  sense,  personal  conceptions.  It  is  there- 
fore all  the  more  necessary  to  reflect  seriously  over 
their  preparation. 

It  is  imperative  that  any  important  information 
should  reach  the  Head  Quarters  of  the  army  or  the 
Great  Head  Quarters  as  early  as  possible,  at  all  events, 
early  enough  to  allow  of  the  measures  rendered  neces- 
sary by  the  enemy's  movements  to  be  initiated  and 
carried  out.  The  patrol  leader  must  therefore  con- 
sider the  time  requisite  for  a  wheel  or  other  such 
movement  of  a  modern  army  in  order  to  calculate 
what  is  the  latest  time,  under  any  circumstances,  that 


72  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

his  information  must  be  sent  in.  It  is  obvious,  and 
has  already  been  demonstrated,  that  he  should  be  in- 
structed as  to  the  advance  of  his  own  army  in  order 
that  he  may  be  able  to  appreciate  these  matters. 

As  already  stated,  it  will,  as  a  rule,  be  necessary  for 
a  distant  patrol  only  to  send  in  two  messages  daily. 
The  first  contact  with  the  hostile  infantry  must  al- 
ways be  reported.  It  will  generally  suffice  if  the  di- 
rection of  march  of  the  enemy  and  the  march-objec- 
tive reached  by  him  are  reported.  It  will  often  be 
desirable  to  send  back  only  a  single  report,  setting 
forth  the  events  of  the  day.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
method  of  despatch  of  such  messages  must  be  most 
carefully  prepared.  During  the  advance  of  the  pa- 
trol the  leader  must  call  the  attention  of  his  men, 
more  especially  from  any  good  look-out  points,  to 
any  prominent  features  passed.  He  must  make  marks 
at  difficult  places,  and  where  the  main  roads  have  to 
be  left,  to  assist  them  in  finding  their  way  back. 

Reports  should  only  be  sent  from  some  point  from 
which  the  despatch-riders  have,  at  least  to  a  certain 
degree,  a  safe  route,  where  they  will  not  have  to  pass 
through  any  hostile  outposts,  occupied  localities,  or 
defiles.  It  is  highly  desirable  to  continually  instruct 
the  patrol  as  to  the  route  to  the  rear,  and  as  to  its 
conduct  under  special  circumstances,  and  to  give  it  a 
sketch  of  the  road.  The  latter  should  contain  not  only 
names,  which  will  not  be  of  much  use  to  the  patrol, 
but  characteristic  marks  which  may  be  used  as  points 
of  orientation — forked  roads  and  the  like — to  assist 
the  men  in  choosing  the  right  road.  Orderlies  should 
be  told  the  general  contents  of  messages  which  they 
carry. 

It  is  quite  out  of  the  question  that  in  war,  and 
especially  in  hostile  country,  despatch-riders  will  be 


DISTANT  PATROLS  73 

allowed  to  ride  about  free  from  harm,  as  they  are 
unfortunately  allowed  to  do  in  peace.  The  endeavour 
to  send  many,  and  often  superfluous,  messages  by  a 
few  men  always  eventually  leads  to  the  sending  of  sin- 
gle horsemen  as  despatch-riders.  Such  a  custom, 
which  in  war  must  lead  to  disastrous  consequences, 
cannot  be  too  sharply  reproved. 

Single  orderlies,  in  hostile  country,  cannot  be  sent, 
except  where  they  know  the  district,  and  where  col- 
lision with  the  enemy's  patrols  is  out  of  the  question. 
When  long  distances  have  to  be  covered,  there  is  also 
the  danger  that  a  horse  may  succumb,  or  that  the  in- 
habitants may  stop  the  man.  The  fact  that,  in  the 
Franco-Prussian  War,  the  custom  of  sending  single 
despatch-riders  proved  itself  generally,  if  not  entirely, 
sufficient  must  not  be  regarded  as  of  great  signifi- 
cance, as  at  that  time  there  was  no  question  of  hav- 
ing to  reckon  with  the  opposition  of  hostile  cavalry. 
In  a  modem  war  it  will  certainly  be  different,  and  we 
may  be  quite  sure  that  the  cavalry  of  each  army  will 
strive  its  utmost  not  only  to  reconnoitre,  but  also  to 
prevent  the  enemy  reconnoitring.  The  distances  to  be 
covered,  also,  will  be  very  different  from  those  of 
1870-71. 

The  single  despatch-rider,  therefore,  especially  in 
the  case  of  the  distant  patrol,  must  be  replaced  by 
a  reporting  patrol.  This  can  best  be  formed  of  three 
men,  who  can  mutually  support  each  other,  and,  should 
they  meet  with  the  enemy,  have  more  chance  of 
escape  than  a  single  horseman.  For  very  important 
information,  and  against  strong  opposition,  several 
such  patrols  must  be  sent  by  different  routes.  In 
friendly  country,  where  the  population  will  give  all 
possible  support,  the  single  despatch-rider  can,  for 
short  distances,  be  more  often  used,  and  the  report- 


74  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

ing  patrols  can  be  made  weaker  according  to  circum- 
stances. 

These  circumstances  must  determine,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  strength  of  patrols,  and  the  time  which  they 
can  stay  out  without  relief. 

Patrols  must  choose  their  accommodation  for  the 
night  with  great  care.  It  is  obvious  that  for  them, 
as  for  the  reconnoitring  squadrons,  it  is  of  great  im- 
portance whether  they  are  in  their  own  or  hostile  coun- 
try. 

In  their  own  country  it  will  often  be  safer  to  seek 
shelter  for  the  night  in  the  larger  villages,  because 
such  places  will,  as  a  rule,  be  avoided  by  hostile  troops. 
It  is,  however,  not  only  a  question  of  safety,  but  also 
of  keeping  the  road  confided  to  them  in  sight  during 
the  night,  and  of  interrupting  the  transmission  of 
the  enemy's  intelligence,  which  will,  like  our  own,  be 
most  active  after  dark.  His  despatch-riders,  however, 
will  most  probably  endeavour  to  avoid  villages.  For 
the  rest,  patrols  in  their  own  country  can  choose  their 
accommodation  freely  according  to  the  situation,  and 
can  at  least  always  get  under  cover,  even  when  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  enemy. 

In  hostile  country,  however,  the  conditions  are  dif- 
ferent. Isolated  and  far  distant  from  support,  the 
patrols  run  great  danger,  even  from  the  inhabitants 
themselves,  and  should  never  try  to  spend  the  night  in 
enclosed  villages  or  farms.  If  they  wish  to  get  cover 
for  the  night,  they  must  look  for  single  houses  close  to 
the  road,  and  take  measures  that  the  inhabitants  do 
not  betray  them  to  any  of  the  enemy's  troops  or  to 
partisans  that  may  be  in  the  neighbourhood.  They 
must  also  be  careful  to  keep  a  good  look-out  and  be 
ready  to  get  away  at  a  moment's  notice.  They  should 
not,  however,  as  long  as  it  is  possible,  lose  sight  of  the 


DISTANT  PATROLS  75 

road  detailed  to  them  until  absolutely  forced  to,  but 
should  watch  it  by  an  advanced  post  in  order  to  inter- 
rupt the  enemy's  transmission  service. 

When  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  it  will  be  ad- 
visable not  to  seek  shelter,  but  to  spend  the  night  in 
woods,  or  at  all  events  distant  from  localities  where 
forage  or  food  has  been  requisitioned.  Horses  may 
then  be  off-saddled  and  fed,  singly  or  by  groups,  ac- 
cording to  circumstances.  Special  measures  of  safety 
are  also  necessary  under  such  circumstances. 

It  is  of  great  importance  to  establish  communication 
with  the  reconnoitring  squadron  during  the  night  halt 
and  to  adhere  closely,  when  it  is  at  all  possible,  to  any 
arrangements  made  with  it.  It  may  very  easily  hap- 
pen, as  we  have  seen,  that  the  task  of  the  reconnoitring 
squadron  may  be  changed,  and  that  it  may  be  required 
to  operate  in  new  directions.  It  is,  therefore,  im- 
portant that  the  patrols  do  not  get  lost  to  the  squadron, 
but  are  in  a  position  to  receive  fresh  instructions. 
The  patrols  can  also  utilise  this  opportunity  for  re- 
ceiving reinforcements  if  necessary. 

The  patrol  may  sometimes  lose  connection  with  the 
squadron ;  it  will  then  be  generally  most  advisable  for 
it  to  remain  in  observation  of  that  portion  of  the  en- 
emy which  has  been  found  upon  the  road  allotted  to  it. 
If  this  should  entail  a  change  of  direction,  reports 
should  be  sent  direct  to  that  portion  of  the  army  which 
is  assumed  to  be  the  nearest  according  to  the  general 
situation.  This  must  not,  however,  be  regarded  as  a 
hard-and-fast  rule.  It  should  rather  be  left  to  the 
independent  decision  of  the  officer  how  he  will  act  in 
the  particular  case.  Independence  of  judgment  and 
of  character  is  of  the  highest  importance,  especially 
when  on  patrol.  These  qualities  can,  however,  only 
be  effective  if  cavalry  officers  are  instructed  as  to  the 


yS  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

conditions  of  modern  armies  and  are  quite  clear  in 
theory  as  to  the  duties  and  methods  of  conducting 
patrols.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  they  will  in  future  re- 
alise the  obligation  of  applying  themselves  most  seri- 
ously to  this  branch  of  their  important  duties,  that 
they  may  be  thoroughly  prepared  and  capable  of  the 
greatest  effort  when  the  call  to  arms  resounds  in 
bloody  earnest  through  the  land. 

4.     Close  Reconnaissance  and  Reconnaissance  during 
the  Fight 

Within  certain  limits  determined  by  the  various 
crises  of  the  fight  the  reconnoitring  duties  of  the  cav- 
alry are  continuous.  As  the  hostile  armies  approach 
one  another,  distant  exploration  merges  into  close 
reconnaissance,  and  from  the  latter  evolves  the  bat- 
tle reconnaissance,  when  the  heavily-charged  thun- 
der-clouds of  war  come  into  collision,  and  the  brazen 
dice  of  battle  are  thrown. 

Within  these  limits  the  arrangements  made  for 
reconnaissance  should  not  require  fresh  dispositions, 
but  merely  supplementing  as  they  gradually  develop 
from  strategical  into  tactical  measures.  This  is  a 
matter  for  consideration  when  detailing  close  patrols, 
as  the  tendency  is  to  be  too  prodigal  of  the  scanty 
force  at  disposal.  When  the  army  cavalry  concen- 
trates towards  the  flank  of  the  army,  the  detachments 
of  it  which  have  been  carrying  out  the  reconnaissance 
against  the  enemy's  front  must  be  gradually  relieved 
by  the  divisional  cavalry.  The  army  cavalry  will 
only  be  able  to  assist  the  divisional  cavalry  in  the 
close  reconnaissance  by  the  action  of  those  portions 
of  it  which  may  fall  back  behind  the  front  of  their 
own  army.    In  such  a  case  all  should  be  placed  under 


CLOSE  RECONNAISSANCE  yy 

a  single  command,  to  prevent  useless  expenditure  of 
force  and  contradictory  orders.  Whether  the  divi- 
sional cavalry  is  to  be  reinforced  by  the  army  cavalry 
or  vice  versa,  or  whether  a  separate  sphere  of  action 
is  to  be  assigned  to  each,  must  depend  on  circum- 
stances. 

It  will,  however,  seldom  happen  that  the  army  cav- 
alry will  fall  back  behind  the  front  of  its  own  army. 
It  will  nearly  always  be  most  advantageously  placed 
on  the  flank  of  the  army,  and  will  therefore  only  have 
to  carry  out  such  reconnaissance  as  is  possible  from 
this  position.  Such  reconnaissance,  however,  is  gen- 
erally the  most  important. 

As  already  indicated,  the  reconnoitring  squadrons 
will  gradually  fall  back  upon  the  army  cavalry  itself, 
or  upon  the  advancing  columns  of  the  main  army 
which  will  now  be  approaching  them.  The  recon- 
noitring squadrons  on  the  outer  flank  will,  however, 
be  well  advised  not  to  join  themselves  at  once  to  the 
main  body  of  the  cavalry.  They  must  rather  seek 
to  operate  against  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  who  is  al- 
ready deployed,  or  against  his  lines  of  advance,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  report  the  presence  of  any  ap- 
proaching hostile  reserves  as  early  as  possible.  As  a 
single  example  of  this,  had  the  French  at  Mars  la 
Tour  acted  in  this  manner  they  would  very  soon  have 
discovered  the  approach  of  Wedel's  Brigade  and  its 
approximate  strength.  They  would  not  then  have 
been  surprised  by  the  attack  of  this  brigade  nor  would 
they  have  mistaken  it  for  the  advance-guard  of  the 
Third  Army.  One  may  well  assume  that  after  dealing 
with  Wedel's  Brigade  the  French  would,  under  such 
circumstances,  have  proceeded  to  undertake  a  general 
offensive,  and  that  the  fortunes  Qf  the  day  might  have 
been  with  them. 


78  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

The  close  reconnaissance  before  the  decisive  battle 
must  seek,  above  all  things,  to  obtain  an  idea  of  the 
grouping  of  the  hostile  forces.  Herein  lie  the  con- 
ditions of  success  or  failure.  To  this  end  endeavours 
must  be  made  to  get  far  round  the  front  of  the  en- 
emy and  to  observe  as  many  lines  of  approach  as  pos- 
sible. Rapid  and  distant  patrol  riding  and  the  strain- 
ing of  every  nerve  must  be  demanded  in  such  cases. 

When  the  whole  force  is  to  be  employed,  the  army 
cavalry  must  endeavour  to  pave  the  way  for  these 
patrols.  If  it  has  been  possible  to  defeat  the  hostile 
cavalry  before  the  decisive  battle,  this  will  be  compara- 
tively easy.  Otherwise,  every  means  must  now  be 
employed  to  bring  about  this  decision  and  to  carry  it 
to  a  successful  conclusion,  as  well  as  to  deal  with  other 
troops  which  may  seek  to  cover  the  enemy's  flanks. 

That  the  position  of  the  army  cavalry  for  such 
duties  should  not  be  in  rear  of  a  flank  of  its  own 
army  need  scarcely  be  emphasised.  It  should  rather 
strive  with  all  energy  to  Schelon  itself  in  advance  of 
the  wing  of  its  own  army  and  to  maintain  itself  on 
the  enemy's  flank.  It  will  thus  be  in  a  position  during 
the  period  of  close  reconnaissance  to  support  its  own 
reconnoitring  organs  and  either  to  join  the  battle,  or 
operate  against  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy. ^ 

*  Compare  "Unser  Kavallerie  im  nachsten  Kriege"  ("Cav- 
alry in  a  Future  War,"  translated  by  Sydney  Goldman),  and 
paragraph  522  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations. 

"During  a  battle,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  army  cavalry  to 
operate  against  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear,  to  attack  his 
shaken  infantry  and  unprotected  artillery,  to  protect  the 
flanks  of  its  own  army,  and  to  prevent  hostile  reinforcements 
reaching  the  field  of  battle.  According  to  the  result  of  the 
encounter,  it  takes  up  the  pursuit  or  covers  the  retirement. 

"For  such  activity,  the  army  cavalry  will  find  opportuni- 
ties on  the  flanks  of  the  battle  field.  A  position  in  front  of 
the  flank  of  the  main  body  will  facilitate  the  attack  and,  at 


CLOSE  RECONNAISSANCE  79 

As  to  the  close  reconnaissance  patrols  and  the  com- 
bat patrols,  as  clear  and  definite  orders  must  be  given 
them  as  to  the  distant  patrols  to  operate  in  certain 
particular  directions  or  block  certain  roads.  The  ar- 
rangements for  their  return  or  relief  must  leave  no 
room  for  doubt  if  it  is  desired  to  be  independent  of 
the  discretion  of  the  patrol  leader,  and  to  be  con- 
vinced that  the  observation  in  all  important  directions 
is  being  carried  out. 

It  will  often  be  necessary,  especially  during  the 
period  of  close  reconnaissance  in  flank  or  rear  of  the 
enemy,  to  make  the  patrols  strong  enough  to  be  able 
to  fight  their  own  way,  for  it  will  generally  be  impos- 
sible to  support  them  from  the  rear.  Should  it  be 
found  impossible  otherwise  to  break  through  the  thick 
screen  of  the  hostile  service  of  security,  whole  squad- 
rons may  operate  as  patrols,  and  must  exert  all  their 
endurance  and  speed  to  attain  their  object. 

When  a  decision  is  impending,  it  is  of  the  greatest 
importance  that  the  service  of  transmission  should  be 
especially  swift  and  sure,  for  there  will  be  but  little 
time  available  in  which  to  make  fresh  arrangements 
to  meet  any  newly  ascertained  movement  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy.  It  will  be  necessary  under  such  circum- 
stances to  supply  even  patrols  with  the  light-signal 
apparatus,  even  though  there  is  a  danger  that  these 
may  be  lost.  If  they  are  able  somewhere  from  the 
rear  of  the  hostile  army  to  flash  back  an  important 
message  in  time  for  it  to  be  of  use  they  will  fully  have 
answered  their  purpose.  It  will  of  course  be  impossi- 
ble under  such  circumstances  to  establish  permanent 
stations.  Before  the  departure  of  a  patrol  the  men 
must  be  carefully  instructed  as  to  the  point  that  will 

the  same  time,  constitute  a  threat.    This  position  is  also  well 
adapted  for  clearing  up  the  situation," 


8o  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

most  probably  be  chosen  as  a  receiving  centre,  and 
must  make  a  mental  note  of  its  position  on  the  ground, 
and  also  of  those  places  from  which  it  is  hoped  to 
send  back  intelligence.  They  must  endeavour  to  escape 
the  enemy's  notice  and  to  avoid  his  pursuit.  When 
necessary,  they  must  be  prepared  to  fight  for  posses- 
sion of  that  point  from  which  they  expect  to  be  able 
to  transmit  reports.  That  any  intelligence  transmitted 
by  signal  must  also  be  sent  to  the  rear  by  a  reporting 
patrol,  goes  without  saying. 

In  such  situations  the  activity  of  the  cavalry  must 
be  increased  to  the  utmost,  and  their  action  character- 
ised by  feverish  energy.  The  last  drop  of  blood  and 
the  latest  breath  of  man  and  horse  must  be  devoted 
to  fulfilling  the  task  of  reconnaissance. 

It  is  obvious  that  in  such  periods  of  crisis  cavalry 
cannot  go  into  quarters  for  the  night,  whether  in 
friendly  or  hostile  country.  It  will  be  best  for  them 
to  remain  concealed  in  woods,  where  they  will,  as  a 
rule,  be  discovered  with  difficulty.  For  the  rest,  the* 
night  is  the  time  which  will  generally  be  used  for 
transmitting  reports.  In  friendly  country  the  assist- 
ance of  the  inhabitants  must  be  used  for  this  purpose 
as  much  as  possible.  The  enemy  must  continually 
find  himself  moving  in  the  close  meshes  of  a  net  of 
hostile  enterprise.  In  hostile  country  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  requisition  supplies  by  force,  but  this  should 
never  be  done  in  the  area  in  which  observation  is  re- 
quired. Where  requisitions  have  been  made  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  enemy,  patrols  should  quickly 
move  away,  in  order  not  to  be  surprised,  as  Count  Zep- 
pelin was  in  the  Schirlenhof,  before  the  battle  of 
Worth.i 

*  On  June  24,  1870,  Captain  Count  Zeppelin,  of  the  Wiir- 
temburg  General  Staff,  with  a  patrol  of  3  Baden  officers  and 


CLOSE  RECONNAISSANCE  8i 

For  the  reconnaissance  on  the  battlefield  itself — in 
contradistinction  to  the  energetic  action  in  the  flanks 
and  rear  of  the  enemy — officers  provided  with  good 
glasses  must  be  employed.  The  scissors  telescope, 
which  no  higher  cavalry  leader  should  be  without, 
should  also  be  used  for  this  purpose.  Observation 
should  be  made,  when  possible,  from  some  secure  place, 
and  endeavours  made  to  recognise  the  moment  for  ac- 
tion and  intervention  in  the  battle.  Observation  carried 
out  by  patrols  from  the  front  during  the  battle  of 
the  measures  taken  by  the  enemy  is  unpractical  and 
only  possible  in  peace,  and  is  a  procedure  that  is  the 
outcome  of  the  requirements  of  leaders  lacking  in 
determination,  who  wish  to  be  continually  informed 
down  to  the  smallest  details  about  the  enemy,  instead 
of  trusting  with  self-confidence  to  the  compelling  force 
of  their  own  measures.  Patrol  service  during  the  bat- 
tle itself  is  a  matter  for  the  infantry,  and  can  be  car- 
ried out  by  no  other  troops. 

8  dragoons,  crossed  the  Rhine  at  Lauterburg,  with  orders  to 
ascertain  certain  of  the  French  dispositions.  Reaching  Selz- 
bach,  after  various  encounters,  and  finding  it  occupied  by 
French  cavalry,  the  patrol  took  refuge  on  the  25th  in  the 
little  inn  at  Schirlenhof  for  a  well-earned  rest.  Here  they 
were  surprised  by  a  squadron  of  French  hussars,  who  had 
received  information  of  their  presence  from  a  boy  at  the  inn. 
The  inhabitants  having  locked  the  Germans'  horses  into  the 
stable,  nothing  remained  but  to  fight  or  surrender.  The 
brave  Germans  chose  the  latter  course.  Lieutenant  Winsloe 
here  killed  was  the  first  casualty  of  the  war  on  the  German 
side.  The  whole  patrol  was  finally  killed  or  captured,  with 
the  exception  of  Count  Zeppelin  himself,  who  escaped  on  one 
of  the  French  hussars'  horses.  This  officer  succeeded  after 
a  nine  hours'  ride  in  winning  his  way  back  across  the  fron- 
tier with  valuable  information. — Trans.  (Count  Zeppelin  is 
the  well-known  airship  constructor.) 


82  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

II.      RECONNAISSANCE    BY    THE    DIVISIONAL     CAVALRY 

Generally  speaking,  the  conduct  of  the  various  re- 
connoitring organs  of  the  divisional  cavalry  will  be 
regulated  according  to  the  same  principles  as  hold 
good  for  the  army  cavalry.  As  for  the  latter,  so  is  it 
a  matter  of  great  importance  for  the  divisional  cav- 
alry whether  it  is  acting  in  friendly  or  in  hostile  coun- 
try. Its  methods,  too,  must  be  regulated  according 
to  its  distance  from  the  enemy.  It  will  also  endeavour 
to  establish  a  material  and  moral  superiority  over  the 
hostile  cavalry.  In  its  relative  weakness,  however, 
and  its  distribution  to  the  columns  of  the  army  there 
must  lie  certain  factors  which  will  leave  their  stamp 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  divisional  cavalry. 

First  of  all  it  is  important  what  part  the  division  to 
which  the  cavalry  belongs  plays  in  the  general  scheme. 
Various  cases  can  be  conceived  which  may  have  no 
inconsiderable  influence  on  the  character  of  the  recon- 
naissance which  the  divisional  cavalry  must  carry  out. 

It  may  belong  to  a  column  which  is  advancing  be- 
tween others,  and  where  it  has  but  a  comparatively 
small  front  for  reconnaissance  allotted  to  it.  The  army 
cavalry  may  be  in  front  of  it.  Or  it  may  be  given 
the  task  of  carrying  out  the  frontal  reconnaissance 
independently.  The  latter  case  must  be  considered 
the  most  usual  in  a  great  army,  when  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  army  cavalry  in  the  decisive  direction 
takes  place.  Or  again,  it  may  belong  to  the  flank 
column  of  an  advancing  army,  which  may  or  may  not 
be  covered  by  the  army  cavalry.  Finally,  it  may  be 
part  of  an  independently  operating,  more  or  less  de- 
tached force,  and  have  to  perform  all  the  cavalry 
duties  for  it.  In  the  last  case  it  will  generally  be  ad- 
visable to  strengthen  it,  if  possible,  from  the  army 


DIVISIONAL  RECONNAISSANCE        83 

cavalry;  but  in  any  case  its  methods  will  necessarily 
be  of  a  different  kind. 

The  most  simple  case  is  where  the  front  upon  which 
the  divisional  cavalry  finds  itself  is  covered  by  the 
army  cavalry.  It  is  then  most  important  to  keep  up 
communication  with,  and  to  be  continually  informed 
of  the  intentions  of  the  army  cavalry,  in  order  that 
the  duties  of  reconnaissance  may  be  taken  over  when- 
ever the  army  cavalry  is  compelled  to  clear  the  front 
by  a  flank  movement  or  to  uncover  the  flank.  The 
reconnoitring  organs  of  the  divisional  cavalry  must 
then  be  sent  forward  early  enough  to  effect  a  relief 
of  the  corresponding  detachments  of  the  army  cavalry, 
so  that  the  service  of  observation  of  the  enemy  in  the 
first  line  will  not  be  interrupted. 

Where  the  divisional  cavalry  cannot  rely  upon  the 
army  cavalry  for  assistance  in  reconnaissance  the  con- 
ditions are  different. 

This  leads  to  the  question  of  the  strategical  explora- 
tion. These  duties — in  contradistinction  to  those  of 
the  army  cavalry — will  be  distinguished  by  the  fact 
that  the  divisional  cavalry  cannot  advance  as  an  in- 
dependent unit  separated  from  the  mass  of  infantry, 
but  must  remain  in  continual  conjunction  with  the 
detachments  of  the  other  arms  to  which  it  belongs. 
It  is,  on  the  one  hand,  too  weak  to  be  able  to  operate 
independently,  and,  on  the  other,  is  bound  to  the  col- 
umn of  the  other  arms  by  ties  of  local  service,  which 
at  any  moment  may  make  fresh  demands  upon  it. 
It  will  therefore  not  be  denied  that  the  divisional  cav- 
alry, if  it  would  reconnoitre,  must  cleave  to  the  in- 
fantry. Its  method  of  procedure  will  rather  be  to 
advance  from  point  to  point  with  those  portions  of 
its  strength  which  can  be  spared  from  the  local  service 
of  the  division.     In  so  doing,  it  must  arrange  for 


84  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

support  in  case  of  necessity  during  the  fight  from 
the  rear,  and  can  rest  at  night  covered  by  the  infan- 
try outposts  without  being  compelled  to  march  to  the 
rear.  To  take  its  own  measures  for  security  would 
make  too  great  demand  upon  its  strength,  and  would 
quickly  deplete  it.  Only  when  the  distance  from  the 
enemy  renders  an  attack  out  of  the  question  can  the 
divisional  cavalry  remain  in  advanced  positions.  This 
consideration,  also,  must  have  its  due  influence  on 
the  method  of  advance  adopted. 

The  advance  by  stages  from  one  point  of  vantage 
to  another,  according  to  the  map,  or  from  one  defen- 
sible locality  to  another,  will  be  found  advisable.  The 
divisional  cavalry,  like  the  reconnoitring  squadrons, 
should  always  be  surrounded  by  a  close  screen  of  local 
patrols,  which  will  ensure  its  immediate  safety  and 
concealment. 

In  this  lack  of  freedom  in  the  conduct  of  the  di- 
visional cavalry  two  facts  become  apparent.  Firstly, 
that  only  in  very  rare  cases  will  the  divisional  cavalry 
be  able  to  clear  the  way  for  its  patrols,  as  the  army 
cavalry  will  continually  have  to  do.  It  is  generally, 
indeed,  too  weak  to  fight  independently  with  any 
prospect  of  success.  It  is  also,  as  we  have  seen,  lo- 
cally dependent,  and  cannot  advance  with  full  free- 
dom even  where  hindrances  to  the  reconnaissance  de- 
mand its  intervention.  Secondly,  only  in  exceptional 
cases  will  it  be  feasible  for  the  divisional  cavalry  to 
immediately  support  its  patrols  by  reconnoitring 
squadrons. 

If  the  army  corps  is  marching  in  two  columns,  the 
cavalry  of  each  is  obviously  too  weak  to  push  forward 
squadrons  of  this  kind  perhaps  several  days'  march 
ahead,  and,  when  necessary,  to  provide  for  their  re- 
lief.    Somewhat  different  are  the  conditions  of  the 


DIVISIONAL  RECONNAISSANCE        85 

advance  of  a  corps  upon  one  road.  If  it  is  accom- 
panied by  columns  on  each  side,  it  will  generally  be 
possible  to  mass  the  greater  part  of  the  cavalry  of 
both  divisions  at  the  head  of  the  corps,  and  it  will 
then  at  times  be  possible  to  push  forward  a  recon- 
noitring squadron.  In  the  case  of  a  flank  column, 
however,  the  cavalry  of  the  rear  division  will  generally 
be  occupied  with  securing  the  flank,  and  will  therefore 
not  usually  be  available  for  reinforcing  the  recon- 
noitring cavalry  in  front. 

The  divisional  cavalry  will  thus  usually  be  able  to 
detail  only  weak  patrols  for  the  distant  reconnais- 
sance, and  these  will  often  have  to  reckon  with  su- 
perior hostile  cavalry.  At  least  the  conditions  which 
obtain  in  the  army  of  our  probable  opponents  compel 
us  to  make  these  presumptions.  The  reconnoitring  pa- 
trols of  the  divisional  cavalry  must  therefore  rely 
chiefly  on  cunning  and  speed  in  carrying  out  their 
duty,  and  will  only  be  able  to  attack  under  especially 
favourable  circumstances,  where  the  enemy  whom  they 
meet  has  no  support  behind  him,  or  can  be  attacked 
with  obvious  advantage.  It  is  far  more  important 
for  them  than  for  the  patrols  of  the  army  cavalry  to 
gain  contact  with  the  enemy  unsuspected,  and  not  to 
betray  their  presence.  They  must  always  try  first  to 
get  distant  observation  of  the  enemy,  as  they  will  have 
no  fighting  support  behind  them  to  help  them  to  break 
through  the  hostile  screen  of  patrols  and  win  their 
way  to  the  head  of  the  enemy's  columns.  Their  re- 
ports, also,  will  have  to  be  brought  back  through  the 
enemy's  cavalry. 

The  distant  patrols  of  the  divisional  cavalry  will 
therefore  often  be  obliged,  even  in  their  advance,  to 
avoid  the  main  avenues  of  approach  of  the  enemy,  as 
upon  them  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  certain  to  be  met 


86  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

with.  They  must  use  secondary  roads,  and  as  secretly 
as  possible,  a  matter  of  considerable  difficulty  in  un- 
known hostile  country.  To  avoid  possible  ambush  they 
should  retire  by  a  different  road  from  that  by  which 
they  advanced.  They  will  very  rarely  be  able  to  get 
under  cover  for  the  night,  especially  when  in  the  en- 
emy's country. 

Such  duties  can  only  be  successfully  carried  out,  if 
at  all,  where  the  commander  has  at  his  disposal  a 
number  of  efficient  officers  and  under-officers,  and 
horses  trained  to  endurance  and  cross-country  work. 
In  order  to  be  able  to  carry  out  their  task  properly,  the 
men  must  be  clever,  determined  horsemen,  well  trained 
in  the  use  of  their  weapons  and  resourceful.  They 
must  also  be  absolutely  reliable  men,  who  will  not 
shrink  from  encountering  odds  when  necessary.  In 
such  patrols  as  these  the  cavalry  spirit  must  be  de- 
veloped to  its  utmost. 

It  is  a  somewhat  easier  matter  if  the  divisional  cav- 
alry is  not  confined  to  a  purely  frontal  and  limited 
area,  but  can  reconnoitre  from  the  head  of  a  flank 
column.  It  will  then  get  opportunities  of  obtaining 
observation  by  moving  round  the  enemy's  outer  flank. 
It  will,  however,  only  succeed  in  obtaining  and  trans- 
mitting intelligence  by  wide  detours,  and  the  demands 
on  the  endurance  of  man  and  horse  will  be  great  in 
proportion.  It  is  obvious  how  necessary  it  will  be, 
under  such  circumstances,  that  the  intelligence  so 
hardly  won  should  at  least  be  transmitted  quickly  and 
safely.  Some  detachment  must  therefore  be  detailed 
to  perform  the  duties  of  the  reporting  or  communi- 
cating station  usually  formed  by  a  reconnoitring 
squadron.  I  see  nothing  for  it  but  to  devote  bodies 
of  cyclists  to  this  purpose,  which  can  be  pushed  for- 
ward as  reporting  centres  on  the  main  avenues,  and 


DIVISIONAL  RECONNAISSANCE        87 

equipped,  whenever  possible,  with  the  light-signal  ap- 
paratus. A  few  mounted  men  must  be  sent  with  them 
for  scouting  purposes.  Without  these,  they  would 
be  confined  to  the  roads  for  the  close  reconnaissance 
of  the  surrounding  country,  a  procedure  which  would 
not  suffice  in  the  face  of  a  determined  enemy,  espe- 
cially in  difficult  country. 

Besides  the  distant  reconnaissance,  the  close  recon- 
naissance along  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  front 
of  the  army  falls  to  the  lot  of  the  divisional  cavalry. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  army  cavalry  will  only  in  ex- 
ceptional cases  be  able  to  support  it  in  this  task  as, 
on  the  near  approach  of  the  enemy,  it  will  probably 
have  occasion  to  draw  off  to  a  flank.  But  nowadays 
this  close  reconnaissance  appears,  by  reason  of  the 
increased  distances  and  the  greater  range  of  firearms, 
to  have  become  considerably  more  difficult.  Hostile 
armies  move  to  battle  nowadays  on  a  front  of  50  to 
100  miles. 

That  it  has  naturally  become  much  more  difficult 
under  such  circumstances  to  estimate  the  enemy's 
strength  and  to  obtain  the  necessary  knowledge  of  his 
dispositions  and  of  the  ground,  no  further  proof  is 
needed.  It  thus  becomes  possible  for  the  cavalryman 
in  general  to  get  no  closer  to  the  enemy  than  his 
rifle  will  carry,  and  to  be  compelled  to  observe  him 
from  a  distance.  There  should  be  no  mistake  about 
this. 

The  importance  of  observation  has  grown  in  pro- 
portion to  its  difficulty.  Troops  nowadays  have  to  be 
deployed  for  the  fight  at  long  ranges,  where  it  is  prac- 
tically out  of  the  question  that  a  commander  will  be 
able  to  survey  the  enemy  and  the  country  with  his  own 
eyes,  as  was  formerly  almost  invariably  the  case. 
Should,  for  example,  the  opponents  be  advancing  to'- 


88  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

wards  each  other  and  still  5  miles  apart,  another  134 
miles  will  bring  them  into  effective  artillery  range  of 
each  other.  If  they  are  going  to  wait  to  deploy  until 
they  reach  this  point,  the  deployment  will  have  to  be 
completed  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  guns,  a  thing 
which,  of  all  others,  is  to  be  avoided.  It  therefore 
follows  that  in  a  battle  of  encounter  deployment 
should  take  place,  at  the  latest,  when  still  5  miles  dis- 
tant from  the  enemy.  It  is  better  to  begin  to  draw 
the  forces  apart  even  earlier,  so  that  the  army  is 
already  deployed  when  it  moves  into  the  range  of  the 
enemy's  shrapnel. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  will  usually  be  quite 
impossible  for  the  leader  to  make  his  dispositions  ac- 
cording to  his  personal  observations.  He  is,  rather, 
almost  entirely  dependent  in  his  appreciation  of  the 
enemy  on  the  reconnaissance  of  the  cavalry,  and  may 
find  himself  at  a  great  disadvantage  if  this  should  fail 
or  lead  him  to  erroneous  conclusions. 

Reports  as  to  the  character  of  the  country,  suitable 
positions  for  artillery,  decisive  localities  or  points,  thus 
increase  greatly  in  importance,  and  it  is  obviously  most 
necessary  for  cavalry  officers  to  be  able  judiciously  to 
appreciate  such  matters  and  to  report  them  clearly 
and  intelligibly.  The  tactical  conduct,  and  at  the 
same  time  tactical  success,  will  often  be  as  dependent 
on  the  tactical,  reconnaissance  of  the  divisional  cavalry 
as  the  strategical  measures  of  the  commander-in-chief 
are  upon  the  results  of  the  strategical  exploration  of 
the  army  cavalry. 

Tactically  and  strategically  the  service  of  the  di- 
visional cavalry  is  of  equal  importance  if  it  belongs  to 
a  force  operating  independently.  In  such  cases  it 
will  often  be  obliged  to  move  with  more  freedom 
than  when  employed  in  purely  frontal  reconnaissance 


DIVISIONAL  RECONNAISSANCE        89 

with  the  main  army.  For  rest,  also,  it  will  not  always 
be  able  to  seek  the  protection  of  the  infantry,  but  will 
frequently  have  to  be  pushed  out  for  the  night  on  the 
flanks,  in  order  to  secure  the  main  body  while  at 
rest  from  these  directions,  or  the  better  to  observe 
the  enemy.  It  should,  however,  never  lose  its  im- 
mediate connection  with  its  force,  and  will  therefore 
not  always  be  in  a  position  to  measure  its  strength  with 
any  hostile  cavalry  that  may  be  met  during  the  period 
of  reconnaissance. 

When  the  tactical  decision  is  in  prospect,  or  when 
contact  has  been  gained  between  the  opposing  forces, 
the  divisional  cavalry  must  redouble  its  efforts  in  re- 
connaissance. It  is  then  a  matter  for  it  to  reconnoitre 
from  the  flanks,  and  such  reconnaissance  can  only  be 
successful,  as  in  the  case  of  the  army  cavalry,  if  those 
portions  of  the  country  are  occupied  from  which  it  is 
possible  to  observe  the  movements  and  dispositions  of 
the  enemy. 

It  is  quite  wrong  to  hang  on  the  flank  of  the  in- 
fantry, as  is  unfortunately  often  done  in  peace  ma- 
noeuvres, and  to  remain  wherever  possible  under  its 
protection,  and  to  expect  to  force  reconnaissance 
merely  by  sending  out  a  number  of  patrols. 

In  such  a  situation  patrols  have  generally  small 
prospect  of  success.  They  will  most  frequently  come 
in  contact  with  the  hostile  screen,  which  will  prevent 
them  gaining  the  decisive  points  of  the  terrain,  and 
can  hinder  the  despatch-riders  but  too  easily  from  find- 
ing their  way  to  the  rear.  It  is  more  than  questionable 
under  such  circumstances  whether  it  will  be  possible 
to  gain  any  observation  at  all,  or  to  send  back  infor- 
mation in  time  to  be  of  use.  In  these  moments  of 
crisis,  which  will  be  of  comparatively  short  duration, 
rude  force  can  alone  avail,  and  recourse  must  be  had 


90  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

to  the  sword.  The  artillery  patrols,  too,  will  only- 
find  it  possible  to  reconnoitre  successfully  under  the 
wing  of  a  victorious  cavalry.  Their  efforts  will  other- 
wise have  little  prospect  of  success. 

Speaking  generally,  the  reconnaissance  must  remain 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  cavalry  leader  who  ar- 
ranges it.  Should  the  commander-in-chief  interfere 
without  due  cause  in  his  dispositions,  he  deprives  him 
of  responsibility  and  interrupts  that  systematic  con- 
duct of  the  reconnaissance  which  is  absolutely  essential 
if  the  strength  of  the  divisional  cavalry  is  to  be  equal 
to  its  task.. 

Reports,  too,  should,  as  a  general  rule,  be  sent  to 
that  unit  of  the  cavalry  from  which  the  patrol  is 
found,  and  which  forms  the  reporting  centre  of  the 
patrol.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  cav- 
alry leader  to  remain  in  communication  with  the  Su- 
preme Command  by  using  all  means  at  his  disposal, 
even  relays  when  necessary,  so  that  all  reports  may 
reach  the  latter  by  the  shortest  route.  Only  excep- 
tionally should  patrols  report  direct  to  the  Supreme 
Command,  that  is  to  say,  when  to  send  their  messages 
through  their  own  cavalry  means  a  useless  detour  or 
a  danger. 

This  particular  method  can,  however,  only  be  car- 
ried out  in  practice  if  the  patrol  is  in  continual  com- 
munication with  the  cavalry  from  which  it  is  found. 
This  circumstance  indicates  also  the  necessity  for  de- 
tachments that  are  not  limited  in  their  zone  of  opera- 
tion to  advance  during  the  fight  against  the  enemy's 
flank,  so  that  they  may  remain  as  close  as  possible 
behind  their  own  patrols,  continually  prepared  to  sup- 
port them  and  to  hamper  the  hostile  efforts  at  recon- 
naissance. 

It  does  not  appear  advisable  under  such  circum- 


DIVISIONAL  RECONNAISSANCE         91 

stances  to  unite  all  the  available  cavalry  on  one  wing. 
It  is  certainly  obvious  that  its  main  strength  must 
be  concentrated  in  what  is  considered  the  decisive  di- 
rection, in  order  that  it  may  be  as  strong  as  possible 
on  the  field  of  battle.  This  desire,  however,  should 
not  go  so  far  as  to  denude  one  flank  wholly  of  cav- 
alry. This  flank  would  then  be  completely  laid  bare 
to  the  enemy's  observation,  and  would  itself  be  de- 
prived of  the  possibility  of  ascertaining  what  was 
going  on  on  the  enemy's  side.  It  is  much  more  advis- 
able to  provide  upon  each  flank  a  centre  of  reconnais- 
sance, even  if  such  consists  of  quite  a  weak  detach- 
ment of  cavalry,  which  will  act  as  a  reserve  for  patrols 
and  a  reporting  centre.  The  offensive  cannot,  of 
course,  be  undertaken  on  the  flank  where  the  cavalry 
is  weak,  but  reconnaissance  must  be  carried  out  by 
patrols  of  scouts,  and  other  action  limited  generally 
to  keeping  the  enemy's  patrols  at  a  distance. 

III.      THE    SCREEN 

The  idea  of  the  screen  is  first  touched  on  in  the 
"Field  Service  Manual"  of  1908;  it  is  also,  however, 
demanded  by  the  conditions  of  modern  war.  For 
however  important  it  may  be  to  gain  early  intelligence 
as  to  the  enemy  in  order  thereby  to  be  able  to  make 
the  necessary  dispositions,  it  is  naturally  just  as  im- 
portant to  deprive  him  of  this  advantage.  Reflection 
and  experience  have  shown  that  although  the  measures 
of  reconnaissance  considerably  assist  the  screening  if 
the  enemy's  cavalry  is  defeated,  they  are  not  of  them- 
selves sufficient  to  secure  the  army  from  hostile  ob- 
servation. 

The  "Field  Service  Manual"  sums  up,  I  think,  the 
chief  considerations  as  regards  screening,  for  the  most 


92  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

part  to  the  point,  especially  where  it  deals  with  the 
defensive  screen.  There  are  no  war  experiences  in 
modern  times  of  this  matter,  and,  according  to  my 
opinion,  peace  experiences  are  not  comprehensive 
enough  to  allow  of  any  appreciable  amplification  of 
the  "Field  Service  Manual." 

At  the  same  time  I  would  draw  attention  to  some 
of  the  points  which  give  occasion  for  further  research 
and  reflection. 

In  the  first  place,  I  think  that  what  the  "Field  Ser- 
vice Manual"  says  as  to  offensive  screens  requires 
some  explanation.  Strong  cavalry  will  be  concen- 
trated to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance  from  our  own 
army.  In  addition  to  this,  strong  patrols  and  even 
cyclist  detachments  advance  along  all  roads  in  order 
to  throw  back  the  hostile  patrols.  These  arrangements 
can  only  apply,  as  a  rule,  for  portions  of  the  army 
cavalry.  They  presuppose,  especially  if  the  front  of 
the  modern  army  is  to  be  screened,  a  mass  of  cavalry 
which  could  with  difficulty  be  found  from  the  di- 
visional cavalry.  By  such  methods,  moreover,  as  long 
as  strong  cyclist  detachments  are  not  available  for 
blocking  the  road  communications,  a  cause  of  dis- 
sension will  always  arise  as  to  how  much  strength  can 
be  used  for  blocking  the  roads  and  how  much  con- 
centrated for  battle,  all  the  more  so  as  the  divisional 
cavalry  can  only  with  difficulty  be  used  in  this  kind  of 
screen. 

The  latter  must,  as  we  have  seen,  remain  more  or 
less  locally  tied  to  the  division.  The  army  cavalry, 
however,  if  it  will  undertake  an  offensive  screen,  must 
advance  against  the  enemy,  seek  him  out,  force  him 
back  as  far  as  possible  from  our  own  army,  and  en- 
deavour to  defeat  him.  For  this  task  complete  free- 
dom of  movement  is  necessary — not  only  for  itself, 


THE  SCREEN  93 

but  also  for  the  screen  of  patrols  that  will  accompany 
it.  The  divisional  cavalry  will  thus  generally  only  be 
able  to  form  a  second  screening  line  behind  the  veil 
formed  by  the  advancing  army  cavalry,  and  will  not 
be  in  a  position  to  spare  for  it  patrols  for  the  block- 
ing of  roads.  Nor  is  it  at  all  clear  where  the  cyclist 
troops  mentioned  are  to  come  from. 

I  am  therefore  inclined  to  think  that  the  procedure 
advocated  by  the  "Field  Service  Manual"  can  only  be 
carried  out  in  exceptional  cases;  and  it. would  per- 
haps be  advisable  to  alter  it  somewhat. 

The  principal  task  of  the  offensive  screen  is,  ac- 
cording to  my  opinion,  to  defeat  the  hostile  cavalry; 
and  for  this  object  all  available  force  must  be  con- 
centrated, for  one  cannot  be  too  strong  upon  the  field 
of  battle.  Even  such  cyclist  detachments  as  are  avail- 
able will  be  best  used  by  bringing  them  up  for  the 
fight.  The  blocking  of  roads,  on  the  other  hand,  will, 
as  a  rule,  be  only  undertaken  when  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry has  been  beaten  and  thrown  back.  The  screen 
of  patrols  can  then  be  strengthened.  But  it  must 
be  quite  clearly  understood  that  troops  are  not  to  be 
simply  disposed  in  a  cordon;  but  that  a  sufficiently 
strong  force  must  still  remain  in  touch  with  the 
beaten  enemy  in  order  to  prevent  him,  at  all  events, 
from  taking  up  the  offensive  again,  and  breaking 
through  the  screen. 

Until  this  moment  of  victory  over  the  hostile  cav- 
alry the  duties  of  screening  must  be  left  to  the  recon- 
noitring organs  and  to  the  divisional  cavalry  of  the 
army  which  is  following  in  rear  of  them. 

According  to  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  "Field 
Service  Manual"  it  is  to  the  divisional  cavalry  that  the 
task  invariably  falls  of  screening  the  movements  of 
its  division.    I  think  that  these  duties  cannot  always 


94  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

be  clearly  regulated  according  to  the  idea  of  an  of- 
fensive or  defensive  screen;  they  will  more  often  be 
of  a  mixed  nature.  As  far  as  its  strength  will  admit, 
the  divisional  cavalry  will  endeavour  to  carry  out  the 
task  by  pushing  back,  by  fighting,  the  hostile  recon- 
noitring patrols  and  detachments  before  these  have 
succeeded  in  gaining  observation.  As  it  is  more  or 
less  locally  confined  to  its  own  front,  and  will  cer- 
tainly often  have  to  do  with  an  opponent  of  superior 
strength,  it  will,  on  the  other  hand,  frequently  be 
obliged  to  join  battle  for  favourable  localities  dis- 
mounted, supported  whenever  possible  by  machine- 
guns  and  cyclists  from  the  infantry.  In  situations 
where  the  divisional  cavalry  cannot  undertake  an  of- 
fensive fight  against  the  superiority  of  the  enemy,  and 
can  find  no  points  d'appui  in  the  terrain,  it  must  try  all 
the  more  to  block  the  roads  with  patrols  which  will 
attack  all  hostile  patrols  with  the  utmost  determina- 
tion, and  endeavour  to  capture  their  despatch-riders. 
The  divisional  cavalry  must  show  the  greatest  bold- 
ness and  judgment  if  it  will  carry  out  this  task.  The 
great  importance  of  its  role  in  the  army  here  again 
becomes  obvious. 

The  army  cavalry  will  only  undertake  an  offensive 
screen  when  the  army  is  advancing,  and  where  the 
country  does  not  afford  suitable  localities  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  defensive  screen. 

Such  a  screen  (defensive),  which  can  eventually  be 
pushed  forward  from  one  area  to  another,  is  without 
doubt,  as  is  emphasised  by  the  "Field  Service  Man- 
ual," of  much  more  use  than  an  offensive  screen. 

Of  great  importance  in  a  defensive  screen  is,  first 
and  foremost,  the  nature  of  the  obstacles  on  which  it  is 
based.  Watercourses  and  canals,  which  can  only  be 
crossed  by  bridges,  form  the  best  of  these.     Exten- 


THE  SCREEN  95 

sive  woods,  however,  lend  themselves  easily  to  the 
purpose.  They  are  doubtless,  for  cavalry  patrols,  a 
most  unpleasant  obstacle,  as  view  is  restricted  in  them, 
and  an  ambush  may  lurk  behind  every  tree.  In  the 
campaign  of  1870-71  the  German  cavalry  patrols  were, 
as  far  as  I  could  ascertain,  quite  unable  to  penetrate 
into  the  wood  of  Orleans  and  that  at  Marchenoir. 
These  woods,  by  their  mere  existence,  formed  an  ef- 
fective screen. 

To  utilise  woods  for  this  purpose  it  will  be  neces- 
sary, according  to  the  circumstances,  the  depth  and 
nature  of  the  wood,  to  post  the  fighting  detachments 
of  the  screening  line  either  at  the  exit  of  the  defile  on 
the  enemy's  side  or  more  towards  the  defender's  side 
on  the  inner  edge  of  the  wood,  if  they  can  there  find 
a  good  field  of  fire.  In  any  case  the  opposite  edge  of 
the  wood  should  be  occupied  by  observation-posts;  in 
order,  in  the  first  case,  to  get  knowledge  of  and  to  neu- 
tralise any  hostile  patrol  which  may,  in  spite  of  all 
diifficulties,  have  penetrated  the  wood,  as  soon  as  they 
emerge;  and,  in  the  second,  to  get  early  information 
of  the  entrance  of  hostile  detachments  into  the  wood, 
and  to  be  able  to  hinder,  report,  and  observe  their 
further  advance. 

I  think  that  penetration  of  such  a  screen  is  generally 
considered  to  be  easier  than  it  really  is,  especially  if 
the  defending  cavalry  is  supported  by  cyclists,  ma- 
chine-guns, and  even  artillery.  According  to  my 
opinion,  reconnoitring  squadrons  would  only,  under 
favourable  circumstances,  be  able  to  break  through 
such  a  line  that  has  been  well  disposed,  and,  even  if 
successful  in  so  doing,  would  find  it  even  more  difficult 
to  return.  It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  to  over- 
come well-placed  posts,  defending  themselves  with 
fire  action,  requires  a  great  superiority  of  force;  that 


96  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

a  squadron  can  only  overcome  quite  weak  detachments 
so  placed,  and  will,  if  successful,  very  soon  find  itself 
confronted  by  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy's  reserves. 
Single  patrols  of  picked  scouts  may  perhaps  creep 
through,  but  their  return  will  be  problematical  unless 
they  are  strongly  supported  from  the  rear.  It  will 
therefore  generally  require  strong  forces  of  the  army 
cavalry  to  break  through  a  well-organised  screening 
line  composed  of  moderately  strong  cavalry  detach- 
ments, and  to  maintain  the  breach  so  made  long 
enough  to  carry  out  the  object  of  the  reconnaissance.- 
The  place  where  the  screen  is  broken  must  in  all  cases, 
even  where  the  main  body  of  the  victorious  recon- 
noitring cavalry  is  obliged  to  advance  farther,  be  so 
strongly  occupied  that  it  will  under  all  circumstances 
remain  open  for  the  service  of  transmission  and  for 
the  eventual  retirement. 

The  greater  the  advantages  of  a  defensive  screen, 
the  more  must  the  divisional  cavalry  naturally  en- 
deavour to  avail  itself  of  it,  in  order  to  compensate 
in  some  measure  for  its  numerical  weakness.  It  will 
always  seek,  even  during  the  advance  of  the  army,  to 
choose  such  favourable  areas  for  an  occasional  halt, 
and  to  reach  them  by  advancing  in  bonds  successifs. 
Such  procedure  will  facilitate  at  the  same  time  the 
carrying  out  of  its  duties  of  screening  and  of  warding 
off  hostile  detachments  by  defensive  action.  In  order 
to  secure  the  greatest  possible  effect  for  such  action 
a  similar  procedure  as  regards  time  and  space  must 
be  arranged  with  the  cavalry  of  neighbouring  columns, 
or  ordered  by  superior  authority. 

During  the  night,  when  it  is  not  possible  to  occupy 
advanced  areas,  the  divisional  cavalry  should  try  to 
assist  the  screen  by  being  so  disposed  that  detached 
posts  will  lie  on  the  main  road  in  advance  of  the  in- 


THE  SCREEN  97 

fantry  outposts  and  at  crossroads  and  defiles,  with  a 
view  to  capturing  the  enemy's  patrols.  The  erection 
of  temporary  obstacles,  particularly  of  wire,  will  con- 
siderably assist  this  action.  In  friendly  country  the 
inhabitants  will  be  able  to  co-operate  in  this,  and,  by 
judicious  conduct  and  the  procuring  of  timely  and 
sufficient  intelligence,  may  be  of  great  use  to  the  force. 
In  erecting  such  obstacles  it  must  always  be  remem- 
bered that- our  own  advanced  patrols  should  be  warned 
of  them,  or  that  by  some  kind  of  pre-arranged  mark 
upon  the  road  they  should  be  made  aware  of  their 
presence  when  returning  with  reports  through  their 
own  line.  It  scarcely  needs  to  be  emphasised  that  such 
measures  should  be  made  use  of  by  the  army  cavalry 
as  well  as  by  the  divisional  cavalry,  in  order  to  increase 
their  own  safety  at  night. 

IV.      RAIDS 

The  idea  of  the  raid  has  been  taken  from  the  Ameri- 
can War  of  Secession.  Our  new  Regulations  desig- 
nate such  undertakings  as  "Streifziige"  (527),^  and  do 
not  appear  to  attach  overmuch  importance  to  them. 
Their  use  is  only  advocated  if  a  superfluity  of  cav- 
alry is  at  hand.  They  should  not,  it  is  said,  distract 
the  cavalry  from  their  own  duties  or  from  co-operat- 
ing in  the  battle  (395)-^ 

^  "Enterprises  of  long  duration  by  large  bodies  of  cavalry 
against  the  enemy's  lines  of  communication  separate  them 
from  their  principal  duties.  Such  raids  are  to  be  undertaken 
only  when  cavalry  is  redundant.  Sufficient  ammunition  and 
supplies  must  be  carefully  arranged  for." 

*  "Attempts  on  the  more  distant  hostile  communications 
may  produce  valuable  results ;  but  they  must  not  distract  the 
cavalry  from  its  true  battle  objectives.    In  the  event  of  an 


98  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Whether  one  agrees  with  this  estimation  of  the 
value  of  such  enterprises  naturally  depends  upon  the 
view  taken  of  the  co-operation  of  cavalry  in  the  bat- 
tle and  the  general  conception  of  the  conditions  of 
modern  war.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  importance  of 
such  undertakings  has  increased  in  the  same  measure 
as  the  value  of  cavalry  on  the  main  battlefield  has 
diminished. 

The  great  size  of  modern  armies  renders  it,  gen- 
erally speaking,  impossible  for  them  to  live  on  the 
country.  A  modern  army  marching  once  through  the 
richest  country  will  nowadays  almost  completely  ex- 
haust its  resources,  and  yet  the  supplies  carried  will 
scarcely  suffice  to  feed  the  columns  during  a  pro- 
tracted movement.  Armies  are  far  more  dependent 
than  formerly  on  the  supplies  from  the  rear — more, 
indeed,  than  in  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great.  In 
those  days,  if  the  bread-wagons  ran  short,  it  was  pos- 
sible to  fill  up  from  the  country.  The  armies  were 
never  so  great  that  this  became  impossible.  The  cav- 
alry, indeed,  devoted  most  of  its  time  to  foraging,  and 
the  soldier  frequently  bought  his  supplies,  all  except 
his  bread,  on  the  spot. 

Nowadays  the  circumstances  are  quite  changed.  It 
is  out  of  the  question  for  the  horses  of  the  modern 
army  to  find  the  necessary  forage  in  the  country  it- 
self. That  the  men  of  the  great  armies  of  the  present 
day  can  supply  themselves  when  rations  run  out  re- 
mains to  be  proved.  On  paper  it  is  indeed  often  pos- 
sible, taking  into  consideration  the  supplies  available 
in  peace;  but  these  calculations  cannot  hold  good  for 
a  real  theatre  of  war  where  concentration  has  claimed 
all  available  resources. 

engagement,  co-operation  with  a  view  to  victory  must  be  the 
watchword  of  every  formation,  whether  great  or  small." 


RAIDS  99 

Of  the  straits  to  which  a  great  army  may  be  reduced 
when  suppHes  really  give  out,  the  campaign  of  1812  in 
Russia  is  a  good  example.  There,  even  during  the 
advance  to  Moscow,  Napoleon's  army  practically  dis- 
solved owing  to  lack  of  supplies.  Only  some  90,cxx) 
men  of  the  mighty  host  arrived  in  Moscow;  only  these 
perished  during  the  retreat.  How  fearfully  the  Napo- 
leonic armies  suffered  and  melted  away  owing  to  want 
of  supplies  gives  cause  for  reflection.  In  the  armies 
of  millions  of  the  present  day  such  conditions  become 
still  more  perilous.  Matters  appertaining  to  ammu- 
nition are  of  equal  importance.  The  modern  army 
carries  enormous  masses  of  artillery  with  it.  All  the 
guns  are  designed  for  a  vast  expenditure  of  ammuni- 
tion, and  the  rafale  from  covered  positions  and  against 
covered  positions  will  indeed  make  this  necessary. 
Modern  infantry,  too,  is  armed  in  a  manner  that  will 
entail  a  prodigious  expenditure  of  cartridges.  The 
replacement  of  this  expended  ammunition  is  of  vital 
importance.  Railways  will  have  to  be  laid  in  rear  of 
the  armies  to  cope  with  these  demands.  Long  trains 
of  wagons  and  automobiles  will  move  to  and  fro  be- 
hind them.  On  every  high-road  and  in  every  railway- 
station  magazines  will  appear,  and  all  operations  must 
come  to  a  standstill  and  miscarry  as  soon  as  this  great 
organisation  ceases  from  any  cause  to  carry  out  its 
functions. 

I  hold,  therefore,  that  such  circumstances  render  a 
disturbance  of  the  rear  communications  of  an  army  an 
important  matter.  It  will  often  do  the  opponent  more 
damage,  and  contribute  more  to  a  favourable  decision 
of  arms  than  the  intervention  of  a  few  cavalry  di- 
visions in  the  decisive  battle  itself. 

The  one  does  not,  of  course,  exclude  the  possibility 
of  the  other.     General  Stuart,  in  the  campaign  of 


lOO  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Gettysburg,  rode  all  round  the  hostile  army,  broke  up 
its  communications,  drew  hostile  troops  away  from 
the  decisive  point,  and  was  yet  in  his  place  on  the 
wing  of  the  army  on  the  day  of  battle.  What  this  man 
performed  with  cavalry  and  the  inestimable  damage  he 
inflicted  on  his  opponent  are  worth  studying.  The 
fortune  of  war,  which  lay  in  might  and  in  the  nature 
of  things,  he  could  not  turn.  Nor  could  he  bring  the 
advance  of  an  army  to  a  standstill,  because  at  that 
period  and  under  those  circumstances  it  was  possible 
for  the  army  of  the  North  to  live,  at  least  for  a  time, 
upon  the  country.  If  we  regard  his  achievement  by 
the  light  of  modern  conditions,  we  shall  certainly  not 
fall  into  the  error  of  underestimating  the  value  of 
such  enterprises.  If  we  compare  it  with  the  per- 
formances of  cavalry  upon  the  battlefield  in  the  latest 
war,  we  will  be  able  to  obtain  a  true  impression  of 
the  degree  of  importance  of  modern  cavalry  action. 

I  am  inclined  to  think  that  such  enterprises  will  be 
of  altogether  extraordinary  significance  in  a  future 
war;  least  so,  perhaps,  during  the  earlier  battles  re- 
sulting from  the  concentration,  when  it  will  be  difficult 
to  get  round  the  flanks  of  the  enemy,  but  more  so 
during  the  subsequent  course  of  operations.  We  have 
only  to  imagine  what  the  decisive  consequences  must 
have  been  if  General  von  Werder,  and,  later.  Gen- 
eral von  Manteuffel,  had  been  in  a  position  to  con- 
tinually interrupt  the  rear  communications  of  the  army 
of  Bourbaki.  In  all  probability  the  latter  must  have 
capitulated  long  before  it  reached  the  Swiss  frontier, 
always  granting  that  it  was  successful  in  getting  so 
far  as  the  battlefield  of  the  Lisaine.  The  whole  crisis 
of  this  campaign,  which  was  very  nearly  ending  in 
the  defeat  of  the  Germans,  would  thus  possibly  have 
been  avoided. 


RAIDS  loi 

There  are  plenty  of  examples  of  this.  To  indicate 
only  one  from  the  history  of  the  latest  war,  I  would 
call  to  mind  the  undertaking  of  the  Russians  against 
the  rear  communications  of  the  Japanese  army. 

If  this  undertaking  had  been  actually  directed 
against  the  only  railway  at  the  disposal  of  the  Japa- 
nese army,  if  it  had  been  carried  through  by  throwing 
into  the  scale  the  whole  fighting  strength  of  a  really 
mobile  and  efficient  cavalry,  and  if  it  had  thereby  suc- 
ceeded in  interrupting  the  supplies  of  the  Japanese 
army  for  a  period,  the  whole  course  of  the  campaign 
might  have  been  changed.  Victory  in  this  tremendous 
conflict  hung  continually  in  the  balance,  and  it  needed 
but  little  more  weight  on  either  side  to  turn  the  scale 
of  the  fortunes  of  war. 

The  importance  of  such  raids  in  modem  war  should 
not  therefore,  in  my  opinion,  be  underestimated.  They 
are  capable  rather  of  exercising  enormous  influence 
on  the  course  of  events. 

Rules,  however,  cannot  be  laid  down  for  their  con- 
duct. The  Regulations  indicate,  shortly,  that  atten- 
tion must  be  paid  to  the  transport  of  sufficient  ammu- 
nition and  supplies,  and  here,  indeed,  move  in  the  right 
direction.  It  is  absolutely  indispensable  that  a  cavalry 
mass  destined  to  carry  out  such  an  enterprise  should 
be  independent  of  what  it  may  find  in  the  country 
and  be  perfectly  free  of  movement. 

The  supply  and  ammunition  columns,  however, 
which  accompany  it,  must  also  be  so  mobile  that  they 
are  able  to  follow  the  troops  closely,  even  at  a  rapid 
pace,  as  otherwise  they  will  run  the  danger  of  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  whole  force  de- 
signed for  the  enterprise  must  be  able  to  advance  rap- 
idly as  a  concrete  whole,  and  should  not  be  allowed 
to  take  up  too  much  room.     Resources  foimd  upon 


I02  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

the  enemy's  lines  of  communication  and  magazines 
captured  must  be  used  for  the  sustenance  of  the  troops 
as  far  as  possible.  It  will  then  be  able  to  reserve 
the  supplies  carried  for  critical  times  or  for  a  further 
turning  movement.  Any  of  the  enemy's  supplies  which 
are  not  used  must  be  ruthlessly  laid  waste.  His  rail- 
ways and  magazines,  particularly  any  important  en- 
gineering structures,  must  be  thoroughly  destroyed, 
the  necessary  explosives  being  carried  in  sufficient 
quantities. 

In  contrast  to  Stuart's  raids,  however,  one  must 
count  on  meeting  not  inconsiderable  bodies  of  the  en- 
emy's communication  troops,  which  will  probably  be 
capable  of  rapid  reinforcement.  This  entails  corre- 
sponding preventive  measures. 

Hostile  cavalry  sent  to  secure  the  safety  of  the  com- 
munications will  generally  have  to  be  attacked  in  a 
determined  manner.  It  may  sometimes,  however,  be 
more  advantageous  to  avoid  it  by  rapid  marching.  For 
the  rest,  the  factor  of  surprise  is  of  decisive  impor- 
tance. Should  the  enemy  early  become  aware  of  the 
approach,  he  will  generally  be  in  a  position  to  bring 
up  fresh  forces,  often  by  rail,  and  thereby  imperil  the 
success  of  the  whole  undertaking.  Under  such  circum- 
stances a  covered  approach,  perhaps  by  night,  careful 
screening,  and  the  interruption  of  the  enemy's  tele- 
graph-lines and  transmission  service  are  matters  to 
which  special  attention  must  be  paid.  It  is  also  a 
matter  of  consideration  in  the  attack  on  communica- 
tions and  railways  to  destroy  them  at  a  sufficient  dis- 
tance above  and  below  the  objective  by  means  of 
detachments  deflected  for  that  purpose,  so  that  the 
enemy  may  be  prevented  from  bringing  up  reinforce- 
ments. If  the  direction  of  the  attack  is  fixed  upon 
and  assured,  and  if  approach  and  deployment  have 


RAIDS  103 

been  successfully  effected  unobserved,  the  attack  must 
from  the  first  be  carried  through  with  sufficient  fire- 
power and  energy  to  allow  the  enemy  no  time  for 
reflection. 

It  is  therefore  absolutely  necessary  that  troops  en- 
gaged in  a  raid  should  be  of  sufficient  fighting  strength 
to  be  able  rapidly  to  break  down  any  resistance.  The 
scanty  strength  of  a  division  of  six  regiments  is  much 
too  small  for  such  an  undertaking  in  modern  war. 
Stronger  divisions  must  be  formed  for  the  purpose, 
and  strengthened  when  necessary  by  cyclist  battalions. 
An  enterprise  of  this  kind  also  requires  thorough 
preparation,  especially  by  an  extensive  system  of 
espionage  which  will  amplify  the  results  of  the  cavalry 
reconnaissance.  Before  such  a  raid  is  undertaken  all 
possible  information  must  be  to  hand  as  to  the  condi- 
tions in  the  rear  of  the  hostile  army.  Mobile  light 
bridging  equipment  should  accompany  the  expedition, 
with  the  necessary  complement  of  mounted  engineers. 
During  the  advance  the  cavalry  should  be  surrounded 
by  a  screen  of  patrols,  not  too  far  distant  from  it, 
so  that  the  enemy  will  not  too  early  become  aware  of 
the  expedition,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  far  enough 
to  guard  against  surprise.  After  a  successful  surprise 
the  force  should  withdraw  with  the  same  speed  in 
order  to  escape  from  the  enemy's  counter-measures. 
Finally,  the  chief  safety  of  such  enterprises  lies  in 
their  daring. 

The  leader  of  such  a  raid  should  be  minutely  in- 
structed as  to  the  advance  and  intended  operations  of 
his  own  army,  so  that  he  may  be  able  to  calculate 
when  and  where  the  decisive  collision  between  the  op- 
posing armies  will  take  place.  He  must  regulate  his 
own  movements  accordingly.  As  long  as  the  two 
armies  are  still  distant  from  each  other  he  can  strike 


I04  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

the  enemy's  communications  far  to  the  rear,  destroy- 
ing railways  and  magazines.  The  nearer,  however,  the 
opponent  approaches  to  his  own  army,  the  more  closely 
must  he  endeavour  to  hang  on  the  rear  of  the  hostile 
troops  and  to  interrupt  the  supply  of  the  immediate 
necessities,  that  is  to  say,  to  destroy  the  supply  and 
ammunition  columns  of  the  army  corps,  and  to  capture 
the  provision  and  baggage  wagons  of  the  troops.  If 
circumstances  demand,  he  must  be  able  to  appear 
upon  the  battlefield  itself  on  the  day  of  battle. 

Keen  perception  and  foresight,  rapid  decision,  and 
relentless  energy  are  indispensable  qualities  to  the 
leader  of  such  a  raid.  The  ability  to  mystify  and 
mislead  the  enemy  will  greatly  facilitate  the  carrying 
out  of  the  enterprise.  A  considerable  measure  of  cav- 
alry ability  is,  at  the  same  time,  necessary  to  ensure 
proper  horse  management.  A  combination  of  all 
these  qualities  goes  to  form  the  great  cavalry  leader, 
before  whom,  even  in  modern  war,  lie  great  pros- 
pects of  distinction,  if  he  but  understands  how  to  break 
loose  from  the  routine  and  pedantry  of  the  day. 


B.    THE   ACTION   OF   CAVALRY 

I.      GENERAL 

As  I  have  already  indicated,  the  action  of  cavalry  in 
the  fight  may  be  divided,  according  to  its  character, 
into  two  quite  distinct  groups — i.e.  the  fight  of  cavalry 
acting  independently,  and  to  which  is  detailed  only  a 
small  proportion  of  the  other  arms ;  and  the  interven- 
tion of  cavalry  in  the  battle — in  the  great  decision  of 
the  other  arms. 

It  has  been  proposed,  even  for  the  cavalry,  to  di- 


GENERAL  105 

vide  tactical  principles  according  to  the  idea  of  the 
prearranged  battle  and  the  battle  of  encounter.  I  do 
not,  however,  think  that  this  grouping  will  meet  the 
case.  In  a  great  battle  the  fighting  is  always  of  a 
prearranged  nature;  in  the  fight  of  the  independent 
cavalry  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  between  an  en- 
counter and  an  arranged  affair.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  conditions  of  prearranged  action  in  a  battle  and 
in  an  independent  conflict  of  the  cavalry  are  quite 
different,  and  cannot  be  examined  from  a  single  point 
of  view. 

The  grouping,  then,  proposed  by  me  is  still  that 
which  best  corresponds  to  the  actual  circumstances. 
In  this  grouping,  in  the  first  case,  the  cavalry  appears 
as  the  chief  arm,  whose  spirit  and  character  set  the 
tone  of  the  whole  nature  of  the  fight;  in  the  second, 
it  is  merely  an  auxiliary,  and  must  conform  to  the 
law  of  the  other  arms  in  great  matters  and  small. 

But  the  fight  is  deeply  influenced,  even  in  the  first 
case,  by  the  co-operation  of  these  other  arms,  and  I 
believe  that  only  in  exceptional  cases  will  a  purely 
cavalry  combat  take  place,  at  all  events  on  a  large 
scale.  Where  squadrons,  regiments,  and  perhaps  even 
brigades  unassisted  by  the  other  arms,  come  into  col- 
lision with  each  other,  the  charge  may  still  often  suf- 
fice for  a  decision.  But  where  it  is  an  affair  of  larger 
masses  it  will  never  be  possible  to  dispense  with  the 
co-operation  of  fire-arms,  and  in  most  cases  a  combina- 
tion of  cavalry  combat,  of  dismounted  fighting  and 
artillery  action,  will  ensue. 

We  must  not  conceal  from  ourselves  the  fact  that  in 
a  future  war  it  will  by  no  means  be  always  a  matter  of 
choice  whether  we  will  fight  mounted  or  dismounted. 
Rather,  by  himself,  seizing  the  rifle,  will  the  opponent 
be  able  to  compel  us  to  adopt  dismounted  action.    On 


io6  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

our  mancjeuvre-grounds  the  charge  on  horseback  is 
always  the  order  of  the  day,  even  against  artillery 
or  machine-guns.  The  umpires  continually  allow  such 
attacks  to  succeed,  and  the  troops  ride  on  as  if  noth- 
ing had  happened.  Equally  fearless  of  consequences 
do  they  expose  themselves  to  rifle-fire.  But  there 
are  no  bullets. 

In  real  war  it  is  different.  Even  then  many  a  charge 
will  naturally  be  successful,  but  victory  will  mean  such 
sacrifices  that  the  troops  will  often  become  too  weak  to 
carry  out  their  further  tactical  and  strategical  duties. 
Such  losses  will  not  be  incurred  without  necessity,  and 
troops  will  give  way,  where  possible,  or  themselves 
adopt  dismounted  action.  The  last  will  often  indeed 
be  necessary,  as  space  and  time  will  frequently  be 
wanting  for  a  turning  movement,  and  even  if  such  a 
movement  were  undertaken  it  would  often  lead  to  a 
fresh  obligation  to  fight  on  foot  in  another  place. 
This  was  repeatedly  proved  by  the  events  of  the  cam- 
paign of  1870-71.  Again  and  again  was  it  necessary 
to  detail  infantry  to  the  cavalry  divisions  in  order  to 
brush  aside  by  offensive  action  resistance  that  hindered 
the  advance  of  the  cavalry,  and  which  could  not  be 
broken  down  even  by  the  horse  artillery  which  ac- 
companied it. 

That  the  English  in  the  South  African  war  were 
finally  repeatedly  successful  in  forcing  the  mounted 
Boers  back  by  turning  movements  without  actual  at- 
tacks proves  nothing  for  European  conditions.  The 
explanation  lies  in  the  clumsiness  of  the  Boers,  who 
were  hampered  for  rapid  movement  by  their  wagons 
and  possessed  no  offensive  strength  of  any  kind,  at 
least  during  the  decisive  portion  of  the  campaign. 
Otherwise  they  could  easily  have  anticipated  the  ef- 
forts of  the  English  at  a  turning  movement  by  the 


GENERAL  107 

shortest  line,  or  would  have  been  able  by  taking  the 
offensive  to  punish  the  dispersion  that  the  turning 
movement  entailed.  We  must  not  fall  into  any  mis- 
conception of  the  fact  that  turning  movements  al- 
ways contain  an  element  of  danger  and  can  often 
bring  about  very  unfavourable  situations.  They  lay 
bare  our  own  communications  or  lead  to  dangerous 
dispersion  of  force.  It  is  necessary  too,  not  only  to 
see  behind  the  enemy,  but  also  to  defeat  him,  in  order 
to  gain  a  jree  hand  for  reconnaissance.  To  this  end 
we  will  have  to  attack,  and  often  on  foot,  as  we  may 
be  quite  sure  that  our  possible  opponent  will  use  the 
rifle. 

Circumstances  have  distinctly  altered  since  1870-71. 
If  we  had  at  that  time  no  real  cavalry  opponent  to 
face,  we  may  yet  be  certain  next  time  of  having  to 
deal  with  a  numerous  and  determined  cavalry  who 
will  quite  conceivably  endeavour  to  meet  us  in  shock 
action  with  the  arme  blanche.  There  will  always  be 
dashing  soldierly  natures  everywhere  who  will  make 
a  bid  for  success  by  risking  all.  Whether  the  hostile 
cavalry,  once  beaten,  will  return  to  the  attack,  is  more 
than  doubtful.    I  do  not  think  so. 

It  lies  deeply  embedded  in  human  nature  that  he 
who  feels  himself  the  weaker  will  act  on  the  defen- 
sive. Both  opponents  will  often  endeavour  to  exploit 
the  advantages  of  the  defensive.  It  frequently  hap- 
pens during  manoeuvres  that  the  cavalry  endeavours 
to  seize  some  commanding  position,  and  so  force  the 
enemy  to  attack  it  under  the  fire  of  artillery  posted 
there.  The  other  side,  however,  may  make  correspond- 
ing endeavours.  An  indecisive  artillery  duel  is  the 
usual  result  of  such  efforts.  But  if  such  action  is  fre- 
quent in  peace,  how  much  more  frequent  will  it  be 
under  the  pressure  of  responsibility  which  war  brings 


io8  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

with  it,  especially  where  one  side  is  tactically  the 
weaker  ? 

It  requires  an  enormous  moral  strength,  personal 
influence  over  troops,  and  firmness  of  character  to  be 
able  to  maintain  the  offensive  spirit,  even  after  an 
unfavourable  conflict,  and  continually  to  invoke  the 
ultimate  decision  anew.  In  general,  it  may  be  relied 
upon  that  defence  will  be  carried  out  according  to  tac- 
tical defensive  principles,  and  that  with  the  firearm. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  upon  that  point  to  those  who 
have  studied  human  nature  by  the  light  of  military 
history. 

Our  probable  opponents,  too,  will  certainly  often  ad- 
vance dismounted.  At  all  events  they  are  endeavour- 
ing to  strengthen  cavalry  divisions  by  cyclist  battalions 
and  infantry,  and  perhaps  by  mounted  infantry,  and 
thereby  already  show  a  remarkable  inclination  to  con- 
duct the  fight,  even  of  cavalry,  with  the  firearm,  and 
only  to  use  their  horses  as  a  means  of  mobility,  as 
was  the  custom  of  the  Boers  in  Africa. 

The  role  of  cavalry  in  the  fight  will  then  apparently 
consist  of  a  combination  of  the  various  methods  of 
fighting.  In  explanation  of  this  view  I  would  cite  a 
well-known  example. 

The  task  of  the  German  army  cavalry  in  the  battle 
of  Mars  la  Tour  was  to  relieve  the  left  flank  of  the 
German  army  by  a  determined  attack  against  the 
right  of  the  French,  and  thus  to  bring  the  appre- 
hended advance  of  the  enemy  to  a  standstill.  It  did 
not  accomplish  this  task,  but  was  satisfied  with  trying 
conclusions  with  the  French  cavalry ;  but  did  not  either 
win  a  decisive  victory  over  the  latter  nor  reap  the 
necessary  tactical  benefit  from  the  action.  It  cer- 
tainly maintained  its  superiority  over  the  enemy,  but 
it  made  no  attempt  to   interfere  decisively  in  the 


GENERAL  109 

course  of  the  battle  itself.  This  honour  was  left  to 
the  1st  Dragoons  of  the  Guard. 

But  if  we  assume  for  a  moment  that  this  cavalry, 
after  driving  the  French  from  the  field,  had  made  an 
attempt  to  operate  further  against  the  right  flank  of 
the  French  army,  Cissey's  Division,  how  would  mat- 
ters have  stood? 

The  French  infantry  had  occupied  the  Grey  ere  Farm 
as  a  support  to  their  right  flank.  The  Chasseurs 
d'Afrique,  on  the  other  hand,  who  initiated  the  cavalry 
fight,  retired  after  they  had  been  beaten  by  the  13th 
Dragoons  in  a  northerly  direction,  and  occupied  with 
dismounted  fire  the  southern  edge  of  a  small  wood 
near  Ville  sur  Yron,  which  the  French  call  Bois  de  la 
Grange  and  the  German  official  history  Bois  de 
Greyere.  It  is  bordered  on  the  south  by  the  plateau 
of  Ville  sur  Yron.  The  dismounted  Chasseurs  here 
formed  an  echelon  behind  the  right  flank  of  the  French 
infantry. 

How  should  the  German  cavalry  have  acted  under 
such  circumstances  in  order  to  gain  contact  with  the 
right  flank  of  the  French  infantry  so  protected?  The 
strongly  occupied  Geyere  Farm  commanded  the 
crossing  of  the  Fond  de  la  Cuve,  which  stretches 
in  a  northerly  direction  from  Mars  la  Tour  towards 
Chateau  Moncel,  while  to  the  north  the  wood  occu- 
pied by  the  Chasseurs  limited  freedom  of  movement. 
What  else  remained  but  a  determined  attack  of  both 
objectives  and  their  capture,  and  that  on  foot?  Ar- 
tillery alone  would  not  have  sufficed  against  the 
Greyere  Farm,  for  this  point  would  have  had  to  be 
strongly  occupied  with  riflemen,  and  nowadays  also 
with  machine  guns,  befoie  the  crossing  of  the  Fond 
de  la  Cuve  which  the  farm  commanded,  and  which 


no  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

divided  our  cavalry  from  the  French  infantry,  could 
be  accomplished. 

We  can  thus  see  that  even  in  the  action  of  cavalry 
in  battle  the  combination  of  the  several  methods  of 
fighting  can  scarcely,  if  ever,  be  avoided.  In  flank  and 
rear,  also,  the  opponent  will  endeavour  to  secure  him- 
self by  occupying  points  of  support  as  soon  as  he  be- 
comes aware  of  our  intention  to  operate  in  these 
directions.  Our  cavalry  must  thus  be  continually  pre- 
pared to  pave  the  way  by  dismounted  action  for  the 
mounted  combat. 

Our  new  Regulations  mention  quite  incidentally 
(390)*  that  cavalry  will  often  have  to  combine 
mounted  and  dismounted  action,  that  "on  occasions" 
also,  in  combination  with  shock  action,  dismounted 
cavalry  must  be  ready  to  hold  supporting  points  to 
cover  deployment  or  to  co-operate  in  the  engagement 

(438).^ 

1  do  not  think  that  this  passing  mention  of  the  im- 
portance of  combination  of  the  two  methods  of  fight- 
ing of  the  cavalry  sufficiently  emphasises  the  matter. 
After  due  reflection  over  all  the  circumstances  apper- 
taining to  the  question,  I  am,  on  the  other  hand,  firmly 
convinced  that  the  mutual  relationship  between  the 

*  "By  reason  of  its  fire-arms,  cavalry  is  capable  also  of 
dismounted  action.  It  is  thus  in  a  position — and  especially 
so  when  supported  by  horse  artillery  and  machine-gxins — to 
offer  resistance  to  detachments  of  all  arms,  or  to  cause  them 
serious  loss  by  unexpected  fire-action.  Nor  need  it  refrain 
from  attack,  should  the  situation  require  it.  It  will  often 
have  to  combine  dismounted  with  mounted  action." 

2  "In  combination  with  the  cavalry  combat,  the  fire  effect 
of  the  carbine  may  be  employed  on  occasions.  Thus  the  oc- 
cupation of  points-d'appui  by  portions  of  the  advanced  guard 
may  often  provide  favourable  and,  at  times,  indispensable 
preliminaries  to  the  deployment  of  a  division.  The  support 
of  carbin  fire  may  be  possible  and  useful  even  during  contact." 


GENERAL  in 

fight  on  foot  and  on  horseback  will  give  the  modern 
cavalry  combat  its  peculiar  character.  This  relation- 
ship will  always  have  to  be  reckoned  with,  and  all  tac- 
tical considerations  must  be  guided  by  it. 

In  my  opinion  all  the  principles  of  cavalry  tactics 
should  spring  from  this  co-operation  of  the  several 
methods  of  fighting  and  not  from  its  attitude  towards 
the  various  arms  considered  separately.  The  modem 
battle  suffers  no  division  of  the  action  of  one  arm,  or 
of  one  manner  of  fighting  from  another.  As  every 
kind  of  country  has  to  be  utilised  for  the  fight,  so  also 
must  the  most  varied  kind  of  action  of  the  arms  be 
taken  into  account.  It  must,  of  course,  be  clearly  es- 
tablished how  these  can  best  be  applied  against  the 
various  adversaries — cavalry,  artillery,  or  infantry. 
Such  reflections,  however,  can  refer  only  to  tactical 
formations.  On  the  other  hand,  as  soon  as  it  becomes 
a  question  of  tactical  leading,  such  combination  of 
all  arms  must,  from  the  first,  be  taken  into  account 
as  war  may  demand. 

Military  history  affords  us  vivid  examples  of  such 
co-operation  of  the  arms  in  a  cavalry  fight,  not,  in- 
deed, in  a  European  theatre  of  war,  but  in  the  Civil 
War  in  America.  They  are  woven,  above  all,  round 
the  heroic  figure  of  General  "]eh"  Stuart,  and  if  weap- 
ons and  other  circumstances  of  the  time  and  place 
were  different  from  those  obtaining  in  Europe  to-day, 
the  principle  of  action  has  still  remained  the  same. 

"Soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Stuart  dis- 
tinguished himself  as  a  cavalry  leader,  and  his  stra- 
tegical work  in  blindfolding  the  enemy  and  in  en- 
lightening his  own  army  has  never  been  surpassed. 
As  a  cavalry  tactician  he  is  not  only  the  first,  but 
hitherto  the  only,  leader  of  the  arm  who  understood 
how  to  combine  the  effects  of  fire  and  shock,  how  to 


112  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

render  effective  service  in  fighting  on  foot  without 
losing  the  power  to  strike  on  horseback  when  oppor- 
tunity offered."  ^ 

There,  indeed,  was  a  man  worthy  of  emulation. 

We  must,  I  think,  be  resolute  in  freeing  ourselves 
from  all  old-fashioned  conceptions  of  those  knightly 
cavalry  combats  which  have  in  reality  become  obsolete 
owing  to  the  necessities  of  modern  war.  We  do  not 
in  this  need  to  break  with  our  ancient  and  honoured 
traditions,  for  the  spirit  of  tradition  consists  not  in 
the  retention  of  antiquated  forms,  but  in  acting  in 
that  spirit  which  in  the  past  led  to  such  glorious  suc- 
cess. But  this  spirit  points  to  the  road  of  progress  and 
bids  us  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  urged  by  events, 
but,  hurrying  before  them,  to  gain  a  start  in  develop- 
ment and  therewith  a  decisive  advantage  over  our 
enemies.  To  maintain  in  the  troops,  under  modern 
conditions,  the  spirit  of  discipline  and  independence, 
and  of  the  greatest  effort  and  self-sacrifice,  that  is  the 
old  Prussian  tradition,  and  not  the  adherence  to  dead 
forms,  which  in  our  history  has  been  bloodily  enough 
avenged. 

This  principle  has  been  embraced  in  all  the  other 
spheres  of  military  development ;  it  is  only  the  cavalry 
that  has  remained  behind  the  times. 

In  order  to  be  able  to  deal  with  the  functions  of  the 
mounted  arm  in  accordance  with  the  old  Prussian  prin- 
ciples, we  must  try  to  get  a  clear  and  unprejudiced  con- 
ception of  the  spirit  of  the  modern  cavalry  combat. 
We  must  look  forward  and  pierce  the  veil  of  the 
future  uninfluenced  by  the  ghosts  of  the  past.  The 
probable  events  and  conditions  of  the  modern  battle 
must  be  our  guiding  star,  and  when  we  have  realised 
how  the  spirit  of  cavalry  may  be  adapted  to  them,  how 
*  "The  Crisis  of  the  Confederacy,"  by  Cecil  Battine. 


GENERAL  113 

the  results  of  modem  technical  improvements  in  arms 
influence  and  strengthen  the  action  of  the  cavalry 
masses,  then  alone  can  we  lay  down  principles  for  the 
conduct  and  tactics  of  cavalry  in  the  fight. 


II.      ATTACK   AND   DEFENCE 

Mobility  is  that  prominent  characteristic  of  the  cav- 
alry on  which  the  justification  of  its  existence  is  chiefly 
based.  That  it  is  able  to  come  into  action  rapidly  at 
distant  points,  and  to  observe  the  enemy  while  still 
afar  off,  makes  it  indispensable  in  the  composition  of 
an  army.  Anything  that  hinders  its  free  mobility  mili- 
tates against  its  purpose  and  its  characteristics.  Noth- 
ing, therefore,  is  more  justifiable  or  more  in  accord- 
ance with  its  spirit  than  that  it  should  endeavour  to 
preserve  its  mobility  in  the  fight,  and  that  mounted 
shock  action,  therefore,  should  be  regarded  as  its 
proper  role  in  battle.  In  this  role,  cavalry  is  able  not 
only  to  force  a  decision  quickly,  but  to  continue  its 
m.ovement  mounted,  even  from  the  fight  itself. 

These  advantages,  inherent  in  the  nature  of  the  arm, 
must  not  be  expected  in  dismounted  action.  Such 
action  always  entails  delay  and  hampers  the  move- 
ments of  the  troops,  not  only  by  the  method  of  opera- 
tion, but  also  by  the  separation  of  the  men  from  their 
horses.  It  is  therefore  natural  that  cavalry  should 
only  undertake  an  attack  on  foot  when  there  is  no 
prospect  of  obtaining  their  object  by  shock  action,  or 
when  the  latter  would  entail  such  sacrifice  that  it 
might  imperil  the  further  successful  action  of  the 
troops. 

The  more,  however,  the  disadvantageous  factors  of 
dismounted  action  are  realised  and  appreciated,  the 


114  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

more,  in  my  opinion,  will  endeavours  be  made  to  give 
it  an  offensive  character,  in  order  to  remove  as  quickly 
as  possible  obstacles  which  hinder  the  free  movement 
of  the  cavalry.  All  delay  and  hesitation  are  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  very  spirit  of  the  arm.  To  preserve  its 
peculiar  element  of  mobility  a  rapid  decision  is  im- 
perative in  every  situation. 

Mounted,  the  cavalry  knows  only  the  charge  and  has 
no  defensive  power,  a  circumstance  which  strengthens 
its  action  considerably  in  carrying  out  its  offensive 
principles,  by  relieving  the  leader  of  the  onus  of  choice. 
On  foot  it  is  a  different  matter.  The  application  of 
the  firearm,  under  all  tactical  and  topographical  con- 
ditions, particularly  facilitates  defence  and  enables  it 
to  appear,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  stronger  form  of 
action.  Herein  lies  the  reason  why  defensive  action 
is  continually  sought.  All  the  more,  therefore,  must 
it  be  kept  in  view  that  it  is  the  offensive  on  foot  that 
the  cavalry  will  require.  To  operate  in  combination 
with  shock  tactics  to  assist  the  offensive,  and  pave 
the  way  for  free  movement  is,  however,  the  real  ob- 
ject of  dismounted  action. 

It  would  perhaps  have  been  better  if  the  new  Regu- 
lations had  upheld  this  principle  a  little  more  definitely. 
In  them,  however,  it  is  the  defensive  strength  which 
cavalry  has  gained  in  dismounted  action  which  is 
chiefly  emphasised  (390),^  and  the  attack  is  only  dealt 
with  as  a  method  of  fighting  from  which  the  troops 
"need   not   shrink."     Attention   is   certainly   drawn 

*  "By  reason  of  its  fire-arms,  cavalry  is  capable  also  of 
dismounted  action.  It  is  thus  in  a  position — and  especially 
so  when  supported  by  horse  artillery  and  machine-guns — to 
offer  resistance  to  detachments  of  all  arms,  or  to  cause  them 
serious  loss  by  unexpected  fire-action.  Nor  need  it  shrink 
from  attacking,  should  the  situation  require  it.  It  will  often 
have  to  combine  dismounted  with  mounted  action." 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  115 

(455)^  to  the  various  cases  in  which  an  attack  upon 
foot  may  be  undertaken.  That,  however,  does  not 
alter  the  fundamental  utterance  that  the  dismounted 
fight  will  chiefly  be  undertaken  on  the  defensive.  This 
interpretation  is  strengthened  on  reading  in  the  di- 
rections for  the  action  of  the  army  cavalry  during 
operations  that  "Especial  additions  to  the  force  (cy- 
clist detachments,  infantry  in  wagons,  etc.)  are  mainly 
intended  for  the  duty  of  strengthening  local  resistance, 
or  of  overcoming  such  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy."  The  thought  involuntarily  occurs  to  the 
reader  that  in  the  spirit  of  the  Regulations  such  addi- 
tions to  the  force  will  be  just  as  necessary  in  face  of 
a  serious  hostile  resistance,  in  order  to  free  the  way 
for  the  cavalry.  We  would,  then,  again  find  ourselves 
in  just  the  same  state  which  the  war  of  1870-71  proved 
to  be  so  undesirable,  and  the  cavalry  would  again  find 
the  wings  of  its  mobility  clipped. 

The  Regulations  of  course  only  intend  to  convey  on 
this  point  that,  if  such  special  additions  to  the  cavalry 
were  forthcoming,  the  task  mentioned  would  be  their 
principal  duty.  It  is,  however,  a  matter  of  significance 
that  it  is  here  presupposed  that  infantry  in  wagons 
may  be  detailed  to  accompany  the  strategic  army  cav- 
alry. If  it  were  but  a  matter  of  cyclists,  that  would 
be  a  quite  different  matter.  But  there  cannot  at  pres- 
ent be  any  question  of  this,  as  there  is  no  sufficient 
number  of  them  in  the  army. 

*  "Cavalry  will  often  be  obliged  to  clear  the  way  for  fur- 
ther activity  by  means  of  dismounted  attack.  Attempts  also 
on  the  hostile  lines  of  communication  (such  as  the  capture 
of  railway  stations  or  magazines,  the  destruction  of  impor- 
tant engineering  works,  or  the  capture  of  isolated  posts,  etc.) 
will  certainly  involve  such  attacks.  On  the  battle  field,  how- 
ever, dismoimted  cavalry  will  rarely  be  pushed  forward." 


ii6  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

If  the  Regulations  discuss  these  kind  of  possibili- 
ties I  fear  that  the  demand  for  infantry  will  very  soon 
be  heard  from  the  army  cavalry  when  there  is  any 
question  of  a  serious  attack  on  foot,  and  herewith  the 
free  action  of  the  cavalry  will  be  limited  once  and 
for  all. 

Military  history  and  theoretical  reflection  teach  us 
equally  that  the  great  masses  of  the  army  cavalry  must 
under  all  circumstances  be  independent,  at  least  for 
their  offensive  undertakings — that  they  cannot  rely,  in 
any  case  for  these,  on  the  "occasional"  support  of 
infantry.  For  they  would  thus  find  their  mobility 
hampered,  and  themselves  tied  to  the  very  troops  from 
which  they  expect  support,  and  would  then  be  unable 
to  carry  out  those  important  duties  which  fall  to  their 
share.  The  army  cavalry,  then,  can  only  preserve  its 
necessary  independence  if  it  can  rely  upon  its  own 
strength  even  in  an  attack  on  foot.  It  must  at  any 
moment  be  prepared  to  throw  all  its  force  into  the 
conduct  of  a  decisive  attack.  This  is  a  method  of 
fighting  from  which  not  only  should  it  not  "shrink," 
but  in  which  its  dismounted  role  essentially  consists. 
When  an  attack  on  foot  has  been  determined  on,  it 
must,  however,  be  first  perfectly  clear  that  the  results 
will  justify  the  sacrifice  which  such  an  attack,  under 
any  circumstances,  must  mean — that  is  to  say,  the 
expenditure  not  only  in  lives,  but  also  in  time,  which 
must  both  be  regarded  as  lost  in  estimating  the  further 
operative  value  of  the  force. 

The  new  Regulations  take  this  point  of  view  also 
into  consideration,  but  in  a  manner  that  gives  cause 
for  serious  reflection.  They  would  limit  the  time  ex- 
pended in  an  attack  on  foot,  and  during  which  the  arm 
is  deprived  of  its  free  mobility,  and  therefore  demand 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  117 

(456)^  that,  if  such  an  attack  be  found  necessary,  en- 
deavour must  be  made  to  carry  it  out  with  the  utmost 
rapidity.  Here  is  expressed  a  desire  easy  to  under- 
stand. But  I  do  not  think  that  the  object  will  thus  be 
attained  of  limiting  the  time  that  a  dismounted  fight 
demands.  To  carry  an  attack  rapidly  through  under 
modern  conditions  demands  the  employment  of  over- 
whelming fire  power  and  numerical  superiority. 

In  so  far  as  the  Regulations  express  the  idea  that  an 
attack  should  only  be  undertaken  when  this  superiority 
is  assured,  there  is  great  justification  for  the  definition 
laid  down  in  paragraph  456.  But  the  cavalry  must 
then  generally  confine  itself  to  the  attack  of  quite  weak 
hostile  posts,  for  even  the  division  contains  but  an  in- 
significant number  of  rifles.  But  such  limitations,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  no  way  take  into  account  the  neces- 
sities of  grave  situations.  The  army  cavalry  will  often 
find  itself  in  a  situation  where  a  difficult  attack  must 
be  carried  through  without  any  overwhelming  superi- 
ority, unless  it  means  to  renounce  the  accomplishment 
of  the  duties  entrusted  to  it. 

I  do  not  think  that  we  should  interpret  the  wording 
of  the  Regulations  in  this  sense.  Taken  literally,  great 
danger  lies  in  them — the  danger,  that  is,  of  seeing  in 
the  wording  of  paragraph  456,  a  demand  for  the  has- 
tening of  the  conduct  of  the  attack.  We  should  thus 
see  ourselves  prevailed  upon  to  carry  out  a  necessary 
attack  in  a  precipitate  manner  without  the  necessary 
fire  preparation  in  order  to  fulfil  the  demand  for  haste. 
In  peace  manoeuvres  such  conduct  is  but  too  often  seen. 

*  "Cavalry  must  endeavour  to  bring  dismounted  attacks 
to  a  conclusion  with  the  utmost  rapidity,  so  that  they  may 
regain  their  mobility  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  It 
may  also  be  of  importance  to  bring  the  encounter  to  a  de- 
cision before  the  arrival  of  hostile  reinforcements." 


ii8  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

In  war  it  must  inevitably  lead  to  defeat.  Under  mod- 
ern conditions  of  weapons  an  attack  does  not  allow 
of  being  accelerated  by  force.  It  must  take  its  own 
time.  We  must  not  therefore  deceive  ourselves  into 
thinking  that  voluntary  acceleration  of  the  offensive 
fight  is  possible,  but  quite  clear  that  every  decision 
to  attack  on  foot  signifies  considerable  loss  in  time  as 
well  as  men. 

After  considering  these  circumstances  it  would  al- 
most seem  advisable  to  alter  the  wording  of  paragraph 
456,  to  make  it  somewhat  more  precise,  and  to  elimi- 
nate the  idea  of  acceleration  of  the  attack.  Every 
trooper  must  be  conscious  that  from  the  moment  he 
dismounts  for  fire  action  he  is  no  longer  a  cavalry- 
man, but  a  foot  soldier.  He  must  follow  the  laws  of 
fighting  on  foot,  and  can  only  reach  his  horse  again 
by  successful  action  according  to  these  laws.  Then, 
certainly,  the  dismounted  troops  must  strive  with  all 
means  in  their  power  to  reassume  their  mounted  role 
with  the  utmost  celerity. 

The  same  holds  good  for  the  defence. 

Cavalry  will  only  undertake  this  when  absolutely 
obliged.  It  may  be  that  the  conditions  of  force  do  not 
allow  of  the  attack,  or  that  the  maintenance  of  some 
locality  is  the  chief  object  of  the  fight.  In  the  con- 
sciousness, however,  that  any  hampering  of  initiative 
and  free  movement  is  opposed  to  the  spirit  of  cavalry 
action,  so  must  the  defence — if  circumstances  in  any 
way  permit — ^be  carried  out  with  the  idea  of  emerging 
as  soon  as  possible  from  the  defensive  role  imposed, 
to  regain  freedom  of  movement,  and  then  to  lay  down 
the  law  to  the  enemy.  This  can  only  be  attained  by 
conducting  the  defence  in  an  offensive  spirit,  that 
compels  the  opponent  to  a  decision  in  accordance  with 
our  will. 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  119 

This  point  of  view  does  not,  according  to  my  think- 
ing, receive  sufficient  attention  in  the  new  Regulations. 
Daring  and  initiative  carry  in  them  the  seeds  of  great 
success.  The  cavalry  should  continually  remember 
this,  even  in  defence.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  it 
must  also  be  ready  when  occasion  demands  to  defend 
itself  with  the  utmost  obstinacy  to  the  last  man.  The 
resolute  defence  of  Sandepu  by  a  Japanese  cavalry 
brigade  against  heavy  odds  gives  us  a  good  example  to 
follow.  This  action  made  the  timely  arrival  of  the 
Japanese  reinforcements  possible. 

III.       CAVALRY     IN     COMBAT     AGAINST     THE     VARIOUS 
ARMS,    MOUNTED    AND    DISMOUNTED 

In  the  mounted  combat  against  cavalry,  every  effort 
must  be  directed  towards  falling  upon  the  enemy  at 
full  gallop  in  a  serried  mass,  and  thus  to  overthrow 
him.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  succeed  in  coming  to  blows 
with  the  enemy.  His  tactical  formation  must  be  de- 
stroyed, and  he  must  be  rendered  incapable  either  of 
evolution  or  battle.  And  this  must  be  done  without 
losing  cohesion  or  power  of  command.  The  material 
damage  done  to  the  enemy  is  a  matter  for  the  mounted 
pursuit,  which  need  only  be  carried  out  by  part  of  the 
troops,  or,  in  default  of  this,  by  shrapnel. 

For  the  conduct  of  the  purely  cavalry  fight  we 
should,  in  my  opinion,  rely  upon  men  like  Frederick 
the  Great,  Seydlitz,  and  the  prominent  Napoleonic  cav- 
alry leaders.  In  the  relations  of  cavalry  to  cavalry, 
nothing  has  altered  since  their  day,  and  the  experiences 
of  these  men  are,  in  their  lessons,  just  as  applicable  to- 
day as  at  the  time  in  which  they  lived.  And  what  do 
they  teach  us? 

It  is  the  serried  formation  of  the  attack  that  is, 


I20  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

above  all  else,  to  be  aimed  at.  Frederick  the  Great 
certainly  changed  his  formation  from  the  three-rank 
to  the  two-rank  line.  This  was  owing  to  his  desire  to 
render  the  troops  more  mobile,  and  in  some  way  to 
compensate  for  the  numerical  superiority  of  his  op- 
ponent. The  longer  his  experience  of  war,  however, 
the  more  did  the  king  insist  upon  close  formation  in 
the  attack,  and  to  the  end  that  the  attack  should  lead 
not  to  a  melee,  but  to  the  breaking  up  of  the  enemy 
by  the  impact  of  the  solid  mass.  Napoleon,  whose 
cavalry  was  not  so  proficient  in  the  saddle,  sought  to 
obtain  this  result  by  greater  depth,  while  in  the  infre- 
quent cavalry  fights  of  the  present  day  it  has  become 
thoroughly  apparent  that  cohesion  in  the  shock  is  the 
deciding  factor.  At  Mars  la  Tour  the  French  Hussar 
Brigade  of  Montaigu  was  overthrown  by  the  closely 
formed  13th  Dragoons,  after  having  made  an  easy 
prey  of  the  loth  Hussars,  while  the  other  attacks  only 
led  to  long  and  indecisive  melees.  Frederick  the  Great, 
in  order  to  attain  the  greatest  possible  cohesion,  finally 
abolished  all  intervals  between  the  tactical  units  and 
required  the  knee-to-knee  riding.  As,  however,  he 
was  perfectly  well  aware  that,  in  spite  of  all  regula- 
tions, the  ranks  must  open  out  while  crossing  country, 
he  would  never  allow  the  enemy's  cavalry  to  be  at- 
tacked without  a  second  line  following  the  first,  not  in 
echelon,  but  directly  in  rear  of  it,  a  measure  which 
repeatedly  proved  itself  necessary,  if  not  decisive.  Na- 
poleon's cavalry  leaders  held  that  a  still  greater  depth 
was  necessary  owing  to  the  looser  riding  of  the  French 
squadrons.  As  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no  example  of 
their  attacking  in  large  masses  without  depth  of  for- 
mation. Peace  experience  teaches  us,  that  riding 
across  country  must  loosen  cohesion,  while  the  mod- 
ern firearm  obliges  us  to  take  refuge  in  broken  coun- 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  121 

try,  where  the  closest  touch  cannot  always  be  kept, 
and  to  this  end  riding  stirrup  to  stirrup  has  been  in- 
troduced. Is  it,  however,  ordained  that  we  should 
attack  in  this  formation  and  neglect  the  decisive  fac- 
tor of  the  charge  in  favour  of  mobility,  a  proceeding 
which  is  almost  always  seen  in  charges  at  manoeuvres  ? 

The  disadvantages  of  such  methods  are  certainly  not 
apparent  in  peace,  as  the  troops  do  not  come  into  real 
collision,  and  rapidity  and  ability  to  deploy  receive 
therefore  more  attention  than  cohesion  in  the  attack. 
At  inspections  on  the  drill-ground  such  cohesion  is 
certainly  demanded,  but  at  manoeuvres  it  is  generally 
conspicuous  by  its  absence.  In  war  I  am  firmly  con- 
vinced that  such  habits  will  be  heavily  punished. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  we  must  return  to  the  princi- 
ples of  Frederick  the  Great,  which  up  to  now  have 
been  neglected.  In  approach  and  deployment  we  must 
indeed  ride  stirrup  to  stirrup,  and  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances in  even  looser  formation.  But  for  the 
charge  against  cavalry  we  need  a  closer  formation, 
knee  to  knee  as  of  old,  which  can  be  effected  on  the 
move  by  word  of  command,  as  in  France,  where  the 
order  "Serrez  les  rangs!"  is  still  in  use.  Besides  this, 
we  require  always  a  second  line  in  the  Frederician 
sense,  to  assist,  when  necessary,  in  maintaining  co- 
hesion, and  to  be  ready  to  meet  the  vicissitudes  of  the 
attack.  This  is  a  matter  of  experience  which  allows 
of  no  misinterpretation. 

Another  point  comes  under  consideration.  Com- 
manders always  seem  to  be  particularly  desirous  of 
retaining  close  formation  throughout  the  attack,  and 
of  preventing  the  whole  of  the  troops  becoming  in- 
volved in  a  melee  or  pursuit.  This  originates  from 
the  necessity  of  having  to  reckon  with  the  enemy's  re- 
serves, which  may  appear  suddenly  on  the  field  at 


122  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

the  decisive  moment  to  extricate  their  beaten  com- 
rades. We  must  always  be  in  a  position  to  meet  them, 
and  the  rapid  rally  from  the  melee  is  therefore  to-day 
diligently  practised,  in  the  hope  that  the  troops  may 
quickly  be  got  in  hand  ready  to  be  led  against  a  fresh 
foe. 

It  is  indeed  astounding  that  we  should  give  way  to 
such  self-deception.  Such  rallies  can  only  appear  pos- 
sible if  we  disregard  all  the  moral  forces  which  the 
fight  sets  loose.  Whoever  has  had  experience  of  a 
single  charge  in  war  knows  what  excitement  possesses 
the  men  and  what  time  and  trouble  are  required  to 
tactically  concentrate  troops  that  have  once  been 
launched  to  the  attack,  and  render  them  capable  of 
evolution.  In  peace  this  is  delightfully  easy  after  a 
little  practice;  in  war  it  is  an  absolute  impossibility. 

We  must  therefore  be  perfectly  clear  in  our  minds 
that  only  those  troops  which  have  not  been  engaged 
in  the  melee,  those  parts  of  the  first  and  second  lines 
which  have  remained  formed  during  the  charge,  and 
the  reserve  which  has  been  held  in  rear,  will  be  avail- 
able to  meet  any  hostile  forces  which  may  suddenly 
appear. 

Up  to  now  our  Regulations  have  followed  the  teach- 
ings of  military  history  in  so  far  as  they  provided 
for  supporting  squadrons  behind  the  front  line  in  the 
attack  against  cavalry.  The  new  Regulations,  how- 
ever, not  only  retain  the  "stirrup  feeling,"  ^  even  in 
the  attack  against  cavalry,  but  have  also  greatly  lim- 
ited the  employment  of  supporting  squadrons,  and 
rendered  it  exceptional.  The  Regulations  practically 
ignore  the  use  of  the  second  line  in  the  attack  against 
cavalry.    To  preserve  cohesion  in  the  attack  in  spite 

^  "Biigelfiihling,"  as  against  "Knie  an  Knie"  (knee  to 
knee). — Trans. 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  123 

of  this,  the  men  in  the  rear  rank  are  to  advance  into 
the  front  rank  in  order  to  fill  the  larger  gaps  which 
may  there  occur  (106).^  This  will  lead  under  certain 
circumstances  to  a  loose,  almost  single-line  attack 
against  cavalry.  These  measures  give  ground  for  some 
concern.  They  can  scarcely  lead  to  any  other  end  than 
to  render  steady  riding  to  the  charge  impossible,  to 
create  disorder,  and  to  deprive  the  already  thin  line 
of  its  force  of  impact. 

It  appears  to  me  to  be  very  questionable  whether 
such  directions  could  be  carried  out  at  all  in  practice. 
They  will  most  certainly  not  attain  the  object  which 
the  Regulations  apparently  expect,  that  is  to  say,  of 
securing  cohesion  in  the  attack,  and  thereby  a  victory 
for  one  thin  attacking  line.  The  necessity  for  a  second 
line  under  such  circumstances  appears  all  the  more 
obvious.    The  Regulations  in  this  respect  direct  (200)^ 

*As  a  rule,  the  squadron  attacks  cavalry  as  a  single  unit 
in  line.  The  shock  must  be  affected  with  the  maximum  mo- 
mentum in  two  well-defined,  well-closed  ranks.  Cohesion  is 
above  all  things  necessary  for  decisive  results.  Every  man 
must  realize  this,  must  maintain  his  place  in  the  ranks,  and 
must  keep  close  touch  with  his  neighbour. 

"The  two  squadron  flank  glides  will  hold  the  squadron  in 
towards  the  centre.  Small  gaps  in  the  front  rank  may  be 
filled  by  closing  in,  larger  gaps  by  moving  up  the  rear  rank 
files." 

*"When  attacking  cavalry,  the  regiments  will,  as  a  rule, 
be  employed  in  a  line  formation  side  by  side;  this  will  pre- 
vent their  personnel  from  becoming  mixed  up.  The  neces- 
sary depth  will  be  supplied  by  the  regiments  themselves,  and, 
in  this  case,  it  is  usually  in  the  form  of  echelons.  If  the 
situation  demands  it,  even  single  squadrons  can  follow  in  col- 
umn formation. 

"The  employment  of  several  lines  may  be  useful  on  occa- 
sions when  the  situation  demands  rapid  action  from  the  lead- 
ing regiment,  and  circumstances  will  not  permit  of  the  rear 
regiments  taking  ground  to  a  flank." 


124  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

that,  "if  the  situation  demands  it,  even  single  squad- 
rons can  follow  in  column  foiTnation,"  also  as  an  ex- 
ception. This  indicates  a  distinct  divergence  from 
the  proven  results  of  all  experience,  and  cannot,  in  my 
opinion,  be  even  theoretically  justified. 

Such  dispositions  cannot  therefore  be  regarded  as 
justifiahle.  I  consider  it  to  he  my  unavoidable  duty  to 
express  myself  clearly  upon  this  point.  They  in  no 
wise  alter  the  fact  that  to  attack  the  enemy  successfully 
our  cavalry  must,  where  its  comparative  strength  in 
any  way  allows,  be  fundamentally  formed  in  two  lines, 
and  be  launched  to  the  charge  in  the  closest  attack 
formation,  knee  to  knee.  For  it  was  thus  that  the 
Prussian  squadrons  gained  their  laurels  in  all  the  splen- 
did victories  of  the  Frederician  and  Napoleonic  wars. 

At  Mars  la  Tour,  also,  the  success  of  the  cavalry 
fight  was  decided  by  the  i6th  Dragoons,  who  threw 
themselves  into  the  melee  from  the  rear,  acting  as  a 
second  line  entirely  in  accordance  with  the  Frederician 
spirit.  The  loth  Hussars  also  attacked  as  a  second 
line;  and  it  was  the  cohesion  of  the  13th  Dragoons,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  that  allowed  them  on  two  occa- 
sions rapidly  to  secure  a  victory. 

If  the  conditions  of  the  fight  of  cavalry  against  cav- 
alry to-day  have  remained  practically  unaltered  as 
compared  to  those  of  the  past,  it  is  a  very  different 
matter  where  the  attack  is  against  troops  armed 
with  modern  firearms,  essentially  infantry  and  artil- 
lery. 

In  the  old  days,  where  infantry  fought  in  serried 
masses,  standing  up,  and  were  only  able  to  cover  a 
short  distance  to  their  front  with  a  comparatively  slow 
fire,  the  cavalry  were  able,  even  as  against  their  own 
arm,  to  ride  them  down  with  shock  action  in  close 
formation.    They  were  therefore  justified  in  attacking 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  125 

infantry  in  the  same  formation  and  with  the  same  co- 
hesion as  they  attacked  cavalry.  This  has  now 
changed.  Nowadays,  when  infantry  can  cover  the 
ground  to  a  distance  of  1,500  or  even  2,000  yards  with 
a  hot  and  rapid  fire,  and  offer  in  their  wide  extension 
no  sort  of  objective  for  shock  action,  an  attack  on  un- 
shaken, steadily  firing  infantry,  which  has  any  sort  of 
adequate  field  of  fire,  is  quite  out  of  the  question.  Only 
infantry  whose  morale  has  been  shaken,  or  which  can 
be  surprised  at  quite  close  range,  can  still  be  charged 
with  a  prospect  of  success.  It  is,  then,  no  question  of 
attack  in  cohesion,  but  a  matter  of  crossing  as  rapidly 
as  possible  the  zone  swept  by  the  enemy's  fire  in  some 
formation  which  will  allow  a  portion  at  least  of  the 
cavalry  to  escape  its  full  effect. 

These  conditions  may  be  fulfilled  by  the  formation 
in  lines.  The  first  line  must  receive  the  fire,  and  will 
thereby  provide  cover  to  some  extent  to  the  lines  be- 
hind and  the  possibility  of  reaching  the  enemy  without 
suffering  too  severely.  It  will  usually  be  no  advantage 
to  form  the  first  line  in  two  ranks,  as  such  a  disposition 
would  but  increase  losses  and  the  disorder  caused  by 
them.  It  will  be  better,  generally,  that  the  leading  line 
or  lines  should  consist  of  one  rank  at  quite  loose  in- 
terval. This  is  principally  on  account  of  the  ground, 
as  the  horses,  in  order  to  rapidly  cover  the  necessary 
distance,  must  have  room  to  gallop  freely,  and  to  avoid 
such  obstacles  as  may  lie  in  front  of  them  or  may  be 
caused  by  losses  in  the  leading  line. 

It  is  obvious,  in  my  opinion,  that  such  attacks  can- 
not be  ridden  home  according  to  the  same  principles 
that  govern  the  attack  against  cavalry.  It  is  an  arbi- 
trary assumption  that  a  line  of  cavalry  1,500  or  2,000 
jards  wide  can  cross  country  stirrup  to  stirrup  at  the 


126  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

regulation  pace  of  the  charge,^  as  the  Regulations  de- 
mand. Not  only  must  the  leading  line  ride  at  quite 
loose  interval,  but  the  main  attack  must  also  have  a 
looser  formation  than  is  here  demanded.  It  is  there- 
fore indicated  that  such  extension  should  be  laid  down 
in  the  Regulations.  For  it  can  in  no  case  be  avoided, 
but  is  the  outcome  of  the  force  of  circumstances.  In 
the  formation  in  lines,  however,  there  is  always  room 
to  open  out,  and  troops  or  squadrons  may  be  used  in 
single  rank. 

The  same  principles  that  govern  the  attack  against 
infantry  hold  good  for  that  against  artillery.  Here 
also  it  is  a  matter  of  crossing  the  zone  of  fire  at  a  rapid 
pace  in  widely  extended  order,  or  drawing  the  fire 
of  the  artillery  by  the  advance  of  the  leading  line,  and 
of  compelling  it  to  repeatedly  alter  its  elevation.  To 
this  end  it  may  perhaps  at  first  be  advisable  to  expose 
only  weak  portions  of  the  charging  first  line  to  the  fire 
of  the  guns,  in  order  to  disturb  it,  and  to  pave  the  way 
for  the  success  of  the  main  attack.  This  will  have  to 
ride  in  line,  or  perhaps  better  still  in  squadron  column, 
in  order  to  make  full  use  of  the  unexposed  portions  of 
the  ground.  Thus  in  this  case,  also,  the  leading  lines 
in  single  rank  extended  and  loose  riding  in  the  chang- 
ing formations  of  the  main  attacking  line  are  advo- 
cated. 

The  new  Regulations  arrive  partially  at  the  conclu- 
sions inevitable  from  these  reflections.  The  attack  in 
several  lines,  and  the  formation  of  a  first  line  in  single 
rank   for  the   attack   against  fire   action  have   been 

^  The  German  cavalry  use  two  paces  at  the  gallop,  500  and 
700  paces  per  minute,  the  pace  being  80  cm.  (32  in.),  thus 
1454  and  20^  miles  per  hour. — Trans. 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  127 

adopted  by  them  (113  and  174).^  In  one  point  only 
according  to  my  view,  they  do  not  take  sufficient  ac- 
count of  the  demands  of  reality,  and  this  is  in  the  mat- 
ter of  extension.  As  before,  the  attack  in  close  forma- 
tion against  infantry  which  the  Regulations  advocate, 
will  be  carried  out  and  practised  according  to  the  same 
principles   as   against   cavalry.     As  before,   infantry 

^  "A  squadron  must  seek  success  against  infantry,  artillery, 
and  machine-guns  by  means  of  surprise  and  flank  attacks. 
If  a  frontal  attack  is  necessary,  the  zone  of  fire  is  best 
passed  by  increasing  the  pace.  The  gallop  will  be  resorted 
to  early  in  the  advance,  and  the  pace  increased  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  enemy.  Breathing  spaces  can  be  obtained  under 
cover  of  the  terrain.  As,  in  these  cases,  momentum  of  im- 
pact is  not  so  important,  it  will  be  sufficient  if  collision  takes 
place  at  a  rapid  gallop. 

"In  order  to  minimize  loss,  it  is  advisable  to  let  the  ad- 
vanced portions  of  the  squadron,  or  even  the  whole,  adopt 
single  rank  formation  with  wide  intervals.  By  this  means 
the  hostile  fire  may  be  broken  up,  and,  on  occasions,  the 
dust  raised  by  the  troops  in  open  order  may  facilitate  the 
attack  of  the  portion  of  the  squadron  remaining  in  close 
order. 

"If  it  is  a  question  of  simultaneous  attacks,  either  on  a 
single  enemy  from  several  directions,  or  on  several  distinct 
units  of  the  hostile  force,  action  by  single  troops  may  be 
advisable. 

"Hostile  skirmishing  lines  will  be  ridden  through,  if  there 
are  other  detachments  behind  them  to  be  attacked.  Any 
form  of  attack  may  be  employed  against  shaken,  yielding 
infantry.  Skirmishing  lines  are  best  pursued  in  open  order, 
which  formation  permits  of  the  most  effective  employment 
of  cavalry  weapons. 

"If,  during  an  attack,  a  squadron  breaks  into  a  battery  or 
machine-gun  detachment,  a  portion  of  the  men  will  be  em- 
ployed against  the  personnel,  a  portion  against  the  limbers. 
Captured  guns  or  machine-guns  should  be  carried  off;  but, 
if  this  is  impossible,  they  will  be  made  unserviceable,  or,  at 
any  rate,  incapable  of  movement.  Led  horses  should  also  be 
made  the  objective  in  attacks  on  dismounted  cavalry. 


128  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

firing  lying  extended  under  cover,  as  also  artillery,  are 
to  be  charged  in  the  same  method  as  cavalry  advancing 
in  close  formation. 

I  think  we  have  proved  that  the  attendant  conditions 
of  the  two  cases  differ  widely.  If  the  Regulations 
had  but  taken  them  into  consideration,  the  difference 
between  the  two  methods  of  attack  would  have  there- 
by been  made  more  intelligible  to  all  officers  from 
the  first  than  could  be  done  by  general  instructions  of 
this  nature. 

The  cavalry  has  now  a  demand  made  upon  it  by 
Regulation  which,  although  it  can  be  met  on  the  drill- 
ground,  will  be  impossible  of  fulfilment  in  war.  It  will 
therefore  be  necessary  to  discard  in  war  what  we  have 
taken  such  pains  to  learn,  a  thing  which  frequently 
happens  in  manoeuvres,  and  even  on  the  exercise- 
ground. 

In  the  formation  for  attack  and  the  deployment,  the 
Regulations  follow  the  logical  sequence  of  their  point 
of  view  that,  in  the  attack  upon  cavalry,  no  second  line 
is  necessary,  and  in  this  matter  adhere  to  the  directions 
laid  down  in  the  old  Regulations.    From  my  point  of 

"The  principles  laid  down  for  action  against  cavalry  can 
be  applied,  mutatis  mutandis,  in  the  matters  of  pursuit,  melee, 
and  rally." 

"Such  attacks  are  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  para.  113. 

"The  strength  of  a  regiment  renders  it  impossible  to  attack 
the  objective  in  several  lines.  The  officer  commanding  will 
give  orders  as  to  whether  the  front  line  is  to  be  in  single 
rank,  and  as  to  whether  the  rear  lines  are  to  be  in  a  similar 
formation  or  in  closed  double  rank. 

"In  attacking  infantry,  the  lines  must  not  be  at  too  great  a 
distance  from  one  another.  In  attacking  artillery,  the  dis- 
tance between  lines  is  determined  by  the  effective  area  of  the 
burst  of  shrapnel  (300  metres  =  330  yds)." 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  129 

view,  this  does  not  seem  to  correspond  at  all  with  the 
necessities  of  the  fight. 

In  my  "Reflections  on  the  New  Cavalry  Drill  Regu- 
lations" I  laid  down  "that  it  should  always  be  possible 
for  cavalry  to  change  from  the  manoeuvre  column 
straightway  into  attack  formation  with  flank  protec- 
tion, without  first  forming  line,  as  hitherto  has  been 
deemed  necessary."  In  opposition  to  the  Regulations 
I  still  hold  fast  to  this  principle. 

We  have  seen  that  the  formation  in  lines  is  the 
necessary  one  for  all  charges,  and  that  an  attack  in  one 
line  will  only  be  possible  in  exceptional  cases  where 
weakness  forbids  the  formation  of  several  lines,  or 
where  the  surprised  and  demoralised  condition  of  the 
enemy  appears  to  render  a  second  line  superfluous. 

The  logical  conclusions  resulting  from  these  reflec- 
tions are  that  all  column  formations  employed  in  the 
approach  march  must  keep  in  view  first  and  foremost 
the  rapid  adoption  of  the  attack  formation,  and  that 
deployment  must  in  principle  lead  to  the  formation  in 
lines  for  attack.  The  complete  deployment  in  line  of 
any  units  from  the  regiment  upwards  can  only  be  nec- 
essary in  exceptional  cases.  It  can  be  formed  from 
the  attack  formation  or  direct  from  column  when  spe- 
cially ordered. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  rapidity  with  which 
approach,  deployment,  and  attack  will  often  follow 
each  other,  I  would  even  advocate  that  a  trumpet-call, 
"Form  for  attack!"  should  be  laid  down  in  the  Regu- 
lations. The  strength  of  the  various  lines  will  gener- 
ally have  to  be  ordered  according  as  the  objective  con- 
sists of  cavalry  or  troops  using  fire  action.  It  will 
not  always  be  possible  to  find  time  for  detailed  arrange- 
ments, particularly  during  the  rapid  vicissitudes  of  a 
cavalry  combat.    The  trumpet-call  would  then  justify 


I30  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

itself,  and  the  lines  would  be  formed  by  the  inde- 
pendent action  of  squadron  leaders,  according  to  the 
formation  the  troops  were  in  and  the  expected  breadth 
of  frontage  of  the  enemy.  It  should  be  laid  down  as 
a  guide  that  of  four  squadrons  one  at  least  should  form 
a  second  line,  and  that  an  unprotected  flank  should, 
when  possible,  be  covered  by  a  squadron  in  echelon. 
The  squadrons  nearest  the  enemy  would  form  a  first 
line,  and  the  remainder  would  act  according  to  circum- 
stances, and  either  follow  the  first  line,  echelon  them- 
selves in  rear  of  it,  or,  when  necessary,  prolong  it. 
For  the  deployment  into  one  line  a  special  call  could 
be  used. 

For  the  conduct  of  the  fight  on  foot  the  same  prin- 
ciples hold  good  as  for  the  infantry.  The  duties  and 
conditions  of  the  fight  are  similar,  and  demand  simi- 
lar general  tactical  directions.  The  arrangements  for 
the  led  horses,  however,  render  the  introduction  and 
the  conduct  of  the  fight  considerably  more  difficult. 
There  is  also  a  certain  difference  according  as  the  op- 
ponent is  infantry  or  cavalry. 

For,  in  the  first  case,  there  is  generally  no  danger  of 
a  further  turning  movement,  or  of  threats  against 
the  led  horses  from  the  flank  or  rear.  In  the  greater 
number  of  cases  when  arranging  for  the  position  and 
safety  of  the  led  horses,  only  small  hostile  patrols  need 
be  expected.  An  action  may  therefore  generally  be 
conducted  with  more  boldness  under  these  circum- 
stances than  when  opposed  to  cavalry  which  might 
seriously  threaten  the  led  horses  by  a  mounted  reserve. 

These  circumstances  must  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion when  dealing  with  the  principles  for  the  conduct 
of  the  led  horses. 

In  defence,  the  measures  required  are  comparatively 
simple.     The   conformation   of  the   ground  usually 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  131 

chosen  with  a  view  to  the  peculiarities  of  defensive  ac- 
tion will  ofen  allow  of  the  led  horses  being  kept  close 
to  the  firing-line,  where  it  will  also  be  possible  to 
mount  out  of  the  enemy's  range  and  to  withdraw  from 
his  fire  under  cover  of  the  ground.  The  led  horses 
should  only  be  left  to  the  rear  if  the  position  is  to  be 
maintained  until  the  enemy  comes  to  close  quarters, 
and  then  should  be,  if  possible,  behind  some  fresh  posi- 
tion, where  it  seems  likely  that  resistance  may  be  re- 
newed. In  defence,  the  led  horses  will  generally  be 
left  quite  immobile,^  though  this  method  should  not 
be  considered  imperative.  For  even  in  defence  the 
led  horses  must  be  sometimes  kept  mobile ;  for  instance, 
when  it  is  necessary  to  rapidly  occupy  on  foot  some 
locality  in  the  neighbourhood  of  which  there  is  no  suit- 
able position  for  the  led  horses.  In  such  a  case  they 
will  have  to  be  sent  behind  cover,  which  can  only  be 
done  if  they  are  mobile.  The  horses  will  only  be  kept 
in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  when  it  is  intended 
merely  to  bring  off  a  fire  surprise,  and  not  when  carry- 
ing out  an  attack  or  making  an  obstinate  resistance 
(471-473). 2 

*  i.  e.  with  insufficient  men  to  lead  them. — Trans. 

2  "Cavalry  may  succeed  in  causing  hostile  detachments 
considerable  loss,  and  in  upsetting  their  dispositions,  by  a 
surprise  appearance  combined  with  an  unexpected  and  simul- 
taneous opening  of  fire.  By  means  of  skillful  use  of  ground 
and  by  reason  of  their  mobility,  they  can  rapidly  disappear 
and  escape  hostile  fire  action,  as  soon  as  they  have  obtained 
the  desired  results." 

"As  many  carbines  as  possible  must  open  fire  simul- 
taneously. The  leader  must  do  his  best  to  select  such  ground 
for  the  surprise  as  will  permit  of  the  horses  being  kept  un- 
der cover  close  at  hand." 

"Horse  artillery  and  machine-guns  are  necessary  to  pro- 
duce the  full  effect  of  fire.  Occasionally  the  co-operation  of 
the  cavalry  may  be  limited  to  protecting  the  artillery  while 


132  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

For  the  attack  the  conditions  are  different.  The 
troops  must  then  be  often  completely  separated  from 
their  horses.  It  is  therefore  all  the  more  necessary  that 
the  latter  should  be  secured  against  all  hostile  attack. 
If,  for  instance,  hostile  cavalry  threatens,  they  must 
have  a  special  escort.  The  possibility  of  a  reverse  must 
be  taken  into  consideration  when  selecting  the  position 
for  led  horses,  and  the  retiring  troops  must  be  able  not 
only  to  mount,  but  to  withdrav/  under  cover. 

It  is  of  especial  importance  that  the  troops  should 
regain  their  mobility  after  an  attack  has  been  carried 
out.  When  the  led  horses  can  be  moved,  this  is  an 
easy  matter.  Where,  however,  they  are  immobile,  as 
will  generally  be  the  case  where  full  force  has  to  be  put 
into  the  fight,  there  will  be  considerable  loss  of  time 
unless  it  be  possible  for  the  led  horses  to  be  brought  up, 
part  at  a  time,  by  any  mounted  reserve  that  may  have 
been  left  in  the  rear.  In  spite  of  this  disadvantage,  the 
desire  to  render  the  led  horses  mobile  should  not  be 
allowed  to  lead  to  the  undertaking  of  a  dismounted 
action  with  insufficient  numbers. 

This  desire  to  regain  the  horses  as  rapidly  as  possible 
is  frequently  to  be  observed  at  manoeuvres,  and  not 
only  leads  to  dismounting  and  leaving  the  led  horses 
mobile,  but  is  sometimes  allowed  to  exercise  too 
much  influence  on  the  question  of  where  the  horses  are 
to  be  left.  In  war  this  consideration  should  never  in- 
fluence the  conduct  of  the  fight,  nor  lead  to  the  under- 
taking of  a  dismounted  fight  in  a  half-hearted  manner, 
or  precipitately,  and  thus  paralysing  the  energy  of  the 
attack.  It  should  never  induce  a  commander  to  keep 
his  horses  too  close  to  the  battlefield  and  thereby  ex- 
posed to  danger,  in  order  that  he  may  more  quickly  re- 
taking up  a  position,  whence  it  can  suddenly  open  a  rapid 
fire  on  the  enemy." 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  133 

gain  them.  If  dismounted  action  has  been  determined 
on,  the  main  condition  is  that  the  attack  should  be 
successfully  carried  out,  and  all  other  matters  must  be 
subordinated  to  this  end. 

The  precepts  of  the  new  Regulations  do  not,  to  be 
sure,  harmonise  with  this  view.  According  to  them, 
even  when  led  horses  are  not  required  to  be  mobile, 
only  three-quarters  of  the  men  dismount,  and  each  man 
will  hold  four  horses  (366).^  The  number  of  rifles 
will  be  greatly  diminished  by  these  measures  (by  about 
a  quarter)  ;  and  it  is  not  quite  clear,  at  least  to  me, 
what  corresponding  advantage  is  to  be  gained.  The 
measure  is,  however,  so  far-reaching  that  it  merits 
special  criticism — the  more  so  as  the  Regulations  them- 
selves lay  stress  upon  the  rapid  energetic  conduct  of 
the  fight,  and  at  the  same  time  make  such  action  more 
difficult  by  weakening  the  numbers  in  the  firing— line. 

Will  the  horses  thus  retain  a  certain  degree  of  mo- 
bility? This  would  be  a  mischievous  delusion.  Even 
if  such  measures  allow  of  short  distances  being  covered 

*  "At  the  command :  'Dismount  for  dismounted  action  1' 
the  squadron  dismounts.  If  the  carbines  are  not  already 
slung  across  the  back,  they  will  be  taken  from  the  buckets. 

"When  double  rank  has  been  formed,  the  horse  holders 
will  take  charge  of  the  horses.  The  horse  holder  of  either 
rank  is  the  left  flank  file  of  each  section  (excepting  the  left 
flank  guide).  If  there  is  only  one  man  in  the  rear  rank  of 
the  left  flank  section  of  the  troop,  he  will  hand  over  his 
horse  to  his  front  rank  horse  holder;  or,  if  the  latter  is 
already  in  charge  of  four  horses,  to  his  neighbour.  The 
horses  in  charge  of  a  horse  holder  will  be  linked.  OflScers' 
horses  are  held  by  trumpeters. 

"Lances  are  laid  on  the  ground — if  in  line,  in  the  front 
of  the  ranks;  if  in  column,  on  the  flanks — in  such  a  manner 
that  they  cannot  be  damaged  by  the  horses. 

"In  the  absence  of  a  contrary  order,  the  sergeant-major 
and  the  left  flank  guides  will  remain  with  the  led  horses,  in 
addition  to  the  horse  holders." 


134  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

at  a  walk  on  the  level  drill-ground,  such  a  thing  is  out 
of  the  question  in  the  field  and  in  the  proximity  of  a 
fight.  How  will  one  man  lead  four  horses,  and  at  the 
same  time  carry  four  lances?  A  practical  impossi- 
bility. 

The  Regulations  also  give  no  clear  directions  as  to 
how  the  lances  are  to  be  carried  during  these  evolu- 
tions. On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  men  formerly 
detailed  fully  sufficed  for  holding  the  horses  when  it 
was  not  required  to  move  them.  There  seems  there- 
fore to  be  some  other  reason  for  this  measure. 

I  have  asked  myself  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
fact  that  more  men  are  to  be  left  with  the  horses  than 
formerly  will  perhaps  make  it  possible  to  defend  the 
led  horses  by  dismounted  patrols.  The  directions  con- 
tained in  the  Regulations  (368)  ^  that  hostile  patrols 
must  be  kept  at  a  distance  by  single  sentries  posted  by 
the  commander  of  the  led  horses  indicates  that  such 
was  perhaps  the  intention.  But  it  appears  to  me  that 
even  this  object  cannot  be  obtained  in  such  a  way.  The 
sentries,  if  they  are  to  defend  the  led  horses  from 
long-range  fire  in  open  country,  must  be  pushed  for- 
ward in  considerable  numbers,  and  very  far,  almost  at 
rifle  range.  With  single  sentries  close  at  hand,  no 
proper  protection  is  afforded,  nor  can  posts  be  sent  out 
1,000  yards  without  giving  them  a  strength  which  the 
force  cannot  afford.  If,  however,  the  protection  of  the 
led  horses  in  difficult  country  is  to  be  provided  for,  a 

^  "The  led  horses  will  remain  in  the  original  troop  forma- 
tion. Their  leader  must  keep  himself  informed  of  the  course 
of  the  encounter,  he  must  remember  to  keep  off  hostile 
patrols  by  means  of  single  sentries,  and  he  must  facilitate 
the  rapid  remounting  of  the  dismounted  men  by  placing  the 
horses  in  orderly  formation,  with  the  troops  and  ranks  sep- 
arated." 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  135 

few  sentries  will  most  assuredly  not  suffice  to  prevent 
hostile  patrols  approaching  unobserved. 

In  order  to  properly  protect  the  led  horses  they  must 
either  be  so  disposed  that  they  are  actually  covered 
from  the  view  and  fire  of  the  enemy,  or  else  secured  by 
an  escort  strong  enough  to  prevent  hostile  action 
against  them.    There  is  no  third  course. 

Taking  these  things  into  consideration  I  cannot  re- 
gard the  limitation  of  the  number  of  rifles  in  the  firing- 
line  imposed  by  the  Regulations  as  justifiable.  It  seems 
to  me  that  here  a  sacrifice  is  made  with  no  correspond- 
ing advantage  resulting. 

This  anxiety  seems  also  to  have  influenced,  to  a 
certain  degree,  the  text  of  the  Regulations.  In  para- 
graph 367  ^  the  attempt  is  made  to  compensate  in  some 
measure  for  the  danger  created  by  the  weakening  of  the 
firing-line.  That  is  to  say,  the  squadron  leader  is 
allowed  in  either  method  of  dismounting  (with  half  or 
three-quarters  of  the  men)  to  reinforce  the  firing-line, 
if  the  situation  demands,  by  diminishing  the  number  of 
horse-holders.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  this  arrange- 
ment is  not  quite  practicable,  and  does  not  sufficiently 
take  into  account  the  difficulties  that  will  continually 
result  therefrom  in  the  conduct  of  a  real  fight. 

First  of  all,  it  must  be  regarded  as  extremely  haz- 
ardous to  leave  such  measures  altogether  in  the  hands 
of  squadron  leaders.  Only  consider,  for  example,  the 
case  of  a  brigade  commander  who  dismounts  half  his 
men  in  order  to  keep  his  led  horses  mobile,  and  during 
the  attack  makes  the  discovery  that  the  horses  cannot 

^  "If,  with  due  regard  to  the  tactical  situation,  it  can  be 
done  without  risk,  the  squadron  leader  is  at  liberty,  when 
employing  either  method  of  dismounting,  to  increase  the 
number  of  his  dismounted  men  by  decreasing  the  number 
of  his  horse-holders." 


136  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

follow  because  the  squadron  leaders  have  reinforced 
the  firing-line  from  the  horse-holders!  Throughout 
the  Regulations  there  are  no  sort  of  directions  for  lim- 
iting the  initiative  of  the  squadron  leader  in  such  mat- 
ters in  the  case  of  the  larger  bodies  of  troops. 

But  if  this  is  to  be  disregarded,  what  becomes  of  the 
whole  measure?  Is  it  to  be  determined  when  dis- 
mounting that  the  number  of  horse-holders  is  to  be 
diminished,  or  are  these  men  only  to  be  brought  up  in 
the  course  of  the  fight?  Against  the  first  method  there 
is  naturally  nothing  to  urge.  But  the  second,  also,  is 
quite  allowable  according  to  the  letter  of  the  Regula- 
tions.   It  will,  however,  result  in  grave  disadvantages. 

If  in  defence  the  led  horses  are  close  to  the  firing- 
line,  such  procedure  is  certainly  possible,  but  only,  it 
seems  to  me,  in  this  one  case.  If  fighting  a  defensive 
action  where  the  horses  must  be  left  far  to  the  rear,  or 
indeed  in  an  attack,  how  and  when  are  these  reinforce- 
ments to  be  brought  up?  It  is  generally  in  the  middle 
of  a  fight  that  the  discovery  is  made  that  the  troops  are 
insufficient.  How  is  the  order  then  to  be  sent  to  the 
squadron  leader  that  the  few  men  who  can  still  be 
spared  from  the  led  horses  are  now  to  advance  ?  How 
will  these  men  be  led  to  the  front,  perhaps  1,000  or 
1 ,500  yards,  or  still  farther  ?  How  long  will  the  squad- 
ron wait  for  their  arrival  ?  And  in  the  end  will  it  not 
only  be  a  matter  of  comparatively  few  men  for  each 
squadron  which  will  dribble  gradually  into  the  fight? 
These  cannot  be  regarded  as  reserves,  but,  at  best,  weak 
supports  far  in  rear,  which  can  only  be  employed  in  the 
fight  with  difficulty  and  loss  of  time,  if  at  all. 

I  think,  therefore,  that  what  the  Regulations  pre- 
scribe in  this  matter  is  not  suitable  for  real  war,  and 
that  it  would  be  better  from  the  commencement  to 
employ  all  the  men  that  are  considered  necessary,  and 


CAVALRY  IN  COMBAT  137 

rather  to  dismount,  as  before,  and  leave  the  led  horses 
quite  immobile,  than  afterwards  to  allow  single  men  to 
dribble  into  the  fight.  As  reserves,  formed  detach- 
ments must  be  directed  against  the  decisive  points,  and 
not  a  few  troops  brought  up  to  reinforce  the  whole 
length  of  the  line  at  the  discretion  of  the  squadron 
leader. 


IV.     THE   FIGHT   OF  THE  INDEPENDENT    CAVALRY 

Such  fights  will  occur  during  the  offensive  recon- 
naissance of  the  cavalry,  in  screening,  and  in  enter- 
prises against  the  enemy's  communications  and  lines  of 
approach.  Cavalry  may  also  be  entrusted  with  the 
task  of  dispersing  gatherings  of  hostile  partisans,  of 
levying  contributions  on  a  large  scale  in  the  enemy's 
country,  and  of  carrying  out  other  similar  undertak- 
ings. Serious  encounters  must  often  be  expected  under 
such  circumstances. 

It  is  naturally  impossible  to  give  tactical  guides  and 
directions  for  all  these  various  cases;  each  problem, 
rather,  will  demand  its  own  solution.  At  the  same 
time  certain  typical  phenomena  continually  repeat 
themselves  in  all  such  combats,  for  which  general 
principles  and  rules  for  guidance  may  be  profitably  set 
forth. 

The  fight  will  be  either  offensive  or  defensive.  In 
the  offensive  it  will  either  be  a  matter,  if  the  enemy  is 
also  pressing  forward,  of  the  battle  of  encounter,  or 
else  the  attack  against  localities  or  positions.  In  fight- 
ing against  partisans,  also,  it  will  more  frequently  be  a 
case,  as  it  was  in  France,  of  a  struggle  for  localities. 
In  the  defence,  on  the  other  hand,  localities,  positions, 
or  defiles  will  have  to  be  defended.  Beyond  these 
groups  no  real  fight  can  be  considered  with  the  excep- 


138  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

tion  of  surprises,  which  merit  separate  consideration. 
It  is  therefore,  in  my  opinion,  advisable  to  develop 
the  tactical  principles  according  to  some  corresponding 
grouping  of  the  material.  Only  thus  can  clear  and 
reasoned  conclusions  be  arrived  at.  For  if  we  take  all 
the  various  principles  evolved  from  different  tactical 
situations  and  jumble  them  illogically  together,  or  dis- 
cuss them  from  points  of  view  which  are  not  closely 
based  on  the  probable  happenings  of  reality,  we  run  a 
danger  of  confusing  the  judgment  instead  of  clear- 
ing it. 

I.    The  Battle  of  Encounter 

When  lesser  bodies  of  cavalry,  unaccompanied  by 
the  other  arms,  meet  during  a  mutual  advance,  it  is 
essentially  a  matter  of  endeavouring  to  deploy  more 
quickly  than  the  adversary,  of  surprising  him  if  pos- 
sible while  still  deploying,  and  of  seizing  the  advan- 
tages of  the  terrain.  It  is  by  good  screening  of  the 
approach,  superior  reconnaissance,  a  quick  eye  for  the 
possibilities  of  the  ground,  and  rapid  decision  that 
here,  as  before,  superiority  can  be  maintained. 

It  may  happen  in  exceptional  cases,  under  modern 
conditions,  that  the  larger  bodies  of  cavalry,  accom- 
panied by  a  proportion  of  other  arms,  are  unable  at  the 
moment  of  collision  to  employ  them — e.g.  in  close 
country.  There  may  then  be  a  purely  cavalry  fight  on 
a  large  scale,  and  action  must  of  course  be  taken 
according  to  the  tactical  principles  involved.  Early 
deployment,  maintenance  of  exterior  lines,  rapid  de- 
cision, are,  as  regards  the  leading,  the  important  fac- 
tors of  success. 

It  is  quite  another  matter  where  co-operation  of  the 
other  arms  can  be  seriously  counted  on.  It  is  then 
chiefly  the  artillery  which  will  set  its  stamp  upon  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        139 

development  of  the  fight,  and  it  will  no  longer  be 
possible  to  act  according  to  purely  cavalry  tactical 
principles.  A  brigade  or  division,  in  column  of  route, 
or  even  in  several  formed  columns,  if  exposed  to  the 
enemy's  artillery  fire,  will  suffer  such  material  and 
moral  loss  that  such  formations,  unless  compelled  by 
circumstances,  are  particularly  to  be  avoided.  Who- 
ever is  obliged  to  effect  the  deployment  of  his  force 
under  the  enemy's  guns  casts  from  him  one  of  the 
most  important  elements  of  success. 

It  will  therefore  be  necessary,  when  advancing 
against  the  enemy,  to  adopt  the  approach  formation, 
and  to  seek  cover  as  soon  as  it  is  calculated  that  the 
hostile  artillery  are  within  effective  range.  In  order 
rightly  to  calculate  this  moment  the  enemy's  probable 
advance  must  of  course  be  taken  into  consideration, 
and,  as  this  may  vary  greatly  according  to  the  pace 
adopted,  it  is  advisable  in  this  respect  not  to  be  too 
optimistic,  but  to  be  deployed  rather  too  early  than 
too  late. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  range  of  modern  ar- 
tillery, the  deployment  should  commence,  therefore,  in 
open  country,  at  latest  when  some  6,500  yards  from 
the  enemy.*  As  this  distance  will  diminish  very 
quickly  when  the  opponents  are  both  rapidly  advanc- 
ing, it  will  certainly  be  advisable,  if  the  knowledge  of 
the  situation  in  any  way  allows,  to  take  up  the  required 
breadth  of  front  still  earlier. 

I  would  here  lay  down  that  a  too  rapid  advance  of 
our  own  troops,  unless  rendered  necessary  by  the  situa- 

^  If  I  lay  down  that  the  deployment  in  the  case  of  in- 
fantry columns  marching  towards  each  other  should  begin 
at  8,500  yards,  and  in  the  cavalry  only  at  6,000  yards,  the 
reason  is  that  the  mounted  arm  effects  the  necessary  de- 
ployment much  more  quickly.  The  depth  of  the  column,  also, 
is  not  such  a  decisive  factor  as  in  the  case  of  infantry. 


140  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

tion,  is  in  no  way  advantageous.  It  is  not  generally  a 
question  of  striking  the  enemy  as  far  to  the  front  as 
possible,  but  of  striking  surely,  and  of  having  sufficient 
strength  in  hand  to  annihilate  him  in  the  pursuit. 

A  steady  and  well-thought-out  advance  should  there- 
fore be  undertaken;  for  a  precipitate  forward  move- 
ment distresses  the  horses  quite  unnecessarily,  ren- 
ders an  appreciation  of  the  situation  more  difficult,  and 
generally  allows  of  no  well-considered  action.  There 
is  also  another  reason  for  avoiding  a  too  rapid  advance. 
This  is  the  fact  that  in  such  a  case  the  most  important 
reports  generally  come  in  when  the  force  is  already 
in  the  immediate  proximity  of  the  enemy.  This  dis- 
advantage increases  with  the  rapidity  of  the  advance, 
as  a  rapidly  moving  force  will  follow  more  closely  on 
the  heels  of  its  reconnoitring  patrols.  To  ride  slowly 
forward  and  to  give  the  patrols  time  to  send  back 
reports  will  generally  lead  to  better  information  as  to 
the  situation,  and  will  allow  of  a  better  and  quicker 
decision  being  made.-  The  enormous  advantage  may 
then  be  gained  of  being  deployed  earlier  than  the 
enemy,  and  of  gaining  exterior  lines  ^  from  the  begin- 
ning. 

In  spite  of  this,  most  cavalry  leaders,  especially  at 
manoeuvres,  regard  their  task  as  a  matter  of  rapidly 
covering  a  certain  distance,  and  see  in  this  the  essence 
of  the  cavalry  spirit.  This  is,  however,  by  no  means 
so.  Coolness,  reflection,  economy  of  force  in  approach 
and  deplo)anent,  but  that  lightning-like  decision  and 
action  at  the  proper  moment,  which  .can  only  result 

^  "Exterior  lines."  The' author  uses  an  expression  familiar 
to  soldiers.  In  popular  language  the  meaning  is  to  gain  a 
front  wide  enough  to  deliver  a  converging  attack,  and  w^ork 
round  upon  one  or  both  of  the  enemy's  flanks,  from  outside 
of  them. — Editor's  Note. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        141 

from  a  clear  appreciation  of  the  situation,  alone  make 
the  great  cavalry  leader.  It  is  just  because  such  op- 
posite qualities  must  be  united  in  the  soul  of  one  man 
that  such  leaders  are  so  rare  and  so  difficult  to  recog- 
nise in  time  of  peace. 

When  a  collision  with  the  enemy  is  in  any  way  in 
prospect,  the  commander  must  in  principle  remain, 
during  the  advance,  with  the  foremost  detachments 
of  the  advanced  guard,  in  order  that  reports  may  reach 
him*  as  early  as  possible.  When  in  close  proximity 
to  the  enemy  he  will  often  be  obliged  to  advance 
with  a  sufficient  escort  from  point  to  point,  in  order 
that  he  may  be  able  to  study  the  ground  from  good 
points  of  view,  and,  where  possible,  himself  observe 
the  movements  and  dispositions  of  the  enemy.  He 
will  thus  be  in  a  position  to  make  his  preliminary 
arrangements  rapidly  and  effectively,  to  spare  his 
troops  unnecessary  marching,  and  to  counteract  any 
unsuitable  dispositions  made  by  his  subordinates.  He 
must  not,  however,  conceal  from  himself  that  even  the 
most  effective  measures  of  reconnaissance  may  fail, 
and  that  he  may  be  faced  by  the  necessity  of  coming  to 
a  decision  without-  full  knowledge  as  to  the  enemy. 

In  such  cases,  when  it  can  be  estimated  that  deploy- 
ing distance  from  the  enemy  has  been  arrived  at,  fur- 
ther reconnaissance  should  not  be  waited  for  to  assist 
decision;  but  the  initiative  must,  under  all  circum- 
stances, be  maintained.  The  leader,  then,  must  act  ac- 
cording to  his  own  judgment,  and  impose  the  law  upon 
his  opponent,  and  yet  be  ready,  by  careful  dispositions, 
to  meet  unforeseen  events. 

It  may  happen  that  the  opponent  is  unexpectedly 
met  with,  and  has  gained  an  advantage  in  deployment. 
In  such  a  case  a  forward  deployment  generally  leads  to 
the  dribbling  up  of  the  force,  hampered,  as  it  will  be, 


142  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

by  the  proximity  of  the  enemy.  The  deployment 
should  therefore  be  made  either  on  the  existing  line  of 
front  or  to  the  rear,  according  to  the  distance  from  the 
enemy,  and  should  be  covered,  where  necessary,  by 
the  dismounted  action  of  the  advanced  guard  and  by 
artillery  fire.  Only  thus  can  the  lost  freedom  of  action 
be  regained,  as  superior  breadth  of  deployment  is  the 
first  and  perhaps  the  most  important  step  towards  the 
maintenance  of  the  initiative. 

We  must  not,  however,  assume  that  this  deployment 
— in  a  cavalry  division,  for  instance — requires  that  the 
various  brigades  shall  draw  away  from  each  other  at 
regulation  intervals,  and  that  the  division  will,  in  this 
formation,  advance  towards  the  enemy.  This  will  gen- 
erally be  impossible;  first,  because  it  is  usually  advis- 
able to  seek  the  cover  of  the  ground  in  order  to  be  se- 
cure from  possible  hostile  fire  surprise,  even  when  the 
enemy's  artillery  is  not  yet  located ;  secondly,  because 
the  regulation  frontage*  of  deployment  of  a  cavalry- 
division  is  much  too  narrow  to  allow  it  to  gain  exterior 
lines,  or  to  affect  a  concentric  attack.  The  deployment 
must  rather  be  carried  out  according  to  the  demands 
of  the  situation  at  the  moment,  without  regard  to  regu- 
lation intervals.  The  division  commander  will  first 
of  all  detail  a  reserve  for  himself.  To  this  he  will 
then  give  the  orders  necessary  for  its  conduct  as  well 
as  to  the  advanced  guard,  the  various  groups  of  the 
main  body,  and  the  artillery  and  machine-guns.  The 
direction  of  march  of  the  various  subdivisions  will 
thus  be  determined  according  to  the  ground  and  the 
intentions  of  the  commander,  and  it  will  also  usually 
be  necessary,  in  order  to  keep  the  troops  well  in  hand, 
to  order  the  advance  by  stages,  and  to  regulate  the 
pace. 

If  the  advance  has  been  carried  out  in   separate 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        143 

columns,  the  action  of  the'  smaller  columns  must  be 
regulated  before  the  deployment  of  the  main  column. 
A  certain  loss  of  time  will  here  generally  be  found 
inevitable.  The  necessary  preparations  must  therefore 
be  made  early  enough  to  ensure  that,  if  the  junction  of 
a  detachment  with  the  main  body  is  intended,  it  will 
be  possible  to  carry  it  out  before  contact  with  the  en- 
emy is  made.  It  is  a  matter  for  especially  careful  and 
well-considered  action  if  one  of  the  lesser  columns  is 
to  intervene  from  a  flank  direction  in  a  fight  which  is 
already  raging,  an  operation  which  may  be  of  the  most 
decisive  importance,  but  difficult  to  effect  in  the  rapid 
course  of  cavalry  action.  If,  however,  it  is  desired  to 
reap  the  benefits  of  such  action,  an  endeavour  must  be 
made  to  gain  time  by  dismounted  action  for  the  arrival 
of  the  column  which  is  to  strike  the  decisive  blow. 
Such  measures  will  always  be  risky,  but  may  lead  to 
glorious  results. 

The  orders  for  the  concentration  and  for  the  deploy- 
ment form  the  framework  on  which  the  whole  fight 
develops.  They  are  therefore  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance. Faults  committed  here  can  seldom  be  rectified 
later,  and  yet  such  orders  will  generally  have  to  be 
issued  before  touch  with  the  enemy  is  gained,  except  by 
patrols,  and  at  a  moment  when  the  main  features  at 
most  of  the  enemy's  situation  are  known.  Particular 
attention  must,  as  we  have  seen,  be  paid  to  his  artil- 
lery. No  one  will  deny  that  herein  lies  the  possibility 
of  misapprehension  and  failure,  and  that  many  a  leader 
will  shrink  from  the  necessity  of  such  a  decision.  He, 
however,  who,  in  spite  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  situa- 
tion, succeeds  in  making  up  his  mind  betimes  has  an 
obvious  advantage.  For  it  is  just  in  such  a  battle  of 
encounter  that  success  will  fall  to  him  who  knows  how 
to  avail  himself  with  rapidity  and  determination  of  the 


144  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

favourable  moment,  who  quickly  possesses  himself  of 
important  points  and  localities,  and  who  anticipates  the 
enemy,  as  advocated  above,  in  broadening  the  front, 
and  thereby  in  deployment. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  dispositions  made  for 
the  advanced,  guard  will  be  of  the  greatest  importance. 
Its  conduct  has  often  a  deciding  influence  on  the  issue 
of  the  whole  fight. 

If  it  be  carelessly  handled,  this  circumstance  may 
mean  the  loss  of  the  initiative,  and  the  commander  may 
find  himself  compelled  to  turn  his  attention  to  the 
situation  forced  upon  him  by  the  advanced  guard,  and 
to  conduct  the- fight  otherwise  than  his  own  intentions 
and  the  general  situation  demand.  'On  the  other  hand, 
a  too  careful  employment  of  the  advanced  detachments 
is  apt  to  entail  loss  of  advantages  which  might  be  of 
decisive  importance.  The  proper  conduct  of  such  an 
advanced  guard  demands,  therefore,  an  unusually  sure 
military  instinct.  Its  commander  must  always  be  in- 
structed in  a  detailed  manner  as  to  the  intentions  of  the 
general,  if  he  is  expected  to  handle  his  detachment 
successfully  according  to  them. 

It  will  often  be  advisable  for  the  advanced  guard  to 
occupy  some  point  of  support  dismounted,  in  order 
that  the  deployment  and  the  further  tactical  develop- 
ment may  be  undertaken  under  cover  of  it.  In  such 
circumstances  there  is  no  reason  to  shrink,  when  neces- 
sary, from  bringing  the  advanced  guard  back  to  some 
suitable  locality,  if  thereby  full  cover  can  be  afforded 
for  the  rear  detachments  or  for  separated  portions  of 
the  force  that  may  be  rejoining.  It  will  often  be"  found 
desirable  also,  in  the  critical  moments  of  deployment, 
to  strengthen  the  resisting  power  of  the  advanced 
guard  by  machine-guns.  It  may,  however,  on  the  other 
hand,  be  equally  advantageous  for  the  advanced  de- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        145 

tachments,  on  collision  with  the  enemy,  to  charge  him 
recklessly  in  order  to  reap  full  benefit  from  some  fa- 
vourable opportunity. 

The  handling  of  the  artillery,  particularly  at  the 
moment  of  deployment,  is  of  especial  importance.  It 
may  be  a  great. advantage  to  bring  it  into  action  before 
the  enemy's  artillery,  in  order  to  profit  by  any  careless- 
ness of  the  hostile  troops  in  deployment  and  approach, 
and  to  surprise  their  artillery  when  coming  into  posi- 
tion. The  conduct  of  the  advanced  guard  must  there- 
fore be  influenced  by  the  fact  that  a  suitable  position 
must  be  assured  to  the  artillery.  Its  fire  will  often 
suffice  to  induce  the  enemy  to  show  his  strength  or  to 
evacuate  localities  which  he  has  occupied. 

As  long  as  the  strength  of  the  enemy  is  unknown, 
and  the  possibilities  of  superior  force  have  to  be  reck- 
oned with,  it  would  be  a  great  error  to  stake  the  whole 
force  -as  soon  as  contact  has  been  gained.  This  is 
often  done  on  training-grounds  in  quite  a  systematic 
way,  because  there  is  always  a  tacit  understanding  that 
the  enemy  is  no  stronger  than  one's  own  force.  In 
war  such  action  might  lead  to  the  gravest  disasters. 

If,  therefore,  complete  uncertainty  reigns  as  to  the 
enemy's  strength,  it  will  be  better  at  first  to  operate 
tentatively  with  a  portion  of  the  force  until  an  opinion 
can  be  arrived  at  as  to  whether  the  decisive  attack  can 
be  ventured  on.  Energetic  contact  with  the  enemy  by 
fire  action  will  generally  soon  clear  up  this  point. 

The  view  that  a  gradual  and  judicious  employment 
of  force  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  cav- 
alry action  (430)  ^  can  only  be  justified  in  the  case  of 

1  "An  attack  in  which  troops  are  sent  gradually  into  action 
in  small  detachments,  one*  after  the  other,  is  not  in  accord- 
ance with  the  spirit  of  cavalry  combat.  A  force  large 
enough  for  the  attainment  of  the  objective  must,  therefore. 


146  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

the  pure  cavalry  combat  mounted.  This,  however,  in 
my  opinion,  should  only  be  determined  upon  if  the 
enemy's  strength  is  known,  at  all  events  to  some  de- 
gree. I  do  not  share  the  view  of  the  Regulations  that, 
if  uncertainty  reigns  as  to  the  strength  and  intentions 
of  the  enemy,  freedom  of  action  can  be  preserved, 
even  in  the  mounted  combat  against  cavalry,  by  the 
use  of  formations  in  echelon  (424).^  This  is  only  pos- 
sible by  a  protracted  action  in  which  gradual  rein- 
forcements are  used,  and  only  in  such  a  manner  can 
the  enemy  be  forced  to  disclose  his  strength  and  inten- 
tions. A  protracted  fight,  however,  can  only  be  carried 
out  by  fire  action.  A  mounted  advance,  whether  made 
in  echelon  or  otherwise,  cannot  alter  the  rapid  nature 
of  a  cavalry  fight,  and  will  not  allow  of  sufficient  time 
being  gained  to  form  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  en- 
emy. Echelon  formations  lead  at  best  to  eccentric  at- 
tacks and  thereby  to  unfavorable  tactical  situations. 

If  the  situation  is  to  be  cleared  up  by  fighting,  fire 
action  must  be  employed,  and  as  soon  as  this  occurs, 
whether  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  or  oneself,  a  gradual 
employment  of  force  is  not  only  no  disadvantage,  but 
is  demanded  by  the  circumstances.  For  at  first  the 
fight  must  be  carried  out  from  depth ;  the  Napoleonic 
"Je  m'engage  et  puis  je  vois"  ^  holds  good ;  one's  own 
main  force  will  only  be  engaged  when  the  strength  and 

be  employed  from  the  very  commencement  of  the  engage- 
ment. But  not  a  man  more !  No  squadron  must  be  allowed 
to  deal  a  blow  in  the  air.  Conversely,  it  is  wrong  to  com- 
mence an  engagement  with  insufficient  force,  and  thus  to 
leave  the  enemy  with  initial  success." 

*  "Collisions  of  cavalry  partake  usually  of  the  nature  of 
battle  of  encounter.  In  such  cases,  uncertainty  as  to  the 
strength  and  intentions  of  the  enemy  renders  necessary  such 
echelon  formations  as  will  preserve  freedom  of  action." 

•"I  get  into  action  and  then  I  see." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        147 

intentions  of  the  enemy  become  in  some  measure 
known.  It  will,  however,  be  advisable  in  all  cases  to 
keep  a  strong  reserve  in  hand  until  prepared  to  ad- 
vance to  a  well-considered  and  planned  attack. 

The  passage  of  defiles,  also,  is  scarcely  likely  to  be 
undertaken  in  serious  war  in  the  manner  so  often  seen 
at  manoeuvres.  Here  the  chief  matter  for  considera- 
tion is  generally  to  keep  one  side  as  far  from  the  defile 
as  possible,  in  order  that  the  passage  of  the  other  may 
be  possible.  Such  tender  solicitude  is  scarcely  to  be 
expected  of  a  real  enemy,  and  it  will,  I  opine,  scarcely 
occur  to  anybody  in  war  to  attempt  a  defile  without 
preparation,  and  to  advance  on  the  farther  side  against 
an  enemy  whose  strength,  as  is  generally  the  case  in 
war,  is  unknown,  thereby  running  the  danger  of  being 
thrown  back  on  the  defile  and  of  suffering  enormous 
loss.  Such  a  danger,  to  which  the  whole  force  is 
exposed,  would  certainly  only  be  incurred  when  the 
gravest  necessity  compelled.  What  the  Regulations 
say  in  this  respect  (434)  *  has,  to  my  mind,  but  a  lim- 
ited practical  significance. 

Such  directions  would  only  be  followed  if  the  enemy 
were  known  to  be  still  far  distant  and  approaching, 
where  there  is  time  and  space  sufficient,  and  where  the 
force  is  considered  to  be  at  least  a  match  for  the  enemy. 
Even  then,  preparations  should  be  made  for  a  possible 
retirement.    In  all  other  cases,  however,  a  defile  on  the 

*  "If,  on  emerging  from  a  defile,  the  enemy  is  not  so  close 
as  to  necessitate  an  immediate  attack  with  any  available 
forces,  a  deployment  at  the  halt  offers  certain  advantages. 
It  saves  space  towards  the  front,  and  gains  time — a  matter  of 
some  moment  in  a  critical  situation.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  an  immediate  employment  and 
advance  inspires  the  troops  with  enthusiasm.  A  deploy- 
ment at  the  halt  may  also  take  place  when  the  intention 
is  to  make  a  surprise  attack  from  a  concealed  position." 


148  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

far  side  of  which  the  enemy  is  supposed  to  be  will  only 
be  crossed  when  the  ground  for  deployment  on  the  far 
side  is  at  least  commanded  with  fire  in  such  a  way  that 
the  enemy  will  not  be  able,  in  case  a  retirement  becomes 
necessary,  to  pursue  right  into  the  defile. 

It  will  therefore  generally  be  advisable  to  throw 
forward  a  few  squadrons  at  a  rapid  pace  across  the 
defile  in  order  to  occupy  with  dismounted  action  strong 
points  on  the  far  side,  from  which  the  foreground  can 
be  covered.  This  will  secure  the  passage  of  the  main 
body  and  arrest  any  possible  pursuit.  It  will  often  be 
advantageous  to  provide  such  squadrons  with  machine- 
guns.  Artillery  can  most  suitably  come  into  action  on 
the  near  side  of  the  defile,  so  that  it  may  be  able  to 
cover  the  country  on  the  far  side  with  its  fire. 

Even  if  a  defile  occupied  by  the  enemy  has  been 
captured  by  fire  action  it  is  advisable,  before  the  main 
body  crosses  it,  to  secure  a  few  strong  points  in  the 
foreground,  in  order  to  secure  the  passage  against 
counter-attack  by  the  enemy's  reserve. 

Such  necessary  care  in  the  preliminaries  of  an  action, 
however,  must  in  nowise  lead  commanders  to  allow 
themselves  to  be  forced  to  adopt  a  defensive  attitude  or 
to  abstain  from  decisive  attack.  That  is  not  the  in- 
tention. Such  measures  are  only  taken  to  clear  up 
the  situation,  which  cannot  generally  be  done  in  war 
without  fighting,  and  to  diminish  the  risks  of  any 
further  action  which  may  ensue.  If  the  enemy  has  so 
far  shown  himself  that  an  appreciation  can  to  some 
extent  be  arrived  at  as  to  its  strength,  if  he  has  brought 
artillery  into  position,  if  perhaps  he  has  attacked  our 
advanced  guard,  or  by  the  action  of  the  latter  has  been 
forced  to  throw  more  men  into  the  fight,  if,  in  short,  it 
can  be  determined  that  an  attack  has  prospect  of 
success,  then  the  decisive  offensive  must  be  undertaken, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        149 

with  all  the  force  hitherto  kept  back.  Detachments, 
also,  which  have  been  dismounted  can  then,  according 
to  circumstances,  be  withdrawn  from  the  fire  fight  and 
otherwise  used.  The  attack,  especially  when  mounted, 
will  usually  be  delivered  with  greatest  advantage  from 
the  flank,  and  must,  as  a  rule,  reach  well  out  in  order  to 
escape  as  far  as  possible  the  artillery  and  machine-gun 
fire  of  the  enemy.  Whether  it  be  undertaken  mounted 
or  dismounted  will  depend  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
enemy  and  the  attendant  circumstances.  In  either  case 
it  will  be  advisable  to  husband  a  reserve  as  long  as 
possible  to  meet  the  vicissitudes  of  the  fight,  or  to  be 
used  for  a  bold  stroke,  when  it  is  seen  where  a  decision 
may  be  arrived  at. 

If  dismounted  action  must  be  undertaken,  the  prin- 
ciples which  govern  the  infantry  attack  hold  good.  The 
fire  of  the  artillery  and,  where  possible,  the  machine- 
guns  must  naturally  be  utilised  for  the  support  of  the 
attacking  troops.  The  dispositions  for  the  action 
should,  however,  never  depend  upon  the  possibility  of 
finding  a  good  artillery  position.  The  artillery  must 
suit  itself  to  the  circumstances,  and  come  into  action 
wherever  it  can  best  co-operate  in  carrying  out  the 
commander's  intentions.  It  can  often  be  profitably  em- 
ployed in  the  protection  of  an  exposed  flank.  It  will 
be  of  advantage  to  shelter  it  behind  some  obstacle  in 
order  to  save  the  necessity  of  finding  a  detachment  for 
its  security.  Machine-guns  may  sometimes  be  advan- 
tageowsly  used  for  the  protection  of  the  artillery.  It 
is  at  the  same  time  advisable  that  a  specially  detailed 
cavalry  escort  should  be  dismounted  for  this  object. 

A  concentration  of  the  batteries  facilitates  fire  com- 
mand and  measures  for  protection.  A  dispersion  by 
groups  allows  a  better  effect  against  the  hostile  artillery 
and  usually  affords  a  more  extensive  field  of  fire. 


I50  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Machine-guns,  which  must  generally  look  for  positions 
as  far  to  the  front  as  possible,  or,  if  they  are  protected, 
to  a  flank,  will  usually  be  best  concentrated  in  a  single 
fire  position.  They  may,  however,  be  disposed  by 
sections  when  occasion  demands.  This  principle  holds 
good  also  for  the  artillery.  Hard-and-fast  rules  must 
be  avoided  if  the  many  and  varied  demands  of  a  cav- 
alry fight  are  to  be  met.  The  line  of  fire,  however,  of 
artillery  and  machine-guns  should  never  be  allowed  to 
limit  the  movements  of  our  own  cavalry. 

In  consequence  of  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  cavalry 
fight  it  will  often  be  desirable  to  keep  the  limbers  with 
the  guns.  It  may  also  be  an  advantage  not  to  bring 
the  first-line  transport  and  a  portion  of  the  wagons  on 
to  the  field  itself.  For  similar  reasons  the  light  ammu- 
nition columns  will  at  the  commencement  probably 
march  with  the  baggage.  Thus  too  it  will  often  be 
necessary  for  the  machine-gun  detachments  to  keep 
their  teams  near  the  guns,  or  to  shoot  from  the  carriage 
and  to  leave  the  ammunition  wagons  in  a  safe  place. 
All  these  measures  contain,  however,  the  danger  that 
ammunition  may  not  be  at  hand  when  wanted,  or  that 
these  indispensable  supplies  may  fall  into  the  hands  of 
hostile  raiding  parties.  The  failure  of  ammunition 
may,  especially  in  the  case  of  a  protracted  dismounted 
action,  be  of  decisive  importance.  Such  will  be  espe- 
cially the  case  where  the  ground  favours  the  use  of  the 
rifle,  or  where  the  hostile  cavalry  is  strengthened  by 
cyclists  or  mounted  infantry  and  shows  an  eagerness 
(natural  under  such  circumstances)  to  take  advantage 
of  such  methods  of  fighting. 

The  cavalry  leader  will,  under  these  conditions,  only 
undertake  what  must  be  an  obstinate  combat  when  he 
cannot  in  any  way  avoid  it,  or  at  least  is  not  compelled 
to  attack  frontally.    He  will  rather  endeavour,  if  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        151 

general  situation  allows,  to  separate  the  hostile  cavalry 
from  the  less  mobile  infantry  by  repeated  turning 
movements  and  then  to  attack  it  when  isolated.  If  the 
hostile  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  can  be  driven  from 
the  field,  the  infantry  detachments  will  form  an  easy 
prey  for  the  artillery  or  can  be  surrounded.  Under 
such  circumstances,  always  with  due  regard  to  the 
general  situation,  the  road  on  which  the  advance  is 
being  made  may  for  a  time  be  abandoned  and  the 
turning  movement  carried  out  with  the  whole  force,  if 
such  a  proceeding  affords  a  favourable  prospect  of  tac- 
tical success.  Such  a  movement  threatens  the  enemy's 
communications  in  the  same  way  as  it  exposes  our 
own.  Victory,  however,  will  secure  the  latter  again, 
and  will  be  the  more  decisive  the  farther  the  enemy 
can  be  driven  from  his  natural  line  of  retreat. 

Should  the  cavalry  meet  a  superior  force  of  all  arms, 
such  as  might  be  pushed  forward  by  the  enemy's  army, 
to  support  the  offensive  of  his  own  cavalry,  or  to  serve 
as  a  pivot  of  manoeuvre,  for  them,  a  decisive  battle 
must  on  no  account  be  undertaken  with  it. 

When  the  Regulations  (519)  ^  demand  that  endea- 
vours must  be  made  to  force  back  such  detachments  or 
to  break  through  them,  I  think  that  the  tactical  value 
of  the  arm  is  over-estimated.  I  cannot  conceive  any 
real  case  in  which  cavalry  can  break  through  hostile 
detachments  of  all  arms.  In  my  opinion  the  cavalry 
will  generally  have  to  be  content  to  make  such  detach- 

1  "During  operations,  the  army  cavalry  must  seek  to  gain 
the  earliest  possible  insight  into  the  situation  and  disposi- 
tions of  the  enemy.  It  must  endeavour,  not  only  to  drive 
the  hostile  cavalry  from  the  field,  but  also  to  press  back 
advanced  detachments  of  all  arms,  or  to  break  through  and 
push  forward  to  the  vicinity  of  the  main  body.  Cavalry 
screen  duties,  also,  may  provide  fighting  for  the  army  cav- 
alry. 


152  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

ments  deploy,  by  means  of  artillery  fire,  and  especially 
by  fire  action  from  a  flank,  and  thereby  to  lose  time,  to 
deflect  them  from  their  line  of  march,  and,  by  threat- 
ening their  rear  and  communications,  prevent  them 
from  carrying  out  their  intentions.  Bold  measures  are 
in  such  cases  the  best,  and  will  preserve  to  the  cavalry 
the  possibility  of  continuing  the  distant  reconnaissance 
in  rear  of  the  hostile  detachment. 

As  to  the  leading,  in  all  such  battles  of  encounter  the 
commander's  place,  as  has  already  been  indicated,  is  at 
the  head  of  the  advanced  guard.  As  soon,  however,  as 
contact  has  been  gained  he  must,  on  the  contrary,  re- 
main far  enough  behind  the  fighting-line  to  be  able  to 
watch  his  own  troops  and  the  enemy,  and  to  be  easily 
found.  He  should  not  be  wandering  about  the  battle- 
field, seeing  everything  and  arranging  everything  him- 
self. Only  where  it  appears  necessary  to  him  to  make 
a  moral  impression  should  he  place  himself  at  the  head 
of  an  attacking  force.  He  might,  especially,  lead  his 
last  reserve  into  battle,  and  by  his  personal  example 
endeavour  to  inspire  the  troops  to  an  impetuous  attack. 
Such  cases,  however,  will  be  very  exceptional.  It  will 
always  be  most  important  that  the  supreme  commander 
retains  control  over  the  whole  of  his  troops,  and  can 
receive  messages  and  at  decisive  moments  issue  orders 
and  instructions  to  the  force. 

In  the  greater  number  of  cases  the  commander  will 
personally  neither  reconnoitre  the  ground  whither  he  is 
sending  a  detachment  nor  yet  the  enemy  which  it  shall 
engage.  He  will  scarcely  ever  be  able  to  give  to  single 
small  units  or  even  to  the  directing  brigade,  if  indeed  he 
has  detailed  one,  the  direction  of  attack.  It  will  often 
be  impossible  for  changes  in  orders  to  reach  troops  once 
set  in  motion  in  time  to  be  of  use,  especially  in  a  purely 
cavalry  fight. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        153 

When  the  Regulations,  in  spite  of  this,  declare  it  to 
be  indispensable  that  the  leader  himself  must  be  able  to 
see  if  he  takes  the  offensive  against  cavalry  (403),^ 
this  is,  under  modern  conditions  and  large  formations, 
in  most  cases  quite  impracticable,  even  in  manoeuvres. 
As  a  rule  the  commander  will  only  be  able  to  indicate 
the  task,  and  it  must  be  left  to  the  subordinate  leaders 
to  carry  it  out  to  the  best  of  their  ability,  according  to 
the  situation  as  they  find  it  on  the  spot.  The  situation 
during  the  rapidly  changing  phases  of  the  cavalry  fight 
will  often  be  quite  different  from  what  was  expected 
when  the  tasks  were  allotted. 

On  the  other  hand,  before  the  commencement  of  the 
engagement,  all  subordinate  leaders  must  be  informed 
as  to  the  situation  and  the  general  idea  of  the  fight,  also 
as  to  what  duties  each  one  of  the  larger  formations  is  to 
carry  out ;  so  that  all  may  be  in  a  position  to  act  accord- 
ing to  the  views  and  intentions  of  the  commander  if 
circumstances  should  be  found  different  from  what  was 
expected.  It  will  in  most  cases  be  desirable  to  issue  the 
order  for  deployment  in  such  a  way  that  at  least  every 
brigade  commander  is  informed  of  the  general  situa- 
tion, and  then  to  give  supplementary  orders  for  the 
fight  which  will  be  issued  to  all  units.  Whether  in  a 
battle  of  encounter  it  will  be  always  possible  to  detail  a 
directing  brigade  I  very  much  doubt.  One  brigade  will 
often  fight  on  foot,  the  other  mounted,  while  the  change 
from  the  advanced-guard  role  to  deployment  for  battle 

^  "The  leader  must  select  a  station  from  which,  while  keep- 
ing his  own  troops  well  in  hand,  he  can  obtain  a  good  view 
of  the  surrounding  country,  of  the  enemy,  and  of  the  prog- 
ress of  the  battle.  He  will  either  observe  himself,  or  by- 
means  of  officers  sent  out  to  observing  stations.  These 
latter  must  maintain  constant  communication  with  him. 

"Personal  observation  is  always  the  best,  and  is  essential 
in  the  case  of  offensive  action  against  cavalry" 


154  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

will  generally  render  a  handling  of  the  division  accord- 
ing to  rule  practically  impossible.  The  idea  that,  with 
an  independent  army  cavalry  in  the  battle  of  encounter, 
one  division  can  in  some  measure  be  handled  as  on  the 
drill-ground,  and  can  be  put  into  the  fight  in  proper 
cohesion,  must  be  dismissed.  That  is  an  error  that  has 
grown  upon  the  exercise-ground,  and  which  the  condi- 
tions of  modern  warfare  will  not  admit. 

The  more,  however,  that  the  method  of  leading  is 
compelled  by  the  pressure  of  modern  development  to 
change  from  tactical  routine  and  adopt  a  more  or  less 
strategic  form,  the  more  unconditionally  is  it  demanded 
of  subordinate  leaders  that  they  be,  even  when  inde- 
pendent, continually  conscious  of  the  guiding  tactical 
principles,  and  endeavour  to  act  in  accordance  with 
them. 

The  necessary  consideration  for  the  effect  of  the 
enemy's  fire  should  never  lead  to  fainthearted  disposi- 
tions or  paralyse  the  idea  of  decisive  offensive  action. 
If  the  result  of  the  fight  appears  doubtful,  the  most 
decisive  measures  must  be  taken  with  rapidity  and 
determination,  and  the  last  reserve  thrown  into  the 
fight,  regardless  of  consequences,  in  order  to  wrest  vic- 
tory from  the  enemy.  For  daring  is  in  itself  a  mighty 
factor  of  success,  and  one  which  exercises  enormous 
influence  on  the  fickle  Goddess  of  Fortune.  The  cal- 
culated boldness  of  all,  and  the  greatest  initiative  within 
reasonable  limits  of  subordinate  leaders,  must  give  to 
the  fight  of  the  cavalry  mass  its  peculiar  character. 

It  appears  to  me  that  this  principle  cannot  be  too 
greatly  emphasised  when  considering  the  cavalry  tactics 
of  the  present  day. 

If  the  fight  takes  a  favourable  course,  the  com- 
mander will  make  timely  preparations  for  an  effective 
pursuit,  get  control  of  any  reserves  still  intact,  and  take 


THE  BATTLE  OF  ENCOUNTER        155 

measures  for  the  concentration  of  strong_  bodies  of  his 
troops,  so  as  to  be  prepared  for  further  tactical  action. 
Artillery  and  machine-guns  advance  rapidly — when 
necessary,  on  their  own  initiative — in  order  to  come  to 
effective  range  as  soon  as  possible.  Should  the  fight 
take  an  unfavourable  turn,  the  commander  will  first 
make  dispositions  for  these  arms,  unless  they  are  to 
remain  in  position  and  sacrifice  themselves  to  facilitate 
retirement.  They  will  generally  be  sent  to  the  rear  in 
good  time  to  a  previously  selected  position.  Only  then 
will  measures  be  taken  to  extricate  the  troops  involved 
with  the  enemy,  to  concentrate  them  in  a  safe  place, 
and  to  make  fresh  dispositions.  Should  the  enemy 
pursue  with  but  weak  detachments,  the  offensive  should 
be  renewed. 

2.    Attack  of  Localities 

The  attack  of  an  enemy  who  takes  up  a  defensive 
attitude  can  obviously  only  be  carried  out  dismounted. 
It  must  be  a  matter,  therefore,  for  careful  considera- 
tion whether  such  an  operation  shall  be  undertaken  or 
not.  Considerable  numerical  superiority  is  necessary 
to  ensure  success.  A  reserve  will  be  needed,  which  can 
be  used  dismounted,  to  give  the  final  decision  at  the 
decisive  point,  or  to  meet  unexpected  events.  Besides 
this,  it  will  be  necessary  in  most  cases  to  make  a  de- 
tachment which  shall  provide  for  the  security  of  the 
led  horses,  for  reconnaissance,  and  for  operating 
against  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  It  is  the  task  of 
such  a  detachment  to  seek  out  and  overthrow  the  en- 
emy's mounted  reserve,  that  it  may  then  be  able  to 
co-operate  in  the  main  attack.  The  expression 
"Mounted  reserve,"  used  in  the  Regulations  to  desig- 
nate this  detachment,  hardly  corresponds  with  the  role 


156  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

of  these  troops,  which  will  be  offensive  from  the  com- 
mencement. 

Here  also  I  find  myself  in  disagreement  with  the  idea 
of  the  Regulations  that  the  dismounted  reserve  can  be 
frequently  detailed  from  the  troops  which  have  re- 
mained mounted  (460)/  The  mounted  reserve  must, 
as  we  have  seen,  operate  offensively.  The  Regulations 
themselves  allot  this  task  to  it  by  laying  down  that  it 
shall  undertake  operations  against  the  enemy's  flank, 
his  led  horses,  and  his  reserves  (464).^  It  is,  however, 
not  compatible  with  these  duties  that  the  mounted  re- 
serve shall  at  the  same  time  find  a  dismounted  reserve, 
which  can  only  enter  the  fight  from  the  rear,  and  until 
then  must  remain  behind  the  fighting-line.  Different 
troops  must  be  detailed  from  the  first  for  both  these 
duties,  otherwise  neither  of  them  will  be  properly  car- 
ried out. 

Should  the  cavalry  commander  not  have  at  his  dis- 
posal sufficient  force  to  meet  all  these  demands,  he  will 
generally  be  better  advised  to  abstain  from  the  attack, 
and  to  endeavour  to  carry  out  his  mission  in  some  other 

^  "As  a  general  principle,  a  mounted  reserve  will  be  de- 
tailed. 

"In  special  cases,  the  leader  may  detail  a  dismounted 
reserve,  which  he  can  make  use  of  at  points  where,  during 
the  course  of  the  battle,  the  enemy's  weakness  is  disclosed, 
or  which  are  recognized  as  decisive  objectives  for  the  at- 
tack. It  is  often  advisable  only  to  detail  such  a  force,  when 
it  is  required,  from  the  troops  which  have  remained 
mounted." 

2  "The  mounted  reserve  continues  the  tactical  reconnais- 
ance  and  undertakes  the  protection  of  the  led  horses.  It 
will  also  assume  the  offensive  against  a  flank  of  the  hostile 
position,  whenever  it  is  possible  to  combine  it  with  the  above 
duties.  When  fighting  dismounted  cavalry,  it  endeavours  to 
drive  the  hostile  mounted  reserve  from  the  field,  and  to  cap- 
ture the  led  horses." 


ATTACK  OF  LOCALITIES  157 

manner.  An  unsuccessful  enterprise  not  only  entails 
unnecessary  loss,  but  tends  to  lower  the  moral  value  of 
the  troops.  It  is  only  when  conscious  of  great  moral 
and  tactical  superiority,  or  when  there  is  a  prospect 
of  surprising  the  enemy,  that  an  attack  should  be  dared 
without  the  necessary  numerical  preponderance. 

The  more  difficult  and  serious  such  an  undertaking 
is,  the  greater  efforts  must  be  made  to  gain  at  least  a 
favourable  base  for  attack,  as  regards  not  only  the 
direction  of  the  attack  but  also  any  special  advantages 
of  the  ground.  The  mobility  of  the  troops  renders 
rapid  changes  of  direction  possible,  such  as  are  un- 
known to  the  infantry.  Unlike  the  case  of  the  infan- 
try, therefore,  the  line  of  advance  and  of  attack  need 
not  coincide.  If  thorough  reconnaissance  of  the  en- 
emy's position,  and  the  ground  in  front  of  it,  is  made 
in  good  time,  it  will  often  be  possible  to  change  the 
base  of  attack  even  at  the  last  moment  and  to  appear 
suddenly  from  an  unexpected  direction. 

Therefore,  even  in  the  approach,  the  deplo5mient,  and 
the  advance  to  effective  range,  the  ground  should  be 
carefully  utilised  in  order  that  cover  from  view  and  fire 
may  be  secured  as  long  as  possible.  It  is  also  impor- 
tant to  clear  the  country  where  the  approach  and  de- 
ployment will  take  place  of  the  enemy's  patrols,  and 
to  do  everything  possible  to  prevent  his  reconnais- 
sance. 

Artillery  and  machine-guns  must  come  into  action  in 
such  a  way  that  they  will  be  able  to  combine  with  the 
firing-line  in  concentrating  an  overwhelming  fire 
against  the  decisive  points  of  attack.  The  guns  will 
generally  be  able  to  come  into  action  under  cover,  and 
to  fire  indirect  against  the  enemy  in  position.  .They 
will  only  engage  the  enemy's  artillery  if  the  latter 
;Shows  itself  in  open  or  half-covered  positions  with  the 


158  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

object  of  turning  its  fire  on  the  advancing  attack. 
Otherwise  the  fire  of  the  artillery  will  be  directed 
against  the  enemy's  firing-line  or  any  mounted  detach- 
ments that  are  visible.  It  is  of  importance  that  a  suffi- 
cient quantity  of  ammunition  should  be  brought  up, 
and  that  it  should  not  be  wasted  by  random  fire  against 
invisible  targets. 

The  orders  for  the  fight  must  be  issued  with  great 
care  and  clearness,  for,  once  the  battle  is  begun,  it  will 
not  generally  be  possible  to  make  changes  of  disposi- 
tion. The  difficulty,  also,  of  changing  the  front  of  the 
fighting-line  increases  in  proportion  to  the  size  of  the 
units  employed.  It  is  therefore  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance not  only  to  determine  the  front  of  attack  before 
the  commencement  of  a  fight,  but  also  to  give  a  clear 
order  allotting  a  definite  task  to  each  unit,  which 
should,  when  possible,  be  made  known  to  all  the  troops. 
Only  if  this  is  achieved  will  they  be  able  to  act  inde- 
pendently according  to  the  spirit  of  the  orders. 

When  all  preparatory  dispositions  have  been  made, 
the  attack  should,  if  possible,  be  commenced  simultane- 
ously, unless  circumstances  demand  that  some  detach- 
ments take  up  the  fire  fight  before  the  others  are  ready 
to  co-operate.  From  the  moment  that  the  attack  is 
commenced,  but  one  thought  should  inspire  the  troops : 
"Forward  against  the  enemy,  cost  what  it  inay." 
Pressing  continually  to  the  front,  each  must  endeavour 
to  surpass  his  neighbour.  Should  further  advance  be 
impossible  without  reinforcements,  the  ground  won 
must  be  maintained  at  all  costs,  even  against  hostile 
counter-attack. 

The  strength  of  the  first  deployment  of  the  firing- 
line  must  depend  on  circumstances.  In  any  case  the 
whole  breadth  of  that  part  of  the  enemy's  front  must 
be  simultaneously  engaged  which  is  able  to  direct  its 


ATTACK  OF  LOCALITIES  159 

fire  against  the  attack,  as  otherwise  the  latter  will  be 
exposed  to  flanking  or  cross-fire. 

If  the  ground  allows  of  a  covered  approach  to  within 
efifective  range,  a  sufficiently  thick  firing-line  should  be 
established  at  once.  On  the  other  hand,  where  cover 
is  scarce,  it  will  sometimes  be  advisable,  when  sufficient 
time  can  be  spared,  to  deploy  at  first  only  a  loose, 
irregular  firing-line,  which  will  offer  a  difficult  target 
to  the  enemy,  or  to  remain  at  first  under  cover  and 
gradually  to  strengthen  the  firing-line  in  the  same  way 
until  it  attains  the  strength  necessary  to  commence  the 
attack.  In  the  further  advance,  supports  must  follow 
all  the  firing-lines,  to  make  good  losses,  keep  up  the 
ammunition  supply,  and  to  put  new  moral  strength 
into  the  fighting-line. 

Open  country  in  such  cases  demands  increased  depth 
in  order  to  minimise  loss,  while  close  country  requires 
that  depth  should  be  diminished,  and  it  will  be  found 
advisable  to  act  accordingly.  Close  formation  can  and 
must  be  maintained  as  long  as  the  terrain  and  the 
hostile  fire  admit.  It  will  of  course  be  impossible  to 
expose  such  formations  within  range  of  the  enemy's 
fire.  The  advance  will  then  consist  of  rushes,  with 
pauses  for  breath,  of  distribution  into  small  units, 
and  the  adoption  of  extended  order.  The  nearer  the 
decision  of  the  fight,  the  closer  must  the  supports 
follow,  ready  to  co-operate. 

In  difficult  country  the  order  and  cohesion  of  units 
must  not  be  lost.  It  is  especially  important  for  the 
supports  as  well  as  the  firing-line  to  make  use  of  any 
available  cover,  so  that  units  may  be  re-formed,  am- 
munition supply  regulated,  and  that  the  officers  may 
regain  their  influence  over  the  troops.  This  latter 
moral  element  deserves  especial  consideration. 

When  feeling  its  way  forward  the  firing-line  should 


i6o  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

avoid  regular  formation,  and  its  rushes  should  not  be 
made  in  too  small  bodies,  as  such  a  proceeding  is  apt 
to  mask  the  fire  of  neighbouring  detachments.  It  will 
likewise  generally  happen  that  some  portions  of  the 
line  are  able  to  advance  under  cover  of  the  ground 
more  rapidly  than  others.  These  must  then  ask  them- 
selves the  question  whether  their  isolated  advance 
might  not  lead  to  a  reverse  which  would  imperil  the 
success  of  the  attack.  On  the  other  hand,  the  unceas- 
ing pressing  forward  of  all  the  various  detachments  is 
conditional  to  success.  If  localities  exist  in  the  fore- 
ground which  might  serve  as  supporting  points  for  the 
further  development  of  the  attack,  it  should  be  con- 
sidered whether  they  should  not  be  occupied  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  and,  where  necessary,  secured  against 
counter-attack  by  being  placed  in  a  state  of  hasty  de- 
fence. The  advance  of  neighbouring  detachments  may 
then  be  facilitated  from  such  points  by  energetic  fire 
action.  Such  points  at  the  same  time  secure  the  pos- 
session of  the  ground  won  and,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, protect  those  portions  of  the  artillery  and  the 
machine-gun  detachments  which  may  accompany  the 
attack,  according  as  circumstances  dictate.  In  any  case 
such  a  measure  (the  co-operation  of  artillery  and  ma- 
chine-guns) brings  moral  support  to  the  attacking-line, 
and  may  at  times  prevent  a  defeat. 

As  soon  as  the  firing-line  has  arrived  within  assault- 
ing distance  its  fire  must  be  increased  to  the  utmost. 
All  detachments  in  rear  press  forward  regardless  of 
loss  as  soon  as  they  become  aware  that  the  first  line  is 
preparing  for  the  assault.  At  the  trumpet-call  "Rapid 
advance"  ^  the  whole  hurl  themselves  with  the  greatest 
determination  and  with  loud  cheers  upon  the  enemy. 
Any  reserves  which  may  be  still  to  the  rear  strain 
*  "Rasch  vorwarts." 


ATTACK  OF  LOCALITIES  i6i 

every  nerve  to  reach  the  advanced  firing-Hne.  The  as- 
sault should,  if  possible,  be  simultaneous.  But  the 
effort  to  secure  this  should  never  lead  to  detachments 
waiting  for  each  other.  Where  a  possibility  is  offered 
to  single  portions  of  the  force  to  penetrate  into  the 
enemy's  position  they  must  advance  independently, 
and  all  other  detachments  must  conform. 

It  is  important  that  the  assault  should  not  be  begun 
too  early,  but  that  the  firing-line  should  work  its  way 
forward  to  the  closest  range  before  rising  for  the  final 
charge.  The  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  lay  down  150 
paces  as  a  guide  for  this  distance  in  peace.  That  is  a 
great  deal  too  much.  I  do  not  think  that  the  firing- 
line,  especially  in  deep  ground  or  uphill,  can  "rush" 
forward  in  full  marching  order  150  paces  after  having 
already  carried  out  a  lengthy  attack.  These  instruc- 
tions of  the  Infantry  Drill  should  certainly  be  modi- 
fied. Cavalry,  however,  should  not  fall  into  this  error. 
A  premature  assault  may  imperil  the  success  of  the 
attack,  because  physical  force  may  fail,  and  the  enemy's 
fire  is  given  a  chance  of  regaining  its  full  strength. 
The  fire  weapon  should  rather  be  used  up  to  the  last 
moment.  The  assault  should  take  place  only  from  the 
closest  possible  distance,  and  this  will  ensure  success. 
For  the  rest,  I  may  draw  attention  to  the  instructions 
laid  down  in  the  Cavalry  Drill  for  the  dispositions  for 
the  attack  and  for  its  conduct.  On  these  points  it 
coincides  with  my  view,  and  it  would  be  superfluous 
here  to  repeat  what  lies  therein.  If  I  have  gone  into 
the  question  of  the  conduct  of  the  attack  rather  more 
closely,  it  is  to  emphasise  certain  points  that  are  not 
prominent  enough  in  the  compressed  instructions  of 
the  Regulations,  and  which  do  not  generally  receive 
sufficient  consideration. 


i62  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

As  to  surprise  fire  action,  also,  the  Regulations  con- 
tain all  the  essentials  (471-473).^ 

I  may,  however,  touch  here  upon  another  matter 
which  is  connected  with  dismounted  action,  i.e.  the 
question  of  armament.  It  has  often  been  proposed, 
and  from  influential  quarters,  to  replace  the  cavalry 
sword  by  some  kind  of  a  bayonet.  If,  it  is  said,  with 
a  certain  appearance  of  justification,  cavalry  are  to 
assault  hostile  positions  on  foot,  they  must  have  some 
arme  blanche  for  the  hand-to-hand  fight,  and  this  can 
only  be  a  bayonet.  The  war  in  Manchuria,  where 
such  melees  repeatedly  took  place,  is  cited  as  a  proof 
of  the  necessity  of  such  an  armament.  I  cannot  ally 
myself  with  such  proposals.  As  to  the  repeated  hand- 
to-hand  fights  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  these  took 
place  principally  because  the  Russians  found  it  impos- 
sible to  evacuate  their  entrenchments  in  time,  and  that 
they  took  such  full  advantage  of  cover  that  they  were 
in  some  measure  surprised  by  the  attacker.  These  ex- 
amples can  certainly  not  be  adapted  therefore  to  the 
dismounted  action  of  our  cavalry.    With  them  it  will 

^"Cavalry  may  succeed  in  causing  hostile  detachments 
considerable  loss,  and  in  upsetting  their  dispositions,  by  a  sur- 
prise appearance  combined  with  an  unexpected  and  simul- 
taneous opening  of  fire.  By  means  of  skilful  use  of  ground, 
and  by  reason  of  their  mobility,  they  can  rapidly  disappear 
and  escape  hostile  fire  action,  as  soon  as  they  have  obtained 
the  desired  results." 

"As  many  carbines  as  possible  must  open  fire  simultane- 
ously. The  leader  must  do  his  best  to  select  such  ground 
for  the  surprise  as  will  permit  of  the  horses  being  kept  under 
cover  close  at  hand." 

"Horse  artillery  and  machine-guns  are  necessary  to  pro- 
duce the  full  effect  of  fire.  Occasionally  the  co-operation  of 
the  cavalry  may  be  limited  to  protecting  the  artillery  while 
taking  up  a  position,  whence  it  can  suddenly  open  a  rapid 
fire  on  the  enemy." 


ATTACK  OF  LOCALITIES  163 

never  be  a  question  of  prepared  positions — which  cav- 
alry will,  as  a  rule,  neither  attack  nor  defend — but 
of  actions  resulting  from  a  battle  of  encounter.  In 
such  cases,  however,  as  the  experience  of  military 
history  teaches  us,  a  hand-to-hand  fight  is  quite  ex- 
ceptional. Even  the  struggle  for  localities  is  fought 
out  almost  entirely  with  the  firearm.  If  the  defence 
should  consist  of  dismounted  cavalry  and  cyclists,  it 
cannot  as  a  rule  be  assumed  that  such  troops  will 
allow  the  attack  to  come  to  close  quarters.  They  will 
more  generally,  as  soon  as  the  decision  of  the  fire  fight 
has  become  clear,  endeavour  to  reach  their  horses  or 
cycles  and  to  escape  the  fire  of  the  pursuit.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  therefore,  dismounted  cavalry  would 
really  only  use  the  bayonet  on  foot  in  quite  excep- 
tional cases,  and  it  would  only  be  justifiable  to  intro- 
duce it  if  there  were  no  attendant  disadvantages.  Such, 
however,  is  not  the  case.  I  would  regard  the  abolition 
of  the  present  sword  as  a  great  danger,  calculated  to 
seriously  injure  the  morale  of  the  cavalry. 

Our  lance  is  an  excellent  weapon  for  the  charge,  but 
for  single  combat  only  in  cases  where  the  men  have 
freedom  of  movement.  In  the  close  turmoil  of  the  fight 
it  is  very  difficult  to  handle  with  success ;  besides  which, 
it  easily  becomes  unserviceable  on  striking  an  object  too 
heavily.  Should  it  pierce  a  body  at  the  full  speed  of  a 
horse's  gallop  it  will  generally  bend  on  being  drawn  out 
(if  indeed  the  rider  in  his  haste  extricates  it  at  all),  and 
then  becomes  unserviceable.  In  such  a  case  the  man 
needs  his  sword.  A  short  bayonet  can  never  replace 
this,  and  a  compromise  between  a  bayonet  and  a  sword 
would  be  of  but  little  service.  If  the  sword  is  taken 
away  from  the  cavalry  soldier  he  will  be  rendered  in 
many  cases  weaponless.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  this. 
And  the  consciousness  of  this  drawback  would  very 


i64  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

soon  be  felt  by  the  troops  and  would  damp  their  eager- 
ness for  the  fight. 

The  case,  then,  is  this.  When  confronted  by  a  hos- 
tile cavalry  of  any  activity,  the  mounted  combat,  the 
melee,  at  least  for  smaller  detachments  and  patrols, 
will  be  of  almost  daily  occurrence;  while,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  hand-to-hand  fight  on  foot  must  be  most  ex- 
ceptional. To  injure  the  efficiency  of  the  troops  for 
their  daily  role  for  the  sake  of  such  isolated  occur- 
rences I  hold  to  be  a  great  mistake,  and  therefore  hope 
that  the  arm  will  be  spared  this  fate. 

3.    Defence 

As  regards  the  principles  of  the  defence,  I  may  draw 
attention  to  the  instructions  laid  down  in  the  new  Cav- 
alry Regulations,  which  coincide  with  my  views  in  all 
essentials.  There  are,  however,  still  a  few  points  to  be 
raised  which  seem  to  me  of  importance. 

First  and  foremost,  I  think  that  it  follows,  from  the 
above  arguments,  that,  in  the  case  of  cavalry  operating 
independently,  engagements  may  often  take  place 
which,  with  a  generally  offensive  intention,  must  be 
conducted  at  times  in  a  defensive  spirit  and  with  only 
part  of  the  troops — that  is  to  say,  where  it  is  not  the 
intention  to  act  on  the  defensive  with  the  whole  force, 
but  to  use  the  defence  only  as  a  means  of  resuming  the 
general  offensive  later  at  the  most  advantageous  time. 
It  will  be  possible,  especially  in  the  battle  of  encounter, 
to  defend  favourable  positions  or  localities  with  the 
advanced  troops,  either  to  gain  time  for  the  arrival  of 
the  main  body,  or  else  to  oblige  the  enemy  to  weaken 
his  reserves,  against  which  the  offensive  is  intended. 
This  combination  of  attack  and  defence  will  frequently 
occur,  I  am  convinced,  even  in  the  battle  of  encounter. 


DEFENCE  165 

In  such  cases  the  defence  must  endeavour  to  deceive 
the  opponent  and  to  provoke  the  attack.  Efforts  will 
be  made,  while  putting  but  few  men  into  the  fight,  to 
give  the  impression  of  strength  in  the  firing-line,  and 
yet  so  to  dispose  the  troops  that  attack  will  not  appear 
impossible,  if  carried  out  in  sufficient  force.  Groups 
of  men  on  a  broad  front,  a  liberal  expenditure  of  am- 
munition, and  sometimes  the  holding  back  of  artillery 
and  machine-guns,  are  the  means  whereby  the  enemy 
may  be  thus  misled. 

But,  even  if  the  defensive  on  a  large  scale  is  adopted 
because  the  force  is  considered  too  weak  to  take  the 
offensive  in  the  open,  the  guiding  principle  will  still  be, 
as  I  have  already  indicated,  to  obtain  a  decision  in  the 
defensive  fight  by  an  offensive  counter-stroke,  in  so  far 
as  the  force  and  the  circumstances  of  the  ground  in  any 
way  permit.  This  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  the 
spirit  of  cavalry. 

The  force  destined  for  the  counter-attack  should 
accordingly  be  detailed  from  the  first.  Efforts  must  be 
made,  by  using  favourable  country  for  the  defensive 
front  and  thus  being  able  to  occupy  it  weakly,  to  spare 
every  available  man  for  the  counter-attack,  and  to  com- 
pensate for  the  weakness  of  the  force  in  position  by 
ample  ammunition,  well-arranged  cross-fire,  and  simi- 
lar measures.  The  troops  designed  to  play  the  offensive 
role  must  first  be  placed  in  reserve,  withdrawn,  as  far 
as  possible,  from  view  and  fire  of  the  enemy.  As  soon 
as  the  situation  is  cleared  up,  they  will  be  placed  in 
echelon  behind  that  flank  from  which  the  counter- 
stroke  will  take  place.  Whether  this  will  be  a  mounted 
or  dismounted  attack  depends  on  the  character  of  the 
ground  and  similar  circumstances.  In  any  case  a  base 
for  attack  outside  the  limits  of  the  enemy's  fire  must 
be  reached,  and,  where  possible,  by  surprise. 


i66  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

It  is  therefore  of  the  highest  importance  that  the 
enemy  shall  be  prevented  from  gaining  observation  as 
to  the  conduct  of  the  reserve,  in  order  that  its  presence 
may  eventually  come  as  a  surprise  to  him.  Hostile 
patrols  must  be  attacked  with  remorseless  energy  wher- 
ever seen,  and,  if  possible,  put  out  of  action.  Those 
look-out  points,  on  the  other  hand,  from  which  obser- 
vation can  be  made  of  the  enemy  must  be  occupied 
early  in  the  fight. 

The  cavalry  will,  as  a  rule,  only  undertake  a  com- 
pletely passive  defence,  where  the  object  of  the  fight  is 
to  hold  the  crossing  over  some  obstacle,  to  defend 
isolated,  localities,  or  to  gain  time.  In  such  a  case  the 
question  is  one  of  the  obstinate  defence  of  a  definite 
object,  sometimes  perhaps,  also,  of  a  retirement  from 
one  point  to  another.  Such  an  operation,  however,  is 
always  difficult  to  carry  out  on  account  of  the  led 
horses,  and  should  only  be  attempted  in  very  favorable 
country.  It  demands  that  the  fight  shall  be  broken  off 
— always  a  difficult  matter,  and,  to  cavalry  encumbered 
by  their  led  horses,  one  of  considerable  danger.  The 
horses  certainly  render  it  possible,  by  making  a  proper 
use  of  the  ground,  to  withdraw  more  rapidly  than 
could  infantry  in  the  same  case.  On  the  other  hand, 
however,  they  tie  the  dismounted  troops  down  to  a 
definite  direction  of  retreat,  and  remounting,  when 
pressed  by  the  enemy,  is  always  a  critical  matter. 

4.    Breaking  off  the  Fight,  Retreat,  and  Pursuit 

When  it  becomes  apparent  during  the  course  of  a 
fight  that  success  cannot  ensue,  the  commander  must 
decide  in  good  time  whether  he  will  carry  the  engage- 
ment through  or  break  it  off.  To  choose  the  right  mo- 
ment for  the  latter  operation  is  generally  extraordi- 


FIGHT,  RETREAT,  AND  PURSUIT      167 

narily  difficult,  even  when  it  has  been  planned  from  the 
commencement.  To  make  the  necessary  dispositions, 
also,  demands  great  tactical  skill.  To  continue  the  fight 
with  determination,  perhaps  till  nightfall,  will  often 
cost  no  greater  sacrifice  than  the  breaking  off  of  the 
engagement  and  the  attendant  retreat. 

Generally  speaking,  such  engagements  will  only  be 
those  which  are  fought  out  on  foot.  The  more  open 
the  country,  the  closer  the  enemy,  and  the  greater  the 
number  of  troops  which  have  already  been  thrown  into 
the  fighting-line,  so  much  the  more  difficult  will  it 
usually  be  to  break  off  the  fight.  The  circumstance 
also  as  to  whether  the  led  horses  are  mobile  or  im- 
mobile, and  their  position,  will  naturally  influence 
the  decision.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  easier  to  ex- 
tricate the  force  after  some  success  has  been  gained; 
whether  it  be  that  a  hostile  attack  has  been  repulsed,  or 
that  our  own  troops  have  made  a  successful  counter- 
stroke.  History  teaches  us  that  at  such  moments  there 
is  generally  a  lull,  during  which  the  opponent  is  obliged 
to  bring  up  fresh  troops  or  to  make  fresh  tactical 
dispositions. 

Even  under  such  favourable  conditions,  however,  it 
will  generally  be  impossible  to  break  loose  from  the 
enemy  without  suffering  heavy  loss. 

In  defence,  if  the  ground  is  especially  favourable,  it 
will  certainly  be  possible  at  times  to  extricate  a  force 
without  considerable  loss.  If  it  can  rapidly  withdraw 
from  the  firing-line  and  retire  covered  from  pursuing 
fire,  the  whole  force  may  under  certain  circumstances 
simultaneously  evacuate  a  position,  that  is  to  say,  if  the 
enemy  is  still  so  far  distant  that  he  is  unable  to  employ 
pursuing  fire  until  the  defender  has  reached  a  place  of 
safety.  How  seldom,  however,  will  such  be  the  case! 
Small  detachments  will  generally  have  to  be  sacrificed 


i68  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

to  secure  the  retreat  of  the  main  body.  This  means 
that  various  especially  strong  supporting  points  in  the 
position  will  be  occupied,  and  the  force  will  withdraw 
under  cover  of  them. 

Military  history  offers  us  repeated  examples  where 
the  attacker  makes  desperate  endeavours  to  overpower 
such  points,  and  in  so  doing  forgets  to  pursue  the  with- 
drawing masses  of  the  defender's  troops.  This,  for 
example,  was  the  part  played  at  the  battle  of  Weissen- 
burg  by  Geisberg  Castle  and  Schafbusch,  and  the 
chateau  with  its  enclosed  park  at  the  battle  of  Coul- 
miers.  Under  cover  of  these  points,  against  which  all 
the  efforts  of  the  French  were  concentrated,  the  de- 
fenders were  able  in  both  cases  to  withdraw  so  slightly 
molested  that  even  touch  with  them  was  completely 
lost. 

The  defence  of  such  supporting  points,  which  must 
be  conducted  with  the  utmost  obstinacy,  frequently 
ends  in  capture,  but  the  end  gained  is  worth  the  sacri- 
fice. If  the  endeavour  is  made  to  withdraw  the  whole 
line  of  defence  simultaneously  under  circumstances 
where  it  is  possible  for  the  attacker  to  bring  to  bear  an 
effective  pursuing  fire  from  the  captured  position,  loss 
will  generally  be  much  greater  than  that  which  would 
be  deliberately  incurred  in  arresting  the  pursuit. 

The  conditions  are  similar  in  attack.  At  manoeuvres 
certainly  we  see  the  attacker  when  repulsed  turn  about, 
and,  in  a  continuous  retreat,  lay  himself  open  to  a 
pursuing  fire,  which  would  mean  absolute  destruction. 
I  do  not  think  such  a  manoeuvre  possible  in  reality. 
As  the  advance  has  been  by  stages,  so  must  be  the 
retreat.  But,  whereas  in  the  advance  it  was  a  matter 
of  pressing  forward  on  a  wide  connected  front,  in  or- 
der to  hold  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  position  under 
fire,  and  not  oi  massing  together  where  cover  could  be 


FIGHT,  RETREAT,  AND  PURSUIT      169 

obtained,  the  exact  contrary  is  the  case  in  retreat,  and 
the  troops  must  seek  any  cover  that  will  shelter  them 
from  the  fire  of  the  pursuit.  Various  strong  points  in 
the  attack  which  have  already  been  taken  and  occupied 
must  be  obstinately  held  during  the  retirement,  and 
from  them  a  heavy  fire  poured  into  the  pursuit  to  bring 
it  to  a  standstill.  Care  should  be  taken,  even  during 
an  advance,  to  keep  such  places  well  supplied  with  am- 
munition, which  can  either  be  taken  forward  to  the 
captured  position  or  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  retiring 
troops. 

I  do  not  think  that  it  will  be  possible  in  any  other 
manner  to  break  off  an  attack  which  has  penetrated  to 
within  effective  range  of  the  enemy,  or  to  carry  out  a 
compulsory  retreat  without  disastrous  loss. 

The  troops  must  fall  back,  obstinately  contesting 
the  ground  and  continually  recommencing  fire  from 
any  favourable  position.  The  commander  must  make 
careful  preparations,  even  when  advancing,  that  a  pos- 
sible retreat  shall  not  lead  to  disaster,  but  will  be  able 
to  find  prepared  points  of  support.  All  detachments, 
however,  that  are  outside  the  effective  range  of  the 
enemy's  fire,  and  still  capable  of  manoeuvre,  especially 
artillery  and  machine-guns,  must  from  commanding 
positions  bring  fire  to  bear  on  those  troops  which  are 
harassing  the  retreat,  regardless  of  the  losses  they 
may  themselves  incur.  In  such  a  moment  everything 
must  be  subordinated  to  delivering  the  retreating 
masses  from  that  destruction  which  the  fire  of  the  pur- 
suit portends.  Any  advance  of  pursuing  cavalry,  also, 
must  be  met  by  heavy  fire  from  such  detachments, 
regardless  of  the  expenditure  of  ammunition. 

A  retreat,  then,  requires  particularly  intelligent  hand- 
ling. The  various  detachments  must  be  provided  with 
instructions  that  are  clear  and  definite.     The  com- 


170  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

mander  must  have  his  troops  well  in  hand,  must  ar- 
range for  the  occupation  of  any  positions,  decide  which 
detachments  shall  cover  the  retreat,  dispose  of  the 
artillery  and  machine-guns,  determine  the  line  of  re- 
treat of  the  various  units,  with  due  regard  to  the  situa- 
tion of  their  led  horses,  and  arrange  for  the  occupation 
of  the  rallying  position.  He  should  himself  only  leave 
the  field  when  the  force  has  got  clear  of  the  enemy. 
He  must  then,  however,  straightway  attend  to  the  re- 
arrangement of  the  tactical  dispositions,  and  take  the 
other  necessary  measures.  Any  reserve  still  in  hand 
must  be  used  to  check  the  pursuit  where  possible  by  a 
vigorous  offensive.  It  is  just  in  such  situations  that 
a  determined  counter-attack,  even  by  a  weak  force, 
makes  the  greatest  impression  on  the  enemy. 

As  to  the  further  conduct  of  the  retreat  after  a 
successful  extrication,  definite  instructions  are  naturally 
impossible.  Everything  depends  on  the  circumstances 
of  the  moment.  The  possibilities  of  resuming  the  of- 
fensive must  be  borne  in  mind,  even  during  a  retire- 
ment. To  this  end  it  is  frequently  advisable  to  fall 
back  partially  towards  a  flank.  Gneisenau,  after  the 
defeat  at  Ligny,  directed  the  retreat  on  Wavre,  in  order 
to  be  able  to  take  up  the  offensive  again  on  the  follow- 
ing day,  and  thus  supplied  us  with  a  brilliant  example 
well  worthy  of  imitation  even  where  the  forces  engaged 
are  but  small. 

If  it  is  a  matter  of  mounted  combat,  the  breaking 
off  of  the  actual  fight  is  quite  impossible.  Troops  once 
engaged  must  carry  the  fight  through.  Even  when 
retreating  from  the  melee,  fighting  cavalry  has  no  kind 
of  means  of  extricating  itself.  It  is  then  entirely 
dependent  on  the  enemy,  and  can  only  retire  at  the 
most  rapid  speed.  Reserves  alone  are  able  to  bring 
the  immediate  pursuit  to  a  standstill  by  intervening  in 


FIGHT,  RETREAT,  AND  PURSUIT     171 

the  running  fight.  Generally,  however,  this  will  only- 
end  when  the  horses  of  the  victor  are  quite  exhausted, 
or  when  the  latter  feels  the  necessity  of  getting  his 
troops  in  hand  and  forming  again  for  fresh  duties. 
The  further  conduct  of  the  vanquished  troops  must 
depend  on  the  condition  of  the  horses  and  the  general 
situation.  It  is  of  importance  to  withdraw  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  possible  in  order  that 
full  freedom  of  action  may  be  regained. 

If  the  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery  is  to  be  feared,  it  is 
advisable  to  retire  extended  without  regard  to  tactical 
formations,  and  making  the  best  possible  use  of  the 
ground.  The  troops  will  then  only  rally  again  beyond 
the  range  of  the  enemy's  fire.  The  same  naturally  holds 
good  for  the  retreat  from  a  dismounted  action  after 
the  men  have  remounted. 

The  commander  will  be  well  advised  to  inform  his 
senior  subordinates,  if  not  all  the  troops,  before  the 
fight  begins  where  the  troops  are  to  concentrate  again 
in  case  of  a  reverse.  The  necessity  for  such  disposi- 
tions generally  passes  unnoticed  in  peace,  because  pur- 
suit is  never  thoroughly  carried  out,  and  the  beaten 
troops  are  not  so  completely  broken  up  as  has  repeat- 
edly happened  in  war  in  the  past  and  will  happen  again. 
We  should  not  deceive  ourselves  in  this  matter,  as 
otherwise  there  is  a  danger  of  completely  losing  control 
over  the  troops.  Whoever  expects  to  be  able  to  rally 
a  beaten  cavalry  division  after  a  mounted  fight  by 
blowing  the  divisional  call  lays  himself  open  to  bitter 
disappointment.  If  the  enemy  is  pursuing  with  en- 
ergy, this  will  only  be  possible  in  the  very  rarest  cases. 

Before  the  commencement  of  the  fight,  arrangements 
must  also  be  made  for  the  rear  communication,  as  there 
will  otherwise  be  a  danger  of  losing  transport,  and 
thereby  ability  to  operate.    Far  to  the  rear  or  close  at 


172  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

hand  are  the  two  only  possible  positions  for  it.  In  the 
first  case  an  escort  whose  strength  will  be  dictated  by 
the  circumstances  will  always  be  necessary. 

It  should  also  be  remembered  that  wagons  should  be 
able  to  turn  round  where  they  are  halted.  If  single 
teams  are  unable  to  turn  about  on  their  own  ground,  it 
will  be  better  to  park  the  whole  of  the  transport  in  such 
a  way  that  it  can  easily  be  moved  in  any  direction.  It 
is  then  also  easier  to  protect  it  against  attack.  If  there 
is  no  fear  of  attack,  the  various  columns  may  turn  off 
the  road  with  intervals  corresponding  to  their  length. 
It  appears  to  me  to  be  of  especial  importance  to  lay 
stress  on  these  circumstances  because  in  peace  exer- 
cises there  is  no  transport,  and  commanders  conse- 
quently get  accustomed  to  paying  little  attention  to  it. 

As  regards  the  pursuit,  it  is  necessary  to  differentiate 
between  a  tactical  and  a  strategical  pursuit.  The  latter 
must  crown  the  success  of  the  former. 

In  mounted  action,  the  beaten  opponent  must  be  kept 
at  the  point  of  the  sword  as  long  as  the  strength  of  the 
horses  hold  out.  Detachments  not  immediately  pursu- 
ing must  be  concentrated,  and  must  seek  to  regain  their 
ability  for  manoeuvre  as  soon  as  possible. 

After  a  dismounted  action  on  the  defensive,  the  pur- 
suit will  first  be  taken  up  by  rifle  fire.  Any  mounted 
reserve  there  may  be  should  be  launched  to  the  charge 
against  the  retiring  enemy  as  soon  as  the  pursuing  fire 
begins  to  cease  to  be  effective.  A  victorious  attack,  on 
the  other  hand,  must  make  every  endeavour  to  gain  the 
position  vacated  by  the  enemy,  and  to  occupy  ground 
from  whence  an  effective  pursuing  fire  is  possible.  The 
bringing  up  of  the  led  horses  will  be  of  special  im- 
portance in  this  case.  If  they  are  immobile,  a  portion 
of  the  men  must  be  sent  to  the  rear  to  bring  them  up, 
while  the  remainder  hold  the  captured  position.    Any 


FIGHT,  RETREAT,  AND  PURSUIT     173 

mounted  reserves  there  may  be  can  often  be  employed 
to  bring  up  at  least  a  portion  of  the  led  horses.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  however,  all  troops  not  already  en- 
gaged must,  as  we  have  already  shown,  take  up  the 
strategic  pursuit  as  early  as  possible.  This  will  sup- 
plement and  complete  the  results  of  the  tactical  pursuit. 
Never  to  let  the  enemy  rest,  even  when  the  tactical 
pursuit  has  ceased,  to  prevent  him  regaining  his  co- 
hesion, to  capture  prisoners,  horses,  and  trophies,  and, 
above  all,  to  increase  to  the  utmost  the  moral  efiFects  of 
his  defeat,  is  the  task  before  us.  The  immediate  pur- 
suit must  therefore  be  combined,  wherever  possible, 
with  a  parallel  pursuit  commenced  in  good  time.  The 
latter  must  nip  in  the  bud  every  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  retiring  enemy  to  take  up  rearguard  positions,  by 
turning  such  positions  and  pressing  forward  with  reck- 
less energy  against  the  actual  lines  of  retreat.  It  must 
also  endeavour  to  anticipate  the  enemy  in  the  occupa- 
tion of  any  defiles  necessary  to  his  retreat.  At  such 
times  there  must  be  no  thought  of  sparing  horseflesh. 
Even  in  this  pursuit,  however,  the  commander  must 
give  a  definite  object  and  a  rallying  point  for  the  de- 
tachments following.  He  will  otherwise,  by  reason  of 
rapidity  of  the  movements  in  progress,  risk  losing  con- 
trol of  at  least  part  of  his  troops,  and  of  allowing  them 
to  go  farther  than  the  strategical  situation  demands  or 
admits.  For  the  rest,  I  may  draw  attention  to  the  new 
Cavalry  Drill  Regulations,  the  compressed  instructions 
of  which  contain  much  that  is  essential  and  coincide 
generally  with  my  views. 

V.  THE  ACTION  OF  CAVALRY  IN  BATTLE 

In  the  battle  of  all  arms,  cavalry  must  be  handled 
according  to  principles  which  are  quite  different  and 


174  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

almost  diametrically  opposed  to  those  which  charac- 
terise its  independent  action  as  army  cavalry.  For,  in 
the  latter  case,  not  only  is  the  defeat  of  the  enemy  kept 
in  view,  but  another  definite  object  has  also  to  be  pur- 
sued. This  object  can  only  be  attained  if  successful  in 
the  fight,  while  an  unsuccessful  battle  will  paralyse  the 
activity  of  the  cavalry,  and  may  cost  the  army  the  loss 
of  its  organs  of  reconnaissance.  However  daring  its 
conduct  then,  it  should  never  be  engaged  in  hopeless 
enterprises,  and  should  only  undertake  a  fight  where 
success  can  be  reckoned  upon  with  a  certain  measure  of 
probability. 

If,  therefore,  the  strength  and  intentions  of  the  en- 
emy are  not  fully  known,  it  will  be  better,  as  we  have 
seen,  to  guard  against  engaging  the  whole  force  in  such 
an  uncertain  enterprise.  Efforts  should  rather  be  made, 
as  I  have  endeavoured  to  show,  to  clear  up  the  situation 
by  a  careful  feeling  of  the  enemy  and  a  gradual  en- 
gagement of  force.  Once  possessed  of  this  knowledge 
of  the  situation,  it  will  be  possible  either  to  seek  a  de- 
cision or  to  break  off  the  fight  in  time  to  avoid  the  risk 
of  incurring  too  considerable  a  loss. 

Quite  different  is  the  case  in  the  main  battle.  Here 
the  objective  is  contained  in  the  battle  itself.  It  is  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy  that  is  sought.  It  is  not 
expected  that  each  single  detachment  engaged  should 
be  victorious,  but  that  the  net  result  of  the  battle  should 
be  a  victory.  The  task  of  the  various  detachments  is 
only  to  engage  and  to  destroy  so  much  of  the  enemy's 
force  as  lies  within  their  power.  This  naturally  holds 
good  for  the  cavalry.  It  is  not  now  demanded  that 
each  single  action  of  the  cavalry  should  of  itself  be 
successful,  but  that  the  general  engagement  of  the 
cavalry  should  have  the  greatest  possible  effect.  A 
considerable  result  may  often  be  obtained  by  the  at- 


ACTION  OF  CAVALRY  IN  BATTLE     175 

tacking  cavalry  drawing  the  enemy's  fire  upon  itself  for 
a  time,  and  thus  affording  the  infantry  the  possibility 
of  gaining  ground  to  the  front,  or  of  re-forming  and 
receiving  reinforcements. 

To  break  off  the  main  battle  is  generally  quite  out  of 
the  question.  The  very  fact  that  the  battle  has  been 
begun  betokens  the  intention  of  carrying  it  through  to 
a  final  decision,  'even  where  the  enemy  has  shown  him- 
self to  be  in  superior  force.  The  various  troops  which 
advance  to  the  conflict  need  not  therefore  reflect 
whether  they  have  any  special  prospect  of  success,  but 
must  strive  for  this  success  with  all  their  power.  This 
means  for  the  cavalry,  in  by  far  the  greater  number  of 
cases,  always  at  least  where  a  charge  is  in  prospect, 
the  simultaneous  engaging  of  its  whole  fighting 
strength,  naturally  in  that  tactical  formation  which  the 
conditions  of  weapons  demand.  If  in  its  independent 
operations  cavalry  must  be  dealt  with  as  a  strategical 
body,  and  thus  employed  in  the  fight,  it  is  in  the  main 
battle  a  purely  tactical  body,  which  must  be  engaged 
en  masse,  and  not  in  detail.  This  contrast  appears,  at 
least  to  me,  to  be  an  obvious  one.  There  is  another 
that  is  equally  clear. 

In  independent  operations  it  is  the  duty  of  the  cav- 
alry, before  all  else,  to  defeat  the  enemy's  cavalry. 
Victory  over  the  latter  creates  the  possibility  of  carry- 
ing out  its  proper  task,  that  of  reconnoitring  and 
screening,  without  being  involved  in  further  fighting 
on  a  large  scale.  In  the  main  battle,  however,  it  would 
be  taking  quite  a  false  view  of  its  duty  if  it  were  to 
restrict  itself  to  driving  the  hostile  cavalry  from  the 
field.  Victory  over  the  latter  has  indeed  a  certain 
value,  as  it  paralyses  its  further  action,  but  it  will,  in 
most  cases,  be  comparatively  useless  for  the  main  issue 
of  the  battle  unless  further  consequences  result  from 


176  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

it.  A  victory  over  the  hostile  cavalry  only  receives  its 
particular  importance  when  by  it  the  possibility  is 
gained  of  intervening  in  the  decisive  encounter  of  the 
other  arms,  and  of  acting  unhindered  when,  in  the 
course  of  events,  it  becomes  a  matter  either  of  pursuit 
or  of  covering  a  retreat. 

Finally,  in  independent  operations,  even  small  de- 
tachments can  aim  at  great  results,  and  a  division  of 
force  will  frequently  be  indicated.  In  the  great  battle, 
however,  any  considerable  effect  can  only  be  attained 
by  the  action  of  the  mass.  The  reason  for  this  lies  in 
the  size  of  modern  armies. 

It  will  be  advisable  to  concentrate  the  mass  of  the 
cavalry  at  what  are  considered  the  decisive  points,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  engage  it  simultaneously.  Any 
frittering  away  of  force  upon  the  field  of  battle  will 
strike  the  troops  with  impotence.  We  have  only  to 
remember  the  battle  of  Coulmiers,  where  the  richest 
prospects  of  success  confronted  a  cavalry  which 
achieved  nothing,  because  it  did  not  act  in  concert. 
Where  great  tactical  units  have  to  be  concentrated 
which  are  not  under  a  single  command,  it  will  be  ad- 
visable that  the  laws  of  seniority  be  set  aside,  and  the 
command  given  to  that  leader  from  whom  the  best 
performances  are  to  be  expected,  even  though  he  be 
not  the  senior.  In  the  cavalry,  more  than  in  any  other 
arm,  success  depends  upon  the  leader.  Nothing  is 
more  rare  than  a  good  cavalry  leader,  and  it  would 
therefore  be  a  great  mistake  to  ignore  such  a  one,  and 
thus  perhaps  to  sacrifice  the  fortunes  of  the  day  to  the 
Moloch  of  Seniority.  We  should  rather  act  like  Fred- 
erick the  Great  at  Rossbach,  when  he  placed  Seydlitz 
at  the  head  of  his  cavalry,  and  we  must  expect  from 
Prussians  to-day  the  same  generosity  as  Frederick's 
generals  showed  in  willingly  serving  under  their  junior. 


ACTION  OF  CAVALRY  IN  BATTLE    177 

The  best  of  leaders,  however,  will  only  be  capable 
of  great  performances  if  he  is  fully  acquainted  with 
the  intentions  of  the  Head  Quarters  and  the  idea  of  the 
battle.  He  must  therefore  be  not  only  closely  informed 
before  the  fight,  but  must  remain  throughout  its  prog- 
ress in  continual  communication  with  the  Head  Quar- 
ters, and  must  be  made  aware  of  all  dispositions  and  at 
the  same  time  must  share  its  observations  and  be  in 
touch  with  its  intentions.  The  German. cavalry  would 
certainly  have  been  able  to  fight  a  more  successful  and 
connected  action  at  Mars  la  Tour,  as  at  Coulmiers,  if 
it  had  been  better  informed  as  to  the  general  situation, 
and  had  thus  been  in  a  position  to  appreciate  for  itself 
what  was  necessary  and  what  was  possible. 

If,  however,  understanding  between  the  commander- 
in-chief  and  the  leader  of  the  cavalry  is  established,  and 
if  full  confidence  in  the  judgment  and  energy  of  the 
latter  exists,  he  must  be  allowed  that  necessary  freedom 
and  independence  which  alone  ensure  successful  action. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  should  never  wait  for  orders  to 
intervene,  but  must  himself  turn  any  favourable  mo- 
ments of  the  fight  to  account  by  rapid  and  energetic 
independent  action.  Even  if  he  is  definitely  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  the  commander,  he  should  not  shrink  at 
critical  moments  from  acting  on  his  own  responsibility, 
informing,  of  course,  his  superior  officer  of  his  actions. 
As  an  example  of  the  relations  between  the  supreme 
command  and  the  cavalry  leader  I  would  draw  atten- 
tion to  the  conduct  of  King  Frederick  and  General  von 
Seydlitz  in  the  battle  of  Zorndorf .  The  King  felt  the 
necessity  of  restoring  the  wavering  fortunes  of  the  day 
by  launching  the  cavalry  to  the  attack,  but  Seydlitz 
independently  chose  the  moment  for  the  charge;  and 
success  justified  them  both.  When,  however,  in  the 
battle  of  Kunersdorf,  the  General  was  compelled  to 


178  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

order  the  charge  against  his  better  judgment,  the  con- 
sequences were  a  heavy  defeat  for  the  cavalry. 

I.    The  Army  Cavalry  on  the  Flank  of  the  Battle 

I  have  already  repeatedly  indicated  that  the  most 
favourable  position  for  the  army  cavalry  is  to  a  flank 
and  in  advance  of  a  flank  of  its  own  army,  and,  where 
possible,  of  that  flank  on  which,  in  the  battle  of  offence, 
the  decision  will  be  sought,  or,  when  in  defence,  the 
main  hostile  attack  may  be  expected/  The  new  Cav- 
alry Regulations  adopt  this  point  of  view.  It  is  there- 
fore superfluous  to  comment  further  on  the  advantages 
of  such  a  position.  Unless  the  cavalry  is  going  to 
resign  all  claim  to  offensive  action,  this  position  will 
compel  it  to  seek  battle.  This  may  also  happen  when 
the  cavalry  masses  of  hoth  sides  endeavour  to  take  up 
such  a  position,  and  thereby  naturally  come  into  col- 
lision, so  that  a  sort  of  battle  of  encounter  results,  but 
one,  however,  that  will  bear  quite  a  different  character 
from  the  battle  of  encounter  in  strategic  operations. 

There  will  already  be  a  difference,  in  the  fact  that 
the  strategic  approach  and  the  tactical  disposition  in 
advance  guard,  main  body,  and  reserve,  will  be  want- 
ing. In  the  consciousness,  moreover,  that,  whatever 
the  relative  strength  may  be,  the  decisive  battle  has, 
under  any  circumstances,  to  be  sought,  it  must  be  pre- 
pared for  systematically.  The  cavalry  will  therefore 
have  to  adopt  a  wider  front,  or  even  deploy  while 
farther  from  the  enemy,  having  to  its  front  only  the 
necessary  bodies  for  reconnaissance  and  security.  The 
reconnaissance  must  be  of  a  double  nature.  Timely 
measures  must  first  be  taken  to  ascertain  whether,  on 
the  probable  lines  of  approach  and  communication  of 
*  "Cavalry  in  Future  Wars,"  Part  I,  chap.  v. 


ON  THE  FLANK  OF  THE  BATTLE     179 

the  enemy,  further  hostile  forces,  ammunition  columns, 
or  supply  trains  are  hurrying  to  the  battle-field.  Where 
the  squadrons  already  pushed  forward  have  received 
the  necessary  further  instructions,  this  reconnaissance 
will  often  develop  from  the  corresponding  strategic 
measures.  It  will,  however,  frequently  be  necessary  to 
send  forward  new  organs  of  reconnaissance,  even  up 
to  the  strength  of  squadrons,  as  is  discussed  in  the 
chapter  on  "Close  Reconnaissance  and  Reconnaissance 
for  the  Fight."  Besides  this  far-reaching  exploration, 
immediate  tactical  reconnaissance  for  the  fight  must 
also  be  arranged;  this  will,  in  general,  be  directed 
against  such  hostile  troops  as  may  be  within  tactical 
reach,  and  must  at  the  same  time  comprise  reconnais- 
sance of  the  ground.  This  service  must  be  carried  out 
by  contact  patrols  and  it  is  obviously  impossible  to 
separate  the  two  duties. 

The  reconnoitring  organs  suffice  in  such  a  case  for 
safety  to  the  front.  To  the  flank,  however,  local  flank- 
ing patrols  must  be  pushed  out  during  the  advance.  It 
may  at  the  same  time  be  advisable,  for  the  protection 
of  the  main  body,  and  as  points  of  support  for  the 
reconnaissance,  to  occupy  defiles  and  other  important 
places  to  the  flank  or  front  by  dismounted  detachments 
up  to  the  strength  of  a  squadron  or  more. 

Screened  by  these  various  measures,  the  cavalry  mass 
now  advances  fully  deployed  for  the  fight.  It  must  be 
echeloned  so  far  from  the  flank  of  the  army  that  it 
cannot  come  under  the  fire  of  its  own  infantry,  and  that 
it  can,  if  in  any  way  possible,  turn  the  outer  flank  of 
the  hostile  cavalry.  The  latter  may  then  easily  become 
hampered  in  movement  by  its  own  troops,  and  will 
have  to  deploy  eccentrically,  a  disadvantage  under  any 
circumstances.  Connection  with  our  own  army  must, 
naturally,  not  be  lost,  so  that  in  case  of  an  unfavourable 


i8o  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

issue  of  the  fight  the  cavalry  may  not  be  completely 
severed  from  it.  The  tactical  dispositions,  which 
should  always  be  of  an  elastic  nature,  must  obviate  this. 

That  depth  must  be  maintained  in  so  far  as  it  allows 
the  necessary  frontage,  is  easily  understood.  In  deploy- 
ing concentrically  the  various  groups  do  not  by  any 
means  need  to  be  in  touch,  as  during  the  advance  they 
will  gradually  approach  each  other.  They  can,  or 
rather  must,  be  disposed  at  wide  intervals,  and  it  is 
better  that  these  should  be  too  great  than  that  the 
necessary  depth  should  suffer.  A  reserve  must  always 
be  detailed  and  at  the  disposal  of  the  commander,  in 
order  that  he  may  retain  his  influence  over  the  decision 
and  be  ready  to  meet  the  vicissitudes  of  the  conflict. 

Artillery  and  machine-guns  will  generally  be  able 
to  remain  effectively  in  action  longest  on  the  inner 
flank,  and  in  this  position  can  also  form  a  cc^necting- 
link  between  the  cavalry  and  the  flank  of  the  army. 
Special  circumstances,  however,  may,  of  course,  lead  to 
their  employment  elsewhere.  Their  employment  on  the 
extreme  outer  flank,  however,  so  often  seen  in  peace, 
is  to  be  guarded  against.  From  such  a  position  they 
can  indeed  often  bring  an  effective  flanking  fire  to  bear, 
but  are,  on  the  other  hand,  in  great  danger,  especially 
when  opposed  to  a  numerically  superior  enemy.  Should 
the  outcome  of  the  fight  be  unfavourable,  they  will 
generally  not  only  themselves  be  lost,  but  may  often 
contribute  to  the  difficulties  of  the  beaten  squadrons. 
Machine-gun  detachments  must  be  pushed  forward 
recklessly  to  within  effective  range  of  the  enemy,  and 
should  not  shrink  from  the  danger  of  occasional  cap- 
ture. 

Should  the  hostile  cavalry  be  driven  from  the  field, 
it  must  be  pursued  with  sufficient  force  to  prevent 
its  rallying  and  re-forming,  and  to  complete  its  material 


ON  THE  FLANK  OF  THE  BATTLE    i8i 

and  moral  defeat.  Should  it  seek  shelter  behind  oc- 
cupied points  of  support,  farms,  woods,  and  the  like, 
these  must  be  attacked  immediately  by  employing  the 
greatest  possible  fire  power.  It  is  a  matter  of  absolute 
necessity  to  gain  possession  of  such  points,  as  they  may 
otherwise  stand  in  the  way  of  further  action. 

All  portions  of  the  cavalry  not  required  for  the  pur- 
suit should  endeavour  quickly  to  regain  their  tactical 
cohesion,  that  they  may  be  ready  for  further  effort.  If 
localities  are  at  hand  by  the  occupation  of  which  the 
ground  won  can  be  secured,  they  must  at  once  be 
garrisoned  by  dismounted  men.  Artillery  and  machine- 
guns  will,  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  detailed  for  the 
pursuit,  or  as  they  return  from  it,  be  brought  into 
position  with  a  like  object  in  view.  Every  effort  must 
be  made  to  utilise  to  the  full  the  advantages  which 
the  different  methods  of  action  of  which  the  arm  is 
capable  confer,  and  thereby  to  minimise  the  chances 
of  defeat.  To  reckon  with  the  charge  alone  is,  even  on 
the  field  of  battle,  out  of  date,  and  calculated  to  limit 
the  effect  of  cavalry  action. 

If  a  position  of  readiness  has  at  first  to  be  taken  up, 
as  will  generally  be  the  case  until  it  is  known  in  what 
direction  further  developments  will  take  place,  it  must 
be  as  secure  as  possible  from  the  view  and  fire  of  the 
enemy,  but  must  be  one  from  which  immediate  action 
can  be  taken.  A  disposition  in  groups  of  units  will 
generally  be  the  most  suitable  formation.  What  else 
is  to  be  done  the  circumstances  of  the  various  cases 
must  decide;  the  indispensable  condition  is  that  the 
cavalry  should  never  be  present  and  inactive  through- 
out the  course  of  the  battle.  It  must  in  all  cases  pre- 
vent the  enemy's  patrols  from  making  observations  as 
to  the  disposition  of  our  own  army,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  its  own  reconnaissance  should  never  cease. 


i82  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

We  should,  however,  be  quite  wrong  to  regard  such 
action  as  sufficient ;  rather  must  our  whole  attention  be 
devoted  to  participating  in  the  decisive  battle,  if  in  any 
way  possible.  With  this  view  the  cavalry  must  be 
careful  to  ensure  its  own  advance  to  that  portion  of 
the  ground  where  the  decisive  battle  will  probably 
take  place,  so  that  the  charge  will  not  meet  with 
unexpected  resistance  and  obstacles  when  the  moment 
comes  to  ride  it  home.  When  this  crisis  of  the  battle 
approaches,  the  cavalry  must  be  ready  to  intervene, 
whether  it  be  to  complete  the  defeat  of  the  enemy 
and  to  facilitate  the  victory  of  its  own  infantry,  or 
to  support  the  latter  in  difficult  situations. 

Deployment  in  masses  and  depth,  if  possible  in  sev- 
eral lines,  is  indispensable  for  such  attacks.  The  outer 
flank  must  be  secured  by  reserves  against  the  action  of 
freshly  arriving  hostile  cavalry  and  the  covering  troops 
of  the  enemy's  artillery.  Only  when  reconnaissance 
has  clearly  shown  that  there  are  no  more  such  hostile 
troops  at  hand  can  the  reserves  be  dispensed  with. 

The  attack  will  best  take  place  from  the  flank,  and 
will  then  generally  find  a  double  objective  in  the  hostile 
artillery  and  any  infantry  that  may  be  farther  to  the 
front;  but  both  should  be  dealt  with  simultaneously. 
There  may  also  be  a  possibility  and  a  necessity  of 
attacking  from  the  rear.  Circumstances  must  decide 
this.  In  any  case,  there  should  be  no  question  of 
a  gradual  engagement  of  a  force,  but  the  charge  of 
the  whole  mass  must,  even  when  disposed  in  lines, 
be  carried  out  in  a  simultaneous  and  preconcerted 
manner. 

The  moment  chosen  for  the  attack  is  also  of  great 
importance.  As  the  crisis  approaches,  endeavours  must 
be  made  to  get  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  possible,  in 
order  to  shorten  the  distance  that  will  have  to  be 


ON  THE  FLANK  OF  THE  BATTLE     183 

covered  in  the  charge.  In  so  doing,  the  protection 
of  the  ground  must  be  used  as  long  as  possible  for 
cover,  at  least  from  view,  without  adhering  to  stereo- 
typed tactical  formations. 

However  important  and  desirable  it  may  be  to  con- 
tribute to  the  great  decision  by  a  glorious  cavalry 
charge,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  possibility 
of  this  will  only  occur  in  very  rare  cases.  The  more 
cultivated  and  agricultural  the  country  in  which  the  war 
takes  place,  the  rarer  will  be  these  opportunities,  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  ground  offer  so  many  opportuni- 
ties for  local  defence. 

If  we  consider  the  battles  of  the  Franco-Prussian,  the 
Russo-Turkish,  and  the  Manchurian  wars,  we  must 
soon  admit  that  great  cavalry  charges  were  practicable 
only  in  very  isolated  cases.  The  peculiarities  of  the 
ground  rendered  them  impossible ;  nor  can  this  alter  in 
the  future.  If  it  is  to  the  interests  of  the  defence  to 
seek  open  country  with  a  good  field  of  fire,  the  attacker, 
on  the  other  hand,  will  endeavour  to  choose  ground  for 
the  attack  which  will  give  him  cover  from  fire  and 
view.  On  the  whole,  the  possible  European  theatres  of 
war  are  but  little  suitable  for  charges,  owing  to  the 
extent  to  which  they  have  been  cultivated.  We  must 
not  be  deceived  in  this  matter  by  the  experience  of  our 
peace  manoeuvres.  For  then  suitable  ground  has  to 
be  sought  for  the  operation  of  the  three  arms,  and  con- 
siderations of  compensation  make  it  necessary  to 
choose  country  as  free  from  cultivation  as  possible. 

War,  however,  knows  no  such  considerations,  and 
we  must  not  blind  ourselves  to  the  fact  that  the  oppor- 
tunity for  great  decisive  charges  will  but  seldom  occur. 
The  greatest  imaginable  error,  therefore,  which  the 
cavalry  could  possibly  commit  would  be  to  adopt  a 
waiting  attitude  and  renounce  all  other  kind  of  action, 


i84  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

in  order  that  the  possibility  of  a  great  charge  might  not 
slip  by  unutilised.  Besides  the  decisive  attack,  there  is 
another  wide  field  of  activity  indicated  by  the  condi- 
tions of  modern  war,  where  cavalry  can  operate  with- 
out being  compelled  to  renounce  co-operation  in  the 
decisive  battle  when  circumstances  will  allow. 

This  sphere  of  activity  lies  in  rear  of  the  hostile 
army.  Here  columns  of  supply  of  every  kind  are 
streaming  forward  to  the  fighting-line.  Here  are 
massed  the  hostile  reserves,  already  waiting  for  the 
decisive  moment.  Here  stands  the  heavy  artillery  of 
the  enemy  in  action,  often  without  an  escort.  And  it 
is  here  that  opportunities  for  decisive  action  must  be 
sought. 

If  cavalry  can  succeed,  especially  in  battles  of  sev- 
eral days'  duration,  in  interrupting  the  hostile  sup- 
plies from  the  rear,  in  surprising  the  enemy's  reserves 
with  fire,  causing  him  heavy  loss  and  compelling  him 
to  deploy  against  it,  or  if  any  advancing  portions  of 
the  enemy's  army  can  be  brought  to  a  halt  and  pre- 
vented from  reaching  the  battle-field  at  the  right  time, 
greater  results  will  probably  be  obtained  than  by  a 
doubtful  charge.  This  is  quite  apart  from  the  great 
moral  impression  which  such  action  must  produce  on 
leaders  and  troops  when  the  alarm  suddenly  re-echoes 
from  the  rear,  and  the  shrapnel  of  the  cavalry  carries 
confusion  and  consternation  amongst  the  reserves  and 
supports  of  the  fighting-line.  The  enemy's  artillery, 
also,  firing  from  covered  positions,  and  otherwise  so 
difficult  to  reach,  may  then  fall  a  prey  to  a  bold  cav- 
alry, and  will  offer  opportunities  for  a  success  of  far- 
reaching  importance. 

Such  action  must,  of  course,  be  conducted  with  a 
due  co-operation  between  mounted  and  dismounted 
action. 


ON  THE  FLANK  OF  THE  BATTLE     185 

Against  intact  hostile  reserves  the  firearm  will  be 
principally  used,  and  endeavour  must  be  made  to  sur- 
prise them  in  the  formation  of  assembly  or  on  the 
march.  Against  columns  of  wagons,  also,  it  will  be 
well  to  commence  with  fire  action,  by  shooting  down 
the  horses  of  the  leading  teams,  and  so  bringing  the 
columns  to  a  halt.  They  must  then,  however,  be 
actually  taken  possession  of  and  taken  away  or  de- 
stroyed, in  so  far  as  this  cannot  be  done  by  artillery 
fire. 

The  cavalry  must  therefore  endeavour  to  be  ever 
active,  and  to  co-operate  unceasingly  by  damaging  the 
enemy  and  shaking  his  morale.  Great  results  can, 
however,  only  be  obtained  if  antiquated  views,  handed 
down  from  time  immemorial,  are  discarded,  and  the 
demands  of  modern  war  and  the  capabilities  of  modem 
cavalry  are  recognised.  It  is  not  a  question  as  to 
whether  we  cavalry  men  are  to  fight  mounted  or  dis- 
mounted ;  but  that  we  must  be  prepared  and  determined 
to  take  part  in  the  decision,  and  to  employ  the  whole  of 
our  great  strength  and  mobility  to  this  end. 

2.    The  Army  Cavalry  as  a  Reserve  behind  the  Front 

The  same  principles  hold  good  for  those  portions  of 
the  army  cavalry  which  find  themselves  behind  the 
fighting-line,  and  not  on  the  exposed  flank.  Such  a 
position  is  generally,  indeed,  undesirable,  but  may  be 
the  outcome  of  circumstances. 

The  task  before  the  cavalry  is  here  naturally  quite  a 
different  one  from  when  on  the  flank  of  the  army.  The 
necessity,  or  even  the  possibility,  will  in  this  case 
scarcely  ever  occur  of  having  to  deal  with  hostile 
cavalry,  and  of  opening  thereby  a  way  for  intervention 
in  the  decisive  battle.    It  is  much  more  likely  in  this 


i86  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

case  to  happen  that  the  cavalry  will  have  to  adopt  a 
waiting  attitude,  and  see  whether  its  engagement  as  a 
mounted  arm  will  be  necessary.  During  this  period  of 
waiting,  the  cavalry  must  remain  beyond  the  range  of 
hostile  fire,  but  as  near  the  fighting-line  as  intelligent 
use  of  the  ground  will  permit.  Its  position  should 
never  be  chosen  so  far  to  the  rear  that  it  cannot  arrive 
on  the  spot  at  the  right  time  for  the  attack;  for  the 
moments  which  offer  a  favourable  prospect  for  a 
charge  are  often  fleeting — they  depend  upon  the  tacti- 
cal situation  and  the  moral  condition  of  the  opponent. 
These  conditions  may,  however,  quickly  change  if,  for 
instance,  reinforcements  should  arrive  on  the  field. 

Thus,  at  Mars  la  Tour,  when  the  6th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision advanced  in  order  to  attack  the  obviously  shaken 
and  retiring  2nd  Corps  of  the  French,  it  struck,  accord- 
ing to  the  account  of  the  German  General  Staff,  not 
this  corps,  but  the  intact  Guard  Grenadier  Division  of 
Picard,  which  had  already  advanced  in  support,  and 
the  charge  was  frustrated.^ 

To  be  prepared  to  meet  such  conditions,  it  will 
generally  be  advisable  not  only  to  remain  as  close  be- 
hind the  fighting-line  as  possible,  but  to  prepare  for  a 
rapid  deployment  to  the  front,  so  that  a  disposition  in 
groups,  with  the  necessary  deploying  intervals,  may  be 
adopted  behind  that  part  of  the  fighting-line  where  the 
ground  is  especially  adapted  to  a  charge  of  large 
masses.  If  it  can  be  seen  that  the  crisis  of  the  fight  is 
approaching,  and  that  the  intervention  of  the  cavalry 
may  be  necessary,  the  latter  should  advance  still  closer 
to  the  fighting-line,  making,  of  course,  full  use  of  the 

^  According  to  the  French  General  Staff  history,  this  cav- 
alry met  a  battalion  of  the  25th  Regiment  of  the  6th  Corps, 
as  well  as  the  3rd  Chasseur  Battalion  and  a  battalion  of  the 
27th  Regiment  of  the  2nd  Corps.  At  all  events,  the  attack 
met,  not  retiring,  but  unshaken  troops. 


AS  A  RESERVE  BEHIND  THE  FRONT    187 

ground  for  cover,  but  no  longer  taking  heed  of  small 
losses. 

The  cavalry  will  advance  to  the  charge  in  order 
either  to  complete  the  defeat  of  an  already  wavering 
enemy,  and  to  capture  his  artillery,  or  to  relieve  its 
own  infantry,  exhausted  in  the  fight  or  suffering  from 
want  of  ammunition,  when  other  reserves  have  been 
used  up,  or  have  not  yet  arrived  on  the  spot.  The 
attack  will  probably  always  have  to  be  conducted 
against  an  extended  front.  Flanking  and  surprise  at- 
tacks will  rarely  be  possible  under  such  circumstances. 
It  will  scarcely  ever  be  practicable  to  carry  out  separate 
attacks  against  the  hostile  infantry  and  artillery,  as  in 
the  case  of  a  flank  attack.  The  charge  will  rather,  in 
by  far  the  greater  number  of  cases,  first  strike  the  hos- 
tile line  of  infantry,  and  must  endeavour  to  ride 
through  this  and  then  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  artillery. 

The  formation  for  attack  must  be  chosen  to  corre- 
spond with  this  point  of  view.  A  considerable  exten- 
sion will  be  necessary  for  the  first  line,  so  that,  although 
the  wings  of  the  attacking-line  may  be  exposed  to  flank- 
ing fire,  the  main  portion  of  the  front  of  attack  will 
only  have  to  reckon  with  frontal  fire,  and  the  enemy 
will  not  be  in  a  position  to  direct  a  concentric  fire 
against  it.  The  great  range  of  modern  weapons  de- 
mands a  very  considerable  extension  for  this  purpose 
if  success  is  to  be  ensured.  Suitable  ground,  also,  must 
be  chosen  for  this  deployment.  It  will  often  allow,  if 
rightly  used,  of  one  or  other  flank  finding  cover.  A 
previous  close  study  of  the  ground  over  which  the  at- 
tack is  to  be  made  is  therefore  imperative  for  the  cav- 
alry leader,  even  though  it  may  entail  personal  expo- 
sure to  the  enemy's  fire. 

Necessary,  however,  as  this  extension  is,  a  formation 
in  depth  in  two  or  three  lines  is  also  imperative  if  de- 


i88  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

cisive  results  are  to  be  gained — this  is,  as  I  have  already- 
pointed  out,  the  formation  especially  necessary  against 
firearms.  To  lay  down  the  distances  which  must  be 
taken  up  between  the  lines  according  as  infantry  or 
artillery  is  the  objective,  as  is  done  in  the  Regulations, 
will  naturally  be  impossible  in  most  cases,  as  both  arms 
will  have  to  be  reckoned  with  simultaneously.  A  mean 
distance  of  about  250  paces  would  generally  meet  the 
case. 

It  is  obvious  that  not  only  the  preliminary  deploy- 
ment, but  the  formation  for  attack  must  take  place 
beyond  the  effective  range  of  the  enemy's  fire,  for,  once 
inside  this  zone,  flank  movements  can  no  longer  be 
carried  out,  and  nothing  else  can  be  done  but  to  gallop 
straight  to  the  front.  As,  however,  our  own  infantry 
will  have  to  be  ridden  through  in  the  charge,  it  is  im- 
possible in  such  a  case  to  attack  in  close  order.  The 
first  lines  should  therefore  be  of  loose  single-rank 
formation,  with  wide  intervals  from  man  to  man.  This 
is  also  to  be  recommended  on  the  ground  that  it  will 
allow  a  greater  breadth  of  front  for  the  same  strength. 
Behind  the  leading  lines  squadrons  can  then  follow  in 
column  of  troops,  which  can  easily  ride  through  their 
own  infantry,  and  adapt  themselves  to  the  ground, 
utilizing  for  their  advance  the  less  exposed  portions  of 
the  terrain.  In  such  dispositions  there  can  naturally 
be  no  talk  of  regular  distances,  and  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  must  decide. 

If  sufficient  force  is  available,  reserves  must  follow 
behind  the  centre  and  in  echelon  behind  the  flanks. 
Their  duty  will  be  to  to  turn  against  hostile  cavalry 
and  other  troops  which  may  take  the  advancing  mass 
in  flank  or  may  threaten  a  charge. 

The  batteries  and  machine-guns  belonging  to  the 
cavalry  will  usually  remain  at  the  disposal  of  the  cav- 


AS  A  RESERVE  BEHIND  THE  FRONT    189 

airy  commander,  even  during  the  great  battle.  If  a 
charge  is  launched  it  will  sometimes  be  advantageous 
to  use  them  for  flank  protection,  for  which  purpose 
they  may  be  temporarily  held  back.  Such  cases,  how- 
ever, will  be  rare.  The  commander  will  therefore  have 
to  consider  whether  it  is  not  more  advisable  to  let  them 
take  part  in  the  general  engagement,  even  when  the 
cavalry  is  not  yet  called  upon  to  intervene.  For  it 
must  be  clearly  understood  that  in  this  case,  as  in  the 
other,  where  the  cavalry  is  on  the  flank  of  the  army, 
there  will  seldom  be  an  opportunity  for  the  charge,  for 
reasons  already  given. 

As,  however,  the  cavalry  in  the  former  case  should 
not  remain  inactive  even  if  there  is  no  opportunity  for 
the  charge  during  the  decisive  battle,  the  same  holds 
good  where  the  cavalry  is  placed  behind  the  front  of 
the  army. 

Having  a  less  extensive  field  of  action  than  in  the 
case  of  the  cavalry  on  the  flank,  it  is  all  the  more  neces- 
sary, if  there  is  no  chance  of  a  charge,  for  it  to  act 
in  the  manner  of  a  reserve.  The  cavalry  must  not 
shrink,  when  necessity  demands,  from  employing  its 
whole  force  in  the  fire  fight,  disregarding  for  this  pur- 
pose its  purely  cavalry  role,  which  may,  perhaps,  be 
resumed  later.  The  first  essential  is  that  victory  shall 
be  won.  To  this  end  all  available  forces  must  co-oper- 
ate. We  will  find  a  good  example  to  follow  in  the  bat- 
tle of  Fredericksburg  and  the  manner  in  which  Stuart 
threw  the  whole  of  his  cavalry  into  the  fight.  The 
employment  of  cavalry  in  the  War  of  Secession  in 
North  America,  the  study  of  which  I  have  urgently 
recommended,  can  here  again  serve  us  as  a  guide  to 
follow. 


iQO  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

3.     Pursuit  and  Retreat 

In  critical  study  of  military  history  there  is  con- 
tinual cause  for  complaint  that  after  a  victorious  bat- 
tle no  effective  pursuit,  with  a  few  brilliant  excep- 
tions, has  ever  taken  place.  These  complaints  are  justi- 
fied. It  must,  however,  be  conceded  that  a  failure  of 
the  pursuit  may  be  traced  in  most  instances  to  the 
force  of  circumstances. 

As  the  day  of  battle  draws  to  a  close  and  the  de- 
cision has  taken  place,  the  victorious  attacker  has  gen- 
erally accomplished  a  long  march  to  the  battlefield  and 
carried  out  an  exceedingly  exhausting  attack.  The 
troops  have  perhaps  all  been  employed  in  the  battle, 
down  to  the  last  reserve.  Ammunition,  food,  and 
water  are  often  lacking.  It  is  therefore  quite  natural 
that  the  mere  physical  energy  required  for  a  pursuit  is 
wanting.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  defender  is  suc- 
cessful, it  is  generally  against  a  superior  enemy,  or  one 
that  is  thought  to  be  superior.  With  the  greatest  ex- 
penditure of  moral  and  physical  force  he  has  held  his 
own.  In  the  evening  of  the  day  of  battle,  when  the 
attacks  cease,  he  is  still  perhaps  scarcely  conscious  of 
his  victory,  and  still  imagines  that  the  enemy  is  en- 
deavouring to  turn  his  flank.  He  awaits  renewed  on- 
slaughts, and  will  be  fearful  of  imperilling  his  success 
by  leaving  the  positions  which  he  has  maintained  with 
such  difficulty,  in  order,  on  his  side,  to  take  up  the 
offensive.  It  is  therefore  but  natural  that  a  pursuit 
should  at  first  remain  in  abeyance.  If,  however,  it  is 
not  carried  out  at  once,  the  favourable  opportunity  is 
generally  lost  forever. 

The  beaten  defender,  on  the  other  hand,  has  often 
still  a  surplus  of  fresh  troops.  On  the  day  of  battle 
he  will  generally  have  had  no  exhausting  marches  to 


PURSUIT  AND  RETREAT  191 

undertake.  The  battle  has  not  imposed  nearly  such 
heavy  physical  demands  upon  him  as  upon  the  at- 
tacker. He  has  also  been  able  to  supply  himself  dur- 
ing the  fight  much  better  than  the  latter.  To  these 
factors  of  advantage  must  be  added  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  of  the  individual,  which  continually 
induces  afresh  the  desire  to  escape  from  the  grasp  of 
the  enemy.  What  can  be  more  natural  for  the  beaten 
defender  after  a  lost  battle  than  to  march  long  dis- 
tances, and  thus  successfully  to  evade  pursuit,  unless 
it  be  immediately  undertaken?  General  von  Goeben 
gave  orders  on  the  evening  of  the  battle  of  St.  Quentin 
that  all  troops  must  march  five  miles  ^  the  next  day. 
But  the  French  had  already  covered  a  similar  distance 
during  the  night,  and  were  no  longer  within  reach. 

The  beaten  attacker  also  may,  after  the  battle,  no 
longer  have  at  his  disposal  sufficient  physical  force  to 
carry  out  a  further  immediate  march,  but,  as  before 
the  fight  he  was  in  superior  force,  or  considered  him- 
self to  be  so,  it  will  not  be  necessary  for  him  to  with- 
draw from  the  enemy  as  quickly  as  a  beaten  defender. 
The  reason  for  this  lies  in  the  difficulty  which  exists 
for  the  latter  of  taking  up  the  pursuit.  The  attacker 
can  then  utilise  the  time  after  the  battle  to  secure  him- 
self in  the  terrain  and  to  re-form  his  units.  He  falls 
back  on  his  reserves  of  supply  and  ammunition.  Un- 
less he  has  suffered  a  destructive  defeat,  the  pursuer 
will  generally  find  him  the  next  morning  again  in  a 
condition  to  offer  some  resistance. 

The  factors  of  weakness,  therefore,  which  allow  but 
seldom  of  an  effective  pursuit  have  their  origin  in  the 
nature  of  circumstances,  and  are  exceedingly  difficult 
to  cope  with. 

Energy  and  activity  sufficient  to  this  end  are  only  to 
^Five  German  miles  =  23  English  miles. 


192  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

be  found  in  moments  of  the  greatest  moral  excitement, 
under  the  influence  of  overpowering  personalities,  or 
under  special  conditions,  such,  for  example,  as  resulted 
after  the  battle  of  Waterloo.  In  the  future,  however, 
we  shall  generally  have  to  reckon  that  these  factors 
of  weakness  will  prevail  and  the  pursuit  fail  unless  it 
is  prepared  with  conscious  intention  in  good  time,  and 
initiated  with  energy. 

Here  will  certainly  be  required  careful  leading,  good 
tactical  judgment,  and  rapid  decision. 

Before  all  things,  it  is  essential  that  any  reserves 
still  available  should  be  sent  forward  in  the  directions 
important  for  pursuit  as  soon  as  it  is  judged  that  the 
battle  is  won,  and  that  their  supply  should  be  arranged 
for  before  the  pursuit  begins. 

I  may  cite  the  battle  of  Woerth  as  an  example.  The 
4th  Cavalry  Division  stood  at  the  disposal  of  the  com- 
mander. Observation  troops  were  sufficient  in  the 
direction  of  Hagenau  and  Zabern.  This  cavalry  mass 
was,  however,  only  brought  up  late  in  the  evening, 
and  arrived  on  the  field  too  late  to  take  up  the  imme- 
diate pursuit,  although  it  had  long  been  realised  that  a 
pursuit  would  become  necessary. 

The  infantry  pursuit  failed  for  different  reasons. 
At  the  end  of  the  day,  when  success  inclined  to  the 
Germans,  a  fresh  Wiirttemberg  brigade  arrived  upon 
the  battle-field.  Hot  fighting  still  raged  about  Frosch- 
weiler,  in  which  the  whole  of  the  Vth  and  Xlth  Corps 
were  involved.  The  Crown  Prince,  with  a  right  appre- 
ciation of  the  situation,  sent  forward  this  brigade  in 
a  parallel  pursuit  against  the  right  wing  of  the  French 
in  the  direction  of  Reichshofen,  where  it  could  have 
denied  the  exit  at  Zabern  to  the  French.  This  brigade, 
however,  allowed  itself  to  be  deflected  from  its  ob- 
jective, and  involved  in  the  fighting  round  Frosch- 


PURSUIT  AND  RETREAT     193 

weiler,  the  capture  of  which  was  no  longer  of  any- 
real  importance  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Head 
Quarters. 

If  the  affair  is  practically  decided,  as  was  the  case 
at  Woerth,  the  reserves  still  in  hand  should  no  longer 
allow  themselves  to  be  drawn  towards  the  various  foci 
of  the  battle,  but  must  be  sent  forward  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief with  boldness  and  determination  in 
the  now  more  decisive  directions  of  the  pursuit. 

The  same  reasons  and  principles  hold  good  for  the 
pursuit  by  the  cavalry. 

The  cavalry  commander  must  continually  keep  his 
finger  on  the  pulse  of  the  battle,  and  not  watch  only 
that  portion  of  the  great  drama  which  is  being  played 
under  his  own  eyes. 

Should  the  scales  of  victory  incline  in  favour  of  his 
own  army,  if  he  considers  that  the  intervention  of 
his  cavalry  will  no  longer  be  necessary  to  complete 
the  victory,  he  will  often  be  well  advised  to  renounce 
his  share  in  the  decisive  battle,  at  least  by  a  charge 
which  would  entail  heavy  loss,  and  to  husband  all  his 
force  for  the  pursuit,  and  to  prepare  and  make  dis- 
positions for  it.  This  consideration  is  of  especial  im- 
portance for  that  portion  of  the  army  cavalry  which 
is  concentrated  on  the  flank,  as  to  it  must  chiefly  fall 
the  task  of  pursuit. 

Great  attention  should  be  paid,  even  during  the 
battle,  to  nursing  the  horses.  They  should  be  fed, 
not  from  the  small  reserve  of  forage  carried  on  the 
saddle,  but  from  wagons,  which  can  be  easily  sent  to 
the  flank  of  the  army,  emptied,  and  used  later  for  the 
transport  of  the  wounded.  It  is  of  great  importance 
that  these  measures  should  be  taken  in  good  time. 
The  forage  carried  will  be  needed  during  the  pursuit, 
for  supplies  for  the  horses  cannot  be  reckoned  upon 


194  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

in  country  where  armies  have  been  on  the  move.  It 
will  even  be  advisable  to  take  forage  wagons  with  the 
pursuing  force  itself.  When  the  maintenance  of  physi- 
cal strength  has  thus  been  cared  for,  the  next  step  is 
to  push  patrols  and  squadrons  rapidly  forward  to 
reconnoitre  the  outer  lines  of  retreat  of  the  enemy. 
While  these  have  been  ascertained,  the  march  in  pur- 
suit must  be  undertaken  without  hesitation,  and  con- 
tinued even  during  the  night.  While  daylight  in  any 
way  allows,  attempts  will  naturally  be  made  to  attack 
the  withdrawing  enemy  in  flank,  and  to  carry  disorder 
into  his  columns.  As  soon,  however,  as  darkness  falls 
and  puts  an  end  to  the  fighting,  the  march  should  be 
continued  on  parallel  lines  throughout  the  whole  night, 
if  possible  in  constant  touch  with  the  enemy,  in  order 
that  he  may  again  be  attacked  at  dawn  the  next  morn- 
ing, or  that  his  retreat  may  be  barred  at  defiles  or  other 
favourable  places.  The  trophies  of  pursuit  will  rarely 
fall  into  the  hands  of  him  who  shrinks  from  spending 
the  night  after  the  battle  marching,  or  neglects  to  pre- 
pare in  every  way  for  such  an  operation. 

Direct  frontal  pursuit  by  the  cavalry  will  generally 
yield  but  meagre  results  against  the  masses  of  the 
modern  army  and  the  firearm  of  the  present  day. 
Only  when  completely  demoralised  troops  are  retreat- 
ing in  the  open,  and  cannot  be  reached  by  fire,  will  a 
charge  be  feasible.  Generally,  however,  the  frontal 
cavalry  pursuit  will  be  soon  brought  to  a  standstill  by 
the  hostile  occupation  of  localities,  woods  and  the  like. 
Frontal  pursuit  is  essentially  a  matter  for  the  infantry, 
who  must  press  the  retreating  enemy  to  the  utmost. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  of  course  the  duty  of  the 
cavalry  to  maintain  touch  with  the  enemy  under  all 
circumstances.  With  this  object  in  view  it  must  con- 
tinue the  frontal  pursuit,  sometimes  even  without  seek- 


PURSUIT  AND  RETREAT  195 

ing  to  draw  on  a  fight,  by  day  and  night.  When 
the  strength  of  the  infantry  fails,  it  is  the  imperative 
duty  of  the  cavalry  to  continue  to  harass  the  foe.  In 
conjunction  with  the  artillery  it  should  be  able  to  in- 
flict considerable  losses  on  the  opponent.  In  the  face  of 
modem  conditions,  however,  too  great  results  must 
not  be  expected  from  such  action. 

When  the  army  cavalry  undertakes  a  frontal  pur- 
suit, it  will  be  advisable  to  divide  it  by  brigades,  to 
which  must  be  allotted  the  various  roads  along  which 
the  enemy  is  retreating.  To  each  column  must  be 
assigned  artillery,  to  enable  it  to  be  continually  at  grips 
with  the  enemy.  Cases  may  also  occur  where,  if  the 
enemy's  lines  of  retreat  are  not  too  close  together,  it 
will  be  possible  to  penetrate  between  them,  and  thus 
strike  all  the  terrors  of  a  parallel  pursuit  to  the  very 
heart  of  his  army.  The  results  that  might  thus  be 
gained  will  justify  great  risks. 

As  to  the  covering  of  a  retreat,  I  may  draw  atten- 
tion to  paragraph  518  ^  of  the  new  Regulations.  All 
the  essentials  are  here  set  forth  in  compressed  form. 
Under  such  circumstances  the  cavalry  must  never  re- 
nounce the  offensive,  as  the  maintenance  of  morale 
when  things  are  going  badly  is  imperative.  Continual 
efforts  must  be  made  to  confront  the  enemy,  and  to 
attack  him  whenever  possible  with  the  cold  steel.  De- 
fensive fire  tactics,  however,  will  of  course  be  em- 

^  "Should  the  issue  of  the  battle  prove  unfavourable,  the 
cavalry  must  strain  every  nerve  to  facilitate  the  retreat  of 
the  other  arms.  It  is  just  in  such  cases  that  they  must  as- 
sume a  relentless  offensive.  Repeated  attacks  on  the  flanks 
of  the  pursuing  troops  will  produce  the  best  results. 

"Even  temporary  relief  for  the  retreating  infantry  and  a 
short  gain  in  time  may  avert  utter  defeat.  The  cavalry 
which  effects  this  will,  though  it  gains  no  victory,  retain  the 
honours  of  the  day." 


196  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

ployed  whenever  circumstances  demand  such  action. 
Thus,  when  it  becomes  no  longer  possible  to  show  a 
front  to  the  pursuing  cavalry  in  the  open,  measures 
must  be  taken  to  block  the  routes  upon  which  his  par- 
allel pursuit  is  operating  by  barricading  roads  and  oc- 
cupying important  points  and  defiles,  especially  during 
the  night,  and  thus  to  secure  the  retreat  of  the  army. 
Detachments  to  which  these  duties  are  confided  must 
be  despatched  from  the  battle-field  in  good  time,  so 
that  they  may  be  able,  if  possible,  to  arrange  their 
defensive  measures  by  daylight.  The  more  obstinately 
they  hold  well-chosen  points,  even  at  the  risk  of  being 
cut  oflf  and  captured,  the  better  will  they  have  done 
their  duty. 

4.     The  Role  of  the  Divisional  Cavalry 

The  numerical  weakness  of  the  divisional  cavalry, 
and  the  variety  of  duties  that  fall  to  its  lot,  consider- 
ably limit  the  development  of  its  fighting  power.  It  will 
scarcely  ever  be  able  to  seek  battle  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry  in  an  offensive  sense,  nor  in  defence  will  it 
possess  the  requisite  numbers  for  an  effective  counter- 
stroke.  It  is  therefore  all  the  more  important  that 
such  isolated  favourable  opportunities  for  the  charge 
as  some  fortunate  chance  may  place  in  its  way  should 
not  be  allowed  to  slip  by.  Every  tactical  success  raises 
the  self-confidence  of  the  troops,  and  operates  towards 
the  attainment  of  moral  superiority  over  the  enemy. 
even  though  he  may  be  numerically  the  stronger  force. 

In  the  battle  of  all  arms,  as  soon  as  fighting  contact 
has  been  established  with  the  enemy,  and  the  close  and 
combat  reconnaissance  is  thus  probably  at  an  end,  the 
divisional  cavalry  must  endeavour  to  gain  touch  with 
the  army  cavalry,  in  order  to  strengthen  the  latter  for 


ROLE  OF  DIVISIONAL  CAVALRY      197 

the  battle.  In  so  doing,  it  must  not  of  course  lose  all 
connection  with  its  own  infantry  division.  When  this 
cannot  be  done,  and  when  no  other  chance  of  mounted 
action  offers,  the  divisional  cavalry  must  seize  the 
rifle  and  act  as  an  immediate  support  for  the  infantry. 
Opportunities  for  such  action  will  occur  more  espe- 
cially in  defence,  as  was  proved  by  the  cavalry  of 
General  Stuart. 

After  the  battle  it  is  the  duty  of  the  divisional  cav- 
alry to  advance  in  frontal  pursuit,  even  though  no 
great  results  are  to  be  expected  from  such  action. 
During  a  retreat  after  the  battle  it  will  be  continually 
in  action  as  the  rearmost  detachment,  and  must  en- 
deavour to  arrest  the  pursuit  by  occupying  favourable 
positions  with  fire  action.  Frequent  opportunities  for 
a  charge  on  a  small  scale  may  here  occur. 

Should  the  infantry  division  to  which  the  cavalry 
belongs  be  operating  independently  without  army  cav- 
alry, the  divisional  cavalry  must  act  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  laid  down  for  the  army  cavalry, 
as  far  as  they  apply  and  in  so  far  as  its  strength  and 
other  circumstances  will  allow.  Parallel  pursuit  may 
be  possible  under  such  conditions. 

In  retreat,  every  effort  within  the  power  of  the 
cavalry  must  be  made  to  protect  the  flanks  of  the  retir- 
ing division,  and  to  arrest  the  pursuer  by  sudden  bursts 
of  fire  on  every  possible  occasion. 

There  is  for  the  divisional  cavalry  no  such  wide  field 
of  possibilities  as  is  open  to  the  army  cavalry :  it  will  be 
less  often  mentioned  in  despatches.  The  tasks  which 
fall  to  its  share,  however,  are  certainly  immeasurably 
more  arduous  and  call  for  greater  sacrifices.  It  will 
often  be  confronted  by  the  most  important  and  danger- 
ous duties,  for  the  fulfilment  of  which  its  means  are 
quite  inadequate.    Such  duties  can  only  be  carried  out 


198  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

if  the  troops  are  capable  of  the  greatest  efforts  and 
determined  to  do  great  deeds,  without  the  impulse 
that  the  prospect  of  distinction  promotes. 

VI.      DEPTH  AND  ECHELON 

It  is  an  astonishing  fact  that  the  echelon,^  and  espe- 
cially the  rearward  echelon,  should  have  won  for  itself 
an  importance  in  our  cavalry  tactics  which,  in  my  opin- 
ion, is  quite  undeserved  and  contradictory  to  the  es- 
sence of  cavalry  action.  It  is  the  more  astounding 
when  we  consider  that  this  principle  of  echelon  forma- 
tion is  said  to  be  based  on  the  tactics  of  Frederick  the 
Great,  which  have  no  connection  whatever  with  the 
echelon  in  its  present  form. 

Frederick  the  Great  arranged  his  cavalry  in  two 
lines,  and  within  these  lines  the  tactical  units  were  on 
the  same  line  of  front.  Detachments  destined  to  turn 
the  enemy's  flank  were  attached  in  column  to  the  outer 
flank  of  the  leading  line.  As  far  as  I  know,  a  mention 
of  echelon  can  only  be  found  in  one  place.  In  a  sketch 
that  accompanies  one  of  the  Regulations  of  July  25, 
1744,  a  squadron  of  the  second  line  is  shown  thrown 
forward  at  half  the  distance  between  the  lines  and 
echeloned  on  the  first  line,  with  the  obvious  intention 
of  securing  the  outer  flank  of  the  first  line  against  local 
turning  movements.  Out  of  this  one  squadron  the 
whole  of  our  echelon  system  has  grown.  Here  is  the 
only  justification  for  claiming  that  the  echelon  of  the 
second  line  is  of  Frederician  origin. 

^fichelon  formations  are  those  in  which  lines  or  bodies  of 
troops  are  placed  not  directly  in  rear  of  each  other,  but 
with  the  second  line  to  the  right  or  left  of  the  first  and  the 
next  similarly  placed — "like  steps  of  stairs" — hence  the 
name,  "fichelon"  means  literally  a  "step"  or  the  "rung  of  a 
ladder." — Editor's  Note. 


DEPTH  AND  ECHELON  199 

Nor,  as  far  as  I  know,  in  the  tactics  of  the  Napole- 
onic cavalry  is  there  any  trace  of  echelon  in  the  mod- 
ern sense.  We  would  do  well  to  seek,  in  this  period 
of  experience  in  great  cavalry  battles  instruction  for 
the  conduct  of  cavalry  against  cavalry,  and  not  to  sacri- 
fice its  lessons  for  imaginary  advantages. 

According  to  all  appearances,  our  modern  echelon 
is  but  the  offspring  of  peace  requirements.  The  troops 
were  required  to  be  mobile  and  capable  of  manoeuvre, 
and  a  division  was  required  to  perform  the  same 
stereotyped  evolutions  as  a  regiment  or  a  brigade.  In 
the  division  the  echelon  of  brigades  met  this  require- 
ment admirably,  favouring  as  it  did  the  change  to  line, 
a  manoeuvre  which,  on  its  part,  was  well  suited  to  the 
necessities  of  drill  in  a  limited  area,  and  was  regarded 
as  the  piece  de  resistance  of  all  cavalry  divisional  ma- 
CEUvres.  Many  a  time  have  I  assisted  at  these  tactical 
orgies ! 

We  must  not  neglect  the  warning  that,  even  in 
manoeuvres,  as  soon  as  there  is  any  kind  of  approach 
to  service  conditions,  such  necessity  for  change  of 
front  never — literally  never — occurs.  Besides  this,  the 
echelon  formation  has  shown  itself  to  be  quite  unprac- 
tical where  any  real  tactical  deployment  is  required 
off  the  drill-ground.  The  question,  then,  of  the  cir- 
cumstances for  which  it  is  particularly  designed  does 
not  appear  as  yet  to  have  been  definitely  asked  or  an- 
swered. We  have  been  content  with  general  repre- 
sentations that  it  increased  the  power  of  manoeuvre, 
and  thus  added  to  our  beloved  stereotyped  formations. 

For  years  I  have  striven  to  clear  up  these  views  and 
to  establish  their  true  worth.  As  long  ago  as  1903,  in 
-my  book  "Cavalry  in  Future  Wars,"  I  wrote  as  fol- 
lows: ".  .  .  It  is  obvious  that  the  formations  for 
approach  and  attack  prescribed  by  the  (old)  Regula- 


200  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

tions  are  as  unpromising  of  success  as  they  well  can 
be.  While  affording  a  possibility  of  quickly  presenting 
the  same  formation  in  any  direction,  a  feat  of  no  pos- 
sible advantage  for  war,  they  seriously  impede  any 
deployment  to  the  front.  If  it  is  required  to  launch 
the  first  line  against  the  enemy's  flank  because  this  is 
its  shortest  line,  one  at  least  of  the  following  brigades 
will  be  masked,  and  will  be  hampered  in  its  movements. 
If,  again,  it  is  desired  to  utilise  one  of  the  rear  bri- 
gades for  a  flank  movement  or  any  similar  purpose, 
the  first  line  has  to  be  checked  until  the  others  reach 
the  required  position,  or  else  they  will  certainly  arrive 
too  late  to  co-operate.  Furthermore,  the  formations 
advocated  render  it  more  difficult  to  derive  full  benefit 
from  the  configuration  of  the  ground." 

These  deductions  have  remained,  up  to  now,  uncon- 
tested. In  spite  of  this,  however,  the  new  Regulations 
uphold  the  point  of  view  of  the  old  as  regards  echelon 
formation  in  every  way,  and  even  vest  it  with  increased 
importance  by  confiding  to  the  echelon  the  duties  of 
the  real  second  line,  i.e.  of  the  supporting  squadrons  of 
the  old  Regulations.  In  the  regiment,  as  in  the  bri- 
gade, depth  is  to  consist  in  echelon  formation,  and  only 
exceptionally  is  a  real  second  line  to  be  formed.  The 
echelons  are  not  only  to  protect  the  flank  of  their  own 
units,  and  turn  against  any  portions  of  the  enemy's  line 
that  may  break  through,  but  are  also  to  turn  the  en- 
emy's flanks  (170  and  200).^     In  the  division,  also, 

*  "As  a  rule,  a  single  regiment  attacks  in  line.  It  may,  or 
may  not,  be  in  echelon.  Only  on  exceptional  occasions 
should  one  of  the  squadrons  follow  as  a  second  line. 

"The  officer  commanding  will  bring  the  directing  squadron 
into  the  direction  of  the  attack.  The  squadrons,  each  in 
close  formation,  must  be  led  so  as  to  ensure  combined 
action. 

"The  echelons  will  envelop  the  hostile  flank  or  ward  off  the 


DEPTH  AND  ECHELON  201 

during  the  advance  to  attack  cavalry,  echelon  forma- 
tion will,  "as  a  rule,"  be  ordered.  The  transition 
formation  thus  remains  with  us  not  only  in  name,  but 
in  fact,  only  with  the  difference  that  brigades  provide 
for  their  own  depth  and  flank  protection,  thus,  in  fact, 
being  again  in  themselves  echeloned  (223,  424,  425).* 

enemy's  flank  attacks;  they  can  also  be  used  to  prolong  the 
front  of  the  regiment,  or  they  can  turn  against  portions  of 
the  enemy  which  have  broken  through." 

"When  attacking  cavalry,  the  regiments  will,  as  a  rule,  be 
employed  in  a  line  formation  side  by  side;  this  will  prevent 
their  personnel  from  becoming  mixed  up.  The  necessary 
depth  will  be  supplied  by  the  regiments  themselves,  and,  in 
this  case,  it  is  usually  in  the  form  of  echelons.  //  the  situa^ 
Hon  demands,  even  single  squadrons  can  follow  in  column 
formation. 

"The  employment  of  several  lines  may  be  useful  on  occa- 
sions when  the  situation  demands  rapid  action  from  the  lead- 
ing regiment,  and  circumstances  will  not  permit  of  the  rear 
regiments  taking  ground  to  a  flank." 

^  "When  advancing  to  attack  cavalry,  the  divisional  com- 
mander will,  as  a  rule,  order  the  brigades  into  echelon  forma- 
tion. Brigades  will  make  independent  arrangements  as  re- 
gards formation  in  depth  and  for  flank  protection. 

"As  soon  as  the  divisional  commander  has  decided  to  at- 
tack, he  will  arrange  for  the  employment  of  the  artillery  and 
machine-guns;  he  will  give  the  brigades  their  attack  orders; 
if  necessary,  he  will  give  the  directing  brigade  the  line  of 
attack;  and  he  will  detach  his  reserve. 

"The  further  execution  of  the  attack  will  rest  with  the 
brigade  commanders." 

"Collisions  of  cavalry  partake  usually  of  the  nature  of  bat- 
tles of  encounter.  In  such  cases,  uncertainty  as  to  the 
strength  and  intentions  of  the  enemy  renders  necessary  such 
echelon  formations  as  will  preserve  freedom  of  action." 

"The  formation  of  the  echelon  will  vary  according  to  the 
objective  and  to  local  conditions. 

"Shrould  no  certain  information  as  to  the  advance  and 
formation  of  the  enemy  be  forthcoming,  a  double  echelon  is 
possibly  the  best.    But,  should  a  flank  rest  on  impassable,  or 


202  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Only  when  a  closer  knowledge  of  the  enemy  is  at- 
tained may  the  brigades  come  into  the  same  alignment 
from  the  commencement,  and  assume  the  requisite 
frontage  (426).^ 

In  close  connection  with  this  modified  transition 
formation,  the  "change  to  lines"  has  also  been  retained 
in  fact,  though  no  longer  designated  as  such.  That  is 
to  say,  the  possibility  of  a  change  of  front  "to  the 
complete  flank,"  i.e.  at  right  angles  to  the  direction 
of  march,  is  still  contemplated  (220), ^  and  to  this  end 
a  fresh  formation  of  the  division  will  generally  be 
required,  as  well  as  a  fresh  directing  brigade,  which 
takes  up  the  new  line  of  march,  and  to  which  the 
remainder  conform  in  the  desired  manner.  It  is  ap- 
parently a  matter  of  indifl^erence  whether  the  brigades 
are  called  lines  or  brigades.  It  is,  and  remains,  a 
purely  drill  evolution  of  the  division  in  close  forma- 
tion, a  complete  change  of  front  to  a  flank,  and  is 
therefore  something  that  would  certainly  not  occur  in 

on  very  open,  country,  which  is,  however,  covered  by  the 
fire  of  friendly  artillery,  only  single  echelon  is  necessary, 
fichelon  to  the  front  may  be  rendered  necessary  by  the  ad- 
vanced guard  situation.  The  above  cases  are  given  merely 
as  examples. 

"As  the  situation  is  gradually  cleared  up,  the  flexibility  of 
echelon  formations  renders  it  easy  to  attain  the  formation 
in  which  the  attack  will  be  delivered." 

*  "Should  it  be  possible  to  ascertain  the  hostile  disposi- 
tions with  approximate  certainty,  the  cavalry  leader  can 
have  his  front  rank  units  in  line  from  the  start,  and  de- 
ployed on  the  frontage  upon  which  he  intends  to  attack.  The 
advantage  thus  gained,  if  combined  with  rapidity  of  move- 
ment, will  often  render  it  possible  to  deliver  an  enveloping 
attack  during  the  hostile  deployment." 

*".  .  .  for  greater  changes  of  front,  e.g.  to  the  com- 
plete flank,  it  will  generally  be  necessary  to  re-form  the 
division." 


DEPTH  AND  ECHELON  203 

war  if  any  reasonable  sort  of  information  were  to 
hand.  H  it  did  occur,  it  would  presuppose  the  entire 
failure  of  reconnaissance  and  the  corresponding  in- 
capacity of  the  leader. 

My  cavalry  instinct  forbids  me  to  share  the  tactical 
principles  that  these  views  entail,  and  I  will  therefore 
again  endeavour  to  make  clear  that  conception  of  the 
matter  which  I  hold  to  be  correct. 

First,  as  regards  the  demands  of  the  Regulations 
that  echelon  is  to  replace  depth.  In  my  opinion,  the 
conditions  of  reality  have  not  in  this  matter  been  taken 
into  account.  To  be  able  to  meet  a  hostile  squadron 
that  has  broken  through  the  line,  the  echeloned  squad- 
ron, if  still  in  column,  must  wheel  into  line,  or  if,  as  is 
probable,  already  in  line,  must  wheel,  and  then  charge 
behind  the  front  of  its  own  attacking-line.  I  con- 
sider this,  of  itself,  to  be  impracticable  in  the  excite- 
ment of  the  fight,  a  manoeuvre  that  can  only  be  carried 
out  on  the  drill-ground.  We  have  only  to  consult  any 
one  who  has  had  experience  of  a  cavalry  attack  to 
learn  how  difficult  it  is  to  perform  such  evolutions 
immediately  before  the  charge. 

Then,  again,  what  is  our  conception  of  such  a  hostile 
squadron  breaking  through?  It  may  be  expected  to 
be  accompanied  by  a  simultaneous  rearward  movement 
of  a  corresponding  portion  of  our  own  line,  so  that  no 
clear  objective  for  attack  from  the  flank  would  be 
likely  to  offer  itself.  Such  retirements  of  single  por- 
tions of  the  line  can  only  be  met  and  counteracted  by 
throwing  in  fresh  forces  from  the  rear;  such  has  al- 
ways been  the  experience  in  cavalry  fights,  as  far  as 
the  teachings  of  history  show. 

But  there  are  other  matters  for  consideration.  How 
can  the  squadron,  echeloned,  for  instance,  on  the  outer 


204  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

flank  of  a  brigade,  intervene  when  this  so-called  rup- 
ture of  the  line  takes  place  on  the  inner  flank  ?  In  the 
dust  and  excitement  of  a  cavalry  fight,  will  such  a 
rupture,  especially  in  undulating  country,  be  even  no- 
ticed? What  if  there  is  a  simultaneous  threatening 
of  the  other  flank,  which  the  echelon  is  obliged  to 
meet?  What  if  the  echelon  has  advanced  in  an  en- 
veloping movement?  Who  is  then  to  deal  with  the 
rupture  of  the  line? 

To  go  on  trying  to  prove  that  the  duties  devolving 
on  depth  and  echelon  cannot  be  met  by  one  and  the 
same  detachment,  is  like  carrying  coals  to  Newcastle. 
The  formation  of  a  second  line  in  the  fight  against 
cavalry,  regarded  as  exceptional  by  the  Regulations, 
should  be  made  an  invariable  rule,  from  which  de- 
parture is  allowed  only  in  exceptional  cases,  while 
safety  for  the  flanks  must  be  arranged  for  independ- 
ently of  this. 

Here  again  we  come  into  collision  with  paragraph 
170  of  the  Regulations,  which  lays  down  that  an  of- 
fensive flank  attack  may  be  undertaken  from  a  rear- 
ward echelon;  as  if  such  a  manoeuvre  could  possibly 
be  carried  out!  Detachments  which  are  to  turn  the 
enemy's  flank  must,  during  the  approach,  advance  into 
alignment  with  their  own  line  separated  from  its  flank 
by  the  necessary  interval,  or  else  must  be  echeloned 
forwards  from  the  commencement. 

Forward  echelon  will  generally  be  found  to  corre- 
spond with  the  offensive  spirit  of  cavalry  better  than 
the  more  defensive  rearward  echelon.  It  is  usually 
more  practical  and  protects  the  flank  better,  while  at 
the  same  time  threatening  the  enemy's  flank  and  lay- 
ing down  the  law  to  him.  Forward  echelon  is  a 
very  useful  tactical  cavalry  formation,  and  deserves 


DEPTH  AND  ECHELON  205 

more  attention  than  the  Regulations  bestow  upon 
it.i 

On  its  offensive  importance  I  need  scarcely  enlarge. 
Troops  in  forward  echelon  are  already  in  a  position 
which  can  only  be  reached  after  an  exhausting  gallop 
by  those  in  rearward  echelon,  the  position  prescribed 
by  the  Regulations.  They  will  be  in  a  position  to 
frustrate  any  offensive  intentions  of  the  hostile  re- 
serves, and  will  obtain  quicker  and  surer  information 
as  to  the  enemy  than  will  ever  be  possible  at  such  a  time 
by  patrols  alone.  That  they  may  at  times  come  in 
contact  with  hostile  troops  in  rearward  echelon  is 
obvious.  If  the  flank  of  these  cannot  be  turned,  they 
must  be  dealt  with  frontally.  Local  dispositions  and 
a  vanguard  must  provide  security  against  the  action 
of  hostile  reserves. 

Even  in  a  defensive  sense  the  forward  echelon  will 
often  be  more  useful  than  the  rearward.  The  latter 
formation  surrenders  the  initiative  to  the  enemy,  and 
confines  itself  to  parrying  attacks,  always  a  disad- 
vantage in  a  cavalry  fight.  Forward  echelon,  on  the 
contrary,  seeks  to  forestall  the  enemy  in  the  offence. 
As  to  how  it  may  often  be  better  adapted  to  warding 
off  hostile  attacks  than  the  rearward  echelon  I  will 
give  an  example. 

A  body  of  cavalry,  in  the  approach  formation,  is 
advancing  against  the  enemy,  with  blind  ground  on  a 
flank,  which  would  allow  of  the  enemy's  covered  ap- 
proach, and  which  perhaps  it  has  been  impossible  to 
reconnoitre.  Attack  or  fire  surprise  is  feared  from 
this  quarter.  How  will  the  cavalry  protect  itself  ?  The 
modem  tactician  would  in  most  cases  reply:  "By  an 
echelon  to  the  rear."     I  do  not  think  this  would  be 

*  "fechelon  to  the  front  may  be  rendered  necessary  by  the 
advanced  guard  situation." 


2o6  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

suitable.  How  is  such  a  formation  to  give  safety  from 
fire  surprise,  and  to  locate  the  enemy's  advance  and 
arrest  it  until  the  main  body  can  take  counter-mea- 
sures ?  The  forward  echelon  can  here  alone  avail.  It 
comes  to  close  quarters  with  the  enemy,  attacks  him 
before  he  can  reach  the  flank  of  the  main  body,  and 
thus  gains  time  for  defensive  measures  or  retirement. 

It  is  quite  obvious  that  the  cases  for  employment  of 
the  forward  echelon  do  not  allow  of  being  formulated. 
I  think,  however,  that  we  should  make  much  more  use 
of  this  formation  than  is  at  present  the  fashion.  Prop- 
erly applied,  such  methods  will  ensure  to  us  consider- 
able superiority  over  our  opponents. 

If  we  turn  from  this  narrower  tactical  point  of  view 
to  the  formations  on  a  large  scale  where  echelon  is  to 
be  found — namely,  the  divisions — here  too  the  ex- 
amination leads  to  no  more  favourable  conclusions.  I 
ask  myself,  when  and  under  what  circumstances  will 
such  a  formation  be  advisable  ? 

During  the  approach  to  the  battle  of  encounter  it  is, 
as  I  have  endeavoured  to  prove,  quite  superfluous,  and 
may  even  operate  to  our  disadvantage.  In  this  case, 
when  total  uncertainty  reigns  as  to  whether  the  combat 
will  be  carried  out  mounted  or  dismounted,  or  both, 
there  can  be  no  question  of  any  stereotyped  tactical 
formation,  either  of  units  as  a  whole  or  of  smaller 
bodies  within  them.  Here,  as  we  have  seen,  the  battle 
will  generally  develop  gradually,  and  the  fighting-line 
be  fed  from  depth,  until  the  necessary  information  as 
to  the  enemy  has  been  gained  and  the  decisive  attack 
can  be  embarked  upon.  Under  such  circumstances  the 
brigades  advance  according  to  the  tasks  allotted  them, 
and  make  their  dispositions  as  circumstances  dictate. 
The  depth  that  will  be  necessary  can  obviously  not 
be  laid  down,  and  can  be  attained  by  echelon  neither  in 


DEPTH  AND  ECHELON  207 

the  division  nor  in  its  subdivisions.  If  the  division 
should  advance  under  such  circumstances  in  close 
formation  echeloned  within  itself,  the  unnecessary  dan- 
ger would  be  run  of  offering  an  ideal  target  to  the 
enemy's  artillery  (which  must  always  be  taken  into 
consideration),  and  at  the  same  time  of  hampering 
movement  where  circumstances  demand  the  greatest 
freedom  in  all  directions. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy's  dispositions  are 
known  before  a  collision  occurs,  the  Regulations  them- 
selves (426,  see  p.  172)  allow  that  echelon  formation 
is  superfluous,  and  that  the  advance  may  be  made  in 
the  deployed  formation  desired,  brigades  being  on  the 
same  frontage,  if  the  country  and  the  character  of 
the  adversary  offer  the  probability  of  a  charge. 

And  will  it  be  different  in  the  battle  of  all  arms?  In 
that  case,  if  the  army  cavalry  advances  from  the  wing 
of  the  army  with  the  intention  of  attacking  the  enemy's 
flank,  what  need  will  it  have  of  echelon  formations? 
It  is  known  that  an  attack  must  be  made  under  any 
circumstances.  Further  information  as  to  the  com- 
parative strength  of  the  enemy  cannot  and  must  not 
be  waited  for.  All  available  forces  will  be  engaged  in 
order  to  wrest  a  victory,  and  must  from  the  beginning 
be  so  disposed  that  the  enemy  will  be  compelled  as 
far  as  possible  to  conform  to  our  movements,  and  that 
we  may  prepare  the  most  favourable  deployment  for 
attack  in  the  manner  discussed  above.  Must  we,  then, 
advance  with  the  division  in  close  formation,  echeloned 
within  itself,  in  order  to  afford  the  greatest  possible 
target  for  the  enemy's  artillery?  Are  we  to  choose 
the  pusillanimous  formation  of  the  defensive  echelon, 
that  we  may  perhaps  be  obliged  to  approach  and  to 
deploy  under  the  enemy's  eyes,  incapable  in  this  un- 
wieldy formation  of  turning  the  ground  to  account? 


2o8  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

I  cannot  think  that  this  is  practical  and  believe  that 
modem  artillery  fire  of  itself  suffices  to  make  the 
echeloned  division  an  impossibility  and  to  banish  it 
for  ever  from  the  battle-field. 

It  must  be  added  that  should  the  unexpected  ap- 
pearance of  the  enemy  on  a  flank  make  it  necessary, 
rearward  echelon  is  much  easier  to  assume  from  a 
formation  of  brigades  on  the  same  front  than  is  the 
line  or  attack  formation  from  rearward  echelon.  It  is 
only  necessary  for  that  part  of  the  line  which  is  to  be 
echeloned  to  halt  or  decrease  the  pace,  and  the  echelon 
is  soon  formed.  To  push  forward  units  from  depth 
while  on  the  move  means,  on  the  other  hand,  a  con- 
siderable and  indeed  unnecessary  expenditure  of  force. 

VII.      FORMATIONS    FOR    MOVEMENT 

As  the  brigades  in  a  modern  division  must,  on  ac- 
count of  the  effect  of  artillery  fire,  be  disposed  accord- 
ing to  completely  different  principles  from  those  of 
the  past,  so,  too,  must  the  formations  adopted  by  the 
various  groups  be  chosen  to  suit  modern  conditions. 

Our  new  Regulations  lay  down  that,  if  the  cavalry, 
after  its  preliminary  deployment,  has  to  cross  an  ex- 
tensive fire-zone,  the  subordinate  leaders  are  to  choose 
such  formations  for  their  units  as  will  minimise  the 
effect  of  the  hostile  fire,  and  that,  for  this  purpose, 
the  configuration  of  the  ground  must  be  turned  to  the 
best  advantage,  even  though  it  should  involve  tempo- 
rary departure  from  prescribed  intervals. 

I  do  not  consider  these  instructions,  which,  in  con- 
tradiction to  the  general  principles  of  the  Regulations, 
give  free  play  to  the  initiative  of  all  subordinate  lead- 
ers, are  sufficiently  definite.  They  appear  to  try  to 
avoid  giving  a  distinct  designation  to  this  manner  of 


FORMATIONS  FOR  MOVEMENT       209 

advance.  Before  the  publication  of  the  Regulations 
it  was  known  as  "extended  formation."  As  such  I 
have  characterised  it  in  my  brochure,  "Reflections  on 
the  New  Cavalry  Regulations,"  published  in  1908,  and 
it  is  to  be  regretted  that  this  title  was  not  maintained 
in  the  Regulations,  and  with  it  also  the  real  essence  of 
the  whole  formation.  This  would,  I  think,  have  made 
the  matter  clearer.  I  hold  it  to  be  of  great  importance 
that  the  adoption  of  such  formations  should  be  or- 
dered by  higher  authority,  as  otherwise  there  must  be 
a  danger  of  the  troops  getting  out  of  hand. 

In  adopting  these  extensions  it  is  not  only  a  question 
of  ground  actually  under  artillery  fire,  but  also  of 
areas  during  the  crossing  of  which  fire  may  be  ex- 
pected, to  which,  of  course,  the  troops  should  not  be 
exposed.  Whether  such  is  the  case  or  not,  the  cav- 
alry commander,  who  is  observing  and  receiving  in- 
telligence as  the  troops  hurry  forward,  is  alone  in  a 
position  to  judge,  and  not  each  subordinate  leader. 
For  this  reason  alone,  unity  of  action  is  absolutely 
necessary.  So  is  it  also  from  another  point  of  view. 
I  need  scarcely  enlarge  on  the  picture  of  what  would 
occur  if  each  subordinate  commander,  each  squadron 
leader,  according  to  his  individual  judgment,  were  to 
suddenly  regulate  the  pace  and  formation  of  his  own 
volition,  while  it  would  be  a  matter  of  difficulty  to 
maintain  proper  control  of  the  troops  if  it  were  left  to 
the  squadron  leaders  to  regain  alignment  in  their  own 
time. 

It  is  therefore  imperative,  to  my  mind,  that  such 
extensions  should  not  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
squadron  leader,  but  ordered  by  superior  authority. 
Instructions  as  to  pace  should  be  given  at  the  same 
time,  and  the  area  indicated  where  troops  are  to  regain 
the  formation  ordered  and  decrease  the  pace.     These 


2IO  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

are  points  that  have  escaped  the  notice  of  the  Regula- 
tions. Orders  must  also  be  given  as  to  whether  several 
lines  will  eventually  be  formed.  These  will  then  gen- 
erally have  to  follow  each  other  at  shrapnel  distance. 
Only  the  choice  of  formation  and  line  of  advance 
must  be  left  to  the  subordinate  leaders,  as  they  alone 
are  in  a  position  to  judge  of  the  local  effect  of  the  hos- 
tile fire. 

If  such  dispositions  are  to  be  made,  all  commanders, 
down  to  squadron  leaders,  must  be  instructed  in  time, 
so  that  they  may  have  already  adopted  the  necessary 
formation  on  reaching  the  dangerous  zone.  They  must 
at  the  same  time  be  informed,  in  so  far  as  can  be  as- 
certained, from  which  direction  artillery  fire — for  this 
alone  can  be  in  question — is  to  be  expected. 

Should  the  artillery  fire  come  from  the  front,  col- 
umn of  route  will  often  be  a  suitable  formation.  It 
affords  but  a  small  frontage  of  target,  and  facilitates 
use  of  the  ground.  If  the  artillery  fire  is  expected 
from  a  flank,  the  adoption  of  a  single-rank  line  will 
often  commend  itself.  In  any  case,  in  the  larger 
formations,  distances  and  intervals  must  be  adjusted 
so  that  one  and  the  same  burst  of  shrapnel  will  not 
strike  two  squadrons  at  once. 

As  the  Regulations  do  not  touch  on  these  points,  I 
do  not  see  how  a  proper  understanding  of  them  can  be 
awakened  and  cultivated  in  the  troops,  imperative 
though  this  may  be. 

As  a  rule  it  will  be  by  no  means  sufficient  to  adopt 
formations  for  minimising  the  effect  of  artillery  fire 
only  in  special  cases  where  such  fire  is  to  be  expected. 
The  great  range  of  modern  guns,  and  their  capabilities 
of  indirect  fire  induced  by  improved  means  of  observa- 
tion, and  the  possibility  of  bringing  fire  to  bear  on 
large  unseen  targets  with  the  aid  of  the  map,  make  it 


FORMATIONS  FOR  MOVEMENT      211 

absolutely  necessary,  when  entering  within  possible 
effective  range  of  artillery,  to  adopt  formations  which 
will  offer  no  favourable  mark.  If  this  tends  on  the 
one  hand,  as  already  remarked,  to  a  premature  de- 
ployment, it  forces  us,  on  the  other,  to  adopt  forma- 
tions which  can  cross  country  easily  and  afford  no 
easy  target  for  the  artillery. 

I  have  already  shown  in  a  former  work  ^  how  well 
the  double  column  ^  answers  this  purpose,  and  in  what 
a  comprehensive  manner  the  principle  of  independent 
squadron  columns  allows  of  elaboration,  to  procure 
for  the  cavalry  the  greatest  imaginable  freedom  of 
movement. 

The  Regulations  do  not  agree  with  these  views. 
They  hold  fast  to  the  principle  that  deployment  must 
always  be  in  line,  and  not  in  a  succession  of  lines, 
and  that  before  this  deployment  the  squadron  columns 
hitherto  employed  will  generally  be  replaced  by  some 
other  formation. 

The  above  remain  the  chief  formations  for  move- 
ment and  deployment  of  the  cavalry.  The  employment 
of  the  "regimental  mass  and  brigade  mass"  ^  has  been 
limited,  but  the  Regulations  give  us  nothing  in  their 
place.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  flexibility  of  the 
double  column  particularly  emphasised ;  its  use,  indeed, 
is  in  a  certain  sense  limited.  I  see  such  limitation  in 
the  fact  that  the  trumpet-call  "Double  column!"  has 
been  abolished.  As,  on  the  other  hand,  the  call  "Form 
regimental  m>ass!"  has  been  retained,  it  does  not  ap- 

1  "Reflections  on  the  New  Cavalry  Regulations." 

2  Two  squadrons  abreast  in  squadron-column  at  six  paces' 
interval,  followed  by  two  more  at  troop- frontage  distance. 
When  there  is  a  fifth  squadron,  it  follows  in  the  same  forma- 
tion in  rear  of  the  left. — Trans. 

^  "Regiments-  und  Brigadekolonnen." 


212  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

pear  as  if  the  use  of  double  column  is  to  be  further 
developed,  or  allowed  to  replace  the  regimental  and 
brigade  mass  on  the  field  of  battle. 

It  is  further  laid  down  that  the  regimental  mass  is 
to  be  used  when  beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy's  fire, 
the  brigade  mass  when  concealed  by  the  ground,  even 
on  the  battle-field,  A  deployment  is  even  allowed  for 
from  the  brigade  in  mass  towards  the  flank,  and  that 
by  a  wheel  of  the  head  of  the  columns.  This  presup- 
poses that  such  a  column  can  be  used  in  a  flank  move- 
ment, which  I  regard  as  an  impossibility.  A  deploy- 
ment from  regimental  mass  to  squadron  columns  is 
also  provided  for.  In  view  of  the  great  effective  range 
of  the  modern  gun,  I  cannot  think  that  movements  in 
such  close  formation  right  up  to  the  moment  of  de- 
ployment can  go  unpunished  upon  a  modern  battle- 
field. 

All  these  instructions  contained  in  the  Regulations, 
and  many  others  that  take  effect  in  the  same  sense, 
cannot  be  regarded  as  practical.  They  lead  us  to  fear 
that  the  regimental  and  brigade  masses,  in  spite  of  all 
modern  conditions,  will  retain  more  or  less  their  old 
importance.  They  will  serve  as  a  pretext  for  many  a 
hidebound  drill  enthusiast,  of  which,  alas!  there  are 
still  many  among  us.  Upon  the  battle-fields  of  the 
future,  however,  we  will  no  longer  dare  to  appear  in 
such  formations,  but  only  widely  deployed  and  in  thin 
columns,  in  such  dispositions  indeed  as  will  allow  of  a 
rapid  adoption  of  the  attack  formation,  such  as  we 
have  discussed  in  detail  above.  I  can  only  hope  that 
these  views  will,  in  the  not  too  far  distant  future,  come 
to  be  more  generally  recognised  and  will  find  their  way 
into  the  Regulations. 

Finally,  I  would  once  again  draw  attention  to  the 


FORMATIONS  FOR  MOVEMENT       213 

idea  of  the  "vanguard."  ^  It  receives  but  a  passing 
mention  in  the  Regulations,  and  no  explanation  of 
what  is  thereby  meant.  My  opinion  is  that  it  is  indis- 
pensable to  all  flank  movements,  and  must  continually 
be  used,  especially  in  the  offensive.  It  should  therefore 
be  provided  for  by  regulation  in  all  deployments,  and 
the  troops  should  be  fully  conversant  with  its  use. 

For  the  rest,  the  present  Regulations,  in  spite  of  all 
actual  progress  made,  can  only  be  designated  as  pro- 
visional, and  give  rise  to  the  hope  that  it  will  be  found 
possible  to  re-edit  them  soon,  above  all  as  regards  the 
stereotyped  parts,  so  that,  fully  prepared  and  up  to 
date,  we  may  go  forth  with  confidence  to  meet  the 
events  of  any  future  war. 

VIII.      THE  VARIOUS  UNITS  IN   THE  FIGHT 

Having  in  the  last  chapter  endeavoured  to  elaborate 
tactical  principles,  and  to  give  practical  hints,  I  will 
now  shortly  deal  with  the  duties  of  the  various  units, 
and  endeavour  to  form  an  impression  of  the  perform- 
ances that  may  be  expected  of  them  in  the  fight. 

When  a  squadron,  acting  independently  in  recon- 
naissance, as  advanced  guard,  flank  guard,  or  divisional 
cavalry,  finds  itself  obliged  to  attack,  it  will,  as  a  rule, 
employ  its  whole  force  simultaneously,  whether  it 
charges  in  line,  knee  to  knee,  or  uses  a  troop  in  single 
rank  as  first  line.  If  a  troop  has  been  thrown  forward 
as  advanced  guard,  it  must  quickly  clear  the  front,  and 
endeavour  to  join  the  squadron,  so  as  to  strengthen  it 
before  the  collision,  and  not  to  become  prematurely 
involved  in  a  disadvantageous  fight. 

The  squadron  is  generally  too  weak  to  carry  out  an 
offensive  fight  on  foot.  There  is  also  no  means  of 
1  "Tetenschutz." 


214  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

guarding  the  led  horses  but  by  patrols.  If  they  should 
become  isolated  during  the  attack,  there  will  be  a  dan- 
ger of  losing  them,  especially  in  hostile  country.  A 
squadron  must  therefore  only  determine  on  a  dis- 
mounted attack  when  such  action  is  absolutely  un- 
avoidable. For  dispersing  hostile  patrols  or  armed  in- 
habitants, about  a  troop  dismounted  will  generally  suf- 
fice, where  there  is  no  opportunity  of  surprising  them 
in  the  charge,  or  of  enveloping  them.  A  defensive 
fight  on  foot  must  not  be  undertaken  by  a  single  squad- 
ron unless  absolutely  necessary,  or  whch  the  led 
horses  can  be  disposed  in  a  safe  place  in  the  imme- 
diate neighbourhood,  where  the  flanks  cannot  be  turned, 
or  where  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  can  be  relied 
upon. 

A  squadron  attacking  knee  to  knee  is  stronger  than 
a  numerically  superior  enemy  who  charges  in  looser 
formation  and  is  not  armed  with  the  lance. 

The  regiment  of  four  or  five  squadrons  is  numeri- 
cally too  weak  a  body  to  be  able  of  itself  to  carry  out 
the  larger  strategical  missions.  It  will  therefore  op- 
erate in  more  or  less  close  co-operation  with  other 
troops,  and  will  seldom  be  called  upon  to  fight  inde- 
pendently. It  may,  however,  find  itself  for  a  time 
obliged  to  rely  upon  its  own  fighting  strength,  whether 
acting  as  divisional  cavalry,  as  advanced  guard,  or  as  a 
detachment  from  a  larger  force  of  cavalry. 

If  a  fight  is  in  immediate  prospect,  column  of  troops 
must  first  be  formed  from  column  of  route,  and  a 
broader  front,  which  will  allow  of  a  rapid  assumption 
X)f  the  attack  formation,  must  then  be  adopted  accord- 
ing to  the  ground. 

In  the  charge  against  cavalry  the  regiment  should 
only  on  rare  occasions  deploy  all  its  squadrons  into 
line,  but  must,  whenever  practicable,  detail  one  squad- 


VARIOUS  UNITS  IN  THE  FIGHT      215 

ron  to  follow  in  second  line,  and  another  in  forward 
echelon,  to  protect  the  more  exposed  flank  and  to  turn 
that  of  the  enemy. 

It  will  also  be  possible  for  the  regiment  to  operate 
dismounted  against  weaker  hostile  detachments.  If 
relative  strength  allows,  at  least  a  squadron  should  be 
detached  to  guard  the  led  horses  and  to  carry  out 
reconnaissance  duties.  In  the  defence  on  foot,  with 
ample  ammunition  and  every  available  rifle  in  the 
firing-line,  the  regiment  represents  a  formidable  fight- 
ing force,  even  when  obliged  to  detach  one,  or  even 
two  squadrons,  for  reconnaissance  and  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  flanks  and  the  led  horses. 

In  the  fight  of  smaller  bodies  of  all  arms,  a  regiment 
will  frequently  be  able  to  intervene  in  a  most  effective 
manner  by  a  timely  charge,  from  which  considerable 
results  may  often  be  expected,  especially  during  pur- 
suit of  a  retreating  and  shaken  enemy.  In  such  cases 
the  formation  of  lines  for  attack  will  frequently  be 
superfluous,  and  a  broad  enveloping  formation  may  be 
adopted. 

The  brigade  of  two  regiments  is  numerically  too 
weak  of  itself  to  carry  out  strategical  missions,  and  to 
be  able  to  engage  in  the  independent  actions  they  de- 
mand. The  heavy  drains  on  its  strength  which  such 
missions  generally  entail  will  usually  weaken  the  fight- 
ing power  so  much  that  the  brigade  will  no  longer  be 
in  a  condition  to  engage  an  opponent  of  any  strength 
who  may  have  to  be  dealt  with  by  mounted  or  dis- 
mounted action,  or  the  two  in  combination. 

At  the  same  time,  circumstances  may  lead  to  a  bri- 
gade being  forced  to  carry  out  an  independent  role. 
It  will  then  have  to  reconnoitre  with  great  care,  so 
that  it  may  only  embark  on  a  decisive  encounter  with 
a  full  knowledge  of  the  situation.    Otherwise,  in  view 


2i6  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

of  its  small  offensive  power,  it  will  run  a  great  risk 
of  suffering  defeat,  especially  when  dismounted. 

In  the  defence  on  foot,  on  the  other  hand,  a  brigade 
may  be  regarded  as  an  important  factor  of  strength, 
capable  of  successfully  resisting  an  enemy  of  consider- 
able superiority,  as  long  as  its  flanks  are  protected 
and  the  led  horses  do  not  require  too  large  an  escort. 

On  approaching  the  enemy,  the  brigade  must  form 
column  of  troops  from  column  of  route  in  good  time 
and  the  regiments  must  be  deployed  on  the  frontage 
and  in  the  formations  demanded  by  the  situation.  In 
such  cases  a  reserve  must  always  be  detailed.  The 
allotment  of  different  roles  in  the  fight  to  the  various 
regiments  or  groups  will  form  the  framework  for  the 
tactical  deployment.  In  all  attacks  the  brigade  or  its 
component  parts  must  always  adopt  the  formation  in 
lines.  Where  there  is  blind  ground  to  a  flank,  a  for- 
ward echelon  must  be  formed  which  will  co-operate 
concentrically  in  the  charge.  In  the  attack  on  foot, 
too,  it  will  often  be  advantageous  to  echelon  detach- 
ments forward  under  due  protection,  in  order  to  en- 
velop the  enemy's  position. 

In  the  combat  of  detachments  of  all  arms,  and 
especially  in  pursuit,  considerable  performances  must 
be  expected  of  a  brigade.  A  timely  charge  or  the  em- 
ployment of  its  fire  power  in  an  effective  direction  may 
bring  about  a  decision. 

The  division  of  six  regiments,  under  circumstances 
where  its  full  strength  can  be  employed  in  the  charge, 
represents,  even  against  troops  using  the  rifle,  a  very 
considerable  fighting  power,  which  can,  if  judiciously 
handled  and  launched  at  the  right  moment,  have  a 
decisive  effect,  even  in  a  battle  of  armies. 

In  independent  missions  it  must  be  remembered  that 
a  complete  regiment  of  four  squadrons  with  15  files 


VARIOUS  UNITS  IN  THE  FIGHT      217 

per  troop  will  represent  400  rifles  at  most.  In  war, 
however,  this  figure  will  never  be  reached.  Wastage 
on  the  march  and  the  provision  of  the  necessary  de- 
tachments and  patrols,  weaken  squadrons  very  consid- 
erably. We  must  further  remember  that  in  every  great 
battle  a  mounted  reserve  will  always  have  to  be  de- 
tailed, while,  in  addition  to  this,  detachments  such  as 
reconnoitring  squadrons,  escorts  to  transport,  report- 
ing centres,  and  signal  stations,  will  generally  fail  to 
rejoin  in  time  for  the  battle.  Thus  the  division  will 
seldom  actually  be  able  to  reckon  on  more  than  1,000 
to  1,500  rifles  in  the  firing-line. 

Even  counting  on  the  co-operation  of  artillery  and 
machine-guns,  which  the  enemy  will  also  have  at  his 
disposal,  this  represents  no  great  offensive  strength.  It 
is  therefore  necessary  to  be  quite  clear  in  our  minds 
that  only  weak  detachments  can  be  attacked  with  pros- 
pect of  success. 

A  cavalry  division  is  greatly  handicapped  by  these 
circumstances  in  carrying  out  the  role  which  may  be 
assigned  to  it  in  the  course  of  operations.  The  resist- 
ance of  a  body  of  equal  strength  where  circumstances 
demand  a  dismounted  attack  can  thus  never  be  over- 
come. 

Mounted,  however,  it  is  quite  another  matter.  A 
well-trained  German  cavalry  division,  handled  accord- 
ing to  sound  tactical  principles  and  schooled  to  charge 
in  close  formation,  may  attack  even  a  stronger  enemy 
regardless  of  consequences. 

Should  the  task  at  issue  demand  a  larger  force,  sev- 
eral divisions  must  be  united  in  a  cavalry  corps.  In 
the  battle  of  all  arms  such  a  corps,  either  by  the  charge 
or  by  employment  of  its  fire  power,  may  aim  at  decisive 
results.  For  the  conduct  of  independent  strategic  mis- 
sions fire  power  is  an  important  factor.     As  in  this 


2i8  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

case  the  number  of  men  detached,  etc.,  will  be  divided 
between  the  divisions,  a  strength  of  3,500  rifles  can  at 
times  be  reached  in  a  corps  of  two  divisions. 

For  the  division,  as  for  the  corps,  the  framework  of 
the  tactical  deployment  depends  upon  the  commander's 
tactical  plan,  as  too  does  the  allotment  of  duties  in  the 
fight  to  the  various  units,  divisions,  brigades,  and  regi- 
ments, or  to  the  tactical  groups,  advanced  guard,  main 
body,  reserve,  etc.,  and  any  attempt  at  retaining  the 
command  in  one  hand  is  obviously  out  of  the  question. 
Stress  has  already  been  laid  on  the  necessity  for  early 
deployment,  and  once  this  is  effected,  the  various  sub- 
divisions of  the  force  must  take  their  own  independent 
measures  for  carrying  out  the  roles  that  devolve  upon 
them. 

On  the  other  hand,  neither  in  the  fight  of  the  inde- 
pendent cavalry  nor  in  the  great  battle  should  a  unit 
be  allowed  to  become  isolated  in  the  combat.  The  nec- 
essary combination  must  always  be  preserved.  United 
action,  however,  is  only  possible  if  subordinate  leaders 
never  lose  sight  of  the  general  purpose  of  the  fight, 
and  continually  bear  in  mind  the  necessary  interchange- 
able relations  of  the  various  tactical  methods. 

In  war  it  will  seldom  be  possible  either  to  undertake 
or  to  carry  out  the  very  best  course  of  action,  but  will 
generally  be  unnecessary,  for  we  may  certainly  count 
on  numerous  errors  and  vacillations  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  especially  in  the  case  of  cavalry  warfare. 

It  is  of  far  greater  importance  that  any  plan  once 
undertaken  should  be  energetically  carried  through  to 
a  conclusion. 

Success  in  war  is  first  and  foremost  a  matter  of 
character  and  will.  The  indomitable  will  to  con- 
quer carries  with  it  a  considerable  guarantee  of 
success. 


VARIOUS  UNITS  IN  THE  FIGHT      219 

The  determination  to  win,  cost  what  it  may,  is  there- 
fore the  first  and  greatest  quaHty  required  of  a  cavalry 
leader — and  the  offensive  is  the  weapon  with  which  he 
can  best  enforce  his  will. 


APPENDIX 

CAVALRY  AT  PEACE  MANOEUVRES 

If  manoeuvres  are  to  be  of  real  value  to  the  cavalry,  care 
must  be  taken  to  demand  nothing  of  the  troops  but  what 
would  be  required  of  them  in  war.  This  is  most  apparent 
in  outpost  duty,  where  demands  are  made  on  the  outpost 
cavalry,  especially  in  regard  to  reconnaissance,  that  in  no- 
wise correspond  to  the  teachings  of  the  "Field  Service  Man- 
ual"; and  this  is  the  more  unfortunate,  as  the  economy  of 
strength  demanded  in  the  "Manual"  is  absolutely  necessary  if 
the  divisional  cavalry,  in  particular,  is  to  be  prevented  from 
failing  soon  after  the  commencement  of  a  war. 

The  duties  of  outpost  cavalry  are  limited  to  watching  a 
strip  of  country  to  the  front,  and  possibly  on  the  flank,  of  the 
line  of  infantry  outposts,  and  to  carry  messages  between  the 
different  sections  of  the  latter. 

Standing  patrols  are  the  most  useful  for  observation  work. 
In  the  case  of  an  enemy  close  at  hand,  they  should  be  in 
touch  with  him,  and  should,  if  there  be  no  close  recon- 
naissance patrols,  watch  his  flanks  as  well;  however,  with 
proper  dispositions  this  should  be  unnecessary.  The  stand- 
ing patrols  would,  in  any  case,  have  to  be  in  a  position  to 
detect  and  report  any  advance  on  the  part  of  the  enemy's 
outposts  and  any  movement  of  the  enemy  denoting  an  ad- 
vance or  retirement.  If  the  enemy,  however,  is  so  far  away 
as  to  be  out  of  touch  with  the  cavalry  cordon,  reconnais- 
sance work  beyond  this  line  should  be  carried  out  by  those 
portions  of  the  divisional  cavalry  that  are  not  assigned  to 
outpost  duty.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  outposts  on  either 
side  are  in  close  touch,  reconnaissance  to  the  front  should 
be  carried  out  by  infantry  patrols.  It  may,  however,  be 
advisable  under  certain  conditions  to  let  weak  mounted  pa- 

221 


222  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

trols  follow  such  infantry  patrols  to  covered  positions  for 
carrying  messages,  or  to  employ  them  dismounted  in  the 
place  of  the  infantry. 

If  these  arrangements  are  not  strictly  adhered  to,  it  very 
easily  happens,  during  manoeuvres,  that  reconnaissance  work 
is  carried  out  by  the  reconnaisance  patrols  in  the  daytime, 
but  at  night  by  the  outpost  cavalry.  In  the  morning  the 
latter  is  then  scattered  in  all  directions  and  cannot  be  col- 
lected again.  Such  dispositions  are  also  entirely  opposed  to 
the  teachings  of  the  "Field  Service  Manual,"  and  are  un- 
suited  to  conditions  of  real  warfare. 

In  time  of  war  the  reconnaissance  patrols  naturally  con- 
tinue their  work  of  observation  during  the  night,  and  con- 
sequently they  need  not  be  relieved  by  patrols  of  the  outpost 
cavalry.  In  peace  time,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  still  con- 
sidered remarkable  if  the  patrols  remain  in  touch  with  the 
enemy  at  night,  and  those  that  do  so  have  been  dubbed 
"sticky  patrols."  Those,  also,  which  should  really  be  in 
touch  with  the  enemy  throughout  the  night  usually  get  under 
cover,  and  have  been  known  to  spend  a  comfortable  night 
in  excellent  quarters. 

In  making  arrangements  with  regard  to  outpost  cavalry, 
attention  should  be  paid  to  reducing  the  distance  which  mes- 
sages have  to  be  carried.  In  this  respect,  horses  are  not 
always  sufficiently  considered.  When  outpost  companies  are 
pushed  out  far  to  the  flank,  it  would  usually  be  well  to 
observe  the  instructions  of  the  "Field  Service  Manual,"  and 
to  detail  small  detachments  of  cavalry  to  the  companies  for 
their  independent  use,  as  this  will  prevent  considerable  waste 
of  strength.  It  will  often  be  necessary,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  protect  unsupported  flanks  of  a  line  of  infantry  outposts 
by  special  detachments  of  the  divisional  cavalry  that  do  not 
form  part  of  the  outpost  cavalry.  Such  detachments  would, 
if  possible,  find  housing  for  themselves  and  be  self-protect- 
ing, though  they  might,  under  certain  circumstances,  be 
given  a  small  force  of  infantry  for  local  security. 

It  is  most  important  that  the  outpost  cavalry  should  be 
concentrated  in  good  time  in  the  morning  before  the  com- 
mencement of  the  march  or  of  the  engagement,  and  that 
they  should  retire  in  formed  order  on  the  divisional  cavalry. 
This  requires  careful  preparation  and  instructions;  some 
practical  method  must  be  found  which  will  overcome  the 


APPENDIX  223 

difficulties  that  now  present  themselves.  The  various  squad- 
ron commanders  must  act  in  conjunction  with  the  officers 
commanding  the  outposts.  All  the  higher  officers,  and  those 
directing  the  manoeuvres,  must,  however,  always  keep  this 
matter  in  mind,  so  that  the  present  system,  which  offers 
such  serious  disadvantages,  may  not  become  so  customary  as 
to  be  carried  on  in  time  of  war. 

Having  examined  the  flaws  still  to  be  found  in  our  outpost 
system,  and  which  are  likely  to  adversely  affect  the  arm  in 
war,  we  find,  on  turning  to  the  sphere  of  reconnaissance, 
that  such  defects  are  even  more  prevalent. 

The  arrangements  that  are  usually  made  in  this  matter 
often  draw  on  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  in  a  manner  quite 
out  of  proportion  to  the  demands  of  actual  war,  and  weaken 
the  squadrons  to  such  an  extent  as  almost  to  destroy  their 
fighting  value.    The  weak  point  is,  in  the  main,  as  follows: 

It  is  usual  for  every  order  given  by  a  commanding  officer 
to  direct  that  a  reconnaissance  should  be  carried  out,  even 
though  the  previous  order  may  have  given  instructions  for 
one  in  the  same  direction.  The  cavalry  obeys  these  orders, 
and  sends  out  fresh  patrols  each  time  the  order  is  repeated. 
As  the  patrols  are  always  told  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  en- 
emy, and  as,  on  account  of  peace  conditions  that  obtain,  no- 
body thinks  of  relieving  them,  they  collect  in  one  direction, 
whilst  the  squadron  becomes  weaker  and  weaker. 

I  consider  that  every  effort  should  be  made  to  combat  this 
bad  habit.  Care  should  be  taken  not  to  send  out  unnecessary 
patrols,  and  to  call  in,  from  time  to  time,  those  that  have 
been  sent  out,  or  where  necessary,  to  relieve  them.  I  be- 
lieve that  this  would  be  possible  if  the  following  rules  were 
observed. 

If  an  order  has  been  given  which  entails  a  reconnaissance 
in  a  certain  direction,  it  is  unnecessary  that  this  should  be 
repeated  in  a  subsequent  order.  Other  directions  rather, 
which  are  indicated  by  reason  of  the  altered  conditions, 
should  be  brought  to  notice,  and  reference  made  to  the 
reconnaissance  already  despatched.  Under  no  circumstances, 
however,  should  a  cavalry  commander  be  induced,  on  re- 
ceiving instructions  to  reconnoitre  in  a  certain  direction,  to 
send  a  patrol  to  a  point  where  he  knows  his  patrols  to  be 
already  in  touch  with  the  enemy.  The  necessary  economy 
of  strength  can  only  be  effected  by  leaving  the  command 


224  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

of  the  patrol  service  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  cavalry 
commander,  who  must  be  responsible  to  his  superior  officer 
for  the  carrying  out  of  the  reconnaissance  work  entrusted 
to  him.  The  superior  officer  should  only  interfere  if  he 
discovers  obvious  mistakes,  or  if  other  circumstances  render 
such  a  step  absolutely  necessary.  He  must,  for  his  part, 
see  that  orderlies  and  reporting  patrols  that  come  in  remain 
with  his  staff,  and  that  they  are  sent  back  to  the  squadron 
when  opportunity  offers,  so  as  to  be  available  for  fighting 
purposes.  This  should  be  made  a  standing  order  at  manoeu- 
vres. 

All  patrols  that  are  sent  out  must  receive  definite  orders 
as  to  how  far  they  are  to  advance  in  any  given  direction, 
how  long  they  are  to  reconnoitre  in  that  direction,  and 
when  they  are  to  return.  If,  at  the  expiration  of  such  a 
period,  renewed  reconnaissance  is  found  necessary  in  the 
same  direction,  relieving  patrols  should  be  despatched  in 
good  time,  i.e.  before  the  first  patrols  have  returned;  and 
these  fresh  patrols  should,  if  possible,  meet  the  returning 
ones,  in  order  to  exchange  notes  regarding  the  enemy.  For 
this  purpose  the  outward  and  homeward  routes  of  the  pa- 
trols should  be  prearranged  as  far  as  circumstances  permit. 

In  manoeuvres,  when  one  officer  takes  over  command  from 
another,  he  must  inquire  as  to  the  arrangements  made  for 
reconnaissance  work,  and  must  take  measures  accordingly. 

When  a  fresh  squadron  is  sent  out  on  reconnaissance,  due 
notice  must  be  given  to  the  squadron  to  be  relieved.  The 
two  officers  commanding  must  act  in  conjunction,  so  that  the 
officer  being  relieved  can  draw  in  his  patrols  and  the  re- 
lieving patrols  of  the  new  squadron  be  sent  out  in  good 
time. 

It  should  also  be  remembered  that,  in  time  of  war,  close 
reconnaissance  would  gradually  develop  from  distant  recon- 
naissance, and  would  not,  as  a  rule,  require  any  fresh  dis- 
positions such  as  are  usually  found  necessary  at  manoeuvres. 

During  all  exercises,  especially  when  a  long  advance  is 
being  made  and  distant  patrols  are  not  actually  sent  out, 
the  commanding  officers  should  be  furnished  by  the  directing 
staff  with  such  information  as  these  patrols  would  in  all 
probability  have  obtained.  They  should  also  be  told  which 
of  the  distant  patrols  may  be  assumed  to  be  in  touch  with 
the  enemy,  and  which  have  either  returned  or  been  cap- 


APPENDIX  225 

tured  or  wiped  out.  The  distant  patrols,  which  are  to  be 
in  touch  with  the  enemy,  might  with  advantage  be  des- 
patched by  the  directing  staff,  before  the  manoeuvre  com- 
mences, in  time  to  procure  quarters  and  receive  instructions 
as  to  the  situation.  The  troops  should,  of  course,  be  in- 
formed of  the  despatch  of  these  patrols,  and  all  further 
reconnaissance  will  be  furnished  by  the  cavalry  commander. 
Every  cavalry  detachment  must  also  know  exactly  what  area 
it  is  to  reconnoitre,  and  what  reconnaissances  have  been, 
or  are  assumed  to  have  been,  carried  out  by  neighbouring 
detachments. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  indicate  the  direction  in  which  a  near 
reconnaissance  should  be  made,  without  limiting  the  dis- 
tance of  it.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  distant  reconnaissance  to 
locate  an  opponent  who  is  advancing  from  a  distance.  As 
long  as  the  enemy  is  under  the  observation  of  the  distant 
patrols,  the  close  reconnaissance  should  not  be  pushed  for- 
ward to  meet  him,  but  should  be  advanced  from  one  posi- 
tion to  the  next,  within  definite  limits.  When  these  limits 
have  been  reached,  the  close  patrols  should  be  drawn  in 
by  the  squadrons  furnishing  them,  and  fresh  patrols  be 
despatched  to  the  next  position. 

It  would  also  be  well  if  the  directing  staff  were  to  lessen 
the  work  by  stopping  and  sending  back  to  their  units  such 
patrols  as,  by  reason  of  their  direction,  cannot  possibly  come 
in  contact  with  the  enemy;  or  it  may  even  suffice,  for  the 
purposes  of  the  manoeuvre,  to  assume  the  despatch  of  pa- 
trols in  such  directions.  They  might  also  be  given  sealed 
orders,  only  to  be  opened  at  a  certain  place,  containing  the 
data  necessary  for  negative  reports  and  instructions  regard- 
ing their  return  to  their  unit. 

I  believe  that  if  such  methods  were  adopted,  and  if  the 
patrol  leaders  confined  themselves  to  sending  such  reports  as 
would  be  sent  in  real  war,  which  would  include  a  clear  and 
concise  statement  regarding  the  configuration  of  the  coun- 
try, it  would  be  possible  to  avoid  the  unwarrantable  weaken- 
ing of  the  squadrons  now  in  vogue,  which  does  not  even 
produce  a  correspondingly  efficient  service  of  communica- 
tion. It  is,  however,  true  that  the  art  of  sending  a  few, 
but  good  reports,  and  of  sending  them  at  the  right  time 
requires,  in  the  leader  of  the  patrol,  sound  tactical  judg- 
ment, and  a  training  that  is  nowadays  but  seldom  obtained. 


226  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Senior  officers  also  are  often  to  blame  for  the  frequency 
of  reports.  Appointed  to  a  command  at  manoeuvres,  they 
want  to  know  every  detail  about  the  enemy,  and  the  exact 
minute  in  which  an  advance  or  a  movement  is  made.  Every 
little  detachment  must  be  reported,  and  the  slightest  move- 
ment watched.  The  result  is  that  they  encourage  patrols, 
not  only  to  send  as  many  detailed  reports  as  possible,  but, 
if  necessary,  to  obtain  the  information  in  a  manner  incom- 
patible with  service  conditions.  This  is  a  deep-seated  evil 
that  is  to  be  seen  at  all  manoeuvres,  and  one  that  command- 
ers should  consistently  endeavour  to  eradicate. 

Such  procedure  reacts  upon  the  commanding  officers  them- 
selves by  exercising  a  harmful  influence  on  their  individual 
training.  If  everything  is  known  about  the  strength,  the 
line  of  advance,  and  the  distance  of  the  enemy,  generalship 
descends  to  the  level  of  the  solution  of  an  arithmetical  prob- 
lem, decisions  of  the  commanding  officers  being  based  on 
complete  and  established  data.  What  a  difference  is  there  in 
actual  warfare !  But  meagre  information  is  available  re- 
garding the  enemy,  and  decisions  must,  as  a  rule,  be  based  on 
a  certain  knowledge  of  one's  own  plans  and  a  rough  idea 
of  the  numbers,  intentions,  and  fighting  strength  of  the  en- 
emy. In  the  former  case,  decisions  of  commanding  officers 
are  the  result  of  calculation;  in  the  latter — i.e.  in  actual 
warfare — they  are  a  matter  for  military  skill,  or  the  intui- 
tion of  genius,  which  is  a  very  different  thing.  These  are 
the  decisions  that  officers  should  be  encouraged  and  trained 
to  make;  but,  unless  the  malpractices  that  have  crept  into 
the  reconnaissance  work  are  rooted  out,  this  valuable  train- 
ing for  actual  warfare  is  likely  to  be  lost. 

But  all  that  is  only  by  the  way.  We  are  now  discussing 
the  cavalry  and  not  the  generals,  and  I  should  like  to  point 
out  the  great  importance  of  training  units  themselves  to  re- 
port in  a  manner  suited  to  service  conditions,  i.e.  to  report 
only  important  matters,  and  these  at  the  right  time,  so  that 
the  commanding  officer  may  receive  information  regarding 
tlfe  enemy  in  time  to  make  the  necessary  dispositions,  while 
at  the  same  time  the  reconnoitring  detachments  need  not 
unduly  weaken  themselves  by  the  too  frequent  despatch  of 
messages.  On  the  field  of  battle  reports  could  be  carried 
by  individual  horsemen  instead  of  by  patrols,  but  of  these 
only  a  limited  number  should  be  drawn  from  the  squadron, 


APPENDIX  227 

as  it  is  not  possible  to  rely  on  their  return.  They  must 
also  be  taught  only  to  take  reports  to  such  places  as  they 
could  actually  reach  in  war.  At  manoeuvres  and  other  ex- 
ercises they  are  often  to  be  seen  riding  about  behind  the 
firing-line  in  the  most  exposed  places,  having  apparently  no 
idea  of  the  dangers  which  they  would  run  in  real  warfare. 
This  habit,  acquired  in  peace,  may  in  time  of  war  entail 
the  loss  of  many  riders,  horses,  and  reports. 

The  best  means  of  counteracting  these  bad  habits  is  to 
tell  the  despatch-riders  exactly  where  to  go,  and  to  prevail 
on  the  officers  concerned  to  remain  in  certain  fixed  places, 
as  in  real  warfare,  instead  of  moving  about  on  the  field 
of  battle,  even  within  the  zone  of  the  enemy's  fire.  It  is 
true  that,  by  moving  about  and  exposing  themselves,  com- 
manders can  get  a  better  idea  of  the  engagement,  and  can 
make  dispositions  more  rapidly  and  better  than  they  could 
from  the  rear;  but,  at  the  same  time,  such  procedure  spoils 
their  own  training  by  removing  difficulties  that  would  exist 
in  time  of  war.  Making  suitable  dispositions  from  the  rear, 
with  hardly  anything  but  reports  to  go  by,  is  quite  a  differ- 
ent matter  from  conducting  the  fight  from  the  front,  where 
a  clear  view  of  the  situation  can  be  got. 

As  regards  reconnaissance  and  screening,  the  principles 
evolved  in  the  chapter  on  these  subjects  hold  good  for  the 
conduct  of  cavalry  at  manoeuvres. 

First  of  all,  we  must  see  whether  the  cavalry  attached  to 
the  different  divisions  should,  according  to  its  strength,  be 
only  classed  as  divisional  cavalry,  or  whether  its  total 
strength  is  such  as  to  entitle  it  to  be  considered  as  army 
cavalry. 

Units  detailed  to  act  as  divisional  cavalry  should  not  move 
about  independently  in  the  manoeuvre  area,  as  this  would  be 
in  opposition  to  the  essence  of  their  duties,  nor  should  they, 
on  the  other  hand,  remain  tied  to  the  infantry,  as  they  un- 
fortunately so  often  do.  They  must  learn  to  advance  from 
point  to  point,  to  reconnoitre  by  areas,  to  observe  from  a 
distance  with  glasses,  to  judge  correctly  which  flank  is  of 
most  importance  for  reconnaissance,  and,  finally,  to  occupy 
during  the  engagement  such  ground  that  may  be  valuable 
or  essential  for  successful  reconnaissance.  Regiments  and 
squadrons  detailed  as  army  cavalry  should,  on  the  other 
hand,  act  according  to  the  principles  involved. 


228  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

When  army  cavalry  is  taking  part  in  manoeuvres,  the 
leaders  should  be  recommended  to  include  in  the  exercises 
reconnaissance  and  screening  problems  on  a  large  scale. 
This  can  generally  be  done.  Then  the  merging  of  the  dis- 
tant into  the  close  and  battle  reconnaissance  should  be  prac- 
tised, the  gradual  withdraw^al  of  reconnoitring  squadrons  on 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  the  evacuation  of  the  areas  al- 
lotted to  them,  and  the  independent  action  necessitated  by 
the  fresh  conditions.  This  stage  is  instructive,  not  only 
for  the  reconnoitring  squadrons  and  patrols,  but  also  for  the 
cavalry  division  itself.  They  will  have  to  decide  on  which 
flank  of  the  troops  in  rear  to  concentrate,  and  in  this  matter 
must  act  in  conjunction  with  any  divisional  cavalry  there 
may  be;  at  the  same  time,  they  must  take  into  account  the 
ground  and  the  general  strategical  situation.  The  final  de- 
cision will,  as  a  rule,  have  to  be  made  after  duly  weighing 
many  varied  and  often  conflicting  considerations. 

If  a  general  engagement  of  all  arms  should  result,  it  is 
important,  even  though  the  ground  should  not  be  suitable 
for  a  charge,  that  the  best  use  should,  in  any  case,  be  made 
of  the  fighting  value  of  the  troops.  Nothing  is  more  incor- 
rect and  more  opposed  to  the  principles  of  warfare  than 
an  attitude  of  inactivity  in  anticipation  of  the  possibility  of 
an  attack.  If  echeloned"  forward  on  the  flank  of  the  force, 
the  cavalry  should  make  every  endeavour  to  develop  an 
attack  against  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  enemy  by  fire  or  shock 
action,  and  to  threaten  and  harass  his  artillery.  The  heavy 
artillery  of  the  field  army  will  often  afford  a  suitable  object 
of  attack,  more  so,  perhaps,  in  manoeuvres  than  in  actual 
warfare.  It  is  undoubtedly  wrong,  whatever  the  conditions 
may  be,  to  remain  inactive  and  watch  the  other  arms  strug- 
gling for  the  palm  of  victory.  "Activite!  activite!  activitc!" 
cried  Napoleon  to  his  generals,  and  this,  too,  should  be  our 
first  demand  from  our  cavalry  leaders. 

It  would  also  be  a  useful  exercise  if  pursuits  could  occa- 
sionally be  arranged  for  at  manoeuvres,  so  that  the  cavalry 
may  learn  how  to  initiate  them  in  good  time,  and  to  push 
them  home  with  energy.  The  difficulties  of  pursuits,  and 
the  principles  to  be  observed  in  their  conduct,  are  dealt  with 
elsewhere. 

If  the  cavalry  endeavours  to  carry  out  the  tasks  I  have 
sketched  above,  and  at  the  same  time  effects  the  necessary 


APPENDIX  229 

economy  of  strength,  it  will  reap  benefits  from  mancEUvres 
that  will  materially  assist  its  training  for  war,  provided  the 
antiquated  ideas  that  still  prevail  are  discarded. 


LARGER   RECONNAISSANCE   EXERCISES 

Under  this  head  I  should  like  to  draw  attention  to  the 
importance  of  frequent  practice  in  screening.  In  a  war  of 
operations,  which  includes  the  encounters  resulting  from 
strategical  concentration,  the  functions  of  screening  are,  in 
my  opinion,  most  important.  The  American  War  of  Seces- 
sion showed  in  a  surprising  manner  what  could  be  done 
in  this  respect.  Stuart's  screening  of  the  left  wheel  of  the 
Confederate  army,  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  for 
instance,  was  a  masterpiece,  and  the  reconnaissance  carried 
out  by  Mosby's  Scouts  during  the  same  period  was  equally 
brilliant.  I  would  recommend  the  study  of  these  features  of 
the  war,  as  they  are  remarkably  suited  to  the  present  day, 
in  spite  of  the  great  change  in  conditions. 

Our  cavalry  keep,  as  a  rule,  but  little  in  touch  with  such 
matters.  The  new  "Field  Service  Manual"  introduces  the 
idea  of  offensive  and  defensive  screens,  but  the  cavalry  lack 
experience  in  them.  Offensive  screening  is  usually  accepted, 
it  appears,  at  all  events,  at  the  outset,  as  being  somewhat 
similar  to  reconnaissance  duties.  Real  screening  is  but  sel- 
dom practised,  as  operations  only  last  a  short  time,  and 
usually  end  with  a  cavalry  encounter,  entailing  a  lapse  into 
the  usual  set  piece. 

With  regard  to  these  exercises,  I  would  point  out  that  de- 
fensive screening,  combined  with  natural  obstacles,  and 
possibly  with  the  assistance  of  the  other  arms,  is  much  more 
effective  than  the  offensive  method,  and  therefore  deserves 
more  attention,  and,  further,  that  there  is  a  considerable 
difference  between  a  reconnaissance  and  an  offensive  screen. 

In  a  reconnaissance  an  advance  is  made  in  the  direction 
which  the  army  commander  considers  to  be  most  important, 
and  it  is  left  to  the  enemy's  cavalry  to  oppose  this  advance. 
In  offensive  screening,  on  the  other  hand,  the  enemy  must 
be  found  before  he  can  be  attacked  and  beaten.  An  advance 
would  naturally  not  be  risked  in  a  direction  that  would  avoid 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  thereby  afford  it  the  opportunity 


230  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

of  approach  against  the  main  army.  This  should  be  pre- 
vented at  all  costs.  An  advance  must  consequently  not  be 
made  until  information  has  been  obtained  from  patrols  or 
scouts  regarding  the  position  and  the  line  of  advance  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  Then  a  determined  attack  should  be  made 
on  the  cavalry,  the  force  being  concentrated  as  much  as 
possible  for  this  purpose.  It  is  only  after  this  attack  has 
been  successfully  carried  out  that  the  real  screening  work 
begins. 

The  two  main  points  that  should  be  observed  when  carry- 
ing out  such  exercises  are  therefore :  ( i )  no  advance  should 
be  made  until  the  enemy's  line  of  advance  has  been  dis- 
covered; and  (2)  the  forces  should  be  distributed,  after  the 
defeat  of  the  enemy,  on  a  broad  front,  in  accordance  with 
the  requirements  of  the  screening  duties,  while  the  enemy's 
beaten  cavalry  must  be  carefully  watched,  to  prevent  its 
further  activity. 

With  regard  to  defensive  screening,  it  is  necessary  above 
all,  first,  to  occupy  with  sufficient  strength  all  passages  over 
the  natural  obstacle  that  has  been  selected,  and  to  effect 
a  tactical  disposition  of  the  forces  that  will  enable  them  to 
do  a  maximum  of  work  with  the  expenditure  of  a  minimum 
of  strength,  making  the  greatest  possible  use  of  field  en- 
trenchments; secondly,  to  so  dispose  the  reserves  that  they 
will  be  quickly  available  to  strengthen  any  threatened  point ; 
and  lastly,  to  arrange  a  system  of  communication  along  the 
whole  screening-line,  employing  any  suitable  technical  ap- 
pliances in  such  a  manner  that  the  system  will  continue  to 
operate  even  though  the  enemy's  patrol  should  break  through 
the  line.  It  must  be  possible  also  to  communicate  quickly 
and  safely  to  the  troops  in  rear,  so  that  any  detachments  of 
the  enemy  that  might  break  through  the  line  may  be  in- 
tercepted. The  cavalry  telegraph,  in  fact  any  kind  of  tele- 
graph, is  the  least  sure  method  of  communication,  particu- 
larly in  the  enemy's  country,  owing  to  the  ease  with  which 
it  can  be  cut.  There  must,  at  any  rate,  be  other  means 
of  rapid  communication  besides  the  telegraph,  such  as  flag 
signals  or  the  light-signal. 

In  screening  work,  balloons  are  often  very  useful  for 
discovering  the  direction  in  which  the  enemy  is  advancing; 
they  are  more  suited  to  stationary  work,  especially  behind  a 
protected  area,  than  to  active  operations.     The  reconnais- 


APPENDIX  231 

sance  and  the  action  of  the  cavalry  could  then  be  based 
on  the  information  received  from  the  balloons.  It  will, 
unfortunately,  seldom  happen  during  such  manoeuvres  that 
a  balloon  is  available,  but  all  the  necessary  technical  ap- 
pliances for  communication  should  certainly  be  at  hand. 

The  value  of  all  these  exercises,  especially  in  the  case  of 
reconnaissance,  is  largely  dependent  on  the  manner  in  which 
the  enemy  is  represented.  The  best  plan  is,  of  course,  to 
place  real  troops  at  their  full  strength  opposite  to  one  an- 
other, but  this  is  scarcely  practicable,  on  account  of  the 
expense  entailed.  Even  the  Imperial  Manoeuvres  do  not 
faithfully  represent  modern  armies  and  distances,  but  only 
reproduce  portions  of  great  operations  on  a  reduced  scale. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  it  is  impossible,  in  time  of 
peace,  to  set  on  foot  anything  approaching  the  number  of 
men,  or  to  cover  anything  like  the  extent  of  country,  neces- 
sary to  at  all  correspond  with  the  conditions  of  modern 
warfare.  The  only  feasible  plan  is  to  indicate  columns  of 
the  army,  and  even  large  bodies  of  cavalry,  by  flagged 
troops;  but  it  is  well  to  place  real  troops  at  the  head  of 
these  columns,  so  that  they  may  form  the  vanguard  and 
may  send  out  the  full  number  of  patrols  and  outposts,  at  all 
events  to  the  front.  The  reconnoitring  organs  would  thus, 
at  any  rate  to  the  front,  be  confronted  by  an  enemy  dis- 
posed as  in  real  warfare.  I  need  hardly  say  that  both 
sides  should  send  out  these  reconnoitring  detachments,  as 
far  as  possible  at  full  strength;  no  advantage  can  possibly 
be  derived  from  the  exercises  if  this  is  not  done. 

It  is  also  very  important  to  put  the  divisional  cavalry  into 
the  field,  where  possible  at  full  strength,  as  the  difficulties 
that  beset  the  reconnoitring  patrols  will  only  then  become 
apparent.  This  divisional  cavalry  need  only  send  out  a 
limited  number  of  these  patrols,  as  they  are,  as  a  rule,  not 
absolutely  necessary  in  such  exercises,  but  the  work  of 
screening  should  receive  careful  attention.  The  division 
should  therefore  be  surrounded  by  a  screen  of  security  po 
trols,  and  all  points  from  which  the  enemy's  patrols  might 
observe  the  columns  should  be  occupied.  If  these  columns 
are  on  the  march,  the  security  patrols  should  advance  in 
"bonds  successifs,"  together  with  the  divisional  cavalry, 
from  one  line  of  observation  to  the  next,  and  thus  prevent 
any    possible   reconnaissance   on   the   part   of   the   enemy. 


232  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

If  the  ground  on  the  line  of  advance  is  suited  to  defensive 
screening,  this  method  should  be  adopted,  and  all  the  en- 
emy's patrols  and  despatch-riders  seen  should  be  hunted 
down.  When  the  hostile  reconnoitring  patrols  have  been 
driven  back  behind  their  own  screens  or  outposts,  measures 
should  be  taken  to  prevent  their  re-issue.  If  the  enemy's 
patrols  endeavour  to  remain  for  the  night  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  troops  they  wish  to  keep  under  observation,  they 
should,  if  possible,  be  attacked  and  captured.  When  opera- 
tions are  being  carried  on  in  friendly  country,  it  will  be  well 
to  ensure  the  co-operation  of  the  inhabitants  in  obtaining 
information  regarding  the  movements  of  the  enemy's  troops. 
There  are  always  old  soldiers  to  be  found  among  the  civil 
population,  who  would  interest  themselves  in  the  matter  if 
called  upon  by  the  local  magistrates  to  assist,  and  who  would 
certainly  do  their  utmost  to  help  their  own  countrymen  and 
to  hamper  the  enemy.  Care  should,  of  course,  be  taken  not 
to  go  too  far  in  this  direction,  as  unfortunate  consequences 
might  possibly  result. 

It  will  also  be  well  to  send  numerous  umpires  with  the 
army  columns  and  their  vanguards,  and  with  the  divisional 
cavalry,  and  also  along  the  main  roads,  whose  task  it  will 
be  to  conduct  the  manoeuvres  as  nearly  as  possible  on  the 
lines  of  real  warfare.  Umpires  should  also  be  attached  to 
reconnoitring  patrols  and  squadrons,  at  any  rate  to  those  of 
one  side,  so  that  there  may  be  an  impartial  witness  of  any 
encounter.  The  appointment  of  these  umpires  would  have 
the  further  advantage  of  providing  work  at  the  important 
points  for  a  larger  number  of  officers,  who  would  thus  learn 
more  than  they  would  do  when  simply  marching  with  their 
units. 

When  the  various  portions  of  the  army  are  to  be  repre- 
sented by  flags,  each  flag  should  be  made  to  represent  a 
company,  a  battery,  or  a  squadron,  but  the  flags  should  be 
so  disposed  as  to  oblige  patrols  to  estimate  the  strength  of 
the  columns  by  their  length,  as  in  war  there  would  not  often 
be  time  or  opportunity  to  count  the  separate  tactical  groups 
of  the  enemy.  Too  few  flags  should  not,  however,  be  used, 
but  rather  as  many  as  possible,  so  as  to  produce  the  effect 
of  a  continuous  column  on  the  move,  infantry  and  artillery 
being  clearly  indicated.  The  detachments  of  cavalry  that 
would  in  actual  warfare  be  stationed  at  different  points  along 


APPENDIX  233 

the  column  might  with  advantage  be  represented  by  real 
cavalry,  v^^ho  would  be  able  to  pursue  the  enemy's  horsemen. 
Artillery  patrols  might  also  relieve  the  cavalry  of  this  duty, 
and,  in  difficult  country,  march  on  the  flanks  of  the  column, 
thereby  making  matters  more  difficult  for  the  hostile  scouts. 
All  measures  of  this  description  would  greatly  assist  in 
giving  to  manoeuvres  the  character  of  real  warfare,  and  in 
increasing  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  far-too-easy 
peace-time  reconnaissance. 

Umpires  need  not  confine  themselves  to  deciding  the  re- 
sults of  engagements.  They  might  very  well  draw  the  at- 
tention of  patrols  that  act  in  a  manner  incompatible  with 
service  conditions  to  the  hostile  spirit  of  the  population,  or, 
if  necessary,  bring  about  real  or  assumed  attacks  that  would 
inflict  such  losses  or  damage  on  the  patrols  as  they  would 
probably  have  suffered  in  war.  They  can,  in  short,  do  much 
to  give  the  manoeuvres  a  semblance  of  reality. 

The  role  of  umpire  is  also  a  useful  training  for  regimental 
officers.  Regimental  and  squadron  commanders  cannot  form 
a  correct  idea  of  the  possibilities  and  functions  of  their 
reconnoitring  detachments  unless  they  have  accompanied 
patrols  as  umpires. 

It  is,  in  my  opinion,  impossible  to  go  too  far  in  the  direc- 
tion of  making  conditions  resemble  as  much  as  possible  those 
of  actual  warfare,  as  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties  to  be 
faced  consists  in  sustaining  the  interest  of  the  troops  and 
the  semblance  of  reality. 

Goethe,  in  his  "Wilhelm  Meister,"  remarks  how  rare  it  is 
to  find  among  men  "any  kind  of  creative  imagination." 
Nothing,  indeed,  is  more  difficult  than  to  take  a  keen  interest 
in  hypothetical  conditions.  This  truth  applies  particularly  to 
soldiers,  and  the  difficulty  is  one  from  which  most  peace 
exercises  suffer. 

Some  very  powerful  incentive  is  required  to  induce  troops 
to  really  enter  into  the  conditions  presupposed  by  the  general 
idea  of  the  manoeuvres.  They  must  continually  imagine  the 
existence  of  real  warfare,  with  all  its  exactions  and  influ- 
ences, and  they  must  act  consistently  according  to  the  spirit 
of  purely  imaginative  conditions.  It  is  during  the  recon- 
noitring exercises  of  the  cavalry  that  the  men's  powers  of 
imagination  are  most  heavily  taxed,  and  that  most  mistakes 
and  unnatural  situations  result  in  consequence.     Even  the 


234  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

officers  display  a  lack  of  imagination  in  their  inability  to 
conform  to  service  conditions,  to  appreciate  the  difficulties 
and  dangers  of  any  situation,  and  to  take  them  into  account 
when  making  their  dispositions,  and  in  their  general  con- 
duct. 

During  the  last  decade,  reconnaissance  at  our  smaller  field- 
training  exercises  and  manoeuvres  has  suffered  greatly  from 
red-tape  methods  and  the  consciousness  of  peace  conditions. 
I  refer  mainly  to  the  transmission  service.  Times  without 
number,  single  horsemen  arrive  with  messages  from  points 
behind  the  enemy  or  his  outposts,  so  that  the  messenger  must 
ride  right  through  the  enemy,  thus  entailing  the  certain  loss 
of  the  report.  It  should  be  unnecessary  to  point  out  that  the 
best  messages  are  quite  useless  if  they  do  not  reach  their 
destination. 

It  is  a  vital  mistake  in  our  army,  and  one  to  which  I  have 
frequently  drawn  attention,  that  these  single  orderlies  are 
sent  with  messages,  and  that  even  for  long  distances.  Grant- 
ing that  the  improbable  might  happen,  and  they  were  suc- 
cessful in  finding  their  way  without  maps,  often  at  night  and 
in  foggy  weather,  through  a  strange  country,  single  horse- 
men would,  in  the  enemy's  country,  be  often  captured  or  fall 
a  prey  to  the  hostile  population.  In  spite  of  all  this,  every 
one  is  opposed  to  sending  a  patrol  with  a  message,  and, 
when  it  is  done,  the  patrol's  strength  is  cut  down  most  un- 
warrantably. I  am  afraid  that  only  bitter  experience  will 
teach  us  the  folly  of  this  procedure. 

It  also  frequently  happens  that  technical  appliances  for 
transmission  are  use  in  a  most  illegitimate  manner.  Tele- 
graph-lines belonging  to  both  sides  have  before  now  actually 
been  laid  peacefully  side  by  side,  and  had  their  respective 
termini  within  the  cantonment  area  of  the  opposing  armies. 
Until  quite  lately,  telegraphic  messages  were  often  sent 
through  the  enemy's  lines. 

In  these  exercises  both  sides,  as  a  rule,  find  considerable 
difficulty  in  remembering  the  assumed  hostility  of  the  popu- 
lation, and  in  making  corresponding  dispositions.  When 
selecting  quarters,  this  point  is  frequently  forgotten,  and 
patrols  spend  the  night  in  villages  in  hostile  country,  and  in 
close  proximity  to  the  enemy's  cantonments,  where  escape, 
in  time  of  war,  would  be  practically  out  of  the  question. 
On  such  occasions  the  prospect  of   comfortable  quarters. 


APPENDIX  235 

where  the  horses  can  be  well  cared  for,  has  probably 
more  influence  on  the  patrol  leader's  plans  than  military  exi- 
gencies, and  the  protective  measures  taken  would  probably 
prove  correspondingly  inefficient.  The  exercises  should 
therefore  be  so  arranged  that  the  patrols  and,  if  possible, 
the  reconnoitring  squadrons  of  both  sides,  advance  into  the 
enemy's  country,  thus  placing  themselves  in  difficult  situa- 
tions ;  and  the  umpires  should  have  instructions  to  interfere 
immediately  if  anything  were  done  that  would  entail  serious 
consequences  in  war  time,  as  the  lesson  that  should  be 
learnt  is  how  to  act  in  the  enemy's  country. 

Particular  stress  should  be  laid  on  the  method  of  writing 
reports.  If  instruction  in  this  direction  is  to  bear  fruit,  all 
the  details  as  to  contents,  time  and  place  of  despatch,  and  any 
other  important  points  must  be  thoroughly  discussed.  Our 
cavalry  still  suffers  from  bad  habits  contracted  during  peace 
training.  It  has  not  learnt  to  reconnoitre  on  a  large  scale, 
and  consequently  pays  too  much  attention  to  details  of  the 
drill-ground,  while  it  is  unable  properly  to  distinguish  be- 
tween strategical  exploration  and  tactical  reconnaissance. 
Even  in  larger  exercises,  where  stress  should  be  laid  on 
ascertaining  merely  the  strategical  dispositions  of  the  en- 
emy, the  tendency  is  always  to  report  in  detail,  and  as  often 
as  possible,  while  the  relative  importance  of  such  reports  is 
seldom  assessed  at  its  right  value. 

The  question  of  economising  strength  is  often  entirely  ne- 
glected, especially  in  the  case  of  reconnoitring  squadrons, 
just  as  it  is  with  forces  of  all  arms  during  manoeuvres.  The 
force  is  unwarrantably  weakened  by  making  too  many  de- 
tachments, and  is  then  called  upon  to  perform  tactical  evo- 
lutions which  it  cannot  possibly  carry  out  satisfactorily.  The 
commander  must  learn  to  husband  his  force,  even  though 
his  sphere  of  reconnaissance  may  be  large.  He  must  arrange 
the  strength  of  his  distant  patrols  according  to  the  impor- 
tance of  the  mission  upon  which  they  are  despatched,  and 
must  reduce  the  number  of  close  patrols  to  a  minimum,  while 
being  particularly  careful  to  draw  in  his  patrols  at  the  right 
time.  He  must,  on  the  other  hand,  realise  the  value  of  fight- 
ing as  a  means  to  the  attainment  of  his  object.  It  appears 
to  me  that  there  is  some  confusion  of  thought  as  to  the 
use  of  engagements,  particularly   in  reconnaissance   work. 

Formerly,  the  idea  prevailed  that  cunning  and  speed  were 


236  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

the  important  features  of  reconnaissance,  and  that  the  en- 
emy's scouts  should,  if  possible,  be  avoided.  Now,  however, 
the  new  "Field  Service  Manual"  enunciates  the  principle  that 
even  patrols  should  attack  the  enemy's  cavalry  wherever  met 
with.  It  is  rightly  represented  that  by  pushing  back  the 
enemy's  patrols  and  other  reconnoitring  organs  his  recon- 
naissance is  hampered,  whilst  our  own  service  of  transmis- 
sion is  assisted,  and  that  only  by  a  ubiquitous  offensive  can 
an  appreciable  moral  superiority  be  attained. 

I  should  certainly  be  the  last  to  oppose  the  idea  of  bold, 
self-confident,  offensive  tactics;  but  the  question  is  whether 
such  tactics  would  always  be  sound  policy.  In  reconnais- 
sance work,  the  first  object  of  an  engagement  is  to  facili- 
tate scouting;  the  second,  to  inflict  losses  on  the  enemy.  Al- 
though the  "Field  Service  Manual"  is  undoubtedly  correct 
in  principle,  it  should  not  be  taken  too  literally,  especially 
when  the  attainment  of  the  object  in  view — viz.  to  obtain 
information  regarding  the  enemy — might  depend  on  the  re- 
sult of  a  fight.  If  any  doubt  exists  regarding  the  result,  it 
may  be  better  to  abstain  from  attack;  while,  if  it  is  evident 
that  a  victory  can  only  be  gained  at  so  heavy  a  loss  as  to 
adversely  affect  further  reconnaissance,  an  engagement 
should,  if  possible,  be  avoided.  Every  effort  should  be  made 
to  render  the  tactical  conditions  as  favourable  as  possible. 
A  fight  on  foot  is  to  be  avoided,  as  entailing  waste  of  time 
and  considerable  loss.  A  defensive  action  dismounted 
should  only  be  undertaken  when  there  is  a  defile  to  be  held 
that  cannot  be  turned.  Mobility,  on  the  other  hand,  must 
be  exploited  in  every  possible  way,  in  order  that,  if  a  fight 
is  to  be  brought  on,  it  may  take  place  under  the  most  favour- 
able circumstances.  In  such  a  case,  if  an  enemy  is  en- 
countered who  is  either  weaker  or  only  slightly  superior 
in  strength,  and  who  is  known  to  be  without  support,  he 
should  always  be  boldly  attacked.  Stratagems,  or  creeping 
up  to  the  enemy  and  avoiding  his  outposts  and  patrols,  should 
only  be  resorted  to  when  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  discovery 
in  order  to  attain  the  object  in  view.  During  training  great 
stress  should  be  laid  on  a  proper  appreciation  of  these  prin- 
ciples, as  our  cavalry  still  lacks  sound  traditions  with  regard 
to  reconnaissance  work. 

Thus  no  greater  error  could  be  made  during  reconnais- 
sance exercises  than  to  attach  the  most  importance  to  en- 


APPENDIX  237 

counters  between  the  main  bodies,  but  this  mistake  is  un- 
fortunately frequently  committed.  It  is  on  the  exercise 
grounds  that  these  mass  engagements  can  and  should  be 
learnt.  During  reconnaissance  exercises,  however,  the  strate- 
gical conduct  of  detached  columns,  and,  above  all,  the  han- 
dling of  reconnaissance  organs,  should  receive  most  at- 
tention. These  matters  would,  of  course,  be  largely  in- 
fluenced by  the  result  of  the  main  action  between  the 
masses  of  the  cavalry  on  either  side,  and  this  should  be 
made  clear  to  all  concerned;  but  the  manner  in  which  such 
an  engagement  is  actually  conducted  by  the  main  bodies  is 
of  lesser  moment,  and  all  attention  should  not  be  centred 
in  it. 

It  is,  however,  essential  that  the  exercises  should  be  so 
planned  that  the  mass  of  cavalry  does  not  advance  in  close 
formation  in  one  group,  and  that  the  reconnoitring  organs 
are  not  obliged  to  carry  on  the  prescribed  reconnaissances 
throughout  the  manoeuvres  within  the  area  originally  allotted 
to  them,  as  would  usually  be  the  case  where  the  armies,  or 
their  cavalry  divisions,  advance  directly  towards  one  an- 
other. This  entails  but  a  very  elementary  form  of  recon- 
naissance, and  is  mainly  of  use  as  an  exercise  in  co-opera- 
tion between  the  different  units.  The  real  difficulties  only 
commence  when,  during  the  course  of  the  manoeuvres,  the 
detached  columns  of  the  cavalry  have  to  act  in  concert; 
when  they  endeavour  to  co-operate  after  one  of  them  has 
come  into  collision  with  the  enemy ;  when,  perhaps,  the  areas 
allotted  to  reconnoitring  squadrons  have  been  changed;  or 
a  success  achieved  by  the  cavalry  of  one  side  or  the  other 
produces  entirely  new  conditions,  to  which  the  reconnais- 
sance organs  have  to  adapt  themselves  independently.  These 
are  moments  that  call  for  great  powers  of  judgment  on  the 
part  of  the  officers,  and  for  skill  and  resourcefulness  on  the 
part  of  the  men,  and  they  are  consequently  very  valuable 
for  instructional  purposes.  The  relief  of  the  reconnaissance 
organs,  hitherto  never  practised,  but  highly  important,  also 
presents  many  difficulties  of  a  practical  nature.  An  at- 
tempt should  be  made  when  arranging  exercises  to  bring 
about  situations  of  this  nature,  which  will  be  of  great  service 
to  the  troops,  and  afford  an  opportunity  of  bringing  to  light 
cavalry  talent  among  the  officers.  Though  such  talent  is 
often  to  be  found  amongst  the  best  horsemen  or  instructors, 


238  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

such  is  not  always  the  case,  and  every  effort  must  be  made 
to  discover  and  foster  it. 

The  cavalry  service  is  no  place  for  mediocrities,  and  it  is 
important  that  the  directors  of  the  exercises  should  be  fully 
qualified  to  carry  out  their  task,  and  be  free  from  all  de- 
pendence upon  Regulation  or  prejudice.  The  personal  equa- 
tion plays  a  greater  part  in  the  cavalry  than  in  any  other 
arm,  yet  in  no  other  arm  is  it,  as  a  rule,  so  indifferently 
solved. 

I  should  like,  in  conclusion,  to  draw  attention  to  two  more 
points. 

First,  I  would  insist  on  not  more  maps  being  distributed 
among  the  troops  at  these  exercises  than  would  actually  be 
available  in  an  enemy's  country.  The  fact  of  being  the  whole 
time  in  one's  own  country,  where  the  inhabitants  are  ready  to 
give  any  information  required,  renders  the  work  very  much 
easier,  and  if,  perhaps,  in  addition,  every  man  has  a  map,  the 
difficulties  that  would  crop  up  in  time  of  war  are  not  ade- 
quately represented. 

The  second  point  is  of  equal  importance,  though  of  quite 
a  different  nature.  The  movement  of  large  bodies  of  cavalry 
in  time  of  war  entails  considerable  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
transport,  and  it  would  be  well  if  these  could,  somehow,  be 
made  apparent  during  the  exercises.  The  expense  might 
certainly  be  heavy,  but  would  be  well  justified,  for  it  is  in 
the  cavalry,  more  than  any  other  troops,  that  the  drag  of  a 
transport  column  is  most  felt. 


f 


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B46c     Cavalry.  

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